Russia Votes as Putin Says

Source: Carnegie

By Masha Lipman

Originally published in The Washington Post, December 9, 2003.

MOSCOW -- Vladimir Zhirinovsky, with his ultranationalist rhetoric and abusive manners, is back in vogue in Russian politics. He had lost three-quarters of his voters over the past 10 years, but in Sunday's elections to Russia's parliament, the Duma, his party doubled its presence. And he was not alone in the populist-nationalist triumph; in all, the nationalist vote was more than 20 percent. Meanwhile, the pro-Western liberal constituency will go unrepresented: The two liberal parties, which jointly won more than 14 percent of the vote in the last election, failed to make it beyond the 5 percent threshold required to secure representation in the parliament.

Nationalists soaring, liberals in free fall and a huge majority unenthusiastically but dutifully voting "as the big boss says": Such are the fruits of Vladimir Putin's first term as president. Of course, Sunday's vote was not wholly of Putin's making; it was a reflection of the public mood. But Putin's policies have increased the tendencies toward submission to state authority and stirred up social envy and hatred.

The parliamentary campaign was closely managed by the Kremlin. The goal was to ensure a solid majority for United Russia, the party put together by Putin's aides to serve as a legislative base for the government. Several measures were taken to clear the path for party loyalists: Local governors were granted United Russia membership and ordered to deliver votes in their regions; unwanted candidates were removed from races by compliant courts; state-run television provided generous and favorable coverage of the "party of power," along with a thorough vilification of the Communists, United Russia's main rival.

About 37 percent of voters did what the state urged them to do. But the diligence of the Kremlin operation played into Zhirinovsky's hands. With the victory of United Russia so predictable, the campaign became almost insipid. Zhirinovsky, with his scandalous statements and buffoonery, was a welcome alternative. He may have been ugly, but at least he wasn't dull.

And there was another, more important reason for Zhirinovsky's reemergence. The arrest of oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky has brought to the fore public frustration over the unfair distribution of property in Russia. Government officials and the United Russia leadership tend to be careful on the subject, preferring to talk about the rule of law and due punishment for tax evaders. But the aggrieved and disenchanted in the society are not satisfied. They yearn for a real redistribution and revenge on those who have profited; the government, while making moves in that direction, is not inclined to go so far.

Zhirinovsky knows how to cater to these feelings. Unbound by political correctness, he urges locking up all the tycoons -- the longer the term the better -- or even shooting them. He tells one and all whom to blame for the miseries of the Russian people: the non-Russian ethnic minorities, including people from the Caucasus. He soothes hard feelings over the lost empire by pledging that Russian military might will return and that Russia's dominance will be restored.

Ten years ago, when Zhirinovsky won his first big victory (his party led all others in the parliamentary elections), it was regarded by many in Russia as a disgrace. Support for Zhirinovsky was the epitome of the irresponsible vote. Gradually, however, the Russian people seemed to become a bit more mature and more reluctant to give their votes to this eccentric fellow who says such outrageous things and who makes them laugh. His party barely got to the Duma in 1999. It looked like Zhirinovsky's political career was coming to an end.

But now he's back, and this time the disgrace should be blamed on Putin's policies. What's more, now he has company: another nationalist faction. The party is called Rodina (Motherland) and it professes ideas similar to Zhirinovsky's. Yet its leaders are anything but eccentric buffoons of the Zhirinovsky type. Sergei Glazyev is a populist economist who found some following for his plan to strip the Russian tycoons of their super-profits and to return the $30 billion thus procured back to the state. Dmitri Rogozin is a populist nationalist who stands up for ethnic Russians and pushes for Russia's dominance over the ex-Soviet states.

Rodina was an in vitro baby specially manufactured by the Kremlin to diminish support for the Communists. Now, with 9 percent of the Duma vote, it is a force to be reckoned with.

The Kremlin apparently counts on Rodina to reserve its populist nationalism for public use and join the pro-Putin majority on substantial matters. After all, Zhirinovsky was pretty tame in the previous legislatures. But populist politics are easy to unleash and difficult to contain in a country such as Russia, with its impoverished, frustrated population and absence of democratic safeguards.

Putin opted for marginalizing the Westernized, liberal elites and rejecting the principles of democratic politics. He chose to consolidate his support among the broader masses, which find it hard to adjust to the world of competition and choice and feel more comfortable under state control. Putin hopes the result will be the situation he is most comfortable with: a subdued and apathetic nation for him to govern.

Masha Lipman, editor of the Carnegie Moscow Center's Pro et Contra Journal, writes a monthly column for The Post.