Source: Carnegie
Andrew Kuchins, Director, Russian-Eurasian Program
Memo No. 165, prepared for the Program
on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS), November 2000
In the first post-Cold War decade the international system
has experienced a period of relative peace among the great powers not seen since
the Concert of Europe made its debut after the Napoleonic wars nearly 200 years
ago. The United States is enjoying a period of international dominance even
greater than that after World War II, and there is no imaginable competitor
on the horizon for at least a decade or two. The most economically and technologically
advanced countries in Europe and Asia that aligned with the United States in
the Cold War continue to bandwagon with US power. Decisions that the next US
administration takes on key security issues, including nuclear arms reductions,
national missile defense (NMD), and further North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) expansion, will have considerable influence in shaping the policies of
existing and emerging great powers with ambivalent attitudes towards the US--notably
Russia, China, and India. The system may look overwhelmingly unipolar today,
but history suggests that such moments are ephemeral, and we should expect and
prepare for a more complex and perhaps dangerous multipolarity to emerge in
the first quarter of the new century.
Three years ago in a PONARS policy memo addressing Sino-Russian relations and
Eurasian security I concluded that the emergence of some kind of Eurasian, anti-US
security alliance led by Russia and China was a highly unlikely worst-case scenario
that could only come about as a result of "a series of major foreign and
security policy blunders by the United States and its allies." Reasonable
people may disagree about the wisdom of the US-British bombing of Iraq in December
1998, the expansion of NATO's membership and mission, and the 1999 Kosovo War,
but the net result is further alienation of Russia from the West--which has
been codified in its foreign and security policy doctrines enunciated this year.
In December 1998, then Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov in New Delhi
broached the vague notion of a "strategic triangle" comprised of Russia,
China, and India, that would serve as a stabilizing force in international security.
The proposal was not received with great enthusiasm in either Beijing or New
Delhi, and most Western commentators similarly did not take it very seriously
due to long-standing and deep-seated differences between India and China. It
is well known, for example, that subsequent to the Indian nuclear tests in May
1998 the Indian Defense Minister cited China as the most serious threat to India,
one that necessitated the development of an Indian strategic deterrent. A triangular
strategic alliance may not be imminent, but the coincidence of interests between
China, Russia, and India has grown in the past three years. For Russia, the
"strategic partnerships" it is developing on a bilateral basis with
China and India constitute increasingly important components of its overall
foreign policy, which has steadily drifted away from the West during the Yeltsin
era. This memo will analyze the dynamics of these relationships in the context
of Russia's overall foreign and security policy, how their trajectories could
shape the evolution of the international system, and their implications for
US policy.
Russia's Strategic Partnerships with China and India
Before discussing the significance of Russia's strategic partnerships with China
and India, we must point out the obvious yet crucial point that Russia today
enjoys no alliance relationship with any state remotely resembling a great power.
Not since the short-lived Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s has Moscow embraced
another great power in an alliance relationship, and since the dissolution of
the Warsaw Pact, Russia has been bereft of alliance partners except those that
are failed or failing states. For a country like the United States, in the enviable
position of strong alliance relations with powerful states, it is easy to be
dismissive of the more vague notion of "strategic partnerships." But
for Russia, these are very significant relationships, including its floundering
"strategic partnership" with the United States. We also see, however,
by those wishing to critique US policy toward Russia, or seeking to read malign
intent on the part of Russia, a tendency to overstate the significance of Moscow's
strategic partnerships, especially with China. The Russian leadership has elevated
some bilateral relationships to the level of "strategic partnership"
because of perceived long-term and important shared interests--which are not
necessarily directed against a third party. The proliferation of strategic partnerships
on the part of Russia and other powers (including the United States) also reflects
an international system in transition. It is possible that some of these relationships
could evolve into tighter alliances, but that is certainly not clear at this
point.
The Sino-Russian strategic partnership predates the Indo-Russian strategic partnership,
which was finally realized with President Vladimir Putin's trip to India in
October of this year. The two relationships share a number of common features,
but there are some important differences as well. In each case there is strong
rhetorical support for a multipolar world order not dominated by the United
States. All three countries support an enhanced role for the United Nations,
and Russia has specifically endorsed India's candidacy to join the UN Security
Council. All three denounced the NATO action in Kosovo as a violation of international
law since it did not receive a UN mandate. All three are also very sensitive
to violations of national sovereignty and extremely reluctant to invite international
mediation of challenges to their territorial integrity in Taiwan, Kashmir, and
Chechnya.
