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In recent days, the Netanyahu government has doubled down on its efforts to consolidate its control and ramp up its military operations in Gaza and Lebanon. Following the firing of the former director of Shin Bet, an unprecedented decision in Israel’s history, the government has begun the more complicated process of terminating the attorney general, as well as changing the process by which judges are appointed. A ferocious military operation in Gaza that has taken a terrible toll on Palestinian civilians and recent anti-Hamas demonstrations have resulted in renewed negotiations on a new hostage release for ceasefire agreement. And for the first time since the Israeli-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement in November 2024, rockets launched against northern Israel triggered response strikes in the Beirut suburbs.
What does the future hold for Gaza and any longer-term agreement? Will the Netanyahu government succeed in what appears to be a renewal of the 2023 effort to increase its power and undermine Israel’s judiciary? What about any hopes for a regional peace accord encompassing Palestinians and Saudi Arabia? Join Aaron David Miller as he engages former Shin Bet director Ami Ayalon on these and other issues on the next Carnegie Connects.
Event Transcript
Note: This is a rush transcript and may contain errors.
Aaron David Miller:
I'm Aaron David Miller, and this is Carnegie Connects. Good morning, good afternoon, good evening, wherever you are in this world of ours. I truly hope you are safe and, above all, healthy. I'm Aaron David Miller, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and welcome to Carnegie Connects, a series of conversations about issues of critical importance to America and to the world. Today, I'm pleased and honored to welcome back to the program Ami Ayalon, a former director of Israel Shin Bet. Just briefly, Admiral Retired Ami Ayalon is a former director of the Israeli Security Agency known as Shin Bet. He's a former commander as well of Israel's Navy. If I'm not mistaken, he was the first Shin Bet director hired from outside of the organization. Ami can correct me if I'm wrong.
He received the Medal of Honor, the highest military decoration. He also served as a cabinet minister and a member of the Knesset. I'd also say on a personal note, I've known Ami for years. He's also one of the best analysts of Middle East and, particularly, Israeli-Palestinian politics, and a man of extraordinary integrity and courage. And at the risk of embarrassing him further, I'm sorry, Ami, he embodies, in my judgment, many of the leadership qualities that is critically important to leading the state of Israel today. Ami Ayalon, welcome to Carnegie Connects.
Ami Ayalon:
Okay, thank you very much. We should stop here because it couldn't be better.
Aaron David Miller:
Yes. I'd like to divide the conversation, as I often do, into three pieces, the past, the present, and the future. On the past, Ami, I know there are no rewind buttons on history, but I want to ask you two questions about October 7th. Number one, having served under three Israeli prime ministers, having been responsible for the security of the people of Israel, I just wonder, that would be Prime Minister Peres, Netanyahu and Prime Minister Barak, why do you think, as an intelligence analyst, as a former Shin Bet director, what are the major takeaways with respect to why Israel failed, both from an intelligence point of view and operational point of view to anticipate, and then to respond promptly to Hamas' attacks on October 7th?
Ami Ayalon:
Well, I think that it is beyond the name of the Prime Minister, but it is a main question, I think, that we are asking ourselves during the last almost two years or one year and a half. There is the short and the long answer. I'll start with the short and it will be enough. My answer is that Socrates was not sitting in the general staff room before the 7th of October. Now, what do I mean? Socrates, I think that he was the only philosopher, he didn't try to give any answer. He became expert on asking questions, but the questions were so tough up to the point in which the leaders of Athens decided that the young people in the street, they have some doubts when it comes to the leadership and they decided to execute him. By the way, Plato describe this scenario in a beautiful way. His student comes to him and tell him, "Okay, just ask forgiveness. They will forgive you."
And he said, "I cannot because this is my nature." Now, we have to understand that in a military organization, which is built on two cornerstones, one is hierarchical organization and second obedience is a supreme value. People are afraid to ask questions. You see it in every military organization in a place in which people do not have the courage. Yes, they have the courage to go to the battlefield, to kill our enemies, and probably sometimes even to die, but they're afraid to ask questions and to challenge conventions. Until we shall be able to change the genetic structure of every military organization, especially our military organization, we shouldn't be surprised when we just do not see. We do not see the reality the way we understand it today. That's it. This is the answer.
