Source: Carnegie
Joseph Cirincione
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Presentation to the Conference on:
Nuclear Disarmament, Safe Disposal of Nuclear Materials or New Weapons Development?
Como, Italy
Sir Martin Rees, the Astronomer Royal of England, notes that there have been just as many remarkable astronomical discoveries in the past two years as in any earlier period. Evidence of planets around other stars, new evidence of very distant galaxies, news that the expansion of the universe might be accelerating, even the possible discovery of a new basic force in the universe that is the reverse of gravity. The same might be said for the field of non-proliferation. Every week brings new stories of deadly chemical agents discovered in Iraqi warheads; reports of new, deadly strains useful for biological weapons terrorism; shipments of special steel from Russia halted at the Azerbaijan border before it can be used in Iranian missiles; emergency airlifts of poorly-guarded highly enriched uranium from Tbilisi, Georgia; or reports of the deterioration of Russia’s command and control system for its nuclear forces. There is a proliferation of proliferation concerns.
The response should be to redouble efforts to stop the spread of these deadly weapons, including the ratification of treaties and agreements to prevent and reduce the threats. In fact, the reverse is occurring. The reaction from influential members of the US political establishment has been to call for increases in military spending, to stiffen opposition to arms control treaties and to demand the rapid deployment of new weapons systems, particularly a national missile defense system.
For example, the chairman of the Republican Party’s National Committee, Jim Nicholson, this June launched a new initiative to make national missile defense an issue in the November 1998 congressional elections in the United States. "The Republican Party is prepared to have this become a political issue," he wrote in an editorial published in the conservative newspaper, The Washington Times, June 21. "We are prepared to ask the American people if they agree the United States should be defenseless against weapons of mass destruction, relying instead on outdated treaties and the good intentions of our adversaries."
His new campaign builds on Republican efforts in the Senate to pass a bill mandating the deployment of a national missile defense system as soon as it is technologically feasible. Although the legislation was blocked by Democrats, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott said in support of the bill, "Only effective missile defense, not unenforceable arms control treaties, will break the offensive arms race in Asia and provide incentives to address security concerns without a nuclear response." Numerous other Senators took to the Senate floor in the days after the India tests, citing the "India threat" as justification of a crash program to field a missile defense system.
Dozens of articles and speeches by conservatives have used the South Asian tests as proof that future threats are inherently unpredictable, our intelligence estimates are consistently unreliable, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction fundamentally unstoppable and, thus, the only truly effective response is reliance on American defense technology. Gary Bauer, president of the fundamentalist Christian group, Family Research Council, warned with Edwin Feulner, president of the Heritage Foundation, in another Washington Times opinion piece June 14, "The nuclear club is getting larger, not smaller. The world is getting more threatening, not less. America needs to make its house secure again." They are appalled that the U.S. remains defenseless against missiles. "This is not because the military couldn’t field such a system, but because the Clinton administration opposes anti-missile weapons and believes the best defense against missiles is the threat of a U.S. counterattack."
The South Asian tests, the continuing reports of efforts by "rogue" states to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and the highly-politicized controversy over alleged American corporate assistance to China space-launch vehicles and ballistic missiles have increased public and political awareness of proliferation risks. "All this has reinforced the public’s impression that the world is quite a dangerous place," says Frank Gaffney, a staunch conservative proponent of national missile defense.
In short, there is a concerted effort by the right-wing of the Republican Party to use these events and this new unease to promote, yet again, a vision that has assumed almost religious stature in conservative circles despite years of failed tests, bloated budgets and dashed expectations. Will it work this time?
It might.
The growing drumbeat on the right could converge with three other developments:
- The selection, for the first time, of a prime contractor whose job will be to design, develop, and prepare for deployment of a national missile defense system.
- Changes in the national intelligence assessments of the possibility of additional countries fielding long-range ballistic missile or of China significantly expanding its limited ICBM force.
- The lack of a clear, persuasive plan from the Clinton administration on countering the adverse proliferation trends and the lack of an administration leader on these issues
The Politics of Missile Defense
To understand the current development, it is important to briefly review previous efforts to force the deployment of a national missile defense system (a brief history of ballistic missile defense efforts is provided as an appendix.) Republican congressional leaders have tried to make President Clinton’s defense strategy a political issue, first in their Contract with America in 1994 and 1995, and then as the leading defense issue in the 1996 presidential campaign. It didn’t work. The public did not feel threatened by enemy missiles; military leaders did not see a technology capable of meeting the challenge; and deficit-conscious members of both parties in Congress balked at the $60 to $116 billion estimates for deploying the proposed national systems.
Still, the administration felt it necessary to protect its right flank. The Administration developed a "3+3" plan for developing a rudimentary missile defense system over three years and-if conditions then warrant-deploying the system over the next three years. Meanwhile, under congressional pressure, missile defense funding has steadily climbed. The budget for fiscal year 1999 now before Congress calls for spending $950 million of the total $3.6 billion missile defense budget on national missile defense. Clinton has also pumped an extra $2.3 billion for the 3+3 program into the budgets for the next five years, almost double what was originally allocated for the program. Suddenly the program is flush with funds, and it now has a lead contractor to direct and pump up the effort.
This May, the Department of Defense chose the Boeing Co. as its "lead system integrator." Jacques Gansler, the assistant secretary of defense for acquisition, told Congress in late February that he was absolutely committed to deploying the system. The "only question," he said, "is when." And General Lester Lyles, director of the Ballistic Missile defense Organization (BMDO), defended the program schedule before the Senate in late March, promising "We are on the verge of fielding a system."
Almost all the billions spent on national missile defense up to now have been for hundreds of paper studies and long-shot experiments. But once factories start "bending metal," weapons systems acquire a serious constituency of sub-contractors, chambers of commerce, labor unions, and workers’ families, not to mention congressional hearts and minds. The first production funds, for long-lead items such as rocket boosters, guidance systems, and radar, will likely appear next year in the Pentagon’s budget for fiscal year 2000. General Lyles noted during his Senate testimony, "We’re trying to keep the contractor focused on successful testing and not buying hardware. This is very difficult."
