Edition

Dealmaking Under Trump: Imperialist, Chaos-Maker, or "Great Negotiator"?

We asked senior scholars here in the American Statecraft Program for their perspectives on dealmaking under Trump 2.0.

Published on February 27, 2025

Dear Friends,

Under President Trump, the U.S. has entered—or is poised to enter—a stunning number of new negotiations around the world.

What should we make of Trump's many diplomatic initiatives?

We asked senior scholars here in the American Statecraft Program for their perspectives on dealmaking under Trump 2.0:

STEPHEN WERTHEIM: STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

Trump always wants a deal: that is the endpoint he imagines for every international relationship, whether with friend or with foe. But Trump lacks a track record of concluding novel, complex, and consequential deals, and he has piled up a vast to-do list for his second term. Trump’s early “deals” with Colombia, Canada, and Mexico were quick, tactical moves against neighboring countries over which the United States has abundant leverage. Trump will have more trouble brokering an end to the Russia-Ukraine war, a new nuclear agreement with Iran, a way forward in Gaza, and some sort of arrangement with China — and even more trouble pursuing all at once.

CHRIS CHIVVIS: RUSSIA - UKRAINE

Trump is 100% right to try to end the war in Ukraine, but I'm worried he may ignite a whole other bevy of conflicts in the process. His harsh pronouncements about Europe and Ukraine, combined with his open-armed approach to Moscow might still produce a durable ceasefire, but they could just as easily fail. In the process, he has introduced another destabilizing dose of uncertainty about his future plans for other regions of the world, from the Western Hemisphere, to Asia, and the Middle East.

AARON DAVID MILLER: MIDDLE EAST

When it comes to the Middle East, Trump hasn’t really negotiated anything in the traditional sense of the word. In Trump 1.0, his signature achievement – the Abraham Accords – were negotiated by his son-in-law Jared Kushner, of course under his auspices. As for the 2025 Israel-Hamas agreement, it was his special envoy, Steve Witkoff, together with former Biden officials who pushed it over the finish line. Trump playing the public role of madman and con man threatening that hell would break loose if the deal wasn’t finished by his inauguration clearly succeeded in pressing Netanyahu and the Hamas leadership to get the deal done. Indeed, that’s the key to Trump’s dealmaking style, whether it’s threatening to depopulate Gaza to get Arab states to take more responsibility or threatening to walk away from NATO unless the Europeans pay more for defense: Trump postures, bullies, and browbeats publicly, presumably leaving others to the more detailed work of serious negotiating. 

KATIE TOBIN: WESTERN HEMISPHERE

In the Western Hemisphere, Trump negotiates with a big stick to secure rather minor concessions on immigration. We’ve seen this now with at least four countries – Canada, Mexico, Panama, and Colombia – where he’s made big public threats on tariffs and annexing territory – only to back down when they agreed to take relatively small actions on immigration. Canada and Mexico agreed to deploy more troops to their border; Panama agreed to take more people deported from the U.S; Colombia merely agreed to accept military planes full of its own people. These were easy “gives” for our Latin American partners, but big political “gets” for Trump domestically. So far, it’s been a win-win.

PETER HARRELL: TRADE

The biggest question hanging over Trump's aggressive trade agenda is the extent to which he is willing to bargain away his expansive tariff threats in exchange for partners agreeing to buy more U.S. products, give U.S. firms better terms in their markets, and cooperate on geopolitical priorities, such as China and defense. If he wants to get to deals, Trump will have to make choices about his tariff priorities. Trump has spoken of tariffs as a way of raising U.S. government revenue, as a way of protecting strategic U.S. industries, and as leverage over foreign governments. While it is true that he could use tariffs to pursue any of those goals, he will find it challenging to pursue them all.

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Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.