China, Russia, and India share sensitivities about Islamic "threats,"
as each country has large Muslim populations, and each shares borders with states
containing Muslim majorities. In particular, they fear that the increasingly
weak and failing states of Central Asia will serve as conduits for more radical
Muslim groups, terrorist activities, and drug trafficking--which will erode
their authority in peripheral territories. They view Afghanistan under the Taliban
leadership as the dangerous hub of these activities.
India and China have increasingly relied on Russia as a source of conventional
weapons and possibly other weapons technologies. China and India are the two
biggest clients of the struggling Russian military industrial complex, as each
purchase now about $1 billion worth of arms a year, and these relationships
are growing. Since domestic Russian procurement virtually dried up in the 1990s,
arms sales to China and India are a vital, if controversial, national security
interest for Moscow. There is clearly a competitive aspect to Chinese and Indian
conventional purchases from Russia since Beijing and New Delhi to some extent
regard each other as a security threat.
There is also further potential for growth in Russia's economic relations in
the energy sphere as the Chinese and Indian economies continue to grow at a
rapid pace. So although today Russia remains a less significant trade partner
for China and India than vice versa, overall trade relations will likely grow
considerably in the next decade.
On nuclear security, the triangular dynamics between Russia, China, and India
become far more complicated. Both Russia and China denounced India's nuclear
tests in 1998, although Russia's criticism was milder, and both Moscow and Beijing
have urged India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). If the nuclear rivalry between China and India intensifies, Russia's
non-partisan stance as strategic partner to both may become less sustainable.
Possible US deployment of national and/or theater missile defense systems also
elicits different kinds of concerns from Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi. Russians
are concerned primarily about the deployment of a NMD system that could eventually
compromise the Russian strategic deterrent. The Chinese strongly oppose US deployment
of theater systems in the Asia Pacific and especially the potential sharing
of such systems with Taiwan. But Beijing is also concerned about so-called "thin"
national defenses designed to address small attacks and accidental launches,
because these defenses would compromise existing Chinese deterrent capabilities.
India is opposed to US deployment of NMD because it will likely hasten Chinese
efforts to modernize and expand their nuclear forces, thus compelling India
to deploy a more robust nuclear deterrent than it might otherwise.
Even though Moscow has emphasized the long-term nature of its shared interests
with China and India, the Sino-Russian relationship is controversial among Russian
policymaking elites in a way that the Indo-Russian relationship is not. Russia
shares a long border with China and a long history of often bitter and complex
relations. There is an implicit Russian hedge position on China that is amplified
by the growing sense of economic and demographic vulnerability of the Russian
Far East and (to a lesser extent) to Moscow's "sphere of influence"
in Central Asia. While perhaps for the near future China will focus on its interests
in Taiwan and the South China Sea, there exists a barely-veiled Russian fear
that continued Russian weakness will invite Chinese infiltration and eventual
control of some Russian territory. Russia shares no border with India, and despite
the wild designs of nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the like
for Moscow's "drive to the South," it is nearly impossible to foresee
circumstances that could lead to conflict between Russia and India. This is
not to say that conflict with China is at all likely, but rather that the sensibilities
are different.
There are a number of other obstacles that militate against the establishment
anytime soon of a triangular alliance between Russia, China, and India. India
worries about Chinese-Burmese cooperation, and the Chinese naval presence in
the Bay of Bengal is driving India to modernize and expand its naval forces.
The Indo-Chinese border dispute is unlikely to lead to military conflict, but
it is a source of estrangement, especially given the presence of the Dalai Lama
and a large Tibetan population in India. Russia's status as a falling great
power, while China and India are on the rise, also adds to the unease and potential
instability in the triangular relationship.