Test Failures Fail to Deter Proponents
Missile defense advocates accept as a matter of faith that inexpensive technology to defend against missile attacks is at hand. The only obstacles to deployment, they believe, are slavish adherence to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the lack of political will in the Clinton Administration. The solution is both "available" and "doable," says House Speaker Newt Gingrich, but the US "government refuses to protect Americans" by immediately deploying a missile shield.
Three recent independent reports, however, have highlighted the formidable technical failings of both the national and theater missile defense efforts thus far. The most recent, and devastating, is a review by former defense officials chaired by retired General Larry Welch warning that the programs were in a "rush to failure." In particular, the Welch panel said, the national missile defense program was "highly unlikely" to succeed, lacked coherence and a realistic plan and should be fundamentally restructured. Congressional proponents and Administration and industry officials have ignored these warnings.
The Welch panel detailed 17 tests conducted by the Department of Defense since 1982 of "hit to kill" interceptors (now 18 with the recent failed THAAD test). Only four actually hit their targets. Worse, of the 14 tests (now 15) directed against high-altitude targets, only two hit, for a13 percent success rate.
The most advanced system now under development, the Army’s Theater High-Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD), has failed in all five of its intercept attempts, most recently on May 12. These tests were against specially designed targets with known trajectories and characteristics that fell well within the expected performance range of the system. Further, the maximum ranges of these targets were 750 to 1,100 kilometers, or about one-tenth the range of an ICBM.
The Navy’s Upper Tier (or Theater-Wide) program has faired no better. Based on an upgrade to the Standard missiles used by AEGIS cruisers and destroyers, this system as been trumpeted by conservative advocates as a quick, cheap solution to both theater and national missile defense. But, here too, the Welch panel documents, the proposed LEAP interceptor has had four failures in four intercept attempts. The panel noted that "the general planning and execution of the THAAD and LEAP programs are inconsistent with the difficulty of the task. These programs are pursuing very aggressive schedules, but these schedules are not supported by the state of planning and testing."
As General Lyles explained last year, "The THAAD systems have been very successful in every aspect except the very critical end-game." That is, they hadn’t actually hit anything. The low number of tests and the weak kill rates warrant deep skepticism regarding future success.
Finally, there have not yet been any intercept tests of the proposed national missile defense system itself and few are scheduled before a deployment decision is to be made. Noting that the national missile defense schedule is shorter than most other major system acquisition programs, the General Accounting Office recently warned:
"Because of the compressed development schedule, only a limited amount of flight test data will be available for the system deployment decision in fiscal year 2000. By that time, BMDO will have conducted only one system-level flight test, and that test may not include all system elements or involve stressing conditions such as targets that employ sophisticated countermeasure or multiple warheads. As a result, not all technical issues, such as discrimination, will be resolved by the time of the deployment review. Also the current schedule will permit only a single test of the integrated ground-based interceptor before production of the interceptor’s booster element must begin. If subsequent tests reveal problems, costly redesign or modification of already produced hardware may be required."
In February, the Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation warned Congress that the program was filled with technical and scheduling risks. "If deployment is required by 2003," he said in his annual report, "the NMD program will have to compress the work of 10 to 12 years into six years." As a result, he says, the program will have to do basic testing after production has already started, and it will have to rely heavily on modeling and computer simulations instead of actual tests.
The director also said that there are several factors that will "significantly limit the ability of the NMD Test and Evaluation program to test, analyze and evaluate system performance" including: planning for only one system-level flight test before the Pentagon holds its deployment readiness review; not testing the actual capability of the ground-based interceptor boosters before the readiness review; not testing the interface between the battle management command, control, and communications system and U.S. Space Command before the review; not planning for any tests against multiple targets before the review; and having low confidence in the models and simulations used instead of real tests since they will have "minimal validation by real flight data."
The Welch Warning
The Welch panel’s critique of the missile defense programs has been the most biting, perhaps because it comes from missile defense advocates familiar with the programs and frustrated by political pressures to rush into production systems they know are nowhere near ready to be tested, let alone fielded. The panel points out that "we are still on ‘step one’ in demonstrating and validating HTK [hit-to-kill] systems." The test failures, they say, actually had little to do with the kill vehicle performance (the warhead that will intercept the incoming missile), but from failures in supposedly mature components in the missiles carrying the warhead to the target "basket." "And even when this first step is achieved, these programs will still have to go through steps two and three: demonstrating reliable HTK at a weapon system level and demonstrating reliable HTK against likely real-world targets." We are still years away from these kinds of tests.
The most basic lesson highlighted by the Welch panel is that Congress cannot legislate physics. Forcing programs into unrealistic schedules has been counter-productive. "The study group was not surprised to find that accepting higher risk is not accelerating fielded capability," their report said. "The virtually universal experience of the study group members has been that high technical risk is not likely to accelerate fielded capability. It is far more likely to cause program slips, increase costs, and even program failures." These experts should know. The panel included Gen. Eugene Fox (ret.), former program manager of the Army’s BMD program; Gen. Don Lionetti (ret.) former commander of the Army space and Strategic Defense command, Rear Admiral Wayne Meyer (ret.), often cited as the "father" of the AEGIS air defense system, former Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Paul Kaminksi and other veterans of the Star Wars program and defense testing programs.
The Welch report document that the national missile defense is shaping up as a classic example of a program rushing to failure. Historically, weapon systems that have been fast-tracked through concurrent production and testing, such as the B-1 and B-2 bombers, have experienced severe production problems, cost growth, and performance degradation.
The experts on the Welch panel are saying as loudly and as clearly as they can that the Administration and Congress should slow down and rethink these programs. "In the judgment of the study group," they conclude, "successful execution of the 3 + 3 formulation on the planned schedule is highly unlikely. The program will benefit from the earliest possible restructuring to contain the risk."
