U.S.-Russian Arms Control: Where Do We Go from Here?

Meeting Report
July 7, 1999

Speakers: General Alexander Piskunov, Deputy Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Stepashin; Sergei Rogov, Director, USA and Canada Institute; Valery Mazing, Head of Arms Control Department, USA and Canada Institute

Arnold L. Horelick (Chair): I think it?s a tribute to the importance of the topic and to the stature of our guests that they were able to bring out an audience like this in the second week of July, during the biggest heat wave that we?ve had in recent memory in Washington. I told Sergei Rogov when he called about this meeting about a week ago, that we could promise him some relief, because as you may know Moscow has experienced three weeks of 95 degree-plus weather. And unfortunately what I?ve done instead was bring our Russian friends from the frying pan into the fire, almost literally.

Our guests today are General Alexander Piskunov, who is Deputy Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, and is making his first visit to Carnegie in Washington. Sergei Rogov, who is known, I think, to all of you, and has been here many times, is Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, and, I would say, Russia?s outstanding analyst and commentator on the issues that we will be discussing today. General Piskunov is here doing some advance work in connection with the forthcoming Gore/Stepashin Commission meeting, which is now back on track, the parties having agreed to do that at the G-8 Summit in Cologne last month. And also, I suppose anticipating the beginning, or the resumption, of the strategic arms control dialogue in Moscow in connection with Strobe Talbott?s visit scheduled for later this month.

General Piskunov?s military background is as a senior officer in the strategic rocket forces for a number of years. And then in the last Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, he served for the first in a series of relationships with Stepashin; General Piskunov was the deputy to Stepashin, who, at that time, was chairman of the Defense and Security Committee of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet. Later, when Stepashin moved to the government and became head of the Administration Department in the government, General Piskunov was his deputy. And now he is serving as Deputy Chief of Staff to Stepashin.

Our topic today is "U.S.-Russian Arms Control: Where Do We Go From Here." It?s both a timely and a timeless topic. It?s timely, of course, because of the decision at the Cologne G-8 Summit last month, where the US and Russian leaders announced their readiness to resume negotiations on strategic offensive arms. And in a somewhat ambiguous formula, which has been interpreted differently in different quarters, they also agreed to continue efforts to "strengthen and enhance the viability of the ABM Treaty." Talbott will be kicking off that discussion in Moscow later this month. This topic is timeless because the agenda and most of the ideas that have been put out so far are very familiar. These ideas go back as far as 30 years; that?s almost as long as Rogov and I have been talking about these arms control issues. In fact, Russian-American arms control has been in a state of suspended animation ever since the START II treaty was signed six years ago. With the exception of agreements on goals for START III, and the parameters for Tactical Missile Defense demarcation at Helsinki a couple of years ago, basically the history of arms control since 1993 has been waiting for the Duma to ratify START II. START II became, as you know, a political football in Russia. And just as it seemed, with the advent of the Primakov government, that it might be possible for START ratification to be taken out of its sensitive role in domestic politics, it stalled out once again in response to the vagaries of U.S.-Russia relations ? Iraq, Kosovo, and all of that. Somehow the Duma seems to have the attitude that failure to ratify START II is some sort of a form of punishment for the United States for its misbehavior elsewhere. But, of course, this is a risky tactic, and it has become even more risky, because support for and interest in arms control generally in the United States is waning. Constituencies for it are very weak, and the Duma threat not to ratify START II provides virtually no leverage at all for Moscow in the light of that situation.

In the U.S., on the other hand, ballistic missile defense ? a national missile defense system ? has now risen to the top of the strategic agenda here, and it?s clear that arms control in its timeless phase is really back to the old questions of the 1970s. What is the appropriate relationship between strategic offense arms and ballistic missile defense? What are the trade-offs that could be made, and so on and so forth? The problem is that although the issues are the same, their context is radically different -- both the technological context and especially the strategic and the domestic political context in both countries. It used to be in U.S.-Russian relations that we needed arms control in order to help stabilize, and hopefully improve, the overall relationship. Nowadays, we need to improve the overall relationship if we are going to get anywhere with strategic arms control.

But in any case, whether it?s merely a temporary resuscitation of a terminally ill patient, or the start back on a long road to recovery, it remains to be seen whether the agreement at Cologne will amount to very much at all. This afternoon we?ll try to anticipate a little bit what this renewed dialogue may be all about, see if there are any new ideas at all out there in the strategic communities of both Russia and the United States, and both of those communities are represented here at the table. Our Russian guests and I have agreed that we will try to conduct this in a round-table format, even though it is a larger round-table that we anticipated. By that I mean that General Piskunov and Sergei Rogov will make some opening statements, but that we would like more from our American audience than Q?s and A?s. We?d like you to put forth any ideas of your own, make any comments and short presentations on the subject, instead of simply drawing out the speakers. So let?s now start ? I think Sergei Rogov will have the floor first.

Sergei Rogov: Thank you so much, Arnold, for inviting us here, and for your nice words. I?m really surprised to find so many people in Washington, and it seems that almost all of them are here in this room. Which makes me a little bit more optimistic than usual, because it seems that there are still people who care about Russian-American relations, and whether it?s possible to put them on the right track.

