Japanese-Russian Relations and Northeast Asian Security

Rozman opened the seminar by noting that by his count, the recent Putin-Koizumi summit represents Japan's seventh attempt to improve its relations with Russia. The first round of normalization efforts began in the mid-1980s, with the "Entry Approach." Led by the Soviet desk at the Japanese foreign ministry, this initiative sought to resolve the continuing dispute over the Kurile Islands first, and then address other stumbling blocks in Russo-Japanese relations later. By 1989, Japanese politicians favoring the "Balance/Equilibrium" approach-which focused on the simultaneous development of economic ties and political cooperation-had reclaimed Russian policy. From 1991-92, the "Pipe" approach, which sought to use Japanese development funds as a source of leverage, predominated. This ultimately gave way to the less innovative "Law and Justice" approach, which nevertheless resulted in Yeltsin's historic visit to Tokyo in October 1993. From 1996-98, Prime Minister Ryotaro Hashimoto's "Bolder Eurasian Diplomacy"-characterized by deepening economic ties, personal appeals to Yeltsin, and a diminution of Japanese invectives against Russian presence in the Kurile Islands-predominated. This effort ultimately proved no more successful than its forerunners, ending in November 1998, when Yeltsin demanded that Japan sign a peace treaty with Russia before discussing the fate of the Kuriles. In the months leading up to 2000, small groups in the Japanese foreign ministry, with assistance from Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, devised yet another strategy for normalization, though it was never brought before the Japanese public.

Despite the complexity of these normalization efforts, Rozman argued that certain themes pervade this history of "fits and starts." Japan, he noted, is always the pursuer in the normalization process, and its ultimate failure tends to elicit frustration-as well as discussion about how to punish Russia. Additionally, the path toward normalization has often been blocked by a lack of debate about Russo-Japanese relations on both sides, and popular suspicion of those who favor settlement (e.g. Muneo Suzuki). At the same time, however, Rozman believes that the failed attempts at normalization have led to a gradual expansion in Japan's willingness to build the groundwork for a peaceful and productive relationship with Russia.

Indeed, Rozman argued, a number of recent developments have improved the potential for the settlement of long-standing Russo-Japanese disputes. Although America's relationship with Japan and the Soviet Union tended to divide the two nations before 1987, it now drives them closer together. The post-9/11 US-Russian partnership has provided a new venue through which the US can push Russia to resolve its grievances with Japan. Paradoxically, the concomitant desire on the part of both Russia and Japan to balance American unilateralism has also encouraged cooperation between the two nations. Similarly, the desire to balance China's power is likely to encourage a diminution in Russo-Japanese tensions. Japan's concern for energy security-and its desire to tap Sakhalin's rich oil and gas reserves-also exert a centripetal force on the two countries. Should these trends continue, Rozman believes that it may be possible to reach a demarcation settlement-the sole hope for resolving the dispute. Should Moscow and Japan each be able to make partial concessions on their claims to the Kuriles, a permanent settlement could be reached, and politicians in both countries could return home looking like victors.

In spite of these positive developments, however, normalization remains far from assured. Continuing disputes over fishing rights and trade antagonize the Japanese, though an important Russo-Japanese accord on energy could help alleviate this tension. Russian and Japanese claims to Great Power identity also threaten to derail the process. Having weathered the break-up of the former Soviet Union-and more recently, Chechnya's attempted succession-the Russian public is sensitive to the possibility that Russia itself may one day disintegrate. The loss of any territory, even land as desolate as the Kuriles, would therefore garner little sympathy from ordinary Russians. Similarly, the Islands have come to symbolize normality for the Japanese, and are key to their national identity. Indeed, history remains the greatest stumbling block in normalization attempts. With remembrances of the Russo-Japanese war omnipresent in Russian media coverage of the Kurile dispute, many would interpret compromise on the islands as a blow to Russian pride. Even while denouncing the "victim politics" sparked by remembrances of World War II in other East Asian countries, Japan casts itself as a casualty of war, demanding information on Japanese prisoners captured by the USSR half a century ago before it can negotiate a permanent settlement. Still, Rozman remains hopeful that as Russia and Japan reconsider their roles in the twenty-first century world, a focus on potential cooperation might ultimately help overcome the legacies of their painful pasts.

