China remains one of the most consequential—and most difficult—foreign policy challenges facing India today. 

Even as tensions along the border persist, New Delhi is cautiously rethinking economic ties with Beijing. This rethink, in turn, is taking place against a broader change in the strategic environment as Washington rethinks its own relationship with China.

Few people in India have thought more about the changing China-India relationship that Ambassador Vijay Gokhale. Ambassador Gokhale is a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie India. He retired from the Indian Foreign Service in January 2020 after a diplomatic career that spanned thirty-nine years. 

From January 2018 to January 2020, he served as the foreign secretary of India. He previously served as India’s high commissioner to Malaysia, ambassador to Germany, and ambassador to the People’s Republic of China. Ambassador Gokhale has written five books on China, the most recent of which is titled China's Wars: The Politics and Diplomacy Behind its Military Coercion. 

His latest book examines how Beijing uses coercion, diplomacy, and military force to advance its interests—and what those patterns can tell us about China’s behavior today.

On the show this week, Ambassador Gokhale tells Milan why he calls China an “opportunistic power,” why the India-Chian relationship is best characterized as one of “armed coexistence,” and whether the thaw in India-China relations reflects a genuine shift in Chinese policy or a tactical pause. Plus, the two discuss the shift in U.S.-China relations, the Xi-Trump summit, and the prospects of a G-2 accommodation between the United States and China.

Episode notes:

1. Vijay Gokhale, “Xi-ing Eye to Eye,” Times of India, September 28, 2026.
2. Vijay Gokhale and Chirayu Thakkar, On China: Reflections on Chinese Statecraft (New Delhi: Rupa, 2026).
3. “How India and Pakistan See Each Other—and the World” (with Jacob Poushter), Grand Tamasha, September 23, 2026.
4.  “What Do Indians Think About the World?” (with Aidan Milliff and Paul Staniland, Grand Tamasha, June 10, 2026.
5. “Can India Thrive in Trump’s World?” (with Shoumitro Chatterjee, Sameer Lalwani, and Tanvi Madan), Grand Tamasha, April 1, 2026.

Transcript

Note: this is an AI-generated transcript and may contain errors

Milan Vaishnav Welcome to Grand Tamasha, a co-production of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Hindustan Times. I'm your host, Milan Vaishnav. China remains one of the most consequential and most difficult foreign policy challenges facing India today. Even as tensions along the border persist, New Delhi is cautiously rethinking economic ties with Beijing. This rethink, in turn, is taking place against a broader change in the strategic environment as Washington rethinks its own relationship with China. Few people in India have thought more about the changing China-India relationship than Ambassador Vijay Gokhale. Ambassador Gokhale is a non-resident senior fellow at Carnegie India. He retired from the Indian Foreign Service in January 2020 after a diplomatic career that spanned 39 years. From January 2018 to January 2020, he served as the Foreign Secretary of India. He previously served as India's High Commissioner to Malaysia, Ambassador to Germany, and Ambassador to the People's Republic of China. Ambassador Gokhale has written five books on China, the most recent of which is titled China's Wars, The Politics and Diplomacy Behind Its Military Coercion. His latest book examines how Beijing uses coercion, diplomacy, and military force to advance its interests and what those patterns can tell us about China's behavior today. I'm pleased to welcome Ambassador Gokhale to the podcast for the very first time. Sir, very good to see you. Thanks for making the time.

Amb. Vijay Gokhale Thank you, Milan. It's a great pleasure to be on the podcast.

Milan Vaishnav I want to start by asking you about your book, China's Wars, in which you characterize China as a, quote unquote, opportunistic power, but also one that is fairly cautious, fairly judicious. I'm wondering if you could just talk broadly about the conditions that make Beijing decide that the moment is ripe for coercion or military action.