And it?s really an important question because we?ve just experienced the most serious crisis in Russian-American relations since the end of the Cold War. Last time we met in the midst of the crisis. And now we probably can conclude that the meetings at Helsinki and Cologne allowed us to prevent this crisis from turning into a confrontation. Which is good. But I think it is premature to claim that the crisis is gone. Because the major issues where Russia and the United States developed differences remain unresolved. And that covers all three major areas of our relationship.

As far as the economic field is concerned, the dominant issue for Russia?s future remains the issue of Russia?s foreign debt. And there are other problems like economic sanctions against some Russian companies, quotas, Jackson-Vanik, etc. But still the crucial issue for Russia?s future remains the resolution of the debt issue. And at the G-8 Summit, the United States and other Western partners indicated their willingness to do something, but in extremely vague terms. So we could expect that Russia will get another piece of the IMF salami soon, but it seems that the crucial issue of the Soviet debt may not be touched upon for the next 18 months, until the new political cycle begins in the United States and Russia.

If we look at the regional problems, Russian-Western disagreements remain, and while it seems that we are beginning to cooperate in Kosovo, the terms of cooperation are not clear. And Mr. Chernomyrdin, as a special representative of President Yeltsin, agreed to many of NATO?s terms, which the Russian government previously refused to accept. But nevertheless, some of the fundamentals related to Kosovo, to the KFOR, remain unresolved. We were already here in Washington when an agreement was reached between NATO and Russian military authorities on the line of command. I haven?t seen this agreement, but it?s not clear at all whether Russian units will be truly integrated into the KFOR, or as in Bosnia, as in IFOR/SFOR, remain in fact segregated from the rest of the peacekeeping operation, having a different set of rules of engagement, and not accepting the political control of the North Atlantic Council. And that is the most important question concerning Kosovo, because at Helsinki, [U.S. Defense] Secretary Cohen mentioned that the Permanent Joint Council of Russia and NATO will be involved in the political decision-making concerning the KFOR. And in fact the Russian position was that we wanted the PJC to be the political body, which supervises the operation. But that was rejected by NATO. And thus I am not enthusiastic about the agreement reached in Moscow yesterday, or the day before yesterday, because clearly Russian units will not be fully integrated if the political control remains within NAC. And Russia as a non-NAC member, is not going to accept the political guidance of a body to which we don?t belong.

In the arms control area, we have a major development. And as Arnold mentioned, the two presidents agreed to start negotiations simultaneously on START III and modification of the ABM treaty. Which seems to be the first concessions from both sides. The United States didn?t want to discuss officially START III until START II is ratified. And now, of course, ratification of START II is totally out of question. So, the START III negotiations will continue while START II is not ratified. On the other hand, Russia agreed to negotiate modifications of the ABM treaty. Which is a departure from our previous position, when we said that we like the treaty and don?t see any need to change anything at all.

So if you?ll permit me, I?ll try to speculate on what is achievable in the arms control area. First of all, we have the deadline, next June, when the Clinton Administration is committed to announce its BMD deployment plans. Which means that the negotiations have to be finished within 11 months, which is quite unusual for any arms control negotiations at all. Secondly, because of the election campaigns and other domestic political pressures, probably the window of opportunity to negotiate meaningfully is no longer than three or four months. Since next fall, it will be difficult to achieve any breakthroughs, any agreement on key components of the future package, if it?s not done now.

Let me start with START III, and I want to remind you that while this meeting is for the record, but Sergei Rogov is totally unofficial, I don?t have any position in the Russian government, except membership in a number of advisory councils. But what I?m saying is my personal position and not the position of the Russian government. Although I don?t exclude that sometimes my views are not far away from the views of Russian bureaucrats; and of course I don?t mean General Piskunov.

Well, I suggest we should look at the START III-ABM package as the maximum which Russia and the United States can achieve within the model of mutual nuclear deterrence. So how far can we go within this model before the essence of the relationship changes? I don?t see these new agreements, if they are concluded, changing the mutual nuclear deterrence model. But within it, it?s possible to reach the limits without crossing them. And on the offensive side, we probably should go to the lowest possible limit. And that means that Russia would look for very low ceilings, which are economically affordable for Russia. The magic number for us is 1,000. 1,000 warheads is seen as a force that is sufficient to provide credibility to the Russian nuclear deterrence posture, and at the same time, economically affordable. Preferably, it should be a ceiling for all kinds of strategic nuclear weapons. But as a minimum, that should be the number of nuclear warheads on both types of ballistic missiles: ICBMs and SLBMs. With a few, in that case, a few hundred additional nuclear weapons to be allowed for heavy bombers. But clearly we would prefer a 1,000 overall ceiling. Thirdly, under this umbrella, it?s possible to agree on a common ceiling for the number of launchers -- both ICBMs and SLBMs. Let?s say 500, with each side being permitted to make a mix of warheads and missiles the way it considers is better for its own interests. That means a departure from the START II prohibition on MIRVed ICBMs, and the permission to deploy MIRVs on mobile ICBMs, which is the SS-27 or Topol.