And even if everything in a national missile defense system works as planned, a system of 100 ground-based interceptors with space-based sensor satellites might be able to intercept only a few warheads. Deputy Secretary of Defense John White said this to Congress in June 1996:
"If the number of threats increases or the complexity of the threats increases then this basic system is likely to provide poor protection of the [United States]. This poor protection is due partly to a lack of sufficient discrimination capability against complex threats, which will cause the interceptor inventory to be depleted by shooting at warhead decoys, allowing some real warheads to penetrate the defense. . . . The system is not designed to protect against an unauthorized launch which might contain a large number of warheads (e.g., a full load of warheads from a Russian [submarine]).
Budget Busting
The deficit-busting potential of the entire program ultimately ended previous Republican efforts to pass legislation mandating deployment of a national system. Proponents had anticipated House passage of the Defend America Act in May 1996, when a required cost estimate from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) landed like an incoming Scud. The CBO estimated that the bill’s requirement for a "highly effective defense of all 50 states....augmented over time to provide a layered defense against larger and more sophisticated ballistic missile threats" would cost up to $60 billion for the first stages of its deployment of ground-based interceptors, tracking stations, satellite sensors and hundreds of yet-to-be-invented space-based interceptors and space lasers. A July 1996 CBO report showed that the total cost of the proposed systems could reach $116 billion over 20 years, including operation and support costs.
Freshman Republican deficit hawks in the House revolted. They refused to support a major new government program, even for national defense. After a raucous Republican Caucus session, the leadership was forced to pull the legislation from floor consideration. Despite repeated efforts to reintroduce the bill, they could never muster sufficient support. Many member felt betrayed; they had been led to believe that the program was almost cost-free.
National missile defense is expensive. The types of systems proposed by Congressional advocates have always been estimated to cost tens to hundred of billions of dollars. For example, the G-PALS system proposed by President George Bush was similar to the Defend America proposal and would have cost an estimated $63 billion. The simple anti-ballistic missile system the United States built and deployed at Grand Forks, North Dakota in the early 1970s cost $22 billion in current dollars before President Gerald Ford shut it down.
Threat Inflation
The weak public support for national missile defense, the technological setbacks, the absence of a credible and immediate threat and the general fiscal conservatism of the Congress accounted for the failure of missile defense to advance as a political debate in 1997. Undeterred, conservative leaders now seem to believe that the time is right to try again.
A key focus of their strategy has been the national intelligence estimates of the threat from the proliferation of ballistic missile technology.
The missile threat is not as severe or immediate as frequently suggested by the proponents. Only Russia and China have nuclear-armed ICBMs that can reach the United States, and China has only a dozen or so. Building an ICBM is a difficult and expensive process. National intelligence experts agree that it is very unlikely that additional countries will build ICBMs within the next fifteen years. While there is ample reason for concern about a black market in technologies relevant to ballistic missiles, the idea that a huge ICBM, with all its support equipment could be stolen by or sold to a rogue state seems very farfetched.
Indeed, in its review of the November 1995 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of emerging missile threats to the United States, an independent panel of experts chaired by former-CIA Director Robert Gates stated that
"[F]or sound technical reasons, the United States is unlikely to face an indigenously developed and tested intercontinental ballistic missile threat from the Third World before 2010, even taking into account the acquisition of foreign hardware and technical assistance. That case is even stronger than presented in the NIE."
These assessments are under renewed attack. A congressional-appointed panel will soon release its independent review of the ballistic missile threat to the United States. It is likely that this panel will criticize the official findings as overly optimistic and warn that missile threats can develop more quickly than previously estimated. One case in point is the 1000-kilometer Nodong missile, which has now reportedly been fielded by North Korea even thought it has only been tested once in 1993. (This is quite unusual, since new missiles are usually tested several times before military commanders feel confident enough to field them.) Another case is the surprise test April 6 of the Pakistan 1500-kilometer Ghauri missile, Pakistan’s announced plans to test at least two new previously unknown missiles in the near future and India’s announced intentions to renew testing of its 2000 kilometer-range Agni missile.
These intelligence uncertainties bolster claims by deployment proponents that systems such as the mysterious North Korean Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2 could materialize much more quickly than experts anticipate. The latter missile is said to have sufficient range to hit the outer islands of the Alaskan archipelago, while testing for the former "could begin at any time," according to the Pentagon’s annual report on weapons proliferation released last November.
Missing Matter
The South Asian nuclear blasts, the renewed push for missile defense, and charges of compromising vital national security interests for the sake of Chinese business deals and campaign contributions have rattled the arms control strategy of an administration already reeling under the constant attacks and investigations from its Republican congressional opponents.
Even prior to the recent events, the Administration lacked a clearly articulated strategy for dealing with the problems of global weapons proliferation. Its nuclear arms reduction efforts are on perpetual hold pending Russian Duma ratification of the START II treaty, the implementation legislation for the Chemical Weapons Convention contains killer provisions that will seriously compromise challenge inspections, and the only arms control treaty that President Clinton has negotiated and signed while in office, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, is blocked by a determined Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jesse Helms.
The Administration throughout has lacked a single, determined champion for non-proliferation and threat reduction efforts. The most logical spokesperson, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director John Holum, has been constantly distracted by efforts to abolish his agency. Even with his new appointment as acting Under Secretary of State, his status, portfolio and authority remain uncertain. Nor has the administration organized itself as it did during the 1996 presidential campaign. Then, the president delivered a series of speeches, coordinated with cabinet secretaries who unveiled the "3 + 3" program and its integration in a vision of "three lines of defense" against the spread of weapons of mass destruction: treaties to prevent and reduce the threat, conventional forces to respond to attacks, and lastly, missile defense programs.
Now the pressures are all pushing the administration towards further compromise. Republican efforts to push their bill mandating deployment through the Senate failed on May 13 by only one vote. History has shown that lack of proven technical capability has never prevented congressional approval of military systems. If the projected budgets for a national system can be kept low enough (even if they rise later), international events and political pressure could very likely combine to either pass missile defense legislation or force an administration compromise commitment to deployment. As presidential politics 2000 come into play, the odds increase that the Democratic candidate will seek a way to remove missile defense as a campaign issue.