Although Rozman argued that Putin will not have the political capital to move forward with normalization until after the next round of presidential elections, the Joint Action Plan recently agreed to by Putin and Koizumi will serve as a new foundation for Russo-Japanese relations. Even as the prospect of normalization remains on hold, the two leaders have opened up a constructive dialogue on economic issues, energy and environmental cooperation, border control, and fishing rights. Russia and Japan have initiated new cultural exchanges as well; Moscow has even declared 2003 the "year of Japan." Ironically, the North Korean crisis promises to bring the two countries closer together still. Rozman reported that the Japanese press is full of stories about how Putin and Konstantin Pulikovsky, the Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern region of Russia, can aid Japan in diffusing the North Korean threat. Even more important, the recent trouble emanating from Pyongyang has, for the first time in fifteen years, stolen the headlines from the Kurile dispute. Russia and Japan's desire to resolve this new East Asian crisis-and at the same time, to isolate China-will likely lead them to a deeper understanding of their common interests. Indeed, Rozman argued, closer cooperation between Russia and Japan might piggyback on growing interest in Northeast Asian regionalism. It is not out of the question that the two countries' focus on integration might result in regional development banks and other mutually beneficial economic and security arrangements. Even if the prospect of formal negotiation remains politically costly for both sides, then, informal, less political means of cooperation will provide a strong impetus for normalization.

The question and answer session opened with one of the participants noting that Rozman had focused on the politics of normalization primarily from the vantage point of Tokyo, and wondering what the mood is in Moscow. Others challenged Rozman's sanguine predictions about the future, arguing that due to the preeminence of "clans" in Russian politics, Putin has less control over foreign policy than it might appear. Another participant pointed out that it is all too easy for Russian politicians to prove their nationalist credentials over the Kurile Islands, adding that many interest groups are eager to undermine Putin's power. Still another questioned Rozman's rosy prognosis for energy cooperation, asserting that Russian business and political elites have little practical interest in collaborating with foreigners in the development of oil resources-and that many Russian financiers in fact oppose foreigners playing any role in the energy sector.

Rozman acknowledged that in spite of Putin's conciliatory stance toward Japan and good relations with Koizumi, continuing resentment of Tokyo in Russia's elite foreign policy/security circles may constrain Putin's actions. He noted that the potential political costs to leaders on both sides are high, arguing that they might be even greater for Koizumi, whose reluctance to rule out normalization altogether evoked furor in 2002 from the far right. Politicians on both sides also have a tendency to "talk tough," and selling any settlement to the Russian and Japanese people will be a formidable task. However, despite the political pressure placed on both leaders to retain the status quo, Rozman is convinced that Putin and Koizumi are dedicated to forging a partnership. Further, he argued, Russia is in the midst of a "paradigm shift," as concerns for economic development are beginning to erode the influence of political clans. He urged the attendees not to underestimate Putin's determination to move toward normalization with Japan and to develop Russia's economic base.

Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Center added to Rozman's response, commenting that he too expects that Putin might manage to resolve the tensions in Russo-Japanese relations once and for all. Trenin sees two sets of issues working in favor of normalization: Putin's concern for "reclaiming" the Russian Far East, which he fears Russia may be losing due to underdevelopment and depopulation; and his desire to neutralize the growing power of China. In both of these respects, cooperation with Japan would clearly benefit Russian national interests. Even as Putin pursues integration with the European Union and enhanced cooperation with the US, then, Trenin expects he will also make overtures to Tokyo to ensure Russia's economic solvency and geopolitical security.

Another round of questions centered around the situation in North Korea, and its effects on Russo-Japanese relations. One participant asked how Japan would react to Russia's desire to organize talks on the crisis. Another wondered how reports that Russia would expect the credit for arranging a potential Japanese-North Korea conference might be received in Tokyo. Rozman responded that as of yet, Russian intervention in the situation has not increased tensions, or created a spirit of rivalry with Japan. Both countries remain unsatisfied with US diplomatic efforts, and there is growing congruence between them on the necessity of bringing many players together for talks. Rozman also noted that the Japanese press is full of glowing reports about Putin's potential role as a mediator.

Another attendee questioned whether the increased Russo-Japanese cooperation engendered by the Korean crisis would really provide a basis for long-term partnership, arguing that in spite of its rhetoric, Japan still views US as the key player in the crisis. Rozman responded that he is seeing more and more reports in the Japanese press on how Washington, using its new relationship with Russia, can help make Moscow a constructive force in solving the current problems on the Korean peninsula-and ultimately, in crafting a settlement between Russia and Japan. The US has also been placing pressure on Japan to improve its relations with Russia since the early 1990s, he added. If the US can help stabilize the situation in Korea, it may ultimately be able to convince Russia and Japan to settle their differences. However, Rozman warned, excessive pressure from the US might have the opposite result, increasing anti-Americanism in the region, and thus rendering it all the more unstable.

Summary prepared by Faith Hillis, Junior Fellow with the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment.