Political Situation in Ukraine and Possible Developments

"Ukraine is locked in systemic crisis," Moroz began, "at the base of which lies the question: Is Ukraine going to be a democracy, or a criminal dictatorship?" The international community has a stake in how that question is answered. The system of governance in Ukraine, namely the usurping power of the president, is the main brake to the economic and political development of the nation. All layers of society, either covertly or overtly, oppose the president and his circle. A critical new characteristic of the opposition is its breadth, spanning across the political spectrum from communists to nationalists alike. The opposition's primary objective is to restore the Ukrainian government to the control of society by removing the authorities at the top. The opposition seeks to build a Western-style political structure that would facilitate Ukraine's integration into Europe. "Right now we're moving towards Europe only in words," Moroz said, "and we're doing it by way of Turkmenistan."

The United States and the European Union seem to have distinguished between the activities of the top Ukrainian authorities and the desires of the Ukrainian people. While the change in the US/EU stance is more a consequence of President Leonid Kuchma's misdeeds than of the opposition's activity, this change and knowledge of it among the Ukrainian public supports the opposition in its work.

One of the central tasks of the opposition is to prevent governmental incursions on freedom of speech, which have been egregious in the past and continue today. Fabricated editions of established newspapers are circulated without the knowledge of the paper's legitimate editors. The prosecutor's office, even when faced with concrete evidence of which printing houses produced these false papers, claims to be unable to find the culprits. Several years ago, the government illegally fined Ukraine's largest subscription-only paper $600,000. Despite a court ruling in its favor, the money has yet to be returned to the paper. The mechanism used to shut down a newspaper could be quite simple, Moroz explained. If a newspaper includes a few lines critical of a judge, the judge in turn sues the paper for libel. A different judge will then charge the paper with a fine so considerable that it is forced to fold. The government also harasses the foreign-owned Radio Free Liberty/Radio Liberty and the BBC so as to complicate and constrain their activity. The government has denied agreements permitting such groups as the National Democratic Institute and the Republican Institute to continue their valuable work in Ukraine.

The Socialist party has several bills pending in the Rada that provide for changes in the constitution to improve the protection of free speech and to effect a change in the executive office. These bills have passed through legislative review and have been the subject of several weeks of hearings in parliament. The opposition is working in several directions to remove the president and his circle from power. "We hope for your support," Moroz concluded, "in the form of very clear statement on what is happening right now in Ukraine."

Discussion
Anders Åslund asked whether Moroz believes that the Kuchma regime will survive until November 2004, when the next round of presidential elections will be held. Nearly two years ago to the day, Åslund noted, Moroz broke the Kuchma-gate scandal, revealing Kuchma's involvement in the murder of journalist Georgii Gongadze. Will this event really lead to Kuchma's fall? In addition, what will be the effect of Ukraine's possible export of the Kolchuga radar to Iraq? And on the other side, how strong is the opposition? When in Kiev several weeks earlier, Åslund witnessed two popular demonstrations, but nothing that would really shake the regime. Both Mykola Melnichenko, who made the tapes recording Kuchma's involvement in the murder, and Myroslava Gongadze, wife of Georgii, were present in the Carnegie audience.

Moroz answered that he and his supporters, along with the general opposition, will do everything in their power to ensure that Kuchma leaves office before 2004. Kuchma's removal, he continued, would be good for the US, the international community, and most of all good for Ukraine. Moroz did not attempt earlier to publicize other materials concerning the president because he believed Kuchma's involvement in the Gongadze scandal was enough to remove any sitting president from power. Ukrainian society has not reached the point where it could respond adequately to Kuchmagate, Moroz explained, and as a consequence the scandal fell by the wayside. In the 2002 parliamentary elections, however, society expressed its opinions on what is happening in Ukraine. "The elections are a separate topic," Moroz said, "but it is clear that those who won the elections nevertheless find themselves the minority in parliament, and those who lost are in power." For a variety of complex factors, Kuchma was not removed from office, despite the protests of [opposition] activists who spent five winter months camped out in tents in the center of Kiev. Once the authorities overcame their shock at this demonstration, they swept away the tents. "I don't know how many people would have to take to the streets for a smart leader to realize that he has to go," Moroz said. "We had 120,000 people just in Kiev come out in protest, and over a million in other parts of Ukraine."

When the authorities control the major media outlets, the courts, the police, and the security service, the political situation is relatively stable. But if people see even the slightest serious movement against the president, many of those who are now Kuchma's supporters, even in his inner circle, would abandon him. Fear is an important factor in Ukrainian society. The president is fearful of the consequences of his actions, but at the same time he uses this element of fear to control the people around him, particularly with regard to the Kolchuga scandal.

Richard Murphy of CSIS asked what the responsibility of the legislative body should be in setting policy and directing the government in a truly democratic Ukraine. Moroz replied that parliament should help select the cabinet of ministers, and that in turn the parliament and cabinet should jointly form domestic and international policy. Moroz advocates changes to the constitution that would provide for a triangular relationship between parliament, the cabinet of ministers and the president, as well as transferring some of the president's current powers to the parliament. Thus far serious attempts at changing the constitution to reflect these priorities have been blocked by the president and his circle.

