Source: Wall Street Journal Europe

Andrew KuchinsU.S. Vice President Richard Cheney made clear last week in Vilnius that he is not pleased with Russia's democratic backsliding, human-rights abuses and rough behavior in its neighborhood. And to hammer the point home Mr. Cheney then broke bread with the noted democrat, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazerbayev, who got a complete pass on his dubious record. Alert the media: We've identified double standards in U.S. foreign policy!

But the real story that Mr. Cheney and many in Washington and elsewhere have a hard time dealing with is that Russia is back in the game. Rapidly accumulating oil and gas wealth is fueling a new assertiveness in Russian foreign policy that has been missing for nearly 20 years. Whatever issue we look at in 2006 -- be it Iran, the Middle East peace process, gas supplies to Europe or accession to the World Trade Organization -- Russia is more confidently defending its interests as it perceives them far more than two years ago, or even six months ago.

Russia's previous two decades of geopolitical decline started with the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and included the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and, of course, the collapse of the Soviet Union. But it is possible that 2005 may be viewed retrospectively as a historical turning point in Eurasia -- the end of Russia's decline. This recovery might be based on the shaky foundation of high oil prices, but it's real nonetheless.

The momentum of "color revolutions" has dissipated as at-risk countries and their great power supporters have mobilized to prevent further spread. While falsified elections in Kyrgyzstan resulted in regime change last spring, subsequent elections in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Belarus have been effectively managed with incumbent presidents, ruling parties or elites holding on to power. Authoritarian ranks are drawing in tighter formation -- led by Moscow and Beijing -- with Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov, Belarus's Alexander Lukashenko, and others to resist U.S.-led democratization.

The eviction of U.S. military forces in Uzbekistan and the subsequent signing of a security alliance between the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan last year also marks a turning point. If one chooses to look at the U.S.-Russian relationship in Eurasia as a zero-sum game, then what took place in Uzbekistan marked the first clear victory of Russian interests at America's expense. The durability of this particular victory remains to be seen, but as long as record-high energy prices fuel Russia's status both substantively and symbolically as an energy superpower this competition is likely to persist if not grow.

The Russians are aggressively playing their energy card to expand economic, commercial and political influence throughout Europe. They're playing hard on the inclinations of France and Germany to appease their great gas supplier to the east, and to cater to Russian interests at the expense of new European states, notably Poland and Ukraine. If oil and gas prices remain high in coming years or even grow, so grows the leverage of Russia in this region and the world. This is a simple but powerful formula and certainly one that Mr. Cheney understands.

The Russian recovery is truly impressive. According to Moscow-based investment bank Troika Dialog, in 1999 Russian GDP in nominal terms was less than $200 billion; in 2006 it'll be close to $1 trillion -- growing at a rate of more than 25% per year, though nominal dollar growth rates will of course taper downward as the ruble appreciates in value. Since Russia's wealth is based on strategic commodities -- first and foremost hydrocarbons -- rather than information technologies or consumer goods, Russia's weight as a strategic, geopolitical player will increase. It will be able to punch above its weight class to some degree. There are many questions about Russia's capacity to be a real "energy superpower," something still unprecedented and rather undefined, but we better take the notion seriously when we consider Russian interests.

Throughout the 20th century, and notably during the second half of the Cold War, the currency of power was military forces. Remember Stalin's famous question about how many divisions the Pope commands? After a 15-year retreat from power politics, the Russians are returning with a different instrument, oil and gas. The good news is that oil and especially gas trade creates mutual dependencies. To the extent that Europeans can more efficiently use energy and diversify supply sources (not easy to do in the near term), Russian leverage is diminished. It would be extraordinarily naive not to expect Russia to try to use its economic/energy leverage to advance political goals. It is fine to say "let commercial and market interests decide," but we should expect Russian to try to balance commercial with political state interests.

Some, like Mr. Cheney evidently, will interpret Russia's behavior as "neo-imperial" -- or worse. Maybe it is. But this kind of flexing of strategic muscles is expected of great powers. And history suggests Russia is prone to rather rough behavior with its less powerful neighbors. It is as if the West has forgotten what Russia is like, but now the Russians are acting like...well, Russians.

Since Russia has been for all intents defensive, if not out of the power game, for the past 15-20 years, it may now have a tendency to overplay its cards. The rush of petro-wealth is having the effect of "psychological steroids" or mega antidepressants on Russian behavior. There is also a tendency in Washington to overreact to aspects of Putin's Russia that America does not like. Instead, the U.S. needs to very carefully and wisely play its cards to advance its own interests and hold no illusions about how the Kremlin interprets its interests and the U.S. capacity to shape those interests.

We seem to be on a slippery slope toward a new Cold War today. We better get off it, take a deep breath, and think very hard about the real relationship we want with Russia -- not the one we might like to imagine.