Aaron David Miller:
It was an intelligence failure, the greatest intelligence failure since October 6, 1973 that precipitated the 1973 war. Was it a failure to imagine Hamas' intentions and its capabilities?
Ami Ayalon:
No, first of all, it was not only an intelligence failure, it was a combination of political failure, a wrong policy, was an assumption that we can control the level of flames, the level of violence when it comes to Hamas. By the way, all the security, community of Shin Bet and the Mossad. I'm not sure about the IDF. They were totally against it. And Netanyahu, it was an Netanyahu policy. Netanyahu saw Hamas as an asset because for him, Hamas was an asset because as long as Hamas controlled Gaza and Palestinian authority control West Bank, so nobody from the international community can demand a negotiation. They do not have even a unified leadership. But yes, it was an intelligent failure, but it was not intelligence failure to see this scenario. They saw the scenario. We saw it in their speeches, in the television, we saw all the details. It was just the refusal to accept that this will be the scenario.
Once this was the assumption, the assumption was yes, they are dreaming of attacking us, conquering villages in South Israel, but they will not do it because they are afraid to lose their leadership position in Gaza. We did not understand. We measure hardware and they measure software. We measure, et cetera. When we discussed it in our previous meeting, so we did not understand that when we see the future struggle or engagement, we measure it in military terms and they measure it in totally different ... They are looking for the support of the street and in a way they want this military battle because before the 7th of October, the support for Hamas was about 30, 35% in the Palestinian Street and today it's 80%. The way Hamas saw it, we see it much clearer, by the way in the West Bank, because it is obvious that in Gaza ... Gaza by the way, is the only place in which Hamas lost. It's the support of the people. In the master world, in the Arab world and in the West Bank, their support level of support between 70 to 80%.
Aaron David Miller:
One more question, Ami, before we move on to the present. I've wrestled with this one myself since October 7th. Could October 7th have played out any differently if Israel had had a different prime minister? I parachuted both Ehud Barak, and Yitzhak Rabin into the prime ministry on that fateful day. I'll get right to the core issue because I know we're going to talk about it. Do you think that a different prime minister might've responded over the last 18 months differently than the way Benjamin Netanyahu responded?
Ami Ayalon:
Yeah, first of all, yeah, we shall never know, but if you ask me, the way I understand Rabin and Barak and everybody, I met all of them, yes. First of all, because something happens to a person, prime minister, every person when he is in power for too long. I think that even Netanyahu, during his first four or eight years would behave differently. But he did not listen to what they told him before the war. And the way I knew, I not understand, I knew Barak, I knew Ehud Olmert, I knew, of course, Rabin, they listened. Yes, there were discussions. I remember almost a weekly discussion. It was an open debate and this was not the case in the case of Netanyahu. Everybody who presented him a different idea, he saw him as a kind of enemy.
I think that they were much more pragmatic. And finally, what happened to Netanyahu, it's not only that he's losing his pragmatic views, he created a coalition, which is his coalition. It's kind of obstacle for him. The last case, when he tried to nominate a new director of Shin Bet, and I know him, he was a commander of the Navy. He's a good person, very honest, brave, intellectually and in the battlefield, but he didn't have the political power because he is trapped in the coalition that he created. The moment that he will change his policy, he's losing his coalition. So in addition to too many years in power and the coalitions that he created, he cannot change it.
Aaron David Miller:
But before we move to the present, just one question about the prosecution of the war. Clearly, prosecuting a war where your adversary embeds its assets around, under, and co-locates them among civilian populations is a very tough war to fight. Let me ask you, was there any way to avoid ,in your judgment, the exponential rise of Palestinian civilian deaths and the humanitarian catastrophe that played out in Gaza, full knowing that Hamas benefited, or thought it could benefit, from the misery inflicted upon the Palestinian people by the Israeli military in an effort to gain support in the international community, perhaps even among the population of Gaza, and certainly in the West Bank? Was there any way looking back now, 18 months later, to avoid the level of death and injury?
