German Policy Towards the East

Dr. Segbers began by providing key national factors that explained German foreign policy. After World War II, Germany’s focus has been primarily on economic and social development. The country tried to regulate migration and, in the last decade, to solve human capital shortages in the IT sector. The current administration introduced profound changes in employment, health, pension, education, and tax policies under the “Agenda 2010.” Germany focused on soft self-security issues such as drug trafficking control, the rights of Muslim minorities, and crime reduction. Segbers argued that the civilian power concept dominated over external affairs in Germany. Another important concept in the post World War II Germany has been corporatism, when politics are used for bargaining and mediation of conflict regulation.

Segbers also placed German foreign policy in the global context. Since the unification in 1991, Germany experienced normalization and pragmatization of its foreign relations, while pursuing its interests through the politics of integration and institution building. Europe has been the top issue on Germany’s external agenda. Segbers said that Germany was interested in EU institutional reforms and enlargement, in creating a federal structure of the EU, in the active role of the Stability Pact, in NATO enlargement, and in rebuilding Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Under the current administration Germany has been deeply involved in European institutions with economic exchanges, cultural images, and language competence directed toward the West.

Addressing the role of non-state actors, Segbers explained that German foreign policy was not exclusively conducted at the state level. Federal level played a critical role because all of the regions had representatives in Brussels to “pursue their own interests.”

Segbers thought that the Iraqi war has affected U.S.-German political affairs more than economic and social relations have. In German and American societies, there are diverging views on how to address reconstruction in Iraq, on policy towards the Middle East, and on the future role of the U.S. According to 2003 Transatlantic Trends, 45 percent of Germans see strong U.S. leadership in world affairs as desirable, while 80 percent believe the United Nations needs to be strengthened.

Turning to the German-Russian relations, Segbers noted that overall there were no significant bilateral problems, but neither was the interaction great. Germany provides 10 percent of foreign direct investment in Russian industries. The world’s largest exporter, Germany is highly dependent on trade. In 2002, Russia ranked 15th among Germany’s foreign trade partners. 2 percent of Germany’s exports, mainly machinery equipment, go to Russia, and 2 percent of German imports, mainly natural gas, come from Russia.

On the question of importance of Russian oil and gas exports to Germany, Segbers responded that Germany planned to decrease oil and gas imports, utilizing alternative energy sources, so that those imports from Russia were not likely to matter all too much. Currently, Germany imports 75 percent of its energy consumption.

Some minor concerns in the German-Russian relations include the future of the EU-Russian relations after the Kaliningrad issues have been settled, return of pieces of art removed from Russia during World War II, assimilation of over 2.2 million of Russian immigrants in Germany, and visa regulations and security requirements on the Russian southern borders. According to Segbers, although Germany did not express a deep concern over the situation in Chechnya, it was necessary to address human rights violations there. The official German position, as well as a common European concern, has been the coherence of the Russian state.

Segbers concluded that Germany’s foreign policy has been extremely inward looking. German interest in Russia and Eastern Europe has been diminishing because the primary focus of Germany’s policy has been the European Union and German domestic affairs. On one hand, Germany’s interest was limited. On the other hand, the problems were also limited.

Summary prepared by Kate Vlachtchenko, Junior Fellow with the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment.