Veronica Anghel
Assistant Professor, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute
Yes, of course Europe should be negotiating with Russia—but not just for the sake of peace at any price. The EU needs a strategy to get a seat at the table precisely because Moscow doesn’t want it there. The aim should be to weaken the Kremlin, keep Russia in the hole it dug for itself, and deter it from ever threatening European security again.
That means two things. First, Europe should be in the room to make life difficult for Russia—not to trade away Ukrainian territory or sovereignty, but to insist on certain conditions: no sanctions relief without verifiable withdrawal, and security guarantees for Ukraine.
Second, Brussels should openly offer to relieve the United States of the responsibility of negotiating with Russia, something many in Washington see as a distraction. By projecting power, Europe becomes safer. Let the Americans focus on China and domestic affairs—the EU should take ownership of its own security order. The point of European diplomacy must be to worsen Moscow’s bargaining position both with Washington and Beijing, not to appease Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The Kremlin is an adversary to be boxed in, not a partner to be reconciled with. The EU’s approach to Russia has to outlast—and outgrow—this war.
Samuel Greene
Professor of Russian Politics, King’s College London
Yes, but not yet.
There will eventually be a negotiated end to the fighting, if not the war itself, and Europe has more interest in the shape of a negotiated ceasefire than any other nonbelligerent power. The peace process engendered by the United States, however, is backwards in that it expects security to arise from an arrangement between Russia and Ukraine, which could then be backstopped by some configuration of willing Western powers.
The reality, of course, is that Moscow cannot and will not be the crux of reliable security for Kyiv. The imperative, then, is for Ukraine’s Western partners first to develop a structure of security and then negotiate on that basis. Right now, and for the foreseeable future, that means Europe needs to step up.
Once Brussels and Kyiv have aligned on a workable security architecture sufficient to provide deterrence against renewed Russian aggression, they can put their consolidated weight behind negotiations with the Kremlin. Absent that, any talks would be used by Moscow to divide the Europeans, lest further support for Ukraine provoke new fighting. In other words, first things first.
Jana Kobzova
Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations
We are in a bit of a paradox: both the Europeans and the Russians would be open to talking to each other—but on very different subjects. The Kremlin wants to discuss restoring economic and energy ties, which, of course, the Europeans (with the exception of Hungary and Slovakia) don’t want to do as long as Putin continues his war in Ukraine.
The Europeans, on the other hand, want to discuss how to end this war on terms that will make armed conflict less likely in the future. Yet on security issues, the Kremlin doesn’t see Brussels as a serious security actor. It prefers to deal with the United States and especially the Trump administration, with which it shares skepticism—if not contempt—for Europe.
The two sides do not have much to talk about. This can change only if the Europeans start using their leverage. Despite all its propaganda, the Kremlin cares about what happens with Russian frozen assets in Europe. Sanctions continue to dent the country’s economic foundations. Front-loading military aid to Ukraine ahead of a difficult winter would be another way of making Moscow think about potential compromises. But time is running out, and empty dialogue won’t fix anything.
Alexander Gabuev
Director, Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
It is long overdue that European policymakers relearn the discipline of talking to their Russian adversaries. Prior to Donald Trump’s inauguration, they could afford to take a back seat and adopt a moralistic approach. In the Biden era, there was a team of seasoned U.S. national security professionals—like former CIA director William Burns—who were ready to do the unpleasant job of talking to the Kremlin and establish guardrails for confrontation. Europeans could always be sure that the United States would put the common interests of NATO and Ukraine front and centre.
Now, it is high time to establish lines of communication between Brussels and Moscow. The EU rightfully demands a place at the negotiation table when critical issues of European security are discussed, but then fails to show up. This helps to avoid difficult conversations on issues like how much Europe should be involved in crafting decisions that concern Ukraine itself, or which capitals should be talking to the Russians. But avoiding these conversations does not solve difficult problems. If this avoidance continues, Europeans should not be surprised to find themselves reacting to developments driven by Washington, Kyiv, and Moscow.
Gwendolyn Sasse
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe
Europe should be at the negotiation table together with Ukraine, Russia and the United States. Putin is clearly playing for time, encouraged by disunity in the EU and the corruption scandal rocking Kyiv. Pretending to conduct peace talks with Washington produces imagery that puts both countries on equal footing and illustrates Russia’s alleged willingness to negotiate.
Military support, sanctions, and diplomacy should work in tandem, though each has a different timeline. Now that Ukraine has clearly signaled that it wants to negotiate, any effort to facilitate actual negotiations on the key points about security guarantees and the occupied territories should be made. However, Europe can only play a role in negotiations if it delivers on three things: a European-Ukrainian peace plan not restricted by Trump’s twenty-eight point plan, new sanctions targeting Russia’s dependence on oil and gas exports, and unfreezing Russian assets at the December 18-19 European Council . The latter goes against Washington’s and Moscow’s wishes, but would make the EU an actor.
Only as a force to be reckoned with can Europe be taken seriously. Ukraine’s future depends on it. Whether the EU is up to this task remains, unfortunately, an open question.
Stefan Meister
Head of the Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
It is time or the EU to come up with its own peace plan, one which is realistic and coordinated with Kyiv. It is obvious that U.S. President Donald Trump has no interest in a just peace that serves the interests of European security and provides sustainable security guarantees to Ukraine. Indeed, the White House might even agree to a Russian sphere of influence in Europe if Trump can get a good business deal in Moscow.
Europe’s partner on peace and security is not Washington, but Kyiv. There is no other choice than integrating Ukraine into both the EU and a European security architecture. It is time for Brussels to define what it is willing and able to do to provide security guarantees, to use the Russian frozen assets, and to develop long-term funding for Kyiv. In the case of the latter, Eurobonds could be an option.
If Europe wants a seat in negotiations on own future, it has to take more responsibility for impacting Moscow’s cost-benefit calculation and in so doing end the war. For this, it needs a coalition of willing that is able to act, provide resources, and build a negotiation channel with Russia. Only then will Trump and Putin accept Europe as an actor.
Eugene Rumer
Senior Fellow and Director of the Russia Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Yes. The United States has negotiated with Russia without Europe, including on issues that impact the continent. Ukraine, too, has negotiated with Russia. The question for Europeans is not whether to negotiate but how. The United States, used to bossing the EU around, and Russia, keen to cut a deal without European input, will oppose it. It is up to Brussels to establish itself as a strategic actor willing and able to stand up to both its adversaries and its allies.
Europe is big, rich, and technologically advanced. A robust rearmament program will make Russia want to negotiate. The allies would thus be capable of putting the Russian heartland at risk not only by conventional means but also by tactical means. It is up to the EU to stop dithering and break the impasse over Russian frozen assets held in Belgium. Once available, those same frozen assets should be used to keep supporting Ukraine with purchases of U.S. weapons, also supporting American job creation. Finally, Brussels must commit to a long-term security assistance program for Ukraine that will signal to Russia that Kyiv and its allies are ready for the long haul. If the Kremlin only understands the language of power, and the White House only understands the language of business, then Europe should speak both.
