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Europe and India: Not So Different After All

India and Europe are not so different. Both have had to rethink their place in the world, which has forced them to re-examine their relationships with global players.

published by
FPRC Journal
 on January 25, 2013

Source: FPRC Journal

On the surface, Europe and India could not be more dissimilar: culturally, historically, demographically. Identifying common strategic interests is challenging partly due to an absence of geographic proximity, partly due to the contraction of Europe’s own capabilities. But India and Europe are not so different. Both have had to rethink their place in the world as a result of China’s changed role on the global stage. This has also forced them to re-examine their relationships with global players like the United States, Russia, and Japan.

A recent articlei in The Economist described politics in India as “big and messy: hundreds of millions of voters, from vastly different backgrounds, are bound to hold widely divergent views. Concerns at local and state level often trump national ones, and national affairs can appear as an amalgam of assorted local rivalries.” Such a description could easily be used for Europe’s own situation where 27 member states vie to get their competing national interests onto Brussels’ agenda of priorities.

India and Europe also have similar neighborhood challenges. Countries on Europe’s eastern and southern flank look to Europe to offset Russian dominance (Europe’s east) and respond to ever more complicated domestic politics in the Middle East (Europe’s south). States in the Asia-Pacific increasingly look to India to balance out Chinese hegemony in the region.

India’s and Europe’s relationship with each otherii is often criticized for being overly cautious in its ambitions and lacking in concrete elements. This is also symptomatic of their shortcomings vis-à-vis the likes of China, Russia, the United States, and Japan: a generally uninspiring performance record and wanting in prioritization, ultimately leading to limited political clout. That India and Europe have so underperformed in their relationships with the global players is hardly surprising given their overall lack of internal coherence. Yet each of these relationships comes with its own set of challenges which are not necessarily insurmountable.

Similar Challenges make for Similar Opportunities

Europe, India, and the United States

Europe’s relationship with the United States has always been a privileged one based on common values and shared history which has given the Americans a permanent security (almost political) footprint in Europe. Enough so that when the United States started looking towards the Pacific Rim to provide the stronger economic guarantees that the transatlantic relationship could no longer maintain; Europe’s reaction was one of restrained panic. These days the Americans expect their European cousins to assume a bigger role in providing for European security and beyond. This will probably remain a pipe-dream until Europe is able to put its financial house in order.

India’s relationship with the United States bears a surprising resemblance to the European relationship. President Obama’s “pivot” towards Asia has had the intended, or unintended, consequence of exerting pressure on the region’s more powerful countries such as India and Japan to adopt a larger security role and offset Chinese dominance in the region. This is especially true when looking at China’s increasingly aggressive attitude towards its neighbors in the South China Sea. Which role India will eventually come to play remains to be seen as the country struggles to balance its own ambitions as a global player with its traditionally non-interventionist policies.

India and China, Europe and Russia

Europe’s relationship with Russia and India’s relationship with China are comparable in terms of what dominates their internal agenda’s and how that leads to tensions in their dealings with each other. Energy security is a case in point which highlights how the relationship with the other is both exacerbated and defined by a major national interest.

China and India both have enormous energy needs which they largely cover with imports from various sources. Both generally lack the technology and/or the extraction techniques needed to be self-sufficient. While energy is not a defining feature of their bilateral relationship, it does put them in direct competition with each other. Couple this with a massive trade deficitiii in favor of the Chinese and an arms raceiv along their shared 4,000km border and you have the recipe for a seriously tense relationship between the two giants of the Asia-Pacific region.

Europe on the other hand, despite all its efforts, remains heavily reliant on Russian energy sources (oil, gas, uranium, and coal). Yet there is interdependence in this relationship: Europe remains Russia’s largest trade partner for energy goodsv with some 80 percent of Russian oil being exported to Europe. However Russia’s increasingly assertive behavior in its (and Europe’s) neighborhood and ever more aggressive stance towards the West signal a former superpower staging a progressively forceful comeback.

Europe, India, and Japan

Japan’s relationship with Europe, on the one hand, and India, on the other, is probably the least problematic of the three and the one which holds the most potential in terms of concrete and realistic progress. Since the end of WWII, Japan’s international influence has mostly been limited to the role of donating development aid in the Asia-Pacific region. Its attempts to reassert itself as a serious contender on the global stage have been compromised both by its rollercoaster turnover of Prime Ministers and the economic stagnationvi it has faced for the last two decades. 

Moreover, Japan faces a delicate balancing act in the Asia-Pacific. It is caught between wanting to play a stronger role in countering China’s power in the region and maintaining the right equilibrium in its relationship with the United States. A Japanese-American relationship that is perceived as too deep could undermine Japan’s autonomy and credibility in the region whereas one that is too shallow could be a threat to its own security. 

That Japan needs to take these factors into account in its regional trade relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for example, underscores the limits of its influence in the region. This is where a stronger multilateral relationship with India and Europe could be beneficial to all three parties as Europe looks for ways to increase its footprint in Asia and India looks to build stronger ties with its Japanese neighbors.

Finding the Space to Play on Strengths

In many ways Europe and India have come to be perceived as the sick men of their regions. Once full of spirit and vitality, now stagnating and splutteringstruggling to overcome internal divisions and find a suitable space for themselves in the global order. Yet if they can find the political will to match ambition with strategy, there are opportunities for both Europe and India to make a difference and begin the ascent towards a more secure place on the world stage. And the challenges both are facing can perhaps be overcome by shared solutions. 

In Asia for example, there is an increased demand for actors like Europe and India to play a stronger role in the region; to act both as a counterbalance to China’s economic (and growing military) presence and to the United States’ military shift towards the Asia-Pacific. Military cooperation between Europe and India on maritime security could be one area which would leverage Europe’s capacities and credibility (in particular following the European Union’s Atalanta mission off the Horn of Africa) while catering to India’s growing military ambitions. Europe has important lessonsvii from Atalanta that can be shared with the security community in Asia who have vital interests in protecting the sea-lanes across the Hormuz and Malacca Straits. At the same time this would be a huge boost to Europe’s standing in the region paving the way for it be perceived as more of stakeholder in the Asia-Pacific.

The lack of domestic consistency in both Europe and India remains a problem for the development of sound economic relations. They need to overcome and resolve whatever differences are preventing them from finalizing the Europe-India Free Trade Agreement that has been under negotiation since 2007. With both economies stagnating, taking a page out of the Turkey-Russiaviii book and putting aside their political differences in favor of helping economic recovery would go a long way in strengthening a sometimes rocky relationship.

India has a wealth of renewable energy resources (solar, wind, biofuels) that hold significant promise. At the same time Europe is the world’s biggest proponent of renewable energies given European companies’ experience with these technologies. While initiatives at the political and private level are underway to strengthen this link, more needs to be done including promoting further exchange with countries like China and Brazilix.

The Europe-India relationship holds much untapped potential; the key is to temper expectations, remain realistic about what can be achieved, and find the niches where both can act as partners to achieve mutual goals.

i The Economist “Power Shifts” September 29, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21563423

ii von Muenchow-Pohl, Bernd: Carnegie Paper, "India and Europe in a Multipolar World" May 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/india_europe.pdf

iii The Economist “Friend, enemy, rival, investor” June 30, 2012: http://www.economist.com/node/21557764

iv Al Jazeera “Is an India-China arms race brewing?" March 5, 2012: http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/03/2012358105253868.html

v “European Commission EU-Russia Energy Relations", accessed December 28, 2012: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/russia/russia_en.htm

vi Pettis, Michael, "China is like Japan and not in a good way”, October 9, 2012, http://www.macrobusiness.com.au/2012/10/pettis-china-is-like-japan-and-not-in-a-good-way/

vii European Union Institute for Security Studies, "Lessons from Atalanta and EU counter-piracy policies, Paris 23-24 March 2011, Brussels 17 June 2011", Seminar Report by Damien Helly, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Atalanta_report.pdf

viii Financial Times “Russia and Turkey focus on economic ties”, December 3, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6ed0bba8-3d7c-11e2-b8b2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2GLCSTKa0

ix Climate Policy Initiative "Meeting India’s Renewable Energy Targets: The Financing Challenge", December 5, 2012: http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Meeting-Indias-Renewable-Targets-The-Financing-Challenge.pdf

This piece was originally written for the Foreign Policy Research Centre Journal.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.