That leads us to a few other important issues related to the strategic arms reductions. One is the sudden breakout potential, or the "strategic reserve." If you try to think how many warheads the United States can bring back on downloaded D-5 and Minuteman-3, or on conventional heavy bombers, the number will be at least 2,500. Which means that the United States will have, if you accept my numbers, 1,000 deployed weapons, and 2,500 deployable weapons in strategic reserve. If Russia is not permitted to test SS-27 with MIRVs, we hardly could have more than 500 weapons, deployable weapons, in strategic reserve. Which makes it necessary to establish some kind of verification for deployable weapons, which are storaged in strategic reserve.

With strategic weapons going to 1,000, the number of sub-strategic weapons could exceed the number of strategic weapons. Russia, for obvious reasons, is interested in a higher number of sub-strategic nuclear weapons. The United States doesn?t share this view. So including sub-strategic nuclear weapons in START III will probably guarantee that we will not reach any legally binding agreement within the time frame I described. So in sub-strategic weapons, what is possible is a continuation or building further, on the Bush-Gorbachev political commitments of 1991, including possibly both sides unilaterally promising not to deploy more than 2,000 or 1,500 non-strategic nuclear weapons. In fact one can also apply to non-strategic weapons this idea of deployed weapons and deployable weapons storaged in reserve. Then the number of deployed tactical nuclear weapons would be, let?s say, 1,000, and 1,000 additional tactical nuclear weapons could be storaged and kept in reserve. But this arrangement should be in the form of parallel political commitments, not a legally binding treaty, which will be simply impossible to negotiate.

Russian flexibility on this issue will be linked to American flexibility on something, which is of tremendous concern to Russian military planners, and that is conventional precision guided munitions, which could be used to attack our strategic assets. The recent war strengthened even more Russian concern about non-nuclear weapons, which could put at risk our strategic forces. Probably here, too, one cannot expect any legally binding bilateral agreements. But is it possible to try the same approach as with tactical nuclear weapons? Something like parallel statements concerning the deployment and the normal, the regular, mode of operation of some types of weapons within the vicinity of each country.

If that happens one can envisage an agreement between Russia and the United State on the modification of the ABM treaty. Of course, we don?t want to have any changes in the treaty ? we are pretty happy with this treaty. But the United States insists that it?s necessary to do. So we face a very unpleasant choice. Whether to see the United States unilaterally go beyond the limitations of this treaty, with the possible collapse of the entire arms control regime as the result of this unilateral action; or to negotiate with the United States very limited modifications in the ABM treaty. What, of course, we would like to see is that these changes don?t allow the United States to produce a thick territorial ballistic missile defense. And this approach can lead one to the conclusion that we may agree to the changes related to the geographic position of the permitted site, from North Dakota to some other place, to protect the sector where a threat form a third party can appear. And that means the Western direction, the Pacific direction. Because from this direction, the United States may face, besides Russian missiles, North Korean missiles, and of course Chinese missiles. So if the Unites States claims that this defense is not against Russia, then from the Pacific sector, one can find possible threats to the United States besides Russia. But you cannot find such possible threats from the Atlantic sector. Because the notion that Iran or Iraq will, in the foreseeable future, have intercontinental ballistic missile defense . . .

Voice: [whispered] Offense.

Sergei Rogov: Offense, I?m sorry, is totally fantastic. At least for the next 20 or 30 years. So if there is a change in deployment, we could be flexible as far as limited protection of the U.S. from a Pacific direction. But if the United States insists on the similar protection for the east shore, it would be very difficult to see it as anything else than a preparation to build a real territorial defense, which will, of course, have, even as a limited defense, a mature battle management system. But if the interceptors are deployed at several bases, then this system could be very quickly built up into thick territorial defenses. And we wouldn?t like that.

We would prefer that the number of permitted interceptors remain the same ? no more than 100. What if the United States insists on two areas of deployment? Of course we would object against it. But if the United States proposes to have a smaller number of interceptors -- instead of 100, a smaller number -- here one can envisage a very unusual solution: like establishing a common ceiling for both offensive ballistic missile and interceptors. So each side, let?s say, is permitted to have 500 ICBMs, SLBMs, and interceptors. And if you want to deploy more interceptors, you have to reduce the number of your offensive missiles. I know it sounds like a crazy idea, but I understand the purpose of our meeting today to speculate about possible new approaches to the problems of arms control.

Well, maybe the components of the package could be different. But it seems to me, personally, that we have to deal with all these issues to reach an agreement between Russia and the Unites States within the next several months. That also means that any new legally binding treaty will be very short. We simply will not have time to negotiate, like START I, 800 pages of small print. And thus, there will be plenty of problems related to the compatibility of START I, START II, and this START III arrangement. I believe that the visit of Prime Minister Stepashin to Washington on July 27 permits to push for an early agreement on strategic issues, within the next several months. So we will have negotiations between our two teams, what is important is that we also shall have, in the beginning of August, a meeting between Marshal Sergeyev and Secretary Cohen, so a U.S.-Russian dialogue on these issues will continue on several levels. But if we don?t achieve an early breakthrough, then one hardly could expect a new arms control package concluded before next summer, and probably the unresolved problems in Russian-American relations, not only in the arms control but also in other areas, will remain unresolved for quite a time. And the recent events demonstrated how fragile is the relationship. So unless we put it on the right track, by the year 2001, Russian-American relations may reach a point of no return. And by that I mean that not only new arms control agreements will become impossible, but even the existing base ? arms control base ? will collapse, if the United States will unilaterally move to decide to deploy the national missile defense.

