Article
Pierre Goldschmidt
{
"authors": [
"Pierre Goldschmidt"
],
"type": "other",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "NPP",
"programs": [
"Nuclear Policy"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"Middle East",
"Iran",
"Syria"
],
"topics": [
"Nuclear Policy"
]
}
Source: Getty
Other
Looking Beyond Iran and North Korea for Safeguarding the Foundations of Nuclear Nonproliferation
The safeguards system established by the International Atomic Energy Agency is failing to detect potential issues of noncompliance because it doesn’t have the legal authority needed to fulfill its mandate and it lacks the necessary cooperation from member states.
Published on Nov 3, 2011
Source: NPEC Conference
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are both the principal means of verifying a state’s compliance with international nuclear obligations, as well as detecting the potential transgression of these obligations. In the coming years, the IAEA will be asked to safeguard an increasing number of nuclear facilities, including new types of facilities (such as laser enrichment and pyroprocessing plants, floating nuclear power plants and nuclear propelled submarines) and decommissioned ones. It will need additional funds to procure new types and more effective equipment, and expertise to carry out these additional responsibilities.
But the real issue does not stem from resource constraints. Even with greater human and financial resources there is nothing more the Agency would have done in fulfilling its verification mandate in Iran and North Korea.
The real constraint was identified by current IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards Herman Nackaerts in a July 2011 speech. “Experience has shown,” he stated, “that proliferation risk is not only associated with the amount of declared nuclear material that a State possesses or the number and type of declared facilities. Indeed, the major proliferation challenges have arisen in States with limited nuclear fuel cycle facilities, and involved previously exempted or undeclared nuclear material.... [The safeguards] system was manifestly failing in its primary objective, namely, to detect activities that did raise potential compliance issues and proliferation concerns – such as those undertaken, for instance, in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Iran.”
There are two main reasons the safeguards system has been “manifestly failing.” First, the Department of Safeguards doesn’t have the legal authority it needs to fulfill its mandate and to provide the assurances the international community is expecting from its verification activities. Second, the Department lacks the necessary cooperation and transparency from Member States of the IAEA. Redressing both deficiencies would significantly strengthen the role of IAEA safeguards in preventing further proliferation.
1. George Santayana (1863-1952) was a Spanish American philosopher, essayist, poet, and novelist.
About the Author
Pierre Goldschmidt
Former Nonresident Senior Associate, Nuclear Policy Program
Goldschmidt was a nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment.
- A Realistic Approach Toward a Middle East Free of WMD
- Serious Deficiencies Exposed by Latest IAEA Safeguards Implementation ReportArticle
Pierre Goldschmidt
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- The Impacts of the Houthis’ Advance Could Extend Well Beyond Saudi ArabiaCommentary
The Horn of Africa countries are among those facing a new security calculus.
Andrew Leber, Lesley Anne Warner
- Untangling the Nuclear Knot: A Constructive Agenda for Managing China’s Nuclear Relations with the United States and Its AlliesPaper
The nuclear relationship between China and the United States is increasingly shaped by widening perception gaps rather than deliberate strategic design.
Tong Zhao
- Three Ruptures and the End of Pax Americana in the Middle EastCommentary
As the U.S. stumbles in its war with Iran, we are likely to see an acceleration of its disengagement from the region.
Michael Young
- In Pursuit of Nuclear-Powered Submarines: Australia, South Korea, And JapanResearch
A look at why states without nuclear weapons are seeking naval nuclear propulsion, whether they can legally and technically deliver it, what it will cost them, and what responsible stewardship of the capability would look like.
Jamie Kwong
- The Iran War’s Climate, Environmental, and Human Security FalloutArticle
Understanding the climatic pain points is necessary for policymakers hoping to minimize the war’s negative environmental consequences.
Alejandro Martin Rodriguez, Joy Arkeh, Sarah Yerkes
