Commentary
Richard Youngs
{
"authors": [
"Richard Youngs"
],
"type": "commentary",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"Carnegie Europe",
"Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "democracy",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Europe",
"programAffiliation": "DCG",
"programs": [
"Democracy, Conflict, and Governance"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"South Asia",
"Russia",
"Eastern Europe",
"Western Europe"
],
"topics": [
"Foreign Policy",
"Global Governance"
]
}
Source: Getty
Commentary
Eurasia and the ASEM Summit
It would be a stretch to think that ASEM can foster any kind of benign diplomatic triangle between the EU, Russia, and Asian powers. However, ASEM may survive as an interesting mix of debating club, retreat and venue for bilateral meetings.
Published on Oct 23, 2014
The 10th ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) Summit, held on October 16 and 17 in Milan, had a distinctly Eurasian bent. Kazakhstan became ASEM’s 53rd member, representatives discussed a “New Silk Road” initiative intended to bolster relations between Europe and Asia, and side meetings involving Russia garnered intense media attention.
Russia has been a member since 2010, but the biannual summits were originally conceived primarily to strengthen the EU’s focus on North and South East Asia. One of ASEM’s goals is the development of a “global partnership” between European and Asian states. This highlights a desire for the two regions to work together not only on their own inter-regional relationship but also on “shared global challenges.”
Russia’s role in fulfilling this ambition has become sensitive in recent months. The EU has looked to Asian states for support in their criticism of Russian actions in Ukraine. Singapore has been outspoken in criticising Moscow and Japan has joined the United States and EU in imposing sanctions on Russia. In general, however, Asian states have been reluctant to condemn Russian aggression openly, despite privately expressing alarm over President Putin’s disregard for the kind sovereignty norms that remain sacrosanct in intra-Asian affairs.
Many in ASEM have suggested that a group of more than 50 member states is simply too unwieldy to deliver practical results. Indeed, ASEM has never been a terribly high-profile summit and habitually struggles to deliver tangible results.
In light of new tension between Europe and Russia, talk of ASEM being based on “shared values” rings even more hollow. EU countries fear that the body, which was ostensibly designed to manage relations with the rising powers of North and South East Asia, could be shackled—if not completely undermined—by “the Russian problem.” Certainly, the EU is increasingly interested in intensifying relations with Asian states on an individual or sub-regional basis, rather than prioritizing ASEM.
ASEM may survive as an interesting mix of debating club, retreat and venue for bilateral meetingsTweet This
Unsurprisingly, the media focused on the side meetings involving the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and EU member states. And these meetings will not have been in vain, if their reportedly positive discussions translate into a tangible tightening of the ceasefire in eastern Ukraine (something that is far from being guaranteed). However, the very fact that these and other side meetings stole the show in Milan reinforces the feeling that ASEM needs a fundamental revamp.
The next summit will be held in Mongolia in 2016. That meeting will mark ASEM’s 20th anniversary, and is likely to be of a very different format and nature than the one in Milan. There is already talk of a more informal, Davos-like discussion forum.
It would be a stretch to think that ASEM can foster any kind of benign diplomatic triangle between the EU, Russia, and Asian powers. Indeed, its internal dynamics may suffer if the EU and Russia continue to diverge, as Asian powers remain circumspect in their own approach to certain global norms. ASEM may survive as an interesting mix of debating club, retreat and venue for bilateral meetings. Still, its shortcomings are emblematic of how difficult it is to make multilateralism work in today’s fraught international environment.
About the Author
Richard Youngs
Senior Fellow, Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program
Richard Youngs is a senior fellow in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, based at Carnegie Europe. He works on EU foreign policy and on issues of international democracy.
- The EU Needs a Third Way in Iran
- European Democracy Support Annual Review 2025Paper
- +6
Richard Youngs, ed., Elena Viudes Egea, Zselyke Csaky, …
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- The Iran War Is Making America Less SafeCommentary
A conflict launched in the name of American security is producing the opposite effect.
Sarah Yerkes
- Taking the Pulse: Is it NATO’s Job to Support Trump’s War of Choice?Commentary
Donald Trump has demanded that European allies send ships to the Strait of Hormuz while his war of choice in Iran rages on. He has constantly berated NATO while the alliance’s secretary-general has emphatically supported him.
Rym Momtaz, ed.
- India and a Changing Global Order: Foreign Policy in the Trump 2.0 EraResearch
Trump 2.0 has unsettled India’s external environment—but has not overturned its foreign policy strategy, which continues to rely on diversification, hedging, and calibrated partnerships across a fractured order.
- +6
Milan Vaishnav, ed., Sameer Lalwani, Tanvi Madan, …
- Lukashenko’s Bromance With Trump Has a Sell-By DateCommentary
Lukashenko is willing to make big sacrifices for an invitation to Mar-a-Lago or the White House. He also knows that the clock is ticking: he must squeeze as much out of the Trump administration as he can before congressional elections in November leave Trump hamstrung or distracted.
Artyom Shraibman
- The Middle Power Moment?Collection
The world has entered an era of upheaval—a period of heightened geopolitical rivalry, deepening political polarization, quickening technological change, glaring economic inequality, accelerating environmental crises, and eroding respect for international law. This moment of disruption and fluidity is also one of opportunity, however. It provides openings for middle powers, both established and emerging, to exercise unaccustomed agency and influence the future of global order.
Carnegie scholars are analyzing middle power responses to this moment of upheaval and assessing whether—and under what conditions—these states can contribute to practical problem solving. They are asking critical, concrete questions: What countries, precisely, are we talking about when we refer to middle powers? In what issue areas do their priorities converge and diverge, including across North-South divides? In what domains can middle powers pack a punch, rather than produce a whimper? Are they willing to shoulder actual burdens and responsibility? Finally, how can middle powers assert themselves globally, without running afoul of or threatening their relations with the United States or China?
