Decades later, the debate rages on. Should the atomic bomb have been dropped on innocent civilians? Did the devastation of Hiroshima and, sixty years ago today, of Nagasaki save American lives? Robert L. Gallucci, Dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, says no, he would not have used the bomb on cities. "Our targets should be military forces and leadership… President Truman should have looked for targets that were primarily military or genuine war industry… It is unlikely that Hiroshima and Nagasaki could be so described." On the other hand, Thomas Donnelly, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, sees the decision to drop the bomb as necessary for the sake of saving lives. "The use of atomic weapons did not bring a world without war, but it did bring an end to the most lethal conflict in human history … I hope I would have made the same decision to shorten the agony that was WWII in the Pacific."
In a fascinating article, the July issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists asks eight experts and historians to weigh in on the question: "Would you have dropped the bomb?" Below we provide highlights of two essays on each side – supporting the decision and arguing against it.
Thomas Donnelly, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute
Donnelly argues that the terrible cost of war in the Pacific, particularly with the planned invasion of the Japanese Home Islands, means the A-bomb saved lives. He focuses on the situation as it was known in 1945, rather than "from the safe distance of several decades." In 1945, "There was no debate that an invasion of the Home Islands would have been a ghastly and bloody affair; nor was victory preordained." In using the bomb, Truman acted to end the agony of American soldiers, and "no commander-in-chief could have acted otherwise." Echoing the WWII memoir of William Manchester, Donnelly writes, "Thank God, again, for the atomic bomb – and for Harry Truman’s willingness to bear the burden of using it."
Richard B. Frank, author of Downfall: The End of the Japanese Imperial Empire
Like Donnelly, Frank focuses on war costs as the key argument in favor of the A-bomb. He writes, "The bombs killed between 100,000 and 200,000 Japanese – many from the horrifying effects of radiation that U.S. policy makers were ignorant of in 1945. The alternatives were worse. Beyond the military losses, the Soviet Union’s initial intervention in the war against Japan ultimately cost the lives of between 340,000 and 500,000 Japanese, overwhelmingly noncombatants. Had the war not ended when it did, many more would have perished. The blockade would have killed millions." Consideration of various alternatives to the A-bomb, including Soviet invasion, blockade, and continued conventional bombing, leads Frank to conclude that, "Ghastly as the bombs were, the grim reality is that no other combination of events would have produced an enduring peace at less cost."
Robert L. Gallucci, Dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University
Gallucci identifies the critical question as whether it is "acceptable to commit an act that will predictably kill tens of thousand or more civilians … in order to have some material impact on the enemy’s capacity to wage war – and, more importantly, to crush the enemy’s will to continue the war?" With the bombings of Dresden and Tokyo, the U.S. had shown that the answer was yes. However, Gallucci argues that atomic bombs were still different from conventional bombings; "these weapons have the potential of wiping out entire populations of nations." Gallucci concludes that, "our targets should be military forces and leadership… Beyond that, we get into acts that cannot even be justified by allusions to self-defense… Breaking the will of the enemy or hoping to put future enemies on notice cannot justify the intentional slaughter of innocent civilians."
Gar Alperovitz, Lionel R. Bauman Professor of Political Science at the University of Maryland
In his essay, Alperovitz adds an alternate historical interpretation to the A-bomb decision. "Many historians now understand that the decision to use the atomic bomb – and the timing- had a great deal to do with diplomacy towards the Russians rather than military defeat of the Japanese… the bomb was seen as a great ‘hammer’ (to use President Truman’s term) to make the Russians more ‘manageable’(as Secretary of State James F. Byrnes put it)." The bomb was used without first informing the Russians, making post-war control more difficult. Alperovitz would not have used the bomb against a Japanese city, and his essay’s closing comments also go beyond the 1945 situation; "Truman’s shortsightedness was both immoral and dangerous. Since his time, many presidents, including the current one, have neglected arms control and instead pursued short-term, dubious military advantage."
Many historians point out that the dropping of the atomic bomb was not an agonizing decision for President Truman. As historian Barton Bernstein writes, it was rather an "assumption of use." The target shifted from Germany to Japan, Roosevelt handed over an ongoing project to Truman, and a race for the bomb produced a weapon to destroy cities. Yet, as reflected in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists essays, the historiography of early nuclear development is still riddled with dispute.
The National Security Archive has recently made available on the web an annotated collection of atomic bomb-related documents, including declassified meeting notes, diary entries, and memos. The documents offer a direct view into lingering historical questions. For example, did decision-makers in 1945 knowingly choose to bomb civilians, or were the cities seen as legitimate military targets, like Dresden and Tokyo, which had been leveled by conventional means? (see Documents 4, 6, 12) Was Japan already on the verge of surrender in the months before the bombing? (see Documents 29, 42) Were there alternate motivations for using the bomb, particularly impressing the Soviet Union? (see Documents 7, 8 ) And perhaps most importantly, did the bomb save lives? (see Documents 13, 28)
The primary documents pose the same poignant question, not only for the Bulletin essayists but also for all readers. Would you have dropped the bomb?
Sources and Links of Interest
Barton J. Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered," Foreign Affairs, January 1995, Vol. 74, Iss.1.
William Burr, ed. "The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II: A Collection of Primary Sources," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 162, National Security Archive, August 5, 2005.
George Perkovich, "Expert's Picks, From Hiroshima to Armageddon: A Reading List." Washington Post, Sunday, July 31, 2005.
"Sixty Years Later: A Bulletin roundtable: Would you have dropped the bomb?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2005, Volume 61, No. 4.
