• Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Global logoCarnegie lettermark logo
DemocracyIran
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "Alexey Malashenko"
  ],
  "type": "commentary",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center",
  "programAffiliation": "",
  "programs": [],
  "projects": [
    "Eurasia in Transition"
  ],
  "regions": [
    "Central Asia",
    "Kazakhstan",
    "Russia",
    "Eastern Europe",
    "Ukraine"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Policy"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

Commentary
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

Nazarbayev as Mediator

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has managed to use the Ukraine crisis as a sort of stepping stone to elevate his international profile and Kazakhstan’s geopolitical status.

Link Copied
By Alexey Malashenko
Published on Jan 21, 2015
Project hero Image

Project

Eurasia in Transition

Learn More

The Ukraine crisis has created a host of problems for a number of countries, but one state has managed to use it as a sort of stepping stone to elevate its geopolitical status and its leader’s international profile. I am talking about Kazakhstan and its president, Nursultan Nazarbayev.

Risking the Kremlin’s ire, the Kazakh leader shrewdly and conveniently pitched himself as a mediator in the Ukraine crisis. Moscow hardly expected Nazarbayev to take such an unequivocally neutral position in the dispute between Russia and Ukraine. He characterized himself as an “objective manager” who supports neither side of the conflict. Such a position was not welcomed by the Russian leadership at the outset, but the Kremlin did not want to escalate tensions with Astana, especially because Nazarbayev had linked the Ukrainian issue to the Eurasian Economic Union. The EEU, in his opinion, is being subjected to “great risks” by the current geopolitical crisis and its implications.

Playing the role of an independent intermediary yields substantial dividends for Nazarbayev. First, it insures him against excessively sharp political moves on Russia’s part, which were plentiful in 2014. For its part, Russia will have to reckon with Nazarbayev’s views, which will remain independent and objective in relation to the opposing sides of the conflict. In other words, Kazakhstan’s behavior confirms its commitment to a multi-vector foreign policy.

Second, Nazarbayev’s freestanding position indicates to Russia’s Western opponents that Astana should not be identified with Moscow’s policies, and thus there is no point to pressuring Kazakhstan in any way. At the same time, the Kazakh president is emphasizing that the sanctions against Russia do not work, adding that that there is nothing good about them because “Russia is our [Kazakhstan’s] partner.”

Third, Nazarbayev demonstrates that no matter how the Ukraine crisis develops, Kazakhstan’s relations with the European Union will remain normal. In fact, the EU leaders, particularly the Western members of the “Normandy Four,” hope that Nazarbayev can be the figure who manages to help the parties achieve at least some progress in the implementation of the Minsk agreements.

Apart from mediating between Russia and Ukraine, Nazarbayev’s mission has another, less publicized aspect: the Kazakh leader serves as a bridge between Russia and the European Union, seeking to improve understanding between the sides.

It is commonly believed that both Russia and Ukraine have a positive and even hopeful outlook on Nazarbayev’s mediation. But things are actually not that clear. True, Ukraine is rather well-disposed toward Nazarbayev’s initiatives. Kiev generally interprets any drift away from Russia’s position as a pro-Ukrainian move. But Moscow sees any mediation in a conflict between Russia and another state in the post-Soviet space as testifying to the Kremlin’s weakness and inability to solve foreign policy problems without outside help. Putin only reluctantly accepts Nazarbayev’s mediation, which in a sense humiliates him, since it undermines Russian ambitions.

There is an important personal aspect. Nursultan Nazarbayev has been in power since 1991 and is one of the most experienced and successful post-Soviet heads of states. He is also respected on the international stage. At 74, he enjoys playing the part of a senior statesman.

We have no way of knowing whether Nazarbayev will be able to help resolve the Ukraine crisis. He is likely to stay on as a mediator even if negotiations stall, since neither party will benefit from an end to his involvement. As for the Eurasian patriarch himself, the end result does not seem to be all that critical. It is far more important for him to remain the authoritative and sought-after wise man which the Ukraine crisis has helped him to become.

About the Author

Alexey Malashenko

Former Scholar in Residence, Religion, Society, and Security Program

Malashenko is a former chair of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Religion, Society, and Security Program.

    Recent Work

  • Commentary
    What Will Uzbekistan’s New President Do?

      Alexey Malashenko

  • Commentary
    Preserving the Calm in Russia’s Muslim Community

      Alexey Malashenko

Alexey Malashenko
Former Scholar in Residence, Religion, Society, and Security Program
Alexey Malashenko
Foreign PolicyCentral AsiaKazakhstanRussiaEastern EuropeUkraine

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

  • People gathered in a parking lot of buses
    Commentary
    Emissary
    The Iran War Has Sparked a Domestic Crisis in Kenya

    The conflict has sent economic and political shock waves through a country with no representation at the negotiating table—and Kenya is not alone.

      Georgia Schaefer-Brown, Jane Munga

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Kremlin’s Wartime Censorship Could Prove Fatal for Russia’s Beleaguered Book Industry

    Political pressure and economic headwinds are closely intertwined problems for Russian publishers and booksellers. Together, they risk propelling Russia into a “post-literate” era.

      Galina Yuzefovich

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Russia’s Rubber-Stamp Duma Elections Are Exposing Schisms in Putin's Regime

    In the discussions made possible by the State Duma election campaign, one question is being asked more and more loudly. “What next?”

      Andrey Pertsev

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Russia’s Best-Placed Political Émigrés Are Those With Nothing to Lose

    While the Nazis rushed ahead in a revolutionary fervor, Russia’s modern crusaders against enemies of the state work methodically, giving their targets time to adjust to restrictions before closing the loopholes.

      Leonid Bershidsky

  • people watching a huge column of smoke in the distance
    Commentary
    Emissary
    Is the Russia-Ukraine War Vibe Shift Real?

    Media coverage suggests Kyiv’s fortunes have changed. That shift may be important, but it only goes so far.

      Dara Massicot, Aaron David Miller, Andrew S. Weiss

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Carnegie global logo, stacked
1779 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC, 20036-2103Phone: 202 483 7600
  • Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
  • Donate
  • Programs
  • Events
  • Blogs
  • Podcasts
  • Contact
  • Annual Reports
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
  • Government Resources
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.