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The wide-ranging talk, moderated by Andrew Kuchins, director of the Russian and Eurasian Program, addressed US-Russian relations, increasing economic and political stability in Russia, media freedom, Russian-EU relations, and more. Dividing her time between Washington and Moscow, Shevtsova co-directs the Endowment’s Project on Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions. She is the author of six books, and her most recent book, co-edited with Archie Brown, is Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin: Political Leadership in Russia’s Transition.
Read the summary below or listen to the event on RealAudio or Windows Media Player:
Introduction
Lilia Shevtsova Talk
Question and Answer Session
Meeting Summary
Today, said Shevtsova, both the U.S. and Russia are in the process of redefining their roles in the world. While the U.S. has steadily increased its hegemony after the Cold War to become a more unilateral actor, Russia under Putin has moved in an opposite direction, distancing itself from the vestiges of its Soviet superpower days. For example, recently Russia has endeavored to restructure the debt it is owed by Ukraine, in the interest of improving bilateral relations. Likewise, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and the new policy toward Transdniestria in Moldova, combined with Russia’s unexpected endorsement of the U.S. military presence in Central Asia, herald a sea change in Russia’s attitude toward the rest of the world. The old Russia never would have accepted junior partner status or diminished power in the near abroad. This turn in Russian foreign policy is “revolutionary” and amounts not to a shift but rather a leap toward a new paradigm.
The West, for its part, does not know what to make of this redefined Russian role. Having expected to bestow on Russia the title of partner as a reward for prolonged obedient behavior, the U.S. and others were disconcerted to see Russia declare itself a loyal partner far ahead of schedule. Motivating this change were a lack of resources which precluded any other path, as well as a keen understanding of the power asymmetry between the two countries and a willingness to accept and deal with that asymmetry. Russia’s new identity is to a large degree unarticulated, but will have enormous influence on the future shape of Europe, NATO, and Asian security.
Shevtsova predicted that U.S.-Russian relations will follow one of two models, either that of a Faustian bargain, or “benevolent asymmetry.” In the first, the West and Russia cooperate on some issues, such as terrorism, while the West, disinterested, tolerates Russia’s quasi-authoritarian regime. In the second, a constructive partnership is made possible by broader cooperation and Russia’s acceptance of liberal democratic rules of the game. Putin has shown a readiness to accept different rules of the game, Shevtsova observed. Which model wins out depends very much on the West’s ability to reciprocate and engage Putin.
On the surface, Russia is showing strong political stability and economic growth. But that political stability is based more tenuously on a bureaucratic authoritarian regime, compliance and subordination within the Russian elite who have no alternative to the present political leadership, and weak institutions. Similarly, Russia’s economic stability is due to a decade of modernization from the top down, the emergence of financial industrial groups which, like the South Korean chaebols, squeeze out mid- and low-level private initiative, and the overreliance on exports of raw materials. Two cornerstones—approval ratings in the 70 percent range for Putin and world oil prices above $15 per barrel—keep the system from unraveling, but if those decline, “there are no guarantees.”
Russia, therefore, must add two revolutions to its foreign policy revolution: (1) an advanced, economic structural reform; and (2) a political administrative reform to divorce “business from bureaucracy, economy from power,” and to break down the vertical centralization of power. Shevtsova sees signs that Putin recognizes the limits of present stability and will move to deliver these two major reforms, though to dismantle the tsarist, personalistic system of power and to inject accountability into the executive branch could be politically suicidal for Putin. Since he came to power, Putin has strengthened the middle class, people who increasingly will demand greater independence from his centralized control. Sooner or later, changes will come about, but since there is no historical precedent for a leader dismantling his own regime, Shevtsova predicted this would be a job for a future Russian leader.
Polling numbers indicate that the general public is more pro-West than the elite, so there may be zigzags in Russia’s policy toward the West, but Russia will never return to the hostile opposition of decades past. Russia no longer needs crutches from the West, it needs an outstretched hand and “delicate, strong” pressure to change the political and economic rules of the game. If the West can give structure to Russia’s foreign policy revolution, for example, by formalizing an operational agenda for military logistical cooperation in Tajikistan, the breakthrough in bilateral relations will be second only to the changes of 1991. And more than that, it will increase the clout of pro-West members vis-à-vis hardliners within Putin’s own team, indirectly bolstering people like Grigory Yavlinsky, Anatoly Chubais, and those fighting for independent television.
In sum, U.S.-Russia relations lack substance, which has a negative effect on Russia’s political ego, amplifying nostalgia for the past and fears of irrelevance and neglect. The key to more substantial relations, argued Shevtsova, is to achieve one high-profile example of cooperative success to catalyze faith in the rewards of cooperation. A U.S.-brokered agreement between Russia and Japan over the Kuril Islands could have such an effect, she proposed. A signed treaty could help Russia increase investment in its resource-rich Far East, and help Russia to address the problem of Chinese ascendancy. In politics, progress need not be grandiose, instead “small is beautiful.”
Seven years from now, in 2009, after the 2008 presidential elections, Russia will look quite different from Russia today. The familiar cast of characters—Putin, Zyuganov, Yavlinsky, and the rest—will be gone from the picture, and a new generation, one that matured during the Yeltsin years, will have entered the scene, and that bodes well for the future, concluded Shevtsova.
On the prospects for Russia-E.U. relations, Shevtsova noted that the Prodi-chaired joint committee on energy issues is an example of healthy forward momentum absent elsewhere due to a lack of pro-E.U. cadres within the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Asked whether to expect a breakthrough on peace in Chechnya, she thought that Putin would be forced by divided public opinion on the war to put a peace proposal on the table before the next elections.
Asked about the situation of independent press in Russia, Shevtsova said “everything is becoming worse.” Since Primakov and Volsky, with Kremlin approval certainly, have announced their intention to participate in the tender of TV-6, Yevgeny Kiselyov and the old NTV team are unlikely to win, demonstrating that Putin’s administration knows that the media is a king-maker in Russia today and thus wants no independent television during upcoming elections. If Kiselyov were to get TV-6, observers will know that Western influence was able to outweigh Putin’s pragmatism. Farther into the future, though, Shevtsova foresees an independent press and independent opposition parties for Russia.
Military reform, Shevtsova expected, will take ten to fifteen years, comparable to the time France needed to regroup after Algeria. Russia needs an army of volunteers, not draftees, and must shift its garrisons in European Russia to its southern Eurasian borders.
On Iraq, Shevtsova pointed out that Putin, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal on February 11, 2002, declared support for U.S. policy, clearly wanting to avoid a repeat of the humiliation Russia faced over Yugoslavia, when it sided with Milosevic until the last minute. With Iraq, Russia knows it has no realistic alternative to siding with the U.S., so any zigzagging in policy will take place within a narrow corridor.
