Paper
An exploration into how India and Pakistan have perceived each other’s manipulations, or lack thereof, of their nuclear arsenals.
Rakesh Sood
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REQUIRED IMAGE
Other
Business Opportunities and Threats in Newborn Nuclear Nations
In this paper presented to GDF Suez University's "Nuclear Prospective Seminar" in Paris, Pierre Goldschmidt highlights the high volume of recent nuclear agreements forming between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states.
Published on Sep 26, 2008
Source: Paper presented at GDF Suez University
In this paper presented to GDF Suez University's "Nuclear Prospective Seminar" in Paris, Pierre Goldschmidt highlights the high volume of recent nuclear agreements forming between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. In particular, Russia, France, China, and the United States appear to be taking advantage of growing interest in nuclear energy – spurred by a combination of geopolitical and economic factors – by offering to supply nuclear material, equipment, and knowledge to so-called "newborn nuclear nations," which presently lack adequate infrastructure and operation experience. Current national export rules and laws are simply not enough to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. To minimize the incentive for domestically constructing sensitive fuel-cycle facilities, Dr. Goldschmidt argues for the strongest possible nuclear fuel supply guarantees, including generic export licenses subject to well-defined safety, security, and nonproliferation criteria. He also underlines the need for the nuclear industry to include specific (and transparent) nonproliferation conditions in future supply contracts.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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