So I?ll stop here, and I think that General Piskunov would like also to speak.

Arnold Horelick: General.

General Alexander Piskunov [Translated by Sergei Rogov]: First of all, I want to thank you, the Carnegie Endowment, which as usual is very sensitive to political developments. And the discussion of arms control seems to be very timely. The Russian government is now headed by Colonel General, and during the Kosovo events, the Defense Ministry not the Foreign Ministry was leading Russian policy. But seriously speaking, the President has been, more than ever, in touch with the Ministry of Defense. And the meeting he chaired at the Defense Ministry last week to discuss the outcome of the West-99 exercise demonstrated that the President is providing very strong control over the military.

At the same time, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense, as the two people with military backgrounds, have a long personal relationship and have a common understanding of many problems. And that opens new possibilities for fast progress in arms control. Prime Minister Stepashin is authorized by the president to chair a meeting of members of the Security Council every Saturday, to discuss the most acute problems. Among the questions discussed at the last meeting were the questions relating to non-proliferation, and a few other problems, which will be discussed at the Gore-Stepashin meeting.

The Prime Minister wants to prepare some very important proposals to be approved by the president on this subject. He is quite familiar with this area. Let me remind you that in 1992, he gave a letter to [then U.S. Defernse Secretary] Les Aspin, in which Stepashin, as the chairman of the Committee on Defense and Security, said that the ratification of the START II will be possible only if the two sides agree that within the START III agreement, they will establish the ceiling of no more than 1,000 warheads. Well, it looked like a fantastic idea in 1992. As far as the linkages between the ABM treaty of 1972 and the prospects for strategic arms reductions, this linkage is of principled importance. And the present Duma, and maybe even not the future Duma, will hardly be willing to decouple these two issues unless we reach an agreement on START III. So, we should look for a rational solution to this linkage. I think that one of the alternative approaches presented by Sergei Rogov is interesting enough. [To General Piskunov] Thank you, sir. [Laughter] The discussions that we had in the last several days here in Washington demonstrate that for many Americans these ideas are not totally surprising. We have very little time. In fact, our two presidents have very little time. And of course, for the Prime Minister, too, so we have to make the best use of the meetings, which are scheduled in the next several months, to achieve these results. We would be very thankful to you if you can respond and debate these issues.

Arnold Horelick: Mr. Mazing.

Sergei Rogov: Dr. Valery Mazing is director of the Department for Military Political Affairs and Arms Control of the Institute of USA and Canada.

Valery Mazing: So I just want to make some comments. First of all, returning to the statement made by the chairman about the general atmosphere in Russian-American relations and arms control issues. The general atmosphere in Russia, the general mood, is now, after Kosovo, very anti-Western, anti-NATO, anti-American. So if we wait until this atmosphere changes, we will lose everything, especially now on the eve of the election campaign in Russia. You see the anti-American slogans will be used by most of the candidates for internal purposes. So, I think that we can change this atmosphere if we manage to reach some agreements in arms control field. As Dr. Rogov mentioned, this package of ABM treaty modification and START III treaty, that could be the case. And I consider the serious people in Russia and here in the United States understand that it is quite reachable . . . [side of tape ends] . . . quickly.

Then another, to my mind, very important issue, a very important point: if Russia doesn?t have cooperative relations with the West, with the United States, you must forget about Russia as a democratic country. It cannot survive as a democratic country with a free-market economy. So we are very much interested in cooperation with the West, with Western Europe, and with the United States of America.

And then one arms control issue not mentioned by my colleagues here, but where we can also get some results ? I mean this is the field of conventional arms. You know the general agreement was reached in Vienna on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty. There is not much discussion now in Russia on the results of these CFE treaty adaptation talks. Because people who are involved in the process are very much afraid that in this wave of anti-Western feelings, you know, they will start in the Duma and in some other government offices to criticize the treaty, which is planned to be signed only by the end of the year. But actually if the general atmosphere is better; if there are some results in arms control field in the Russian-American relationship, so the green light will be on for signing this CFE modification ? or CFE II, it?s better to call it. It?s a new treaty ? a new treaty whose character is different. First of all, it?s not at the level of two military blocs -- ceilings for two blocs -- it?s ceilings for each member country of the treaty. And then it?s an open treaty. It?s not only for NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries, it?s open and any European nation can join this treaty. It could be just an all-European treaty in some time. Thank you.

Arnold Horelick: Alright, well, thank you very much. Let us begin, but again, we are not banning questions, but would appreciate it if we could have some contributions, comments, and especially any new ideas or reactions to some of the ideas that our guests on the Russian side have presented. Would you identify yourselves first please? Michael McFaul.

