In a new report, Atoms for War?: U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal, Carnegie Senior Associate Ashley J. Tellis argues empirically that natural uranium resources do not limit India's potential nuclear arsenal and that any limitations in India's nuclear fuel stockpile stem from short-term problems that, in fact, give the U.S. little leverage over India. Tellis argues that Indian policy-makers display no intention nor practice of dramatically building up their nuclear weapon arsenal and that the proposed U.S.-India deal will not cause India to do so or augment its capacity to do so in significant ways.
The report states that India is not seeking to maximize its nuclear arsenal as demonstrated by India’s decision to produce far less fissile material than its capacity allows given its natural uranium reserves. Tellis argues that India’s short-term deficiency of uranium fuel is due to technical hindrances in its uranium mining and milling practices. He maintains that India has the capability to rectify this shortcoming independently.
Tellis also addresses the contentious issue of whether the deal violates Article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He states that the NPT legally allows for nuclear cooperation between nuclear-weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states on safeguarded facilities, even if the country has not committed to full-scope safeguards. Tellis asserts that critiques that the U.S.-India nuclear deal violates Article I lead “inexorably to the conclusion that no party to the NPT should have any economic intercourse with India whatsoever, because the resulting gains from trade would inevitably free up some domestic Indian resources that would be of use to New Delhi’s weapons program.”
To access the full report, click here.
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