The following is taken from a new Carnegie study, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security. This draft report offers a blueprint strategy for strengthening efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism and proliferation.

North Korea has an active nuclear weapons program and may now possess several nuclear weapons. U.S. troops, allies in the region, and strategic interests are directly threatened by North Korea's growing nuclear capability, which has been pursued in violation of Pyongyang's commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other agreements. Given North Korea's economic strains, it is conceivable that for a high price Pyongyang might sell nuclear materials or weapons to other states or even terrorist groups, taking a regional threat to a global level. Such a scenario is so grave that U.S. policy makers could soon face a truly appalling choice between acquiescing in North Korea's transfer of its weapons technology and fighting a full-fledged war on the Korean peninsula.

Short of war, a failure to resolve the North Korean nuclear threat would badly undermine the cause of nuclear nonproliferation and would increase incentives for regional states, including South Korea and Japan, to consider their own nuclear options. It would pose an unprecedented regional and global security risk.

The United States and its partners in dialogue with North Korea must determine whether and under what conditions North Korea is willing to relinquish its nuclear capabilities. Finding Pyongyang's bottom line will either allow the United States and its allies to negotiate a verifiable end to North Korea's nuclear program or improve the prospects for building a consensus to respond to the threat posed by North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons.

The creation of a regional six-party negotiating mechanism has enabled the United States to more closely tie China to the issue of North Korea's nuclear future, but it remains unclear how far Beijing can or is willing to go in pressuring North Korea to abandon its program. China may not have an interest in a nuclear North Korea on its border, but it is also averse to regime collapse or a war between the United States and North Korea that could result in U.S. troops being placed on the Chinese border. All in all, China may find the status quo tolerable, and the United States cannot assume that China will be able or willing to deliver North Korea's consent or compliance with a denuclearization agreement.

North Korea's apparent willingness to create crises in order to extract maximum negotiating leverage cannot be discounted. In comparison to military con?ict or unchecked proliferation, many negotiated settlements become attractive.

If a negotiated solution that eliminates North Korea's nuclear program is possible, now is the time for a determined, comprehensive effort. At the same time, the United States and its allies must prepare for the possibility that Pyongyang will not abandon its nuclear program, forcing them to take appropriate steps to reinforce deterrence and the norm of nonproliferation in the region.

To test whether North Korea is prepared to eliminate its program under effective verifcation, the United States needs to:

• Develop an international consensus through the Security Council that North Korea's actions are a threat to international peace and security and that North Korea's attempt to withdraw from an agreement it has violated is unacceptable.

• Test the will of North Korea to fully, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle all its nuclear weapon capabilities in exchange for a fundamentally different relationship with the United States, including diplomatic relations and peaceful reconstruction assistance.

• Further enhance U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan to broaden support for U.S. security objectives in the region, including the absence of nuclear weapons.

• Pursue rapid and ongoing negotiations with North Korea with a presidentially appointed envoy. This person must be fully committed to the negotiations, prepared and empowered to make serious progress, and meet with North Korean counterparts of suffcient rank to make progress.

• Prepare for the possibility that North Korea will not abandon its nuclear capabilities by reinforcing diplomatic and military capabilities in the region to enhance deterrence and stability on the Korean peninsula and reduce incentives for other countries to follow North Korea's nuclear lead.

• Make clear that any attempt by North Korea to export nuclear materials or weapons will be considered an act of war against the United States resulting in the end to the Korean War cease-fire.

The regional security consequences of an ongoing North Korean nuclear weapon capability are dire. So too are the implications of allowing North Korea's violations of the international treaty regime to go unpunished. By violating and then attempting to withdraw from the NPT, North Korea has undermined the fundamental premise of the regime-that the international community is prepared to hold countries to their commitments. The Security Council presidential statement of January 1992 found the proliferation of nuclear weapons a threat to international peace and security. Thus, Security Council members have a responsibility to respond to North Korea's actions. Yet even now, the Security Council has yet to respond to North Korea's violations and withdrawal. If, after a determined good-faith effort, the United States and the other partners fail to achieve a negotiated agreement, then the United States must convince the Security Council that North Korea's violations are a threat to international peace and security and that its withdrawal from the NPT was invalid. The United States must then prepare for the consequences.