Adrian Karmazyn of the Voice of America asked who the leading contenders are to replace Kuchma, and if that list includes [Victor] Yushchenko, would Moroz's socialist party support him now to ensure that he has a chance later. Moroz replied that he is most concerned with is the system of governance, and less concerned with who exactly will be president. Of primary importance is that the constitution be changed to leave the president with significant powers, but without the ability to break the will of the legislature. If elections were held today, Yushchenko would be elected president even without the support of the communists and the socialists. But in the future, there is no chance that the communists would support Yushchenko's bid for the presidency.

Another question concerned the mechanisms Moroz imagined to remove Kuchma by 2004, and how the international community and the US in particular could support change in Ukraine. "Frieze the accounts of the people around Kuchma and they themselves will tell him that it's time to go," Moroz replied, explaining that the money from international loans, aid programs, and the profits from weaponry sales go into offshore accounts maintained by Kuchma's allies and Kuchma himself. The US and the international community could further support attempts to dislodge Kuchma from office by continuing such gestures as that made before the Prague Summit, when international leaders made clear that Kuchma was not welcome as a representative of Ukraine. While it is personally unpleasant to Moroz that the leader of Ukraine is not invited to such a meeting of European powers, he states that Kuchma brought it on himself, and the event has powerfully resonated with the Ukrainian public.

Myroslava Gongadze of RFE/RL commented that thus far, the opposition has not been successful in its attempts to oust Kuchma from office, and asked what changes Moroz envisioned in the opposition's approach. Moroz said that his group would be stopping in Warsaw on their return trip to Ukraine, where they will meet with a variety of leaders to discuss other steps the opposition could take. He noted the difficulty involved in shaping a definitive policy towards a leader like Kuchma, citing a comment of Belorussian dictator Lukashenko, who said that he did not want to be "like Kuchma, who says one thing and does something else." Moroz also pointed out some important positive results of opposition activities. "Society has changed. New journalists have come to the fore, along with new businessmen." The results of the 2002 elections on proportional party lists show that 70 percent of voters effectively voted against the president, and Moroz believes that the president today has the active support of only 5 to 6 percent of the population. Success will take time, and will come only from the solidarity of all opposition forces putting their diverse ideologies aside.

Rose Goettemoeller agreed that the international reaction has been important in the Ukrainian situation, but noted that Ukraine has lost momentum recently in its relationship with NATO and the European Union. She asked Moroz how he would go about regaining that momentum as new member countries are rapidly entering both NATO and the EU. Moroz reiterated that the EU and NATO are the mechanisms by which he hoped to achieve success for Ukraine. He believes the Ukrainian foreign minister should attend the Prague Summit, and that treaty on a special partnership between Ukraine and NATO is very timely. The treaty requires Ukraine to change its political structure in ways that conform to European specifications, which could assist the opposition in its struggle to change the system of governance. Moroz has met with Lord Robertson and other leaders of NATO, and believes that Ukraine does not need to regain momentum in its relationship with these institutions, but rather needs to make use of the tools already at its disposal.

Nadia Diuk asked Moroz to comment on the significance of Russia in Ukraine's politics, particularly in light of Russia's interest in the March elections, Putin's personal relationship with Kuchma, and Russia's historical role in Ukraine. Moroz does not believe that Russian interests had a significant effect on the March elections. Russia is, however, exploiting Kuchma's weakness to its own benefit, particularly in the economic sense. The nature of Putin's friendship with Kuchma remains an open question-a joke published in the Ukrainian newspapers depicts a conversation between US President George Bush and Kuchma, with Kuchma saying to Bush, "I have a good friend in Putin," and the US president replying, "Oh yes, I have many of those kinds of friends in Africa." Putin is driven by Russia's interests, not the idea of friendship.

Moroz was asked to comment on the speculation that Kuchma has discussed issues of immunity with members of the opposition in return for his early resignation. Moroz dismissed such speculations as inaccurate, noting that for Kuchma to have discussed such questions of immunity, he would have first had to enter into talks with the opposition, which he has not done. Though the option may have been mentioned to Kuchma by some people in his inner circle with their own interests to protect, it is not the official stance of the opposition.

David Sands of the Washington Times followed up on the previous question, asking why, with so much hanging over his head, Kuchma would consider leaving early, voluntarily, or quietly. Åslund noted that Moroz had avoided the word "impeachment" throughout the discussion, and asked if Moroz had a clear view of how the president might leave office. Moroz agreed that Kuchma will not leave voluntarily or peacefully, and continues to refer to himself as a popularly elected president. The Ukrainian parliament has passed a law on impeachment and another on the creation of independent investigative bodies, but the president has blocked both. Moroz believes that impeachment is the only removal mechanism by which the president could leave office while defending the integrity of the office itself.

Peter Voitekowsky of the University of Maryland asked about the role of business elites in Ukraine's current political situation. Presently the parliament is divided evenly between presidential supporters and the opposition, and elite businessmen fall on both sides. Moroz replied that there is no fundamental difference between the two groups of businessmen, especially when it comes to their business interests. The two groups are divided, however, by their access to the president and his levers of power. The president's office decides major business deals, putting one bank out of business, changing the ownership of a metals company or selling the state's majority state in Ukraine's largest telecom, Utel, to a Russian firm. While the pro-presidential businessmen in the Rada are left untouched or benefit by these maneuvers, those who oppose Kuchma suffer.

Summary prepared by Anne O'Donnell, a junior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia program.