Despite the low threat, dismal test record, and lack of adequate technology, it appears more likely than anytime in the past decade that the United States will eventually commit to the deployment of a rudimentary national ballistic missile defense system.
Appendix I: A Brief History of Ballistic Missile Defense
The Early History of Ballistic Missile Defense
The earliest recorded use of powered missiles in warfare was in 1232 at the military siege of Kaifeng, former capital of the Chinese province of Henan, in which rockets were used to set fire to tents and wicker-work fortifications. European technology developed these rockets into larger and longer-range weapons. In 1807, for example, Copenhagen and a large French fleet in its harbor were almost totally destroyed by a British naval attack using thousands of iron rockets. The national anthem of the United States reflects the common use of these weapons in naval battles in the 17th and 18th centuries, when Francis Scott Key saw the American flag "by the rocket’s red glare."
The first true ballistic missile—one that has a brief period of powered flight, continues on a ballistic trajectory outside the atmosphere, then curves back to an impact point on earth—was developed at the end of World War II. Serious efforts to find a defense against ballistic missiles began shortly after the first German V-2 slammed into London, without success. Overall, the United States has spent more than $120 billion (in current dollars) in the pursuit of missile defense since the mid-1950s (plus $17 billion on the Patriot system, developed separately by the Army as an anti-aircraft system.) The United States remains the only nation devoting a significant portion of its national defense budget to missile defense.
President Eisenhower began the search for a defense to these missiles when he authorized the operational development of a nuclear-tipped interceptor missile, Nike-Zeus, and commissioned Project Defender to develop components for a nationwide ballistic missile defense system. In the late 1960s, President Richard Nixon approved the deployment of the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system, in response to the Soviet development of an ABM system around Moscow. Although many in Congress were concerned that the system would be ineffective, vulnerable to attack, and easily overwhelmed, it was approved in order not to undermine America’s negotiating position in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
In 1972, the Soviet Union and the United States announced the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 1) as well as an agreement limiting defensive systems--the ABM Treaty. Both nations agreed "that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons." In attaining both of these agreements at the same time, the negotiators intended to insure strategic stability by stopping large scale deployment of strategic defensive systems while attempting to limit offensive forces.
The broad purpose of the ABM Treaty is to prevent either party from fielding a nationwide ballistic missile defense of its territory. The Treaty prohibits the development, testing or deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems, as well as components based on advanced physical principles (Article V and Agreed Statement D). The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency notes the ABM Treaty is designed to "decrease the pressures of technological change and its unsettling impact on the strategic balance."
The proven logic behind the prohibition against a nationwide defense is that an arms race in strategic defense systems fosters the proliferation of offensive missiles and the development of countermeasures to defeat the defense.
The ABM Treaty permitted a limited deployment of defenses. Russia for years maintained today a site of 100 nuclear-tipped interceptors around Moscow. Administration officials have always been confident that United States missiles could penetrate and overwhelm this defense. If the Soviets had deployed more advanced or proliferated defenses, the United States would surely have deployed more advanced devices to ensure the continued capability to penetrate. Russian officials recently indicated that they have recently taken all nuclear warheads off the Moscow ABM interceptors.
In the Administration of President Gerald Ford, officials and military advisors determined that defenses permitted us under the Treaty were not worth maintaining since they could easily be penetrated by Soviet ballistic missiles. As a panel of the George C. Marshall Institute (proponents of deploying a space-based defensive system) noted during the Star Wars debates of the late-1980s, the problems with the 1970s defensive systems were that "a 'ground-based' defense is readily overwhelmed" and that the fixed, ground-based radars on which the system depends are 'easily targeted by the Soviets and vulnerable to destruction in a surprise attack." Ultimately, although the Safeguard system was deployed, it was operational for only a few months in the mid-1970s, and then shut down as obsolete.
The Modern Era of BMD Research
Under President Jimmy Carter, the United States continued an active research program into strategic defenses, averaging just under $1 billion per year. At the beginning of the Reagan Administration, the consensus in the defense community was that ballistic missile defenses could not be militarily effective. Some, however, disagreed and promoted two systems — High Frontier and space-based lasers — each considered by the Reagan Administration and rejected before the President's surprise "Star Wars" speech of March 23, 1983.
High Frontier
Retired General Daniel Graham promised that by using "off-the-shelf" technology the United States could build a network of several hundred satellites carrying rocket interceptors that would defeat any Soviet attack. He claimed the U.S. could launch this system for some tens of billions of dollars. This plan met with nearly universal rejection by defense analysts. In November 1982, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger wrote Graham,
"Although we appreciate your optimism that ‘technicians will find the way and quickly’ we are unwilling to commit this nation to a course which calls for growing into a capability that does not currently exist....While there are many instances in history where technology has developed more quickly than the experts predicted, there are equally as many cases where technology developed more slowly."
Weinberger based his view, in part, on an Air Force Space Division analysis that had concluded High Frontier "has no technical merit and should be rejected... No alternate configuration supported a favorable conclusion." Another Defense Department analysis stated, "It is the unanimous opinion of the Air Force technical community that the High Frontier proposals are unrealistic regarding state of technology, cost and schedule."
Lasers in Space
Another possible defensive system, space-based lasers, was also found to be unpromising. In 1981, the Department of Defense's Science Board concluded unanimously:
"It is too soon to attempt to accelerate space-based laser development towards integrated space demonstration for any mission, particularly ballistic missile defense."
On March 23, 1983, the day of President Reagan's speech, Air Force officials were on Capitol Hill testifying about the space laser programs they ran. General Donald L. Lamberson told the Senate that he could not recommend an acceleration of the space-based laser program on technical grounds "at this point in time." General Bernard Randolph told the House of Representatives that a laser weapon system would require many megawatts of power, would need a precision mirror much larger than any yet manufactured, would weigh 150,000 pounds, and would cost "many, many billions of dollars." He explained that "to point the system at a target would be like pointing from the Washington Monument to a baseball on the top of the Empire State Building and hold it there while both of you are moving.... I view the whole thing with a fair amount of trepidation."
The President's Vision
That night, President Reagan made his speech, asking:
"What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?"
President Reagan called on the scientific community "to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete." The President said he was directing "a long term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles." He said, "It will take years, probably decades, of effort on many fronts."
Congress responded to the President's vision—continued by President Bush—appropriating over $44 billion between 1983 and 1993 for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The annual budget for ballistic missile defense research quadrupled, from $991 million in 1983 to a peak of $4 billion in FY 1988.
Throughout Reagan years, the President's personal sponsorship and persistence propelled the SDI program through Congress far beyond its technical and strategic merits. The President kept his vision alive with repeated references to his hope that SDI could, as he told a 1986 high school graduating class, "put in space a shield that missiles could not penetrate—a shield that could protect us from nuclear missiles just as a roof protects a family from rain."
During those years, the SDI program produced technological advances in some areas, such as sensors, miniaturization, and lasers. In the summer of 1987, the SDI Organization presented to the Department of Defense's Acquisition Board a plan to move from research to the "phased" deployment of strategic defenses. SDI officials advocated the development of a "Strategic Defense System." The Department of Defense approved the new plan, despite the sharp warnings of its own Defense Science Board, which said "there is presently no way of confidently assessing" the system's price or its effectiveness.
The primary mission of Phase I of this system, which was to be deployed in the 1990s, was protecting only nuclear forces and key command centers. The lowered goal now was to "reduce Soviet confidence in the military utility of its ballistic missile force" and to "complicate Soviet attack plans." As SDI officials explained in a 1988 report to Congress:
"These first phases could severely restrict Soviet attack timing by denying them cross-targeting flexibility, imposing launching window constraints, and confounding weapon-to-target assignments, particularly of their hard-target kill capable weapons."
The centerpiece of Phase I was the space-based interceptor, much like BAMBI and High Frontier. Phase I was to have- also include ground-based interceptors; ground- and space-based sensors to detect, track, and target Soviet missiles; and a command, control, and communications network to manage the battle.
Technical Analysis
The major technical problems that remain unresolved and eventually forced the cancellation of these ambitious plans are the same obstacles that have ruled out an effective ballistic missile defense for forty years. The basic problems are:
- the ability of the enemy to overwhelm a system with offensive missiles;
- the questionable survivability of space-based weapons;
- the inability to discriminate among real warheads and hundreds of thousands of decoys;
- the problem of designing battle management, command, control and communications that could function in a nuclear war; and,
- low confidence in the ability of the system to work perfectly the first and, perhaps, only time it is ever used.
These problems have been detailed at length in many independent expert studies, including two that played a major role in the Star Wars debates—the 1987 American Physical Society Directed Energy Weapon study and the 1988 Office of Technology Assessment Ballistic Missile Defense study.
Bu there are literally hundreds of other major technical problems that would have to be resolved before an effective defense can be deployed. In the long term, new technologies, particularly directed energy weapons, hold out the prospect that some of the problems might be solved in the next century. In the short term, there is little reason for technological optimism.
Protecting Against Accidental Launches
The technological problems, the exorbitant cost estimates for deploying a system such as SDS (over $250 billion), and the collapsing Soviet threat led to a restructuring of the program. In January 1991, President Bush abandoned plans to protect against a massive Soviet first strike and redirected the program to a "Global Protection Against Accidental Launch System" (G-PALS) to protect the United States, its forward deployed forces, and its allies and friends from limited ballistic missile attack. This policy shift (though not this particular still-expansive system architecture) had been long urged by some influential members of Congress, including then-Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn. He had said as early as 1988 that:
"If carefully redirected, our research efforts could produce options for limited deployments to deal with the frightening possibility of an accidental or unauthorized missile launch.... This should be coupled with a rigorous unilateral review by both sides of their respective fail-safe procedures and safeguards."
However, analysis of proposed ABM Treaty-compliant accidental launch protection options have raised serious technical, strategic, cost and arms control implications. Dr. Theodore Postol, former scientific advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations, has done extensive work in this area, including an analysis for the House Democratic Caucus in 1988 of the first Accidental Launch Protection system.
Dr. Postol concluded that a limited deployment of 100 missiles, such as the original ERIS system proposed by Lockheed Corporation, might be effective against a small accidental launching, if no penetration aids were used, but the system would have trouble dealing with a launch of more than five missiles. Dr. Postol noted that such a system could not defend the major industrial and population centers of the entire Northeast against a missile launched from a submarine off the coast of the United States. Just what kind of coverage is possible is not clear.
Many analysts believe that an accidental launch protection system would require interceptor sites on both coasts. Such a multiple-site system might require several new large radars and would be much more expensive than a single site system. It would require an abrogation or amendment of the ABM treaty.
Most disturbing, this type of system deployed by either country would have a very large capability to target satellites. Dr. Postol noted in 1988,
"Such a system would introduce a qualitatively new scale of ASAT threat to the satellites of other nations. For example, if the U.S. has an ERIS-like defense system with geosynchronous altitude capabilities in place today, it could be-used to launch a simultaneous attack on two thirds of the Soviet Union's satellites. A similar Soviet ERIS-type system, in turn, could simultaneously attack more than ninety percent of U.S. satellites."
If the Russians viewed the limited nation-wide defense as a foot-in-the-door effort to break out of the ABM Treaty or as a partial defense of ICBM fields (a capability noted by several contractors), they could develop methods to overcome it with relative ease. If the U.S. deploys such a system and the Russians do too, then both sides would certainly deploy penetration aids on their missiles. In that case, our ability to even deal effectively with an accidental launch of a single ICBM would be undermined. (The U.S. now has penetration aids on some of its missiles in response to the limited Russian defense around Moscow.)
The Budget Decline and the Rise of Patriot
From a peak of $4 billion in 1988, funding dropped to an average of $3 billion per year as technology and interested waned. President Bush’s down-sizing of the program’s mission did not convince Congress to provide funding above that level until 1991. Then, the perceived success of the Patriot missile in the Gulf War was used to boost funding back up to $ 4 billion.
For example, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney told the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 21, 1991:
Patriot missiles have demonstrated the technical efficacy and strategic importance of missile defenses. This underscores the future importance of developing and deploying a system for GPALS, to defend against limited missile attacks, whatever their source...Defenses against tactical ballistic missiles work and save lives. The effectiveness of the Patriot system was proved under combat conditions."
SDI Director Henry Cooper told the House Committee on Appropriations on April 17, 1991:
"It is difficult to imagine a better validation of President’s Bush’s redirection of SDI and continued approach to our negotiations with the Soviet Union than the clear lessons of the recent Gulf War."
The SDI Director also told the Government Operation Committee that year:
"Another observation of the Gulf War is that missile defense can ‘work’ well enough to be extraordinarily useful...In the Gulf War, Patriot intercepted 51 to 52 Scuds engaged. This level of effectiveness against a very limited threat would be extremely useful whether the offensive missiles were armed with conventional warheads or weapons of mass destruction."
Israeli officials and experts agree that the Patriot failed in its military mission. The only debate in Israel is whether the Patriot hit one or none of the Scuds it attempted to intercept. Israeli officials tracked each Scud to the ground and thus had the craters to prove that the initial claims of intercept success were false.
In the United States, confusion over the Patriot’s performance still fuels overly optimistic estimates of the effectiveness of new, proposed defensive systems. Many officials, journalists and experts rely on the Army report on Patriot. The Army evaluation was performed by a small team of nine officials from the Patriot Program Office and related Army offices and others from the prime contractor on the program, the Raytheon Company. On average, between three and nine Raytheon personnel supported the Army in the post-war performance analysis and approximately 12 Raytheon personnel provided support to the Army in Saudi Arabia and Israel in analyzing Patriot performance and operations. The Army paid Raytheon $520,000 to provide analysis of Patriot performance in the war. Still, this report remains the only official government assessment ever conducted on the Patriot’s performance.
As a result of Congressional investigations into the performance of the Patriot, the Army revised its claims in 1992. The Army now reports that during Desert Storm, 88 Scuds were launched by Iraq. The first 12 were launched at Israel prior to the deployment of Patriot units in that country. Of the remaining 76 Scuds, somewhat less than 45 were actually engaged by Patriots.
A total of 158 Patriot missiles were fired during the war:
86 Patriots were launched at Scud targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel
30% of the Patriots were launched as Scud debris mistaken for targets
15% of the Patriots were launched against false targets caused by radar backlobe and sidelobe interference (including one launched by accident in Turkey.)
The Army claims, with varying degrees of confidence, that the Patriot Missile system destroyed 52 percent of the Scuds.
The General Accounting Office does not share that confidence. Independent review of the evidence in support of the Army claims reveals that, using the Army’s own methodology and evidence, a strong case can be made that Patriots hit only 9 percent of the Scud warheads engaged, and there are serious questions about these few hits. (GAO Report: "Operation Desert Storm: Data Does Not Exist to Conclusively Say How Well Patriot Performed, " September 1992, NSIAD 920340) The speed of the Scuds, the limitations of the Patriot missile system, and the confusion and targeting difficulties caused by the break-up of the Scud missile as it re-entered the atmosphere seem to have contributed to the high failure rate.
Appendix II: Ballistic Missile Defense Program Descriptions
Current Budgets and Plans
President Clinton in 1993 reduced the missile defense budgets to under $3 billion dollars and renamed the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), while leaving the personnel directing the program largely unchanged. President Clinton also reversed the program’s funding priorities to favor spending on theater ballistic missile defenses over national missile defense system,
In so doing, he followed previous Congressional preferences. Congress had begun the shift by enacted the Missile Defense Act of 1991, which stated that it is :
"...a goal of the United States to provide highly effective theater missile defenses to forward deployed and expeditionary elements of the armed forces of the United States and to friends and allies of the United States."
By 1994, funding for national missile defense was relegated to research only programs with total funding measured in the low hundreds of millions of dollars. Since the Republican Party assumed control of Congress in 1995, however, the Congress has consistently added funds to the Administration’s request, increasing funding once again to $4 billion per year.
This year, as part of the Fiscal Year 1999 $271 billion defense budget, Congress will likely appropriate $3.6 to $3.7 billion for the programs of BMDO. The Administrations budget request was $4.0 billion ($3.6 billion for BMDO, plus $292 million for the Airborne Laser, funding in the Air Force accounts, and $104 million for the Army’s Aerostat program). The Senate Appropriations Committee approved a budget of $3.7 billion, for example, while the House approved a budget of $3.6 billion earlier. These budgets will be reconciled in conferences later this year. These funds include:
$950 million for national missile defense (matching the president’s request)
$401 million for the Army’s Patriot PAC-3 program ($100 million below request)
$295 (or $340, House) million for the Navy’s Upper Tier (theater-wide) program ($190 million was requested)
$497 (or $415, House) million for the Army’s THAAD (cutting procurement funds)
$289 million for the Navy’s Lower Tier (area-wide) program (at request)
$235 (or $292, House) million for the Airborne Laser program
$ 43 million for the Army’s Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)
$ 38 million for Israel’s Arrow program (at request)
$ 73 million for the Space-Based Laser program ($20 million below request)
$ 47 million for Atmospheric Interceptor Technology
Program Descriptions
The so-called lower-tier systems are designed to intercept missiles within the atmosphere and to try to protect relatively small areas, with dimensions of tens of kilometers, and are intended to counter short-range missiles with ranges under 1,000 kilometers. They include:
The Patriot PAC-3 is a major upgrade to the PAC-2 Patriot missile used in Israel and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War with little, if any, success. The actual Patriot missile will be replaced by an entirely new system, the ERINT, which will be much more maneuverable than the original Patriot interceptor and have a hit-to-kill warhead instead of an explosive warhead and proximity fuse. Four ERINT will fit in each of the Patriot launcher canister and be deployed along with PAC-2 Patriots as part of the overall system. An improved "multi-mode" Patriot failed in two out of three intercept tests conducted after the war. The Army found it "operationally unacceptable,"choosing the new ERINT instead. The ERINT will not be fully tested and deployed until 1999.
The Navy Lower Tier (Area-Wide) system is an upgrade to the US Navy’s AEGIS radar system and Standard missile to give them anti-TBM capabilities. The Navy would like to deploy this system on over 50 AEGIS cruisers and destroyers.
The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) is an entirely new missile defense system. Formerly known as Corps SAM, it is being developed jointly with Germany and Italy. France, an original partner, has dropped out, citing the high cost of the program. MEADS is intended to be a highly mobile defense to protect forces on the battlefield.
The higher-tier systems are designed to protest larger areas (hundreds of kilometers) and counter missiles with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. No nation hostile to the United States currently has such missiles, but this is the threat represented by systems reportedly under development in North Korea. Both the Administration and the Congress favor developing systems to intercept these missiles, with Congress trying to force a faster development and deployment schedule. These systems would attempt to intercept targets above the atmosphere.
THAAD has been the primary system proposed by the Administration for this mission. The current design has an interceptor with a peak speed of about 2.6 kilometers per second, with intercept altitudes above 40 kilometers.
The Navy Upper Tier (Theater-Wide) system would use the AEGIS phased-array radar and vertical launcher systems deployed on the Navy’s AEGIS cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyers. The interceptor would probably be a LEAP kill vehicle deployed on a variant of the Navy’s Standard anti-aircraft missile, with a peak speed of about 4.5 kilometers per second and a minimum intercept altitude of 80 kilometers.
There also are three laser systems of interest. The most immediate is the Tactical High Energy Laser system (THEL) that would be deployed against very short-range targets. The MIRACL laser which was used to test anti-satellite capabilities recently, was also used successfully to damage a Katyusha rocket on February 9, 1996 at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The MIRACL is a huge facility, however, and it will be technically challenging to shrink this capability into a rugged system for the battlefield. The current plan is to deploy the system in six or so large trailers.
The Airborne Laser (ABL) would attempt to fit a laser into a Boeing 747 for a demonstrated shoot down in 2002. The Air Force proposes to build a fleet of such planes for $1 billion a copy to patrol friendly airspace. The plane would cruise about 13 kilometers above the surface (and most cloud layers). It would attempt to shoot down tactical ballistic missiles in the boost-phase, the brief period of powered launch, as the missile rises above the clouds. While the beam travels at the speed of light, it will have to dwell on the target for several seconds in order to weaken the 1-3 mm of steel skin of the missiles, triggering either a rupture from the internal pressure of the fuel tanks, or a collapse of the missile along the weakened area.
In order for the laser to bring its laser beam on target and experts estimate it would have to be within 320 to 470 kilometers of an Al-Husayn Scud (the 650 km-range missile encountered in the Gulf War) or within 185 to 320 km for a North Korean Nodong-1 missile (with a reported 1000 km range). This would mean, for example , that it could not be used to counter a Nodong launched from Iran, as the closest friendly territory (Turkey, Israel or the Gulf) would put it out of range.
Finally, the Space-Based Laser would attempt to make real the original cartoon images of the SDI program. At a cost of $1.5 billion, the BMDO hopes to orbit a half-size demonstration satellite in 2005. Based on the Zenith Star program SDI program the so-called "Star Lite" project hopes to build a 17,500-kg laser weapon that can be launched into space atop a Titan IV rocket. It would target missiles in their more vulnerable boost-phase as they rise from the atmosphere. While there have been some advances in mirror technology, miniaturization and beam compensation since cost and technical failures caused the cancellation of the original Zenith Star program in 1993, space lasesr may still be decades away. Even if the formidable technical problems can be solved, officials estimate it could cost as much as $100 billion to build, launch and maintain a constellation of laser weapons in space. And, of course, there are countermeasures that could be deployed by determined opponents to thwart such lasers.
Appendix III: Countries Possessing Ballistic Missiles
This chart is adapted from the forthcoming Tracking Nuclear Proliferation 1998 (July 1998, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). It lists the countries, other than the five nuclear powers, that have operational ballistic missiles with range capabilities over 100 kilometers. Although some countries have demonstrated the ability to use surface-to-air missiles in a surface-to-surface role, these systems are not listed unless they are deployed as dedicated ballistic missiles such as China’s CSS-8. Range is given in kilometers and payload in kilograms
Click Here to see updated ballistic missile charts for available countries.
Abbreviations:
| Status | Country of Origin | Notes |
| D: Development | I: Indigenous | MTCR: Member of Missile Technology Control Regime |
| O: Operational | Unilateral: Unilateral Commitment to MTCR | |
| P: Production | MOU: Memoran, dum of Understanding on adherence to MTCR | |
| S: Storage | SAM: Surface-to-air missile | |
| T: Tested | Mod SAM: SAM modified for use as a ballistic missile | |
| U: Used | From SAM: ballistic missile based on SAM technology |
NOTES
1. Principle sources for this table include Humphry Crum Ewing, Robin Ranger, and David Bosdet, "Ballistic Missiles: The Approaching Threat," Bailrigg Memorandum 9, 1994, Center for Defense and International Security Studies; Robert Shuey with Craig Cerniello, "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Forces of Foreign Countries," CRS, June 5, 1995; Defense Intelligence Agency, "Global Missile Proliferation Threat," Presented to the Missile Technology Control Regime Transshipment Seminar, July 15, 1996; Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997; "Missile Proliferation" in The Military Balance 1995-1996 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995) pp. 281-284; The Military Balance 1997/98 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997); Duncan Lennox, "Ballistic Missiles," Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 17, 1996, p. 40; National Intelligence Estimate, November 1995, printed in Bill Gertz, "Intelligence Report Warns of Missile Launches Against U.S.," Washington Times, May 14, 1996, p. A3; "Artillery Rocket, Ballistic Missile, Sounding Rocket, and Space Launch Capabilities of Selected Countries," Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1996, pp. 162-165; and The Proliferation Primer (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, January 1998).
