Russia’s Policy Towards the New States in Eurasia

Dmitri Trenin began by stating that the Ukrainian Orange Revolution has marked a new phase in Russia’s geopolitical retrenchment, which started after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite gaining its independence in 1991, this year, Ukraine has finally elected a democratic regime and a Western/EU-oriented foreign policy. Ukraine serves as an example to other states such as Moldova and Belarus. The Former Soviet Union has ceased to exist and its constituent parts are gravitating to other orbits. With Russian power and prestige having suffered a major blow, it is the system of alliances led by the European Union and the United States that is the natural point of attraction for many of the New States. In the future, it is possible that Russia will share borders exclusively with the European Union, NATO and American allies.

This creates a totally different geopolitical position for Russia. Ukraine’s policy is to cooperate with Russia and to integrate with the European Union. Russian leadership, however, has determined that there is no chance for Russia to integrate itself with the European Union. Instead, the Kremlin has decided that Russia should reconstitute itself as a modern great power: strategically independent and economically viable.

The debacle with Ukraine was particularly painful because it occurred at a time when Russia has effectively withdrawn from the rest of the world and was ready to focus on the post-Soviet space. Kremlin advocated the creation of the Common Economic Space. This space was to include the largest former Soviet republics (Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus) and would consolidate them into a single economic, and later political, unit and joint security arrangement. Without Ukraine few can see such an arrangement succeeding.

The Ukrainian revolution also came at a point when the U.S. and the EU have lost confidence in the direction of Russia’s internal evolution. Russia is facing mounting Western pressure and criticism, and few states are ready to trust it with the former Soviet republics. The West is also cautious about Russia’s economic investments, viewing it as part of Russia’s foreign policy agenda. Relations between the new states and the West are likely to develop without consideration to Russia and its sentiments. This policy of displacement is breeding deep resentment in Russia.

More competition and rivalry, both strategic and economic, are the results of such relations. Uzbekistan and other countries in the CIS will serve as additional ground for competition between U.S. and Moscow. To prevent another Orange Revolution, the Kremlin will tighten its relations with Belarus—even support Lukashenko as well as other dictators in Central Asia. The outlook is pretty bleak.

There are two likely scenarios. The least harmful scenario is continued Russian retrenchment, gradual recognition of changing realities, further isolation, and passive relations with the West. The more harmful scenario is where Russia is actively resisting the West and its “encroachment” on post-Soviet space. This would lead to greater isolation from the West, and the elimination of Kremlin as a partner in the decisions of the West.

From Russia’s domestic perspective, the following steps are necessary for Russia and its development: 1) Learn from its own mistakes in Ukraine and distinguish between a conspiracy and revolution. 2) Depersonalize relationships and learn to work with the opposition. 3) Stop being arrogant toward the former Soviet states and study them as well as their languages. 4) Focus on itself and its policies. 5) Review the concept of a Great Power. 6) Treat CIS states as full fledge states and not focus on preserving the status quo. 7) Move ahead with conflict resolution with U.S. and EU involvement. 8) Support free elections in CIS states. 9) Go ahead with the single economic space, it is important that relations between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan improve. 10) Turn the collective security mechanism into an effective anti-terrorist organization, not the modern version of the Warsaw Pact. 11) The CIS should be a humanitarian and cultural instrument complete with an institutionalized summitry mechanism, and used to promote the Russian language and culture in the CIS states.

Although Russia’s current policies are questionable, less Russian influence in the CIS is not necessarily a good thing for the CIS and the world at large. Currently, there are vibrant economic relations among the twelve former republics. Russia is the natural market for produce of many of the southern republics as well as a large provider of jobs for migrant workers from neighboring states. What Russia needs is a new and enlightened foreign policy, in a region of the world where it has legitimate interests.

During the question and answer session Trenin was asked whether there has been a change in the mindset of the foreign policy makers in viewing the new relationship between Russia and the NIS and whether Russia is realistic in assessing the process of integration by Europe and its own role in the European integration. Trenin replied that lack of such an assessment and the inability to accept new realities is the key flaw in Russia’s current foreign policy. For the most part, the CIS states are not even considered as foreign countries, thus, diminishing their significance in an interactive and balanced relationship. He also remarked that Russia’s current mindset resembles a very old European sense of Great Powers, not the new European sense of the EU. The foreign policy is very czarist, which is a dangerous model. Trenin further noted that despite of being accused of imperialism, Russia itself feels vulnerable to Western encroachment and expansion. Thus, there is no perception that Russian intervention in the regional conflicts is a foreign affair.

Furthermore, Trenin was asked about what channels of information does the Putin administration use, and how can the West implement them to convey a more accurate picture of what is going on in the world. He replied that the major cause of Putin’s disconnection with reality is that he relies on very personalized relations rather than on international rules of diplomacy. His main source of information is the secret service’s intelligence that has been manifested by the Soviet mentality to be relied on as the only source of truth. Only non-publicly available information is considered valid, thus the government operates with night goggles.