Michael McFaul: Michael McFaul, Carnegie Endowment. I apologize, I have only questions, no answers, and they are to General Piskunov. I want to make sure I understood what you said about this short window available to get these agreements. Of course one of the things one needs to have a successful agreement is continuity in the government, which has been lacking, of course, in the last two years. Lately we?ve heard rumors again that your boss, Mr. Stepashin, is on his way out, and he will be removed from office. Could you comment on to what extent we should take these rumors seriously? And very related to that question is another dynamic, that hinders bilateral relations, which are electoral politics. In our own country, it?s very clear to me, that as we get closer to the presidential election, the role that Mr. Clinton will play in that election decreases, and the role and voice that Mr. Gore will have increases. Sometimes that could be good; sometimes that also leads to more cautious politics rather than aggressive politics. I?m wondering, in your own country, and with your own boss, Mr. Stepashin, who is also talked about as a presidential candidate, could you tell us what the relationship is between his electoral future and the things that you and Mr. Rogov talked about. In other words, why would he have an interest in doing the things that you talked about from an electoral point of view?

General Piskunov: As far as the fate of the prime minister, I would like to quote an old friend of mine ? unfortunately a late friend of mine ? Michael [?], who used to be the vice premier of Russia. He used to say, "the reason I love my president is that he can take any decision." As a military person, I cannot discuss the decisions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. But as far as continuity is concerned, Stepashin continues to insist on the implementation of the commitments made by his predecessors, Primakov and Kirienko. As far as his personal qualities are concerned, in any position, whether he was in Special Services, or an administrative job, supervising the power agencies, or whether he was dealing with Chechnya, he was always very loyal and very brave. Mr. Stepashin is ready to make very unusual decisions. As far as his political prospects are concerned, I would be much more worried if he would have been labeled as the best prime minister, because that would be the time to begin to worry.

Arnold Horelick: Our visitors have agreed to keep this on the record, but I would urge my colleagues not to push that to the outer limits.

Fritz Ermarth: Thanks. Our chairman actually called me before the session and asked me to intervene with something more than just a question. I do have a couple of points to make, and I welcome the opportunity. In the main, they echo or bounce off at least, what Sergei Rogov and General Piskunov have said. First of all, we?ve got ? and what Arnold said ? considering the road ahead for arms control, we?ve got to prevent the worsening of the U.S.-Russia relationship. And that doesn?t really depend on arms control, at least as I see it. It depends on a lot of other things. It would be appropriate to go ahead and ratify START II, just to get it off the table as a problem. This is more important symbolically and politically than it is technically, because of what it prevents what it prevents each side unilaterally from doing.

I would tentatively endorse, as Sergei has enthusiastically endorsed, going ahead with the preliminary START III and ABM discussions that are impending, but I would echo Mike?s skeptical question about what?s the rush. If there?s no technical or substantive military reason for it, it?s a political calculus of one kind or another. I?d be concerned that two short-lived or lame duck administrations under a lot of political pressure as elections approach, get things off on the wrong foot, which future administrations in either or both capitals might have a hard time endorsing. If our Russian colleagues mean that we need to have these negotiations moving and meaning something for political effects in Russia, I can sign off on that. I?ll run the risk, if that political effect is indeed telling. If by that they mean that we better sign something now because the next governments are going to be worse on both sides, forget it, because the agreements aren?t going to mean anything. I can assure you, however, that none of the serious political candidates on this side are going to abrogate or unilaterally violate the ABM treaty, without a serious negotiation with Russia. Gore won?t, Bradley won?t, and Bush won?t. That?s my political judgement.

Now beyond that, if we look beyond the elections and assume two thoughtful and competent administrations that at least want the best possible U.S.-Russia relationship where should we go? Here, I think we need a dialogue about what?s the real fundamental political and strategic nature of our relationship to be in the years ahead, and what that nature says about the architecture of stability. Because as we keep telling ourselves, the old architecture that we inherited from the Cold War is getting increasingly obsolete, and we are obliged to keep refurbishing it and reapplying it. And I?m not sure if it will continue to be helpful and whether that?s necessary.

What kind of a relationship are we going to have? Are we going to be adversaries with a milder, much milder version of the Cold War between us? Or are we going to be something more like partners, well short of allies, but partners nevertheless, who retain a need, if I can put it this way, to keep our powder dry with respect to third parties, and with respect to each other for all kinds of historical and strategic reasons. It makes a difference which, where we are on this spectrum of possibilities. It makes a real difference to our notions about stability. For one thing, the more partner-like our relations are, the more the United States has a stake in the confidence that the Russians have in their strategic posture at the lowest possible cost. More adversarial relationships obviously mean less of a stake or at least a different kind of a stake.

And then I think we can, early in the next administrations on both sides, and this will come about inevitably on the U.S. side -- new administrations always do this, this obligatory stock taking ? we?ve got to address at least three fundamental issues, which are touched upon by our visitors? remarks, but I think need to be addressed on a more fundamental level. And that is, what are to be our notions of stability with respect to the strategic offensive forces themselves? Now, depending on the nature of our relationship, we can really revise and alter how we define stability characteristic of offensive forces -- with respect to MIRVing, basing, as well as numbers. Then, of course, as our visitors, as our guests, have addressed the whole problem of national missile defense. What is to be the role of limited missile defense in the new stability? Well, it depends on the nature of our relationship, among other things. We could set our sights low in very limited defenses, and sort of shoehorn the problem into the framework of the 1972 agreement. Or we could think more radically about truly cooperative measures and cooperative defenses.

But at some point, both the United States and Russia are going to have to ask themselves a question: to whom do we owe a guaranteed capability of assured destruction. If we owe it to each other as a legacy of the Cold War, do we owe it to the Chinese? The Chinese, the Indians, the Pakistanis, the North Koreans, the Iraqis, the Iranians, etc.? We?ve got to ask ourselves that question. What is the role of assured destruction, a minimum deterrent, the ability to inflict unacceptable damage in relationship to the stakes of the conflict?

Finally, we?re going to have to address the future of nuclear weapons themselves. American policy is at the moment in a kind of museum configuration. We have frozen the stockpile, intending to reduce it; we don?t want to innovate in any substantial way except to maintain that stockpile; and of course we signed up to no more testing. We?re going to keep the system intact the best we can, but we can?t probably do that indefinitely. At some point we?re going to have to choose between abolition and innovation.

Meanwhile, our Russian partners have made quite a public presentation of the view that they have got to keep militarily useful nuclear weapons in their arsenal for local conflicts. It?s not just sub-strategic weapons they?re talking about; they?re talking about usable weapons. Whereas American policy has been the less useful nuclear weapons are militarily, the better. We can?t go on indefinitely on this track. We?re going to have to have some sort of dialogue about the future of nuclear weapons themselves. I?ve already taken more time than I should have, so I?ll stop at that point. I thank you for the opportunity.

Arnold Horelick: Thank you, Fritz. I just want to drop one topic on the table quickly that hopefully our Russian guests will get back to. I?d like to get some comment on the question of the tendency in current Russian doctrine to move not only back to first-use of nuclear weapons, but even to early first-use of nuclear weapons. And a marked tendency, it seems to me, in both political rhetoric and in the doctrine, to increase, rather than decrease reliance on nuclear weapons. That clearly is going to complicate future arms control, particularly on the question of whether tactical nuclear weapons are to be included in overall U.S.-Russian arms control agreements. But we?ll hold on that, and get back to it at the end, maybe when we get to final comments. Meanwhile, I have Michael Krepon, then David Kramer, and Anders Aslund.

Michael Krepon: I would agree with Fritz that the whole baggage from the Cold War is obsolete. The times call for a new construct. One that can raise both deep cuts and limited defense. I think this is much more in keeping with the new strategic reality. And it?s something for which I think we can find a common ground. Where I disagree with Fritz is on the issue of ?what?s the hurry.? I think there is a hurry. I think there really is a need to move very, very quickly to develop a new package. And it is a political move. It?s not a technical need; it?s not a military need. It?s a political need. Right now, there is no package of constraints regarding START II, certainly not START III, or even the more ambitious plan that Sergei has put forward. But we do need to go deeper than the existing START III figures. But we don?t have that in place, and the ABM treaty?s place is increasingly insecure. So we do need a new political package. It ought to be a package that can be constructed in sufficient time for the political candidates for the presidency to debate. We ought to have, we need to have, a national debate about the role of nuclear offense and defense. And in the absence of this package, I don?t think we?re going to have coherence in our system. Moreover, I am not as sure as Fritz is that the next administration will be willing to embrace the continuity in this agreement. So I think it?s much more important to have a package, and we debate it, and that we do so whether or not the Senate or the Russian Duma has the time or inclination to formally debate it. A package that is not formally debated may also be a package that can be pursued in a parallel, reciprocal, and verifiable way, that we both know how to do. I would suggest, however, that one of the proposals that Sergei has mentioned could run into some difficulties.

Sergei Rogov: Only one? [Laughter]

Michael Krepon: Just one that I?ll discuss. The notion of revisiting the ban on MIRVs for land-based missiles, is one that might be opposed by both the political right [inaudible].

Arnold Horelick: I actually think that is one of the easiest of the list that Sergei gave us. But that might say something about how difficult I think the others are. [Laughter]

Michael Krepon: If we get to the lower numbers that you?re suggesting, as I hope we will, I wonder how necessary it will be to revisit the MIRV issue. But we do need to rethink the offense-defense equation, and you?ve given us some very good ideas.

Arnold Horelick: Thank you. David Kramer?

David Kramer: I?d like to ask a question about an event that took place in Moscow this week that could have an impact on the bilateral relation, and that is the visit by Syrian President Assad, and what I?m sure will be arms deals between Russia and Syria. If those happen, the United States has threatened not only to suspend aid to Russia but also to put sanctions on the Russian institutions involved in that. What does the likelihood of these arms sales suggest for U.S.-Russian relations, and also what impact might this have on negotiating arms control?

Sergei Rogov: Who do you want to respond? You want us to respond now, or at the end?

Arnold Horelick: Let?s hold them up until the end, and then you?ve got at least two questions. Try to keep your questions as closely related to the strategic arms control issue as possible. Because we have an unusual assortment of specialists on the subject, it would be a shame to miss the opportunity.

Anders Aslund: I have a sense of unreality, and I would to make four points. First, the Russian GDP is now 2 percent of U.S. GDP in current dollars. Defense expenditures in Russia are 2 percent of U.S. defense expenditures in current dollars. It is in Russia?s interest to focus on their assets. Secondly, military reform has been discussed for years, and very little has happened. Which is utterly irrational from every point of view. And this is essentially blamed on the very conservative generals who would then lose through any kind of arms control. Looking at the economic policy, I cannot believe that there will be any substantial policy making until August 2000, because of electoral processes that Mike McFaul mentioned. And then you have the U.S. not being able to do anything for at least a year. So how would it be politically possible in this electoral process to get anything done? And finally, Mr. Mazing made the point that "if you don?t agree, we will abandon democracy and market reforms . . ."

Valery Mazing: I said that we shall not survive as a democratic country with a free-market economy if we do not have cooperation with the West. That was my point.

Anders Aslund: I don?t believe it. It?s always a weak argument to say, "if you don?t agree with us, we?ll commit suicide."

Arnold Horelick: Well, he didn?t say that.

Anders Aslund: Thank you.

Arnold Horelick: There is no necessity to reply to rhetorical questions. [Laughter]

Robert Nurick: I?d like to go back to some of the substantive points in Sergei?s proposals. Let me begin by picking up this political question. I think it?s something we really need to think about very carefully. I understand the reasons why there is concern with getting things done. But I also understand the risks of delay. But I share Fritz?s pessimism about what is possible. Let me say a few words about why that?s the case, just from looking at the U.S. side.

At a minimum, coming to an agreement, even a simple agreement, which had involved an offense-defense trade-off and considerably lower levels of offensive forces than called for at Helsinki, required some politically difficult decisions by this administration. And to put it as delicately as I can, it is not evident to me that the administration is inclined to fight that fight now. I?ll give one example. Personally, I could imagine a circumstance in which I?d feel very comfortable going down [in force levels] very quickly. But in practical terms, I don?t know what kind of analysis could be done in the Defense Department or elsewhere in the government about the levels. I haven?t seen much outside the government and what I do know is that there was some review a few years ago. And the way these things usually work is that when the levels go down, the Joint Chiefs are asked to look at them and come up with yet another, with essentially a message to the administration and the congress, saying, "that?s okay. We know how to [inaudible] at that level."

At a minimum, I think going down to 1,000 between now and next spring will require the administration to argue the level of 1,000 absent JCS approval. Now, again, I can imagine circumstances in which they would do that, or which they would forcibly accelerate the process internally to get that kind of a parameter. To just repeat my observation, it is not obvious to me that this administration is going to be inclined to fight that kind of battle and that kind of political capital. And again, it?s not my preference, but we could expand the examples of how difficult this is politically?difficult decisions the administration would have to confront to move this quickly. So my question is what is politically feasible and how quickly? And my second question is, and this goes particularly to our Russian guests, if it is not feasible?if we simply can?t do it ? but given the political and other risks in the relationship that you described, what is the minimum political requirements? If we can?t actually get this package, what do you think you need in Moscow to keep this process on track? What might be feasible? Let me stop there.

Arnold Horelick: I give the floor to Jessica and then I think I?ll go back to our speakers, because they have a number of questions they want to respond to. Jessica Mathews.

Jessica Mathews: A lot of people have posited some pretty strong political reasons why nothing is likely to happen before February of 2001. But I wonder if there is another kind of political barrier, which suggests that nothing is likely to happen, maybe, at all. At this point, at least in the U.S., people feel that arms control agreements ? U.S.-Russian ? are an enormous amount of trouble to address a negligible threat. And that balance doesn?t lead you to any political result. I think that?s really what?s going on. There will always be events that can derail it, like the elections. But underlying it is something deeper. It no longer seems worth it to the political system to battle this battle. The threat isn?t there. So, the question then becomes, suppose that?s right, that we?re basically stuck where we are? From the Russian point of view, what does that look like? How sustainable is that? What does that mean?

Arnold Horelick: I have to say, I think Jessica has put her finger on what I think is the fundamental problem on the U.S. side. And in a way, the National Missile Defense debate brings it to a head. Because I think when politicians, especially the Clinton Administration -- which by and large has supported the treaty relationship, and by and large has been unwilling simply to walk away from the ABM treaty -- when they face the prospect of a kind of endless, politically unrewarding, probably hopeless, drawn-out negotiation, with the Republicans breathing down their necks on national missile defense, (and the administration more or less has already surrendered on the issue), I have the same problem that Jessica has on seeing what it is that is going to motivate this administration in its waning days, or the presumptive heir of this administration in a campaign, to really seize the strategic arms control issue.

And I?d like your comments on that, but to get back, just a couple of remarks on the presentations. I think that for most thoughtful Americans on this issue ? and not a lot of Americans think much about it ? as far as strategic offensive levels are concerned, pick a four-digit number, and any four-digit number will do. I don?t think it matters much a great deal to people who think about these issues in the United States. However, any old four-digit number won?t do if you are talking about a common ceiling of strategic offensive weapons and missiles and strategic defense. That?s an idea that has a certain attraction to arms control feinschmeckers, but it is politically a no-go. Since the firm American belief that out national missile defense efforts have got absolutely nothing to do with the strategic offensive balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, the notion of trading off at very low levels, offensive weapons for defensive ones, I think is an absolute non-starter.

As far as adjustments to the ABM treaty are concerned, the ones that Sergei talked about ? changes in the location of the base from Grand Forks to Alaska, or adding a couple hundred more interceptors ? I think that would have had a chance if we had pursued it a couple of years ago. I think the National Missile Defense debate in this country has gone beyond that. And I think the adjustments the administration is going to look for are going to be more substantial than that. And they will go to the very heart of the question that concerns you, which is the "breakout question." Because the big issue with a limited missile defense system obviously is its capacity to serve as a basis, under different circumstances, for a thickened territorial defense. And that may have to do primarily with space-based sensors.

And finally, on the notion that we may have to leave the tactical nuclear systems out of the formally negotiated framework because it?s too difficult, I think in a way, that puts the priorities from an American point of view exactly in the opposite way. Because the American strategic thinkers are a lot more concerned in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship with Russian tactical missiles than they are with strategic missiles. So to make the argument that there isn?t enough trust in the relationship to go ahead and negotiate an agreement on tactical missiles, but there may be enough to conclude one on strategic missiles, kind of gets things backward from what is becoming the prevalent U.S. strategic perspective.

Voice: Can I have ten seconds? If Jessica is correct, and we are stuck where we are indefinitely, you can take the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it will be gone.

Arnold Horelick: We?ll just end on this optimistic note. Back to our Russian guests.

General Piskunov: The last remark was very strong and I think it brings us back to earth. Next year we shall face the NPT review conference, and it is expected that we should go down in numbers, otherwise others can go up. A few remarks. I hope Sergei Rogov will give you the other answers. I didn?t quite understand the comment of our chairman. As one of the authors of the foundations of Russia?s military doctrine, which was written a few years ago, I remember that we exactly quoted the American wording as far as usability of nuclear weapons is concerned. And we didn?t make any changes from the American formula. There were some unfortunate interpretations by some of our politicians who never managed to read the Russian military doctrine.

Secondly, the question of Russian ability to maintain a reliable nuclear deterrent: it?s true we spend very little on defense. But a few years ago, it was too big. So what was achieved before in our Research and Development in new missiles allowed us to have successful testing of the SS-27. You should believe this information because we provided the United States with telemetric data of the testing. On the sea-based leg of the triad, we can repair some of the strategic submarines, which would allow us to maintain the sea-based leg of the triad. And the air-based leg of the triad never was too important or too effective for the Russian strategic posture. So I think what was done in the past allows us to maintain nuclear deterrence for quite a long period of time. As far as the Syrian concerns, I was not at the negotiations, I was here. But I know that we are calculating not only our debts to foreign countries, but also the debt of foreign countries to us. That?s why the relations with Iran, the relations with Syria, they are in the center of attention of our leadership. Sergei Rogov will now continue.

Sergei Rogov: I must tell you it is really encouraging to be accused of excessive optimism. I haven?t been in this position for quite a long time. [Laughter] I must tell you that there is very little optimism in Moscow today, and spending the last three days in this city, I found that we still maintain parity at least in one area. The scenario I described has, in my view, no more than a five to ten percent chance to be implemented. But a month ago, the chance was zero. So there is a small possibility now. Why? The administration announced last January the deadline for its decision on deployment plans. Looking at the opinion poll results in the United States, I think that it?s rather difficult to expect that this administration will not announce its plans next June. And that has nothing to do with Russia. But that will have quite an impact on Russian-American relations, which already are in very bad shape. As I said in the very beginning, the crisis is not over. We just stopped it from expanding, from going into a confrontation.

But what will happen with the arms control regime? Of course, you can accuse us of blackmailing you by describing certain developments in Russia. But is it possible to expect ratification of the adaptation document of the CFE treaty by the Russian Duma in the present conditions? No. And if nothing is done right now, we can take it for granted that by the year 2001, we will not be able to maintain the present status-quo in arms control. Arms control will be half dead, or completely dead, six months after the next administration finishes taking stock of what it has inherited from Clinton. So that in my view, is the key reason why there is urgency not only for Russia, but for the United States to try to look seriously at this very narrow window of opportunity that we have today.

And as far as Russia is concerned, you know perfectly well what economic conditions we face today. I want to remind you that sine August 17, the Russian government, I mean Primakov and Stepashin, paid 5.5 billion U.S. dollars to foreign creditors without getting a penny from the IMF or World Bank or anybody else. Meanwhile Russian domestic expenditures by the federal government since August 17 are about 12 billion dollars. Vice premier Kristenko announced that for the year 2000, Russia is planning to spend 48 percent of Russia?s federal budget to pay foreign debt. It?s an impossible situation. It cannot continue much longer. Of course, we are hopefully going to have democratic political elections in our country, and the conditions today [end of tape].

Transcribed by Cody Harris