Amb. Vijay Gokhale Well, Milan, thank you very much for introducing my book. The book was essentially written because I was initially doing some work into why China launched the war in 1962, with an effort to see whether the narrative that has been crafted after the war of 1962, which was that India provoked the conflict, was supported by evidence or facts. And that led me then to start looking at other conflicts that China had fought in the past and the current gray zone warfare that is engaging in with the Philippines, with Vietnam, with India, with Japan, and with other countries. And I pretty soon came to the conclusion that there were several factors which led China to use military coercion or force at times to achieve its objectives. First and foremost, I think the objectives were political and not operational. In other words, I think China was not really concerned how many people or how much material was spent in the process of the war, provided the political goals or objectives set by the leadership were achieved. And an important lesson from this is that therefore China does not engage in conflict simply on the basis of calculating the cost benefits in terms of dollars and cents or in terms of men and material. It actually determines whether to use military coercion or not based on whether it can achieve political goals. And if those political goals are achievable, then the operational costs, whatever they may be, are acceptable. A second finding was that China did not appear to rush into a conflict or seek a prolonged or indefinite conflict. And I think this has resonance today, particularly in the context of both the Russia-Ukraine war and the US-Iran conflict. China prefers, and preferred in the past, to use other means, short of the actual use of military force. Those means included diplomacy, it included coercion in the gray zone, it included other forms of pressure such as economic pressure and so on, and it resorted to force only when it felt that none of these were able to achieve the objective that China was seeking. The third finding was interesting. I found that there was always a domestic element as one of the reasons for conflict. Now, of course, we do know that it is not just in authoritarian systems, but in democratic systems as well, that leaders tend to resort to external adventure when they are facing a domestic crisis. But in a democracy, there are means by which this becomes public knowledge because we have parliaments, we have the media, we have civil society. And so on and so forth. In China, because it's an opaque political system, it's very difficult to discern this domestic element in the decision-making process which leads China to conflict. But what I was able to trace through my research and to put in the book is that in each case when it fought a conflict with the United States during the Taiwan crisis, in 1962 with India, in 1969 with the Soviet Union, in 1979 with Vietnam. These were at turning points when there was a deep political crisis at home and in a sense that political crisis also drove decision making relating to conflict. Now, the other point you asked me about was my description of China as an opportunistic power. I don't mean by this that China is an exception because most countries would tend to use the opportunity to achieve their political objectives. But what I meant is that China, in particular, looks at not simply a bilateral context, but a global context when it determines conflict or the decision to use force or threaten to use forced. In other words, it looks not only at the power equation between China and its adversary, but also at what other principal powers in the world are likely to do or how they're likely to react. And in that sense, when it senses an opportunity, that those other major powers are otherwise distracted, it is then that it uses that opportunistically to achieve its political goals. So, if you read the book, my description of China as an opportunistic power is really defined in terms of that.

Milan Vaishnav So I want to go back to one of the principles that you mentioned that emerged from the research you did for the book, which is China's aversion to protracted conflicts, right, of the kind that we're seeing in the Middle East, of the kind we've seen for some years now between Russia and Ukraine. And I want to ask you about that aversion in the context of the China-India relationship, because you describe their relationship as one of armed coexistence. Now of course it's true that it's not exactly a full-blown war. It's a kind of low-intensity conflict. We see these occasional flare-ups, Galwan in 2020, of course, most notably. I wonder how that squares with this broader aversion of not wanting to get bogged down in a long-term war, but yet, nevertheless, getting stuck into a kind of equilibrium vis-a-vis India. Where you have this lack of resolution along so critical border.

Amb. Vijay Gokhale I think there is a line to be drawn between conflict and gray zone coercion. I think conflict, first of all, involves the deployment of much greater force for an indefinite period of time unless you are quite certain that you will prevail over the adversary within a short time frame. And again, I want to relate this to what is happening between the United States in Iran today or between Russia and Ukraine. Because once you get into a conflict, the decision to end that conflict is with two parties. Gray zone warfare, to my mind at least, involves much less deployment of force. It costs less. At the same time, it achieves the objective of keeping the other party bogged down and, in a sense, physically as well as financially exhausting the adversary. To the point where it might come to negotiation or it might decide that settling matters, presumably to China's advantage, might be a better option than the extraordinary cost that it might have to bear if it results in conflict. So, I think these two are quite distinct. And I don't believe that China's use of gray zone warfare is in a sense either tying it down. Or, in a sense, a huge cost to the exchequer or to the military. It is a relatively cheaper option to deal with a neighbor which it sees as some form of a challenge, either today or in the future, without actually engaging in a conflict where the unknowns are much greater than in this relatively controlled environment. Now, China, of course, does this presuming two things. One, that the adversary doesn't really want to escalate because the adversary feels if it responds, if it counter responds to the gray zone warfare and escalates, then it is a full blown conflict and the adversary has no idea whether it can prevail over a much stronger opponent. So that's one. Two, that eventually therefore, because larger or wider conflict is not the option, the adversary will therefore eventually at the end come to the negotiating table where China will presumably have an advantage and will achieve its objective. So, this I think is really the larger thinking, strategic thinking behind China when it engages in gray zone warfare with us.

