event

U.S.-China Cooperation in South Asia

Fri. March 25th, 2011
Beijing

IMGXYZ3172IMGZYXEver since the 2009 release of the “U.S.-China Joint Statement” pledging bilateral cooperation to promote “peace, stability and development” in South Asia, the role of these two countries in the subcontinent has come under increased scrutiny and criticism. As part of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS)-Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy workshop entitled “U.S.-China Cooperation: Impact on Asia-Pacific Security,” Carnegie’s Lora Saalman moderated a panel focusing on Sino-U.S. intentions in the South Asian region.

China and the United States in South Asia

China and the United States have experience in coordinating their responses to South Asian events. One Chinese expert cited as an example U.S.-China reactions to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and joint statements on India and Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests.

  • Areas of Convergence: To foster cooperation between the two countries, one Chinese panelist suggested focusing on the following areas where U.S.-China interests converge, such as:

    • Stability in Pakistan
    • Nuclear security
    • Prevention of conflict in Kashmir
    • Security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in Indian Ocean
    • Anti-terrorism in Afghanistan

     
  • Areas of Divergence: However, differences between the countries exist in other areas, including:

    • Nuclear cooperation with India and Pakistan
    • Tibet
    • China's concerns over U.S.-India strategic cooperation
    • U.S. concerns over Sino-Pakistan military ties
    • China's growing influence in South Asia

Fluctuations in the Subcontinent

India’s emergence as a major player in Asia, combined with political fragility in Pakistan—which has been exacerbated by the spread of religious extremism and regional terrorism—have led to significant structural shifts in the South Asian region. One Chinese panelist highlighted a number of factors that are a cause for concern in Beijing:

  • Instability in Pakistan, which could create the potential for anarchy in a nuclear weapons state
  • Security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons
  • Possible future terrorist attacks
  • Asymmetry between India and Pakistan in both conventional and nuclear terms
  • U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan
  • India's wariness about a rising China
  • Indian Ocean-based stakes in energy and competition
  • The ongoing dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir
  • Misunderstanding and overestimation of China's role in South Asia's nuclearization
  • India’s Cold Start Doctrine and the rapidity of Pakistan’s nuclear build-up
  • Potential strategic triangles or blocs between India and the United States or Pakistan and China

Terrorism

China has a vested interest in stability in South Asia, particularly at its southwest border and in Xinjiang, according to one Chinese expert. A U.S. participant suggested that China’s biggest concern is not terrorism, but rather separatism . Nevertheless, terrorism remains a serious concern for both nations in the region. A Chinese participant pointed out the difficult balance that the United States is attempting to strike in engaging India in a strategic and economic partnership, while also bolstering its anti-terrorism efforts with Pakistan. In response, a U.S. participant argued that both India and the United States have an interest in:

  • Checking violent extremism in the region
  • Preventing the emergence of terrorism safe havens
  • Opening the China-Afghan border to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) supply lines
  • Encouraging India-Pakistan dialogue to promote crisis stability
  • Preventing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons from falling into the wrong hands
  • Promoting reconstruction, economic development, civil society and democratic institutions

Separate Engagement

The 2010 U.S.-China Joint Statement, unlike its predecessor, did not explicitly mention collaboration by the two countries in South Asia. Overall, a Chinese expert noted that the United States and China are likely to continue engaging South Asia separately. Roadblocks to Sino-U.S. collaboration include:

  • China’s principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries
  • India’s strong resistance to Sino-U.S. “foreign hands” in South Asia
  • A selective U.S. agenda on engaging China on nuclear security, Af-Pak strategy, and Pakistan’s resistance to the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)

Fostering Cooperation

A U.S. expert emphasized that the Sino-Pakistan strategic partnership is comprehensive and not dominated by one or two issues, such as terrorism or proliferation. He argued that China opposes the U.S. decision to de-hyphenate India-Pakistan, re-hyphenate China-India, and hyphenate Afghanistan-Pakistan. Nonetheless, he and other U.S. participants asserted that China and the United States could “bridge the gap” between them by working together in the following areas:

  • Provide targeted aid, reconstruction investment, and troops in non-combat (or even combat) positions
  • Train police, civil servants, engineers, and agricultural experts

Discussants: Ed Smith, Su Hao, Charles Salmon, Sui Xinmin, Hu Yumin, Li Li, Lou Chunhao, David Fouse, Steven Kim

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
event speakers

Lora Saalman

Nonresident Associate, Nuclear Policy Program

Saalman was a nonresident associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Her research focuses on China’s nuclear and strategic policies toward India, Russia, and arms control.

Han Hua

Han Hua is an associate professor at Peking University and director of the Center for Arms Control and Disarmament in the university’s School of International Studies.

Mohan Malik

Yang Xiaoping

Carlton Cramer

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.