Ami Ayalon:
In order to give you an honest answer, we have to divide this war. I think that during the first four or five months until January or February '24, what we did was horrible, was very violent. We knew Hamas strategy, which is to use his people as a human shield in order to bring our soldiers into the cities and to kill as many civilians as we can in order to present us. Okay, look what the Israelis are doing to us. But we, after the 7th of October, the horror of the 7th of October, it was a just war. Yes, it is a totally different war for the wars of the 20th century and even from the war in Afghanistan and Iraq because Gaza is a totally different type of battlefield. But we achieve most of our military goals after, I don't know, five, six months. Since then, this war is a war without any political goal. I know exactly what happens to a war without a political goal. The war becomes the end and not the meaning, only to achieve a better reality.
The whole concept of war is to use violence. We are losing our humanity. But if as long as we are doing it for self-defense, it is a just war. But now it is not a just war because there is, today, not even a military goal for this military intervention or war. We have to stop this war, this war without any political goal. And by the way, it is not a mistake. It's not that we forgot to design or to present a political goal because this is exactly what our prime minister wants. He understand that the moment that this war will end, he is losing his coalition. Because you have to remember before we went back to the war months ago, what was the conditions of the extreme right of this coalition? To go back to the coalition.
First of all, to fire Ronen, director of the Shin Bet, to fire the general attorney and to go back to war. This is exactly the decisions that this government made in order to bring them back to the coalition. And 70% of the people of Israel believe that all the decisions, the decision of this government is not in order to secure Israel and to create a better reality for the state of Israel and its people, it is only for political reasons.
Aaron David Miller:
Yeah. It's a good transition, Ami, to the present and let's move to the present now and focus on politics, the prime minister and opposition. I want to put up on the screen so everyone can see it, an ad that ran in two large Israeli dailies, Yedioth Ahronoth and Israel Hayom. It was sponsored by a group of 24, not a formal organization, but a group of 24 former intelligence security and military officials. Get to that in a minute. And you are among them, the 24 of you meet every several weeks to talk about the state and fate of the country. I want to just summarize what's on the screen in Hebrew.
"Netanyahu's conduct poses a clear and immediate danger to Israel's security and future as a Jewish democratic state. This is rather powerful, recognizing that Netanyahu conduct casts serious doubt on his fitness to fulfill the role of prime minister. We also call for the intensification of the civil struggle, for the immediate return of hostages within the framework of a ceasefire agreement, the establishment of a state commission of inquiry, a halt to controversial legislative moves, judicial overhaul, upholding the high courts of justice decision with regard to conscription into the IDF, and setting an agreed upon date for elections in which the people will have their say." It's signed by past police commissioners, heads of Shin Bet, including yourself, former heads of military intelligence, chiefs of staff, the Air Force, military intelligence. It's an impressive group of security, military intelligence elites.
Ami Ayalon:
By the way, at least one of them was a prime minister and two of them defense ministers, et cetera, et cetera.
Aaron David Miller:
I want to ask you though, to start our discussion on the present. Isn't it curious or interesting, and how do you explain it, that the military security and intelligence elites featured in this ad and who've been working together are playing such a pivotal role in the opposition to this Israeli government, hoping to change the government and create a different pathway for a different future for Israel. Aside from the fact that we could never put hundreds of thousands of Americans out in the streets week after week after week, campaigning for a relatively unified vision of what America is all about, you were able to do that during the judicial reform.
We have a pretty bright line that separates civilian and military authority. There was a letter published by a number of former secretaries of defense in opposition to the current administration and some of its policies, but that's nothing like what former military security and intelligence elites in Israel are doing with respect to oppositions and even civil disobedience. So let's start there. How do you explain it because I think it speaks volumes about the nature of the opposition in Israel and prospects for its success?
Ami Ayalon:
Well, this is not my expertise, but I'll try to explain it from my personal point of view. Israel is a totally different kind of society. We have to remind ourselves that our military is of peoples. Every citizen should serve. By the way, one of the laws that we are demanding to pass is to make sure that the Haredim, which is almost 20% of our people, will join the military. But still Israel is based on the concept that this state belong to the people and every person, every citizen should not only do something for each country, but to serve in the military and to be ready to sacrifice his life in order to secure the state. So the role, the status of the military generals, or in my case admirals, is a result of it, especially in time of war. When we say something, people cannot avoid the fact that these groups that you just mentioned, I think that when we summarize all our experience, it is about between 8 to 900 years of military service.
So it means something for the people of Israel when we say that this war should stop because it is not a just war. Not only it is not a just war, this war will bring to the end of the state of Israel as a Jewish democracy. We are endangering our security if we shall not stop this war. We are speaking in terms of security. We care about not only the identity, but the identity of the security of the state of Israel. This is why what we say is not exactly as if people will see us only as civilians. Second, something very strange. We see it, by the way, not only in Israel, I believe that if you will try to see it in America, you will see the same. In the war of today, in the wars of the 21 century, which usually it's not wars between states. Ukraine and Russia is an exception. And by the way, when it started, the war between Ukraine and Russia, I was optimistic enough or pessimistic enough to say that this war will over because I thought that Russia will conquer Ukraine.
I don't know whether it'll take six, eight months and I was wrong. But I said, "The real war will start only when Russia will conquer Ukraine." We saw it in Iraq. Bush declared victory and the real war started only later in Iraq and Afghanistan. So the wars of today, are wars between a state and a terror organization. I think that the military commanders are the only one who understand the limits of the use of military power. People who do not serve in the battlefield do not see it and politicians refuse to see it. Now, people who never serve in the battlefield cannot understand it, but politicians understand it and they refuse to see it because they need the war in order to be elected. This is exactly what we see in Israel. It's a crazy reality that was created during the 21 century. It's a combination of the global technology of the media and the internet.
What we see is that war creates fear. But in state of fear, when we are afraid we prefer security on rights. This is why in time of war we elect leaders who know how to kill the enemies. We do not elect leaders who promise us a better education, a better democracy, or a better healthcare services. Politicians, at least in the Middle East, they will not stop the war because the war enables it to stay in power.
Aaron David Miller:
You have a peculiar and unique situation which existed in no other Israeli government where the prime minister of Israel is on trial, now, almost five years and counting for bribery, fraud and breach of trust in a Jerusalem district court. To lose power, presumably means either the possibility of a conviction, and there's precedent for this. Ehud Olmert was indicted, not when he was prime minister, but he was convicted of one of the charges leveled against the prime minister. He served, what, 14 to 15 months in prison or a plea agreement that would mean the end of the prime minister's career. But you clearly believe that the struggle now, for the identity of the state of Israel is an existential one. How do you propose to get from where we are now ... and remember, 2023 saw an amazing demonstration of people power, where in a country just shy of 10 million people, if you deduct even the 2 million Palestinian citizens of Israel, wouldn't have expected to be out in the streets protesting, although some did. Translate this people power, you call it civil disobedience, into effective political change.
Ami Ayalon:
Well, when I say that this war must end, it is not only because this war has no political goal and lead us to nowhere to lose our security and identity, it's because we see it. Before the war, the figures of the people who took to the streets doubled. You have to understand that I have three sons, and two of my grandchildren are serving in the military. When you serve in the military, you do not go to the street because the balance between the domestic threat, which is a government, and the ways they are trying to destroy our democracy, the external threat, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah or Iran is changing. People who comes back during weekends from Gaza will not go to the streets. We saw it, by the way, in Yom Kippur it was the same. During Yom Kippur war, it lasted about more than three weeks and we lost 2,700 people in less than three weeks. It was a horrible event. But the moment that the war stopped, they took the streets.
And now, one more reason for the prime Minister to go on with this war, he knows that the moment that this war will end, people will take to the streets. But I want to explain something about the way this conflict, no matter how we call it, the domestic conflict is perceived in Israel. I spent too many years in the sea, and I'm trying to explain it in maritime language. It's like a multifocal storm. You saw the movie Perfect Storm, it was a great [inaudible 00:33:06]. Every wave, 30 meter high can destroy every ship, but the problem is that there is a multifocal storm because I can describe what we see today in Israel as a constitutional crisis or as an identity crisis. The problem is that what we see is both. On one hand, yes, it is a constitutional crisis. We are a very, very fragile democracy, from the day Israel was created because we do not have constitution. We do not have a culture. Our Judaism did not create a culture of democracy. Our coalition system create a reality in which our legislative branch, they don't exist.
