On July 26, the US House of Representatives passed the “United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006” by a clear majority. The Senate version of the Bill will be voted upon, most likely, in September. The House of Representatives adopted the Bill only after ensuring that even after being passed by the Senate and the enactment of the Act into law, the nuclear cooperation agreement would still need the approval of the Congress, thus maintaining its full oversight authority.
The House also demanded periodic reporting from the President on India’s compliance with key U.S. objectives in the region as well as on issues of non-proliferation. In two non-binding sections included in the Bill, the “Sense of the House” and “Statements of Policy,” the House outlined key U.S. interests including, but not limited to : (i) the achievement of a moratorium on the production of fissile material for production of nuclear weapons; (ii) securing India’s full support of and participation in U.S. efforts to deter and possibly isolate and sanction Iran for its attempts to acquire nuclear weapons; and (iii) a complete declaration of India’s civil nuclear facilities to the IAEA as well as a safeguards regime in perpetuity in conformity with IAEA’s practices, standards and principles, rather than an India-specific safeguards regime.
These modifications have generated apprehension on the Indian side. Among the political parties, the CPI (M), a key leftist ally of the ruling Congress government with a traditionally anti-US stance, has expressed a heightened sense of concern about the deal’s impact on India’s ability to continue to pursue an independent foreign policy. The Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, has also voiced similar concