Trump’s Gaza Comments Aren’t Receiving a Warm Welcome in the Middle East

Over the past few weeks, U.S. President Donald Trump’s repeated comments about plans for Gaza’s future have sparked rare unity in the Middle East. Leaders have worked together to build a unified Arab position rejecting any attempt to displace Palestinians from Gaza. Below, three experts on Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia discuss the domestic and regional impacts of Trump’s statements.

What has been the response from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan so far?

Amr Hamzawy: The Egyptian government has repeatedly rejected plans from both the Israeli government and Trump to displace Palestinians from Gaza and into Egypt and Jordan. Trump’s most recent proposal that the United States should assume control over Gaza and develop it economically has been met with fierce rejection from Cairo. The Egyptian government informed U.S. officials that the displacement and annexation plans threaten the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, signed in 1979 and sponsored by the United States, and puts the diplomatic relations between Cairo and Tel Aviv at stake.

Andrew Leber: The Saudi government has also rejected the plan in a strongly worded statement. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted the “firm and unwavering” stance of the Kingdom in support of a Palestinian state, despite that Saudi rhetoric previously has backed away from speaking of “steps” or “pathways” to statehood. Also noteworthy was the ministry’s explicit connection of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) to this stance, as well as MBS’s direct phone call with King Abdullah of Jordan—a rare event. The Saudi readout of the call explicitly noted “the Kingdom's firm and supportive positions on the rights of the Palestinian people.”

Following subsequent offhand comments by Israeli Prime Minister Bejamin Netanyahu that “[the Saudis] have plenty of territory” for a Palestinian state, the Kingdom issued a further statement slamming the “extremist, occupying mentality” that seeks to expel Palestinians from Gaza.

Marwan Muasher: The Jordanian government has also rejected the plan, much as it has rejected all plans for mass transfer of Palestinians, whether to Egypt or Jordan. In September 2024, the Jordanian foreign minister said that any attempt to force Palestinians into Jordan will be a “declaration of war”, explicitly violating terms of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty. After Trump’s latest proposal, the Jordanian royal court expressed “rejection of any attempts to annex land and displace the Palestinians.” King Abdullah II will meet with Trump in Washington on Tuesday to explain the dangers such a plan poses to both Palestinian and Jordanian interests.

What about from citizens?

Amr Hamzawy: Popular reactions in Egypt have been completely consistent with the government’s position. Egyptians have also been critical of Trump’s demand that their country host displaced Gazans. Professional unions such as the Press Syndicate and some civil society organizations and political parties have voiced their objections, and anti-displacement sentiments have shaped the public discourse through newspaper editorials, TV talk shows, and interventions by social media influencers. Evoking past moments of Egyptian opposition to U.S. policies in the Middle East, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, popular reactions have leaned toward a nationalist framing, calling on the government to stand up to the United States and not to acquiesce to Trump’s pressures.

Andrew Leber: Although gauging Saudi public opinion directly is difficult, well-positioned commentators clearly feel free to reiterate (and even celebrate) the Kingdom’s rhetorical support for a Palestinian state. Prince Turki Al Faisal, pointedly wearing a keffiyah, appeared on CNN to criticize what he termed a “mad ethnic cleansing plan.” On social media, Saudi nationalist influencers have championed the Kingdom’s stance as evidence of its influence in global affairs, and state-owned media accounts have posted archival footage of King Salman’s support for the Palestinian cause. The surfacing of these perspectives indicates the political value MBS and his advisers see in asserting Saudi support for the Palestinian cause—at least for now.

Marwan Muasher:  Trump’s suggestions have unified Jordanian public opinion in a way unseen before. Public reaction has been swift, widespread, and strong. Major demonstrations have taken place across the country in support of King Abdullah II and against the U.S. proposal. Citizens have expressed their strong opposition to such a move in op-eds, articles, and media interviews, as have major political parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, professional unions, and civil society organizations.

How would pushing Gaza residents into Jordan and Egypt affect these countries?

Marwan Muasher: Jordan received waves of Palestinian refugees in 1948 and awarded them full citizenship—unlike in many Arab countries, where they are still treated as refugees. As a result, many Jordanians are of Palestinian origin (the figures are disputed). In addition, Syrian, Iraqi, Yemeni, Somali, and other refugees account for an estimated 6.5 percent of Jordan’s 11 million inhabitants. So a mass transfer of Palestinians into Jordan would pose unsustainable economic and security constraints.

Jordan is the second most water scarce country in the world. General unemployment stands at 22 percent, while youth unemployment is around 46 percent. It is deeply affected by climate change, and debt has been a longstanding issue. An influx of Palestinians also would change the character of the state, so the issue is not simply economic or security-related, but also one of identity. 

In addition, Jordan does not share any borders with Gaza, so many believe that pushing Palestinians from Gaza to Jordan will open the door to Israel also pushing Palestinians from the West Bank into Jordan, with which it does have geographical borders. That will empty Palestinian land of its citizens, help achieve the annexation by Israel of all of the West Bank, revive the “Jordan is Palestine” argument, and attempt to solve the Palestinian issue at Jordan’s expense.

Amr Hamzawy: Since the Gaza war broke out in October 2023, Egypt has allowed a limited number of Gazans to travel to the country, whether for medical treatment or family reasons. Therefore, Egypt has not seen a significant increase in the number of Palestinian refugees on its territory. However, the admission of refugees from Sudan in large numbers due to the raging civil war and the continued presence of large numbers of Syrian and Yemeni refugees are putting economic and social pressure on the Egyptian government, and pushing it to reject any pressures to receive displaced Gazans.

In terms of governance and policy, the displacement plans directly threaten a pillar of Egypt’s national security: preventing all forms of mass presence of Palestinian refugees on Egyptian soil, especially in the Sinai Peninsula that borders Gaza. The plans also directly threaten the peace between Egypt and Israel, which since 1979 has been based on mutual respect for national sovereignty and nonaggression, as well as the strategic partnership between Egypt and the United States. Cairo has always valued its partnership with Washington as a fundamental component of its foreign policy that serves both countries’ interests.

Egypt rightfully believes the displacement plans in Gaza and the annexation plans in the West Bank threaten to further destabilize the Middle East and put under pressure Egypt’s commitment to peace and conflict resolution.

The United States and Saudi Arabia have been in talks for years now over an agreement that would give the Saudis access to peaceful nuclear technology and security guarantees in exchange for, among other things, normalization with Israel. How might Trump’s Gaza plan derail this?

Andrew Leber: MBS will not pursue a U.S.-Saudi deal at any cost. A weakened Iran reduces the immediate security value of more overt U.S. military support. At the same time, normalization with Israel—an essential component of treaty-level U.S. security guarantees—is even riskier with Trump’s plan on the table, given its proposed ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Gaza (while leaving the door open to the same in the West Bank). Any association with a Palestinian displacement would hold major risks for the monarchy’s domestic stability and international reputation. In turn, Netanyahu’s “joke” about a Palestinian state in Saudi Arabia shows that the Israeli leader has little interest in courting the Kingdom diplomatically at this point.

In the immediate term, we are more likely to see the Saudi government attempt to peel off specific U.S. policy concessions from a grand Saudi-Israel-U.S. bargain, aided by the promise of substantial Saudi investments in the U.S. economy.

Marwan Muasher: I totally agree with Andrew. The main reason why a Saudi-Israeli normalization agreement has not been reached so far is because the Saudis need to include a commitment, even a nominal one, by Israel for a pathway toward Palestinian statehood. But the Israelis have refused so far, with Netanyahu going as far as saying publicly that a two-state solution is “a reward for terrorism.” An annexation of the West Bank, or a forced expulsion of Palestinians outside their land, will make reaching such a deal extremely difficult.

How do you see this affecting stability in the region?

Amr Hamzawy: Displacement plans in Gaza and annexation plans in the West Bank will only create more violence, instability, and human suffering in the Middle East. Just as these plans threaten Palestinian, Egyptian, and Arab interests, they will not guarantee Israel’s security in the medium or long term. They also threaten U.S. alliances and friendships with Arab countries. While the United States continues to be the most powerful actor in the region, protecting American interests requires good relations with its partners, particularly Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The U.S. bias toward the criminal plans of the Israeli far right is undermining exactly this.

Andrew Leber: Per Amr’s points, Trump’s policies aren’t receiving the warm welcome that his first administration did in Riyadh. At best, some of the president’s most ardent Saudi supporters are insisting the Gaza plan is a bluff to secure greater concessions from Israel. Other Saudi commentators have started to connect Trump’s erratic foreign-policy rhetoric, such as threatening Canada, to concerns about the reliability of his administration as a security partner. Much as MBS and other Saudi officials had significant frustrations with the Biden administration, they likely haven’t forgotten that it was Trump who declined to respond to Iranian attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure. While this latest plan is unlikely to cause a major rupture in U.S.-Saudi relations—at least so long as it remains a plan—it will only further encourage Saudi Arabia to diversify its international partnerships. As for Saudi participation in the reconstruction of Gaza, columnist Abdulrahman Al-Rashed likely channels official thinking in stating that “there will be no funding for the reconstruction of Gaza, no matter what promises are made, as long as Arab and foreign funders feel that the possibility of another war is open.”