Because once you have majority in…so the executive branch controlled the legislative branch and the legislative branch was destroyed by the government. Now, what we see today from the constitutional point of view is that the struggle of today is to destroy the judiciary because the legal system, it's the only way to stop or to limit the power of the government. But in addition, deeper, we see identify crisis. We are very proud to say, "Okay, Israel is only democracy in the Middle East." We have to ask, "Are we really still a democracy?" But what do we mean when we say a Jewish democracy? What is our Jewish identity? What is our democratic identity? I ask myself every day, "Why am I Jewish?" I'm a member of the Jewish people, but my Jewish identity is not the concept of Kahane or Rabbi Kahane or Smotrich or Beville, that their Jewish identity is Jewish supremacy and racism. I want to believe that we believe in a totally different aspect of Jewish identity.
I am very proud every time when I meet somebody who do not understand it, that in time in which thousands of years ago when kings used to say that there are gods, we the Jewish people came and say, "No one is good, but everybody was created in the image of God." This simple concept was the beginning of the liberal democracy of today. I'm very proud to see the Jewish aspect of every liberal democratic constitution. You can see it in the American constitution or in any other liberal constitution. This is a totally different type of Jewish or Jewishness or when we say democracy. Whether it is a dictatorship of the majority, the way many people in Israel believe or whether it is a democracy that preserve and protect civil and minority rights. We say Jewish democracy, we do not agree on what is the meaning of it. What we see today is the rifts between the Israeli tribes are deeper and wider every day. We are facing, not only a constitutional crisis, and not only identity crisis, this is existential crisis as a state.
Aaron David Miller:
I think that makes the problem just even more difficult to resolve because what you're describing is a political system that depends largely on Knesset arithmetic. 60 plus 1, in this case, 60 plus 8 affords a government the capacity to govern. And since the-
Ami Ayalon:
They can pass-
Aaron David Miller:
Yes.
Ami Ayalon:
... a basic law, which is at the constitutional level.
Aaron David Miller:
I think you've described elsewhere, the notion that until you have a mass mobilization where political elites, the universities, the labor unions, and of course, military and insecurity and intelligence, elites, and until you can mobilize hundreds of thousands of people in the streets day after day after day, literally ... and I don't want to speak for you ... to bring the government to a standstill, you red line as no violence. But you have argued that civil disobedience, which involves breaking law, is part of that struggle. Is any of this possible, Ami Ayalon, as we watch the next several months play out? The Israeli Supreme Court is hearing petitions on the firing of one of your successors, Ronen Barr, Shin Bet director. Will the prime minister of Israel, we have a eerie parallel here I might add, where a president may well decide to ignore the rulings of the federal judiciary or is ignoring now, is any of this possible to play out in the weeks ahead?
Ami Ayalon:
I believe, yes. I know that some people that are listening to us now probably will smile, but I'm optimistic. I'm optimistic because the way I understand history, in every crisis or a crisis is the beginning of a new world and in every crisis there is an opportunity. But I think that what we have to do now is, first of all, to recognize the intensity and the magnitude of the threat, of the danger that we are facing and to prioritize. To prioritize the threats because we have all the techniques, the capabilities, and the power to face the external threat, whether it'll be Iran, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad or Hamas. But our major threat, the threat to our future and to our security, is the policy of our government, the internal threat because we were not prepared. We did not realize that this scenario will come. So once we understand, once we convince the Israeli people that in order to maintain our security and our identity, we have to go to take to the streets.