Implications for US Policy
Conclusions that the Sino-Russian and Indo-Russian strategic partnerships have
either taken the place of the US-Russian strategic partnership, or are inherently
threatening to US interests are either meaningless or simply incorrect. Particularly
with Russia and China, but also with India, the United States holds a great
deal of leverage--primarily by virtue of its position as global economic leader--but
also as global military leader and senior partner in the most powerful European
and Asian alliances. For example, when US trade with China is approximately
ten times the level of Sino-Russian trade, it is absurd to claim, as some do,
that the United States is somehow "the odd man out." It was very telling
in recent months how President Clinton received a far warmer reception in India
than did President Putin. And that should not be surprising since the United
States can bring far more to the table that can influence India both positively
and negatively than can Russia. If the United States were to find itself in
a position where Sino-Russian and Indo-Russian relations became more threatening,
this would represent US policy failures toward India and China at least as (if
not more) serious than those toward Russia.
The United States shares concerns with China, India, and Russia about instability
in Central Asia, the growing influence of Islam in the region, the terrorist
threat, and the debilitating impact of narcotic trafficking. It seems that the
growth in authoritarian tendencies of Central Asian leaderships coincides with
a reduction in their capacity to govern. But for the United States these are
shared interests from a distance, and the threats are of far greater consequence
for the Central Asian states themselves and the powers on their borders. It
is possible that India could join the Shanghai Forum--composed of Central Asian
states, Russia, and China--and that this may develop into a more useful institution
for jointly dealing with problems in the region. The United States must be very
careful about its security commitments to the region since it risks bolstering
highly corrupt and increasingly non-democratic governments in an area where
its security interests are minimal.
Sino-Russian and Indo-Russian arms sales and technological cooperation are naturally
a more serious security concerns for the United States for a number of reasons.
Increased conventional capacity could embolden China to take more risks over
Taiwan. The sales encourage Sino-Indian arms racing, which will have spillover
effects in South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia. US policymakers would view
most dimly transfers of ballistic missile technologies and cooperation that
could possibly contribute to the development of Chinese and Indian nuclear forces.
So far, however, despite the near desperate straits of its military industrial
complex, Russian arms sales to China and India have not fundamentally changed
the balance of power in South Asia or East Asia. Since coming to power, the
Putin regime shows signs of greater restraint in its conventional arms sales
relationship with China as the Chinese seek more advanced weaponry and licensing
agreements.
There is one near-term measure the United States could undertake that has the
potential both to accelerate and deepen Sino-Russian and Indo-Russian strategic
cooperation, as well as unleash a chain of very destabilizing events. If the
next US administration were to move swiftly to unilaterally abrogate the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty in order to begin deploying a robust NMD system, all bets
are off for the relative great-power stability we are now experiencing, not
to speak of the non-proliferation regime at large. This will put a great deal
of pressure on China to rapidly expand and modernize its nuclear forces, and
India will then respond, followed by predictable responses from Pakistan. The
Russians will abrogate the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II agreement,
and we will vastly diminish the possibility for truly deep cuts in nuclear arsenals
and probably scuttle a whole series of measures designed to bring greater safety
and security to the Russian nuclear weapons and materials complex.
It may still be unlikely that Russia, China, and India would respond by stepping
up their strategic partnerships to the level of alliances directed against the
United States, but there would likely be growth in strategic cooperation to
develop and share technologies to counter missile defenses. But if Sino-Indian
relations were to sour and result in a greatly accelerated nuclear arms race
including more overt Chinese support for Pakistan's nuclear program, Russia's
capacity to maintain "strategic partnerships" with both countries
will come under much stress. There is clearly much uncertainty now as to how
the United States will handle the missile defense issue and its subsequent impact
on other nuclear states. Putin's proposal in June to jointly develop technology
with the United States and Europe for theater missile defenses including boost-phase
options highlighted possible deep differences between Moscow and Beijing over
the missile defense issue. The Chinese wonder, and they are not alone in this
regard, whether this proposal was simply a political-diplomatic measure to influence
the imminent US deployment decision or whether Moscow seriously entertains cooperation
with the United States in this field. US alliances are not the subject of this
short essay, but US unilateral defection from the ABM Treaty absent clear changes
in the missile proliferation threat (i.e., another North Korean launch or an
Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile test, for example) will also be deeply
damaging to NATO and alliance relations with Japan. But most fundamentally,
this move would unleash a dynamic that is not fully predictable, except that
it is likely to be deeply unsettling for the strategic stability that currently
exists amongst the world's major powers.