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Bush and Putin Have a Lot of Work to Do

Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin were all smiles when they met Wednesday at a Moscow refueling stop during Bush's trip to Asia. But the truth is that the U.S.-Russian relationship has reached its lowest point since the end of the Cold War.

published by
International Herald Tribune
 on November 17, 2006

Source: International Herald Tribune

Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin were all smiles when they met Wednesday at a Moscow refueling stop during Bush's trip to Asia. But the truth is that the U.S.-Russian relationship has reached its lowest point since the end of the Cold War.

Bush and Putin will meet again this weekend in Hanoi at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. Late in their respective terms in office, this could be their last chance to reverse the steep decline in bilateral relations.

At the APEC summit in Shanghai in 2001, the U.S. and Russian presidents announced a "strategic partnership." At the time, the vision made sense: Putin was the first foreign leader to call Bush after 9/11 to pledge solidarity with the United States. But it has turned out to be neither strategic nor a partnership.

Hanoi is a striking setting for the meeting. The first image that jumps to mind is of a long proxy war between the former Soviet client state and an America fearful of toppling Communist dominoes. But that was 30 years ago. Vietnam has just taken another big step out of its Cold War past by receiving an invitation to join the World Trade Organization.

Coincidentally, in Hanoi Bush and Putin will sign a long-delayed bilateral trade agreement, opening the door to Russia's WTO accession. Expanding economic ties, using the WTO agreement as a launch point, could be the key to improving long-term relations. Much of the tension between America and Russia can be traced to the lack of a strong economic foundation capable of cushioning political blows. Today, the contested issues are growing in number and intensity, mutual suspicion is deepening and the areas of cooperation are at a bare minimum. Where Putin has a litany of complaints, Bush has a mounting list of concerns:

  • The United States sees Russia as bullying its much weaker neighbors;
  • Moscow sees America as encroaching in its region, promoting regime change and encircling Russia;
  • energy, once a big hope for partnership, is now used by Russia as a coercive tool;
  •  Central Asia, once a fulcrum of cooperation, is the setting for dangerous competition over political influence and natural resources;
  •  the paramount shared goal of preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is overshadowed by diverging approaches toward the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran.

Perhaps most damaging of all, Russophobia in the United States and anti-Americanism in Russia are rampant. If unchecked, these attitudes could become self-fulfilling prophecies.

Although the WTO deal is an important sign of renewed cooperation, the eventual Congressional debate over Russia's trade status could reignite controversy. To accord Russia unconditional normal trade relations, Congress would have to lift the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment originally imposed on the Soviet Union for restricting immigration.

Bush now has a chance to make good on his longstanding commitment to remove the Jackson-Vanik obstacle, though the task could be harder now that his party has lost control of Congress.

Bush and Putin should also build on the WTO breakthrough and try to steadily enlarge the ambit of bilateral cooperation. The gains for global security could be substantial.

Concrete areas of mutual interest to focus on in the near term include:

  • strengthening sanctions on North Korea and Iran as an inducement for direct negotiations;
  • finalizing an agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, allowing America and Russia to develop a more robust international nonproliferation regime;
  • initiating the next chapter of strategic arms reduction talks;
  • working together to reduce tensions in the South Caucasus, specifically in Georgia's breakaway regions;
  • avoiding conflict over Kosovo's final status by supporting a negotiated settlement.

Russia and the United States need a change of direction, which only the two presidents can signal. Their meeting in Vietnam should remind them of history's blind alleys - and the potential advantages of making U-turns.

Dmitri Trenin is deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Mark Medish is a vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington.

This article first appeared in the International Herald Tribune on November 17, 2006. 

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.