We see the polls today. We don't have to speak now, probably later, on the occupation and our relations with the Palestinians, but today, we have to unite from on the base of what we see in the polls. 70% of the Israelis today, according to all the polls, will agree to the following demands. First of all, we have to demand to return the hostages and to demand immediate ceasefire agreement. Second, we have to establish a state commission of inquiry because it drive people crazy when people who are responsible refuse to present their mistakes and to leave their positions. Third, yes, we have to demand the law of conscription and to demand an agreed date of election. We wrote it, and you mentioned it before, but in addition, we have to understand we shall not be able to do it alone. Many years ago, I used to say, "Nobody will save us from ourselves." When you were in the American administration, David, I remember that you, all of us, you told us, "We cannot want agreement between you and Palestinians more than you want." So yeah, we have to accept it, but it is totally wrong.
This is why we have to understand that without the support and the assistance of the Jewish communities outside and the international community, we shall not be able to do it. This is why, I think, that for me, it is very, very important, especially when I meet Jewish leaders to tell them, "Look, Israel is a very unique country. It's the only country in the world that belong to people who are not its citizens." Israel is a country of the Jewish people and you care about Israel, it's part of your identity. It is your duty to tell us what you see and to tell us that we are heading to the wrong direction. It will bring us to the end of ... the Zionism, we understand it now. And last, my optimism comes from the simple fact it is not a original conflict anymore. I think that it is obvious that it'll shape world economy and it will shape world stability.
This is why I think that every political leader in Europe, in America, in China, in Russia, understand that it is his political interest to try to achieve stability in the Middle East. Stability in the Middle East is very, very simple to achieve. It is to take the regional coalition that was created by Biden and to let Trump and other leaders, political leaders to execute it. As crazy as it sound, I still believe, although I am not sure that I understand your president, I think that he has the power to execute the vision of Biden. I'm not sure that this will be what we shall see in 20 years from now, but I believe that it is in our hands.
Aaron David Miller:
Ami, because I think in the end, and maybe this is too simplistic of an antidote, but I think it's not ... Marx writing in the 19th century, so forgive me, not Groucho Marx, the other Marx said that, "Men make history but rarely is they please." The reality is, Ami Ayalon, every time without exception, and there are no exceptions, when you've seen breakthroughs in the area of conflict, in the conflict zone between Israel and the states and entities with which Israel shares contiguous borders, whether it was Israel Egypt, Israel Jordan, Israel Syria, Israel Palestinians, it was a result of leaders who believed they were acting, not just for their immediate political gain, but for the future benefit and securities of their peoples. Politics was a part of it, whether it was Sadat or Begin, Rabin, Peres, and even Arafat, you dealt with him, as did I, in his first incarnation before Rabin's murder or King Hussein or Nelson Mandela and De Klerk. Without that we don't have a chance.
Without leaders who are masters of their politics, not prisoners of their ideologies, it's hard to imagine any external savior rushing to rescue Israelis and Palestinians. Which is why our conversation and the way in which you process problems, the integrity, clarity, and the honesty that you bring to this conversation is exactly the kinds of qualities that are required on both the Israeli and Palestinian. I'm glad you're an optimist, Ami Ayalon. I would be depressed if you weren't, because you know as well as I, you cannot see what is in front of us for good or for ill. There's hope there, although people have to act to make it so. So I want to thank you, again, for sharing your wisdom, your expertise, and your time with us. You're a real gift, Ami, to the people of Israel.
Ami Ayalon:
Thank you very much. But one last word, it's from my side. I was listening to what President Trump said yesterday, and everybody listened to the same words but understand it differently. What I understood, he brought Netanyahu from Budapest to tell him first, "I don't want war with Iran, I prefer a deal." So he adopted some of Obama's ideas. Second, "I don't want war in Gaza. I want to end this war and to bring the hostages back." This is what I heard from his speech and all the rest probably said something I didn't listen. That's it.
Aaron David Miller:
Well, all I can say is we'll see. Again, Ami, thank you so much for joining. All the best to you and your family and stay safe. Thank you for listening to Carnegie Connects, a production of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Views expressed are those of the host and guest panelists, and not necessarily those of the Carnegie Endowment, which takes no institutional positions on public policy issues. Subscribe to Carnegie Connect on popular platforms such as Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your favorite podcast platform. Like what you heard today? Learn more at carnegieendowment.org/carnegieconnects. I'm Aaron David Miller, and until next time, think positive and test negative.