Milan Vaishnav So I think that's a crucial distinction that you just made. But I guess the follow-on would be, can one infer from what you just said that this kind of persistent tension along the LAC is an acceptable… is the status quo acceptable to China in the sense that it doesn't necessarily feel any kind of pressure to resolve this tension in the short to medium term?

Amb. Vijay Gokhale So I would say that is precisely what the Chinese thinking is to my mind. In other words, I think they see no advantage in resolving the boundary question because they feel time is on their side. But more importantly, the gap between Indian capabilities and Chinese capabilities appear to have grown to a point where China feels that over a long term, it will ultimately prevail and achieve whatever objectives it has. And at this point of time, it is better to keep India under pressure, among other things, by not resolving the boundary, rather than relieve them of that pressure. Now, of course, the big million-dollar question here is, will the other side continue to exercise restraint continuously in a gray zone warfare-like situation? And here, a number of recent scholarly works and academic works are questioning the very premise that the adversary will continue to bear the consequences of gray zone warfare indefinitely. In fact, a couple of studies have postulated that China may be over-assuming or misreading as the situation where a country like India or even Vietnam or Japan might reach a point where it counter responds and therefore China may miscalculate and that may lead to conflict. So, I think that's something worth thinking about. What I do know is the Chinese, however, very carefully weigh the consequences before they engage even in gray zone conflict. And they weigh it in two scales. Number 1: what will be the cost to China if it engages in gray zone conflict, not just in military terms but in economic terms and in diplomatic terms? And if it feels the cost will be relatively affordable or negligible, it is more likely to engage in gray-zone warfare. The second is, what is going to be the geopolitical backlash that might come from other party? And there too, if it reckons that the other party is unlikely to engage in any sort of backlash because it might escalate the situation, or if it feels that the other party's too weak to engage a geopolitical backlash, then it is more likely to apply gray zone coercion rather than if the other party is willing to have a counter response. And it is precisely this calculation which led to the Galwan incident and the other incidents in June 2020, and I think they did not anticipate the backlash that came this time from the Indian side on the Kailash range in August of 2020 as a response to what had happened in Galwan in May and June of 2020. And I think therefore, the Chinese may be rethinking the whole idea of whether they can continuously use gray zone warfare as a longer-term strategy. Notwithstanding that, I think the situation on the border is still one where China thinks this is a viable strategy, which is why I characterize the present situation as a situation where the two countries are living in a state of armed coexistence.

Milan Vaishnav So a few things there to ask you about by way of follow up. So, you know, I think since the rupture of 2020 triggered by the events in Galwan and kind of subsequent back and forth between the two sides, there has been something of a tentative thaw in China-India relations. I think we've seen various signs of that. No one can tell us how sustainable that is, but I'm wondering do you think that this reflects some kind of genuine shift in Chinese policy, or is just kind of a tactical pause in something that allows them greater freedom of maneuver?

Amb. Vijay Gokhale Milan, I would draw more on the very specific comments that India's external affairs minister made, I think in New York a couple of weeks ago when a similar question was posed to him. He did characterize the relationship as better and back on track, but he qualified it by saying it had gone so off track after 2020 that even a few measures such as the resumption of flights or the relative relaxation in terms of investment procedures or the liberalization of the visa regimes was enough to at least bring it back on track. What he did, however, add was that there was no structural change in the basic issues which were contentious or complex in India-China relations. So, I would tend not to read too much into what has happened. Whether this is a tactical development or a long-term strategic shift is something which is more difficult to tell. But I think it's worth asking this question, Milan, because there are shifts not only in India's relations with China, but in India relations with a number of other major powers, including of course the United States and Russia. And those have a bearing on the India-China relationship as well. So, I would very tentatively say this appears to be more tactical than strategic, but we cannot rule out the possibility of a more strategic movement in India- China relations if the current international climate continues to be as complex and as difficult for us. And of course, also depending on whether the Chinese side thinks similarly and is willing to therefore sort of walk in step with us towards perhaps a better or a more improved relationship.

Milan Vaishnav You know, a few years ago, the chief economic advisor to the government of India in the Ministry of Finance's annual flagship economic survey kind of raised the possibility that India might rethink some of the restrictions it imposed on Chinese trade technology investment. Those restrictions had been imposed after the events of the summer of 2020. At the time, there wasn't, frankly, a lot of support, I think, within the government or certainly amongst the public. But it does seem like things have moved. And people now, including government officials, are talking more openly about those kinds of possibilities. I wonder, how do you think India should think about calibrating the economic relationship with Beijing at a time when the security picture still remains quite tense and quite bleak?

Amb. Vijay Gokhale Milan, this debate did not begin in 2020. As far as I recall, even in the first decade of the century, around the mid-2000s, there were two views in India. One set of people felt that reducing trade barriers or investment barriers was likely to result in the hollowing out of Indian industry. Another set of people believed that unless you allowed a relatively free movement of capital and technology into India from a country which had clearly developed because of capital and technology, you would not be able to really make industry competitive. And what we have seen if you followed the trajectory of policy in this regard was that the government of India in fits and starts would either place some restrictions or lift them. Now, of course, when the Galwan incident happened and the public mood changed, I think it would have been difficult for any part of the Indian economic community or the political class to argue that we must be relatively relaxed on investments. And so, you saw the sharp tightening of investment procedures. Now that the situation appears to be improving, at least optically and tactically... I think the debate has resumed. We should be careful not to jump to conclusions. My understanding is that, relatively speaking, a very small adjustment has been made in policy whereby the earlier decision not to allow any Chinese investments into India has been relaxed. And a certain cap has been set in this regard, as well as a certain relaxation has been given to the entry of money from China through third countries or third parties. That having been said, I think the Chinese don't have a great record of investing in India. They have generally participated in projects in India and showed them as investment. But the projects in India are not financed with Chinese money, they're financed with either multilateral money or Indian capital. It is, of course, the technology, the equipment, sometimes the workers, too, used to come from China. But really speaking, there has been fairly little Chinese investment. Some of it is because China didn't think that the Indian market was worth investing in. Some of is because the Chinese state either officially or unofficially did not want those technologies to go to India. And here, I think there are plenty of recent examples, including lithium-ion battery technology, tunnel boring machine technology, certain technologies in biopharma, and so on. So the short point I'm making, Milan, is that yes, there have been some changes in the investment policy. These are at the moment to my mind rather minimal and tentative. We have to see how the larger relationship pans out. Even if it does pan out well, I still believe that we will not see significant Chinese investments in India in the sectors that we would like them to invest in.

Milan Vaishnav And just very briefly, when you say the sectors that we would like them to invest in, what are some examples of some of those domains?

Amb. Vijay Gokhale I certainly think we are not looking for Chinese investment in steel, coal, glass or cement. We are looking for it in solar because we are also massively pivoting in India towards renewable energy. We are also looking for it in electric vehicles and storage solutions because again, green energies of importance. And if you have to deal with environmental, you know, climate change and pollution more importantly, more electric vehicles are required. You're looking at transfer of capital and technology in chip making of legacy chips certainly in terms of the applications for artificial intelligence, in other words the industries, high-speed rail, you know, signaling and such equipment. Now, those are areas that China is obviously not keen to invest in India. And we know, for instance, very specifically, that a number of MOUs between Indian companies and Chinese electric vehicle companies have fallen by the wayside because after they have been signed, the Chinese companies have been unofficially informed that they could assemble the car in India, but they cannot manufacture the batteries or any other high-tech components in India. So, I think it's fairly clear that if any investment comes, it is outdated industries or what is popularly known as dirty industries from the environmental aspect. Certainly, the Chinese are not going to invest in the new or sunrise industries.

[…]

Milan Vaishnav You know, you mentioned a little while ago, Ambassador, that while the China-India relationship is perhaps being recalibrated, India's relationship with other great powers is also changing. And you mentioned in that context the United States. I want to turn now to asking you a little bit about the U.S.-China relationship and how you view it in India, I think before President Trump returned to office in 2025. I think it's fair to say there was a relatively hawkish consensus in Washington on all things China that was a consensus broadly shared by both major political parties. I'm wondering if you see the current shift in U.S.-China relations as something that is very Trump-specific that might change after the next election, or do you sense that there's a deeper rethink underway in American political society about the limits or the extensive strategic competition with China?

Amb. Vijay Gokhale So obviously, I've looked at both the summits with a great deal of interest past the readouts both by the White House and the Chinese Foreign Office. I would certainly say that some of the elements which are very personal in both summits, such as the president going to the airport to receive his Chinese counterpart, or for instance inviting him to look at Marine One or going with him to see the National Guys. These are all gestures which are, I think, particular to President Trump and may not happen in future administrations. On the other hand, I do believe that within the strategic community in the United States, both in the government and outside the government, there is a rethink in terms of where the priorities of the United States lie, not only vis-a-vis China, but vis-à-vis the rest of the world. In other words, going back to first principles, what are the areas of the world which serve American interests, American prosperity, American security? And some of these are identified in the National Security Strategy itself, the Americas for one, the Western Pacific for another, the Pacific Ocean. What I didn't find in either the National security strategy or a lot of the statements by senior cabinet officers of the Trump administration was the mention of the Indian Ocean. And anecdotally, even changing a name of a major command from Indo-Pacific Command to Pacific Command, or PACOM, conveys a certain message, a certain signal. Although the US feels one shouldn't read too much into it, but I think in India something is being read into it. So, my own sense is, and this is still a tentative view, Milan, because I think these are early days, is the interest, the strategic interest of the United States in the Indian Ocean declining in their strategic priorities under a reviewed grand strategy? And would that mean that the United States wittingly or unwittingly allows or affords the People's Republic of China greater space in a region which is of core national interest and of core concern to India. And I think that's a question that is being legitimately posed not just by me, but by the larger strategic community in India. Now I don't want to be misunderstood on this because I don’t believe that a G2 is possible. I think there are structural differences between China and the United States. I think they might accommodate each other where fundamental interests clash in order that it doesn't lead to conflict, but I don't think there's going to be a condominium which decides the future for the rest of the world, including India. My concern is narrower. In the area of most of critical interest to me as an Indian. Is the change in American strategic thinking going to give China greater space? And I think that is a valid question that I am posing to my counterparts and colleagues in Washington. To be honest, I haven't got a very specific reply so far.

Milan Vaishnav So I want to follow up on two aspects of what you said. Let me start with the recent summit between Trump and Xi. And you talked a little bit about the personal touches, the kind of, kind of stylistic idiosyncrasies perhaps of this president, but I want to ask you a little about the substance, right? As you reflect on this summit, you know, what do you think if anything XI actually got out of the meeting beyond the optics of a classic red-carpet welcome in Washington?

Amb. Vijay Gokhale I've written about this last week in a major Indian newspaper. My basic point was the greatest outcome of this meeting was that the Chinese are now able to define the overarching narrative of that relationship by getting the United States and the Trump administration to agree to the framing of the relationship as a constructive relationship of strategic stability. Essentially, the Chinese side believes it has, in a sense, contained those in the United States which are seeking to destabilize the relationship, which are seeking to subvert the Communist Party, which are seeking the contain the United States. And I think this is important because narrative shaping is a critical part of Chinese foreign policy. Interestingly, I contrast this with the more recent developments in India-China relations. Because in the case of India- China relations, we have in a sense taken the narrative shaping back from China, which has shaped the narrative of India China relations for the last two decades by saying that it walks on two legs, the bilateral issues leg and the border issue leg. If you see statements by Foreign Minister Jaishankar and the Prime Minister, and I'm quoting the Ministry of External Affairs' readout on this, both have said the state of the border defines the state of the bilateral relationship. And that's a very clear narrative statement, narrative shaping by the Indian side, which says, well, we're taking back the power to shape the narrative. Something of the reverse has happened in Washington during the summit. The Chinese have taken from the United States the capacity to shape narrative. And we may dismiss this as words, but ultimately words do lead to a broader shaping of policy and thinking across the board in governments and institutions, and therefore I don't think we should be dismissive of it. I do agree, however, that beyond that, there has been... Minimal outcome, either in terms of trade or in terms of technology, in the sense that, yes, there is a dialog and artificial intelligence, but whether it's going to be meaningful, whether it is going to lead to guardrails which are commonly agreed upon is not clear. You know the White House continues to propose bilateral and trilateral talks between the two and three major nuclear powers. The Chinese readout did not contain a word of that. The Chinese readout contained a reference to Taiwan, but the U.S. readout did not contain a word of that. So, I think that on the other substantive issues, the problems remain and there's not much outcome there. But let's not be dismissive of the fact that this narrative which has now taken root in Washington might, I think, have some impact on shaping subsequent policy. Now, of course, I can't say whether this is going to last beyond the Trump administration, simply because we don't even know what is going to come in January 2029. So, I would like to sort of limit my comments to what might happen over the next couple of years.

Milan Vaishnav Well, I think the other point I was just going to add about the narrative dynamic you described is that it may come to define U.S. policy and how U.S. institutions respond, but it also has the impact potentially on how other governments and other capitals also shape their own policy based on this kind of narrative reclamation that the Chinese have made. So, I think that's also a very important point.

Amb. Vijay Gokhale Correct. I totally agree with you on that, Milan. I think that a lot of countries which are already sort of agitated at the fundamental changes in their own relationship with the United States, and these may be just on the surface or deeper, are now looking at a very changed nuance between the United States and China and wondering how they should now look at their own relations with China. So, I'm with you entirely in that this narrative shaping is going to also influence policy and perceptions, public perception, in a lot of America's allies and partners as well.

Milan Vaishnav You know, another thing that you said was about the perhaps lessening or weakening of interest in the kind of Indo-Pacific. In some of your writing, you have referred to the Quad as comatose. You know it's…you get a very interesting narrative when you're in Washington, and I'm sure that you've experienced this yourself, where you have some in official Washington who say, look, it is simply untrue that the Quad is on life support. It is just more narrowly tailored towards a smaller, more concrete set of objectives, as opposed to trying to be everything to everyone. And I wonder, you know, how do you respond to those who advance this argument about what we're seeing now is not a Quad that's irrelevant, but one that's more streamlined?

Amb. Vijay Gokhale I agree on a personal level with the second part of that argument. I think Quad spread itself too thin. Nobody was clear whether it was going to do maritime domain awareness or deliver vaccines, whether it is going to build critical infrastructure or resilient supply chains. I think they spread themselves too thin and the delivery was practically non-existent except where maritime domain is concerned. So, I do agree with those in Washington and even those in New Delhi who say a narrower, sharper focus is required. Where I don't agree is that Quad continues to have the same sort of relevance that it did. There has been no summit or talk over summit. If you look at the foreign minister level statements, they are fairly anodyne and really there is no achievement. We are now well into the end, towards the end of the second year of the Trump administration. And therefore at least, I mean two years is good enough to deliver some result. I don't see any results. Thirdly, I think the United States itself says that the Western Pacific is the more important part of the Indo-Pacific. Given that one has to ask where India is placed in Quad, because we are not a Pacific power. The other three members are all located in the Pacific, Japan, Australia, and the United States, apart from the fact that they're also treaty allies. So, there is a different dynamic that plays out between the three. Our value was firstly that we were not Western, but we were a democracy. We are a democracy. And secondly, that we were located in the Indian Ocean, which, when connected with the Pacific, is going to really be the world's center of economic gravity in this century. Now, if neither of these are relevant to the United States and the Western Pacific is the only aspect where it needs to focus upon, then I don't know whether it will continue to invest in the same way in Quad or whether it will invest in other mechanisms where you substitute. Let's say India for the Philippines or Indonesia, which recently seems to have seen an uptick in its relations with the United States or Vietnam.

Milan Vaishnav You know, I want to bring in a country now that we haven't yet spoken about, but I wanted to kind of gage your view, which is Pakistan, but specifically in the context of China, which is given the kind of all-weather relationship between China and Pakistan, coupled with the seemingly warming ties between Washington and Islamabad. How concerned should India be that Washington is rethinking not just its relationship to one of India's critical adversaries, but actually both of them simultaneously?

Amb. Vijay Gokhale Well, personally, I don't attach much value to what is the current state of relations between the United States and Pakistan. Clearly, this is part of the President's personal imprimatur. He, for a variety of reasons, some of which bemused me, appears to think that Pakistan is critical to his foreign policy and to perhaps his national security policy. I don't believe that this is a wider sentiment within the strategic community in the United States. I also don't think that the core issues have disappeared. The issues of fundamentalism, of support for terrorism, of the frequent use of the nuclear threat, of being disruptive in the region, whether it is with India or Afghanistan, and so on and so forth. So, I think that this is a temporary phase. I don't think the glue which really will bind the United States to Pakistan exists either in terms of national security or in terms of economy and commerce. I'm not suggesting for a minute that the relationship between the two is not important. It has always been important to the United States because they see Pakistan as a fulcrum state from the West Asian perspective as well as the South Asian perspective. But I don't think it's going to fundamentally shape American policy towards India. Now, U.S.-China relations is an entirely different matter, because if the more accommodative posture or the less combative posture of the current administration sort of bleeds into future administrations, then of course that has an impact on India-U.S. Relations. And if that then is joined to Sino-Pakistan collusivity, which was very evident during the May 2025 conflict, then, of course, it's another matter. But I think, you know, that's really stargazing into the distance. I mean, let's be clear, I don't think that U.S.-Pakistan relations under Trump is going to survive in the next administration.

Milan Vaishnav That's fascinating. And I tend to agree with you, which is when you go around official Washington, whether it's on Capitol Hill or whether it is in various agencies of the executive branch, like the State Department, one does not come away with the sense that there has been some kind of massive strategic rethink or some ideological kind of repositioning Pakistan. It seems more to be bureaucrats who have to reposition some of their own views in light of what's coming from the White House, right, to make sure that they're aligned, as opposed to, you know, going down to first principles and saying, oh, you know what, I think we actually do have a robust strategic relationship with Pakistan that we need to pursue. I want to just maybe end this conversation by asking you a little bit about India's and if you look at the past couple of years, there have been sources of tension, not just Pakistan, in terms of how the U.S. and India relate to one another in the broader South Asian sphere. And probably the most prominent example of that is what happened in Bangladesh, where the relationship with Sheikh Hasina proved to be a sticking point between Washington and New Delhi. Now that that is in the rear-view mirror, we have a new regime in Bangladesh, we have a relatively new government in Nepal, a two-year-old government in Sri Lanka. How do you assess how the U.S. and India are relating to one another? Because they do find, one might argue, common cause in trying to guard against Chinese encroachment and the threat that China might pose to both countries' interests in the region.

Amb. Vijay Gokhale I'm glad you really raised that question, Milan, because it's an important one. Let me start by saying, there's a strategic change in South Asia. China's strategic periphery, as defined by itself, if you read the science of military strategy or Chinese think tank outputs, has changed from defense of the homeland to defending a strategic perimeter that stretches from Japan all the way to Central Asia, and South Asia falls within that. In other words, the strategic periphery of China as defined post-2013 is now colliding much more directly with India's strategic interests in South Asia. Now given the situation, it would make sense if the United States and India were to collaborate. But what we are in fact seeing is that the United States policy, beginning with Afghanistan in 2017 or 18, when it kept India out of a sort of plurilateral discussion on the Afghan situation, Myanmar, where both India and the United States are at odds with each other on how to treat the military government, and then going on to Bangladesh and to Nepal, is a matter which I think did, to some extent, put a stress on the Indo-U.S. relationship. You know, I find it hard to explain that on the one hand, the United States, and particularly this administration, says that it needs its allies and partners to do more of heavy lifting on the national security and economic side, and on the other hand, frustrates the attempts of a partner to do that thing in a region where its own vital interests are much greater than that of the United States. And this is true of Afghanistan, of Nepal, of Bangladesh, of Myanmar and so on. You mentioned Bangladesh, you see the situation where the United States, and I can't speak for certain because I'm not in government, I have no available information, but where popular imagination considers that the United States was part of the process that led to the toppling of the Hasina government, thereafter the United States appears to have vanished from Bangladesh, but what we are seeing is an enhanced Chinese presence. So, I don't know what objectives the United States fulfilled in Bangladesh. But what it did was harm India's strategic interest. The last point I want to make is the government of India's policy, however, has been very sensible over the last few years. And if you look at the situation, we began with a hostile government in the Maldives when the current incumbent came in on an India out policy. Three years later, he acknowledges that India is vital to Maldives’ economic and national security. You had a government which came into Sri Lanka, which was not exactly aligned to India. Two years later, you now have people saying that Sri Lanka is more aligned to India than it has been for many, many years. This is true of even the current government in Afghanistan. I know the United States doesn't like that government, but the fact of the matter is that India has handled diplomacy with Afghanistan adroitly, and I think it is. It has made all the right moves with Bangladesh. We have invited the Prime Minister, the new Prime Minister, for a visit. We invited him for BRICS. We are asking him to come for a bilateral visit. And I think over time the dynamics of realpolitik will take over because Bangladesh's closest and largest neighbor is India and not China. Notwithstanding all that, however, I think it would be helpful if the United States were to actually act on what it says, which is allow the partner to take a greater responsibility and to do some of the heavy lifting.

Milan Vaishnav Just one final follow-up, if I could, on Bangladesh, which is, you're quite right, I think, certainly in the popular imagination, and you could see this on social media. You could see it in the op-ed pages, there was an impression that the U.S. was undermining the Indian position in Dhaka. But given what you said about the way in which the new Rehman government has reached out to India and vice versa. Do you think that in the long term, this is going to impose costs on the India Bangladesh relationship? Because you could argue from the other side saying Sheikh Hasina’s position was untenable and this idea of a consolidation of a competitive authoritarian state at some point was going to break. So, in the final analysis net has India actually ended up in a better position.

Amb. Vijay Gokhale, first of all, what happened in Bangladesh was not our doing. We can say it is a domestic, entirely domestic driven development. We can call it an externally induced one. It certainly was not of India's doing. Secondly, I don't think Sheikh Hasina was brought to India by India. She fled in what was essentially a military coup and she landed in India. Now, place yourself in the position of the Government of India. We have given shelter to a large number of political refugees from a very large number of countries, beginning with His Holiness the Dalai Lama to a larger number of Afghan leaders, to Aung San Suu Kyi at a particular time, to President Nasheed of Maldives when he was in trouble, to a number of Sri Lankan leaders and to Haseena herself after Mujeeb was assassinated. It is India's tradition that if someone seeks political asylum or help we give it on the understanding that you don't engage in political activities against a friendly neighbor when you're on Indian soil. So it was extremely unlikely that any government in India, not just the current government, but any government would have denied Sheik Hasina entry when she landed in India or expelled her thereafter. And I think this needs to be understood by our neighbors. We are a democracy with certain characteristics which have developed over 80-odd years. Notwithstanding that, I think India believes that a normal relationship with Bangladesh is important and I think they're building that. If you look at what the situation between India and Bangladesh was immediately after the overthrow of the government in 2024 perhaps, and what it is today, I think it's vastly improved. We are certainly much better off than we were with the its work in progress, but I think the government of India is very clear. Its principle is to deal with the government to the day, and this is an elected government, a legitimate government, to deal with them, to see how we can benefit each other economically, and where matters of security concern are there, we raise it with them. If they choose to ignore it. Well, there are certain red lines that any state imposes, as does India. So I think that basically is the way I think policy with Bangladesh will proceed and I'm fairly confident that you will see a more normal relationship sooner rather than later.

Milan Vaishnav My guest on the show this week is Ambassador Vijay Gokhale. He is the author of multiple books on China, including China's Wars, the Politics and Diplomacy Behind Its Military Coercion. He had a distinguished career as an Indian Foreign Service Officer, retiring in 2020 as a Foreign Secretary of India. He is, importantly to us, a non-resident senior fellow at Carnegie India, and very glad to call him a colleague. Ambassador, thank you so much for taking the time. It was great to talk to you.

Amb. Vijay Gokhale Thank you, Milan. Thank you very much.