Russian-Georgian Relations and the War on Terrorism

On October 1, 2002, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a presentation on "Russian-Georgian Relations and the War on Terrorism" by H.E. Levan Mikeladze, Georgia's Ambassador to the US. The presentation was followed by a panel discussion featuring Fiona Hill of the Brookings Institution, Zeyno Baran of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Charles King of Georgetown University, and Martha Brill Olcott of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Andrew Kuchins of the Carnegie Endowment moderated the discussion, which was followed by a question and answer session including Ambassador Mikeladze.

Andrew Kuchins opened the meeting by introducing the panelists and providing a brief summary of the current Russia-Georgia conflict. Many analysts suspected that the tension had culminated in August, when the OSCE verified that Russian military strikes had occurred on Georgian territory. Yet the situation grew more ominous still on September 11, when Vladimir Putin asked the United Nations to recognize Russia's right to self-defense in the face of terrorism under Resolution 1378 and Article 51 of the UN Charter. Russia's seemingly erratic behavior-and the mixed signals about the conflict that have come from the Russian elite-have baffled Russia experts. Some commentators have suggested that the affair is the result of a miscalculation by Putin, who had expected President Bush to make a stronger defense of unilateralism in his address to the UN on September 12. Defense analyst Pavel Felgenhauer has argued that Moscow is merely bluffing. Still others have seen Russia's Georgia policy as a reflection of its interest in Caspian pipelines, or as a contrived distraction from its failures in Chechnya. Kuchins concluded by noting that whatever the motivation behind Russia's actions, Moscow was unlikely to be placated by Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze's September 30 announcement that all terrorist elements had been cleared from the Pankisi Gorge and that the Georgian anti-terrorism campaign had come to a conclusion.

Relaying observations from her recent trip to Russia, Fiona Hill began the panel discussion by characterizing the current crisis as a "collision of multiple factors." First and foremost among these is the war in Chechnya, which she considers inseparable from the Russia-Georgia conflict. Contrary to the pronouncements of the Russian government, she argued, the war in Chechnya is far from over, as evidenced by the recent downing of an Mi-26 helicopter, a renewed spate of clashes and ambushes, and Russia's ongoing "cleansing" campaigns in Chechnya. On the eve of the third anniversary of the second Chechen War-a war that was once expected to be short-the contention that the war would have ended long ago were it not for Georgia's suspected collusion with terrorists is now widespread among Russian elites. Hill also pointed to the "confluence of commercial and military interests" as factors hindering the resolution of the Chechen war and encouraging the spread of hostilities into Georgia. She discussed how the war economy is supporting fighters and entrepreneurs on both sides of the conflict, and how the Russian military-industrial complex has come to rely upon the continuation of the war, fearing that an armistice might be followed by military reforms that could be devastating to vested interests.

Second, Hill pointed to gradually building tensions between Russia and Georgia as another factor increasing the severity of the current confrontation. Fueled by the ongoing rivalry over South Ossetia and Abkhazia and an influx of Chechen refugees into Georgia, underlying tensions have strained Russia-Georgia relations since the mid-1990s. The differences between Moscow and Tblisi grew more dramatic over the past year, however, as Russia's previously contentious relations with other neighbors such as Ukraine and Azerbaijan stabilized and improved; and as relations with the Central Asian republics, which could have been derailed by the new U.S. bases in the region, were carefully repaired and cultivated. . From Moscow's perspective, Georgia is now the outlier in its relationships with its immediate neighbors, and Shevardnadze stands out among other post-Soviet leaders, seemingly "thumbing his nose" at Russia.

Finally, Hill pointed to US foreign policy and the current state of international affairs as factors that have contributed to the worsening of Russia-Georgia relations. US support of Georgia throughout the 1990s, now supplemented by the "train and equip" program, are generally viewed in the region as having emboldened Shevardnadze, discouraging him from implementing internal reforms or from attempting to improve Georgia's relationship with Russia. On the Russian side, many believe that Putin's acquiescence to the US-sponsored "train and equip" program was too hasty, and it is possible that Putin is now facing substantial pressure from high-ranking government and military officials to reassert Russia's interests in Georgia. Hill deems it unlikely that the US will grant Russia carte blanche in Georgia in exchange for Russia's support for an invasion of Iraq, or that Russia will launch an invasion of Georgia. Moscow will, however, continue to exert substantial military and political pressure on Georgia until the international community applies limits on its capabilities to do so, or until it receives some kind of concession from Georgia.

Zeyno Baran, fresh from three weeks in Georgia, characterized the mood there as extremely tense. It is widely believed in Tblisi that the Russian bureaucracy, military, and even Putin himself are determined to undermine Georgian sovereignty. Georgians note that Russian rhetoric and actions became only more bellicose as Georgia neared completion of its "clean up" maneuvers in Pankisi, and they argue that Russia's obstructionist tactics belie its stated commitment to Georgian self-governance. Indeed, Baran noted that Moscow seems to have cut most lines of communication to the Georgian government, and that Russia blocked an attempt to establish a trilateral commission to resolve the conflict on September 20. Feeling victimized by this "psychological warfare," Georgians now fear that Russian operations might spread to Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Other sources of concern are what will happen if the Chechens purged from Pankisi manage to return to Georgia, and how Georgia will survive the winter should Russia shut off its gas supply.

This sense of uneasiness has turned Georgian public opinion against Russia, and Baran noted that even historically pro-Russian politicians now side with Shevardnadze. At the same time, however, the protracted conflict-and continuing allegations of corruption-have hurt Shevardnadze's popularity, rendering Georgian executive power virtually "impotent." In the absence of strong national leadership or hope for a quick and peaceful resolution, "conspiracy theories" in Georgia abound. Rumors have circulated that Russian funds or individuals are fomenting ethnic and religious intolerance in Georgia, and suspicions remain high that Russia and the US might strike a deal, each giving the other a free hand in Georgia and Iraq, respectively.