2. Russia shipped 8 Scud launchers and 24 missiles to Armenia between 1992-95. Nikolai Novichkov, "Russia details illegal deliveries to Armenia," Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 16, 1997, p. 15.
3. Vaseil Lyutskanov, "Existence of Eight SS-23 Missile Complexes Viewed," TRUD, September 13, 1996 in FBIS-EEU-96-179, September 16, 1996.
4. The Czech Republic dismantled its Scud-B inventory between 1988 and 1991. The last SS-23 and associated launcher and support equipment in the Czech Republic was destroyed by mid-1996. "Czechs Destroy Last Soviet Missiles," OMRI Daily Digest, July 26, 1996, p. 4.
5. According to Admiral Studeman, "Pyongyang has provided Scud missiles and production equipment to Egypt." See Senate Committee on Armed Services, Worldwide Threat to the United States, January 17, 1995, p. 39. The DIA lists Egypt as a recipient of missile-related transfers from North Korea. Egypt reportedly received seven shipments of Scud Mod C-related material, possibly including production equipment, in 1996. Bill Gertz, "Cairo’s Missile Buy Violates U.S. Laws," Washington Times, June 21, 1996, p. 1.
6. The DOD lists a 200 km Zelzal missile and a 150 km Nazeat missile, which may be variations of the Mushak series. Iran has also tried to acquire a complete North Korean Nodong system and the Chinese M-9 and M-11 missiles.
7. During the Iran-Iraq War, Libya and Syria shipped Soviet-built Scud-Bs to Iran. DOD lists the Libyan-supplied Scuds as still in Iran’s inventory.
8. A recent intelligence report called the Al-Amoud a "scaled down Scud." See "Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destrcution Programs," U.S. Government White Paper No. 3050, released February 17, 1998.
9. The DOD and DIA say Libya’s only operational missiles are Scud Bs acquired from the USSR. However, then Director of Central Intelligence Deutch listed Libya as one of the recipients of North Korean Scud missiles (possibly the Scud Mod B or C). See Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and Its Interests Abroad, February 22, 1996, p. 9. The DIA also lists Libya as a recipient of missile-related technology from North Korea, but according to a March 1995 CIA report, The Weapons Proliferation Threat, Libya possesses only Scud-Bs. Libya has also sought to acquire the North Korean Nodong missile, but is not reported to have made the purchase yet.
10. According to the DOD, Libya’s indigenous missile program has only succeeded in producing missiles with ranges of about 200 km. Libya hopes that the Al Fatah will reach ranges of up to 950 km, but so far it has only been successfully tested to 200 km. A Serbian firm, JPL Systems, is reportedly aiding Libya’s Al Fatah missile program. Bill Gertz, "Serbia Is Helping Libya With Ballistic Missiles, CIA Says," Washington Times, November 12, 1996, p. 3.
11. "North Korea builds and is likely to offer for export earlier Scud-based, short-range ballistic missile systems in the 300, 500, and probably 800 kilometer range. We are talking here about what is known as Scud B, C and D systems." Admiral Studeman, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Worldwide Threat to the United States, January 17, 1995, p. 18. An 800 km Scud Mod D has not been listed by any other sources.
12. A December 1995 DIA report estimates that the Nodong can carry a 1,000 kg payload to 1,000 kilometers. Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength Update 1995, December 1995, p. 6.
"We assess the No Dong is capable of delivering a 700 kg payload to 1,000 kilometers." Admiral Studeman, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Worldwide Threat to the United States, January 17, 1995, p. 39. Reportedly, Syria, Libya and Iran are interested in purchasing the No Dong when it is operational.
13. The Department of Defense Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997, notes that the Taepo Dong 1 has a range of at least 1,500 km. Other sources including Shuey and Cerniello, op. cit., and Ewing et al., suggest a range of 2000 km and a payload of 1,000 kg. The CIA believes "it is unlikely Pyongyang could deploy Taepo Dong I or Taepo Dong II missiles before three to five years." Responses to Questions for the Record, dated April 3, 1995, from Admiral William Studeman, Acting Director of Central Intelligence in Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Intelligence Review, January 10, 1995, p. 105.
14. One analysis suggests that Pakistan developed the Hatf 2 based on French sounding rocket engines that it had obtained. See S. Chandrashekar, "An Assessment of Pakistan’s Missile Capability," Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, March 1990, p. 4.
15. Several reports raised speculation about the development of the new IRBM Ghauri missile in Pakistan prior to its surprise test April 6, 1998. The missile has an apparent range of 1500-2000 km. See Ben Sheppard, "Too close for comfort: ballistic ambitions in South Asia," Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1998, pp. 32-5; "Pakistan: Pakistani Daily Reports Ghauri Missile Development," Rawalpindi Jang, January 3, 1998, p. 4, translated in FBIS-TAC-98-005, January 5, 1998.
16. The United States is assisting Romania in the dismantlement of its Scud missiles and launchers. Prepared Statement of Thomas McNamara, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Senate Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion, March 12, 1997.
17. See the CDISS website at http://www.cdiss.org/btablea2.htm#SAUDI.
18. Slovakia’s possession of SS-23 missiles has been confirmed by Prime Minister Meciar. Nora Sliskova, "Meciar Comments on NATO Referendum, SS-23 Missiles," PRAVDA, November 30, 1996, in FBIS-EEU-96-232, December 4, 1996.
19. Admiral Studeman lists a Scud Mod C transfer from North Korea to Syria. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Worldwide Threat to the United States, January 17, 1995, p. 39. The Nonproliferation Center’s Weapons Proliferation Threat, March 1995 states that Syria has both the Soviet-supplied Scud-B and North Korean-supplied Scud Mod-C.
20. This program was reportedly begun in the fall of 1995 and is based on the Sky Bow II SAM. Lu Chao-lung, "Taipei to Test Surface-to-Surface Missiles," CHUNG-KUO SHIH-PAO, September 11, 1996 in FBIS-CHI-96-180, September 17, 1996.
21. Duncan Lennox, op. cit., lists Zaire as a possessor of Scud B variants. North Korea is the only known supplier of such missiles, but this transfer has not been otherwise confirmed.