Charles King views internal political developments in Georgia as a major factor exacerbating the crisis. After an initial spike in his popularity following the beginning of the Pankisi campaign, Shevardnadze has seen his popularity plummet and now finds himself in a "leadership crisis." King argued that allegations of corruption and self-interest on the part of the executive branch have recently resurfaced, and Shevardnadze's National Security Council is now accused of persecuting members of the parliament. Given that Shevardnadze's credibility has been so severely undermined, King believes that analysis classifying Georgian politicians as either pro- or anti-Russian is too facile. Rather, the real political rifts in Georgia center on what will happen after Shevardnadze steps down from the presidency. This issue is salient not only in Georgia, but in Russia as well; a central motivation behind Russia's current actions in Georgia, he argues, is the desire to play a role in the post-Shevardnadze succession.

King identified the continuing disputes over Abkhazia and South Ossetia as additional factors stalling the pursuit of a diplomatic solution to the current crises. He noted that UN involvement in the region has accomplished little, pointing out that Russia has accused Georgia of colluding in the murder of Abkhaz customs officials as recently as September 25. The "general lawlessness" of the region-sometimes created by clashing national interests, and sometimes by "bored young men with guns"-will continue to serve as a flash point for tensions for years to come. This chaotic culture of violence only makes it more difficult for Georgia to control separatist (and even non-separatist) regions; King pointed out that the Pankisi operation, recently declared a success by Georgia, resulted in the arrest of only around a dozen fighters, many of whom were later released.

Finally, King identified the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian bases as a critical precursor to moving toward any kind of settlement. Russia's reaction to the upcoming deadlines for dismantling installations in Moldova and Georgia will prove a bellwether for the future of its relations with Soviet successor states. It is far from assured that the transition will progress smoothly, however. Local elites around the installations benefit economically from the Russian presence, and will likely prove hesitant to lose this source of income. Furthermore, the OSCE program overseeing the Russian withdrawal lacks adequate funds and support from the US. In stark contrast to the substantial financial support-$64 million-that the US has dedicated to the "train and equip" program, it has contributed only $600,000 to aid the dismantling of military bases in Georgia.

Martha Brill Olcott opened her portion of the program by calling the crisis in Georgia a "classic stalled conflict." In part, the present crisis is rooted in the timeless principle that "weak states make bad neighbors." Olcott concurs that post-9/11 geopolitical developments have led to a deterioration in Russia-Georgia relations, however. On one hand, Russian proactiveness in the wake of the terror attacks helped create the Georgian crisis; as Putin established more amicable relations with many former Soviet republics, Russia-Georgia relations stalled, making relations between the two nations appear worse than ever. On the other hand, Olcott argued, Russia acknowledged its weakness by abandoning its pretensions to be a preeminent power after 9/11, and is now acting as any "weak state" does-erratically, ineffectively, and heavy-handedly.

Olcott pointed out that in spite of increased US-Georgia cooperation since September 2001, that relationship has grown more complex as well. Historically, US-Georgia dealings have really been US-Shevardnadze dealings. The personalized aspect of this inter-state relationship renders its future uncertain-particularly after Shevardnadze leaves the presidency. Additionally, the US still lacks a viable long-term plan for its relationship with Georgia; it currently places its hopes for the future in energy cooperation, but these plans are based on energy resources still in the process of being developed. The Bush administration's new emphasis on democracy building further complicates its policy toward Georgia, for there is little evidence of a capacity for reform within the present executive organs of Georgia. Overall, the US has made almost no progress in outlining its post-Shevardnadze goals for Georgia, or in turning those hopes into a reality.

In conclusion, Olcott outlined what Russia wants from Georgia: a capacity to intervene at will in Georgian affairs, a piece of the Caspian energy market, and, most importantly, a voice in Georgia's imminent succession struggle. Unfortunately, these issues demand long-term solutions, and will likely remain sticking points in Russia-Georgia relations for years to come. Still, Olcott believes that neither a Russian invasion nor US intervention in the conflict are likely. Though Russian elites have found it too politically and economically taxing to extricate themselves from the conflict altogether, the costs of war would be unsustainable. From the US government perspective, Georgia remains a relatively low priority. Thus, Olcott believes that the US will continue placing "firm, but not resolute" pressure on Russia to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict, and will become more actively involved only if it perceives Georgia's existence to be threatened.

Questions for the panelists covered a wide range of topics. In response to a question regarding rumors that the Russians had airlifted Chechen warlord Ruslan Galayev out of Pankisi, the panelists agreed that such conspiracy theories, while abundant, are difficult to verify. Several questions revolved around the ability of Georgia to control Pankisi and the areas around it as well as the Khodori gorge, the last foothold of Georgia in Abkhazia. Although Ambassador Mikeladze asserted that Georgia is in complete control of Pankisi, the other panelists disagreed. Baran pointed out that power in Georgia is fragmented among innumerable interest groups, while King argued that Georgia will not be able to garner the resources to exercise "control"-through well-armed border guards, that is-over Pankisi and similar areas anytime soon. Other questions concerned speculation that Russia might receive a free hand in Georgia in exchange for acquiescing to the US campaign in Iraq, or for providing America with low-cost oil. The panelists unanimously stated that this was unlikely, though Olcott suspected that Russia might attempt to engineer such a deal, and Baran said that Russia will try, but not get US to agree to such a quid pro quo. In response to a question what does Russia want from Georgia, Baran's answer was "if Georgia falls, then the whole East-West corridor falls." Ambassador Mikeladze closed the meeting by noting that he had received high-level assurances from the US government that it would not permit a quid pro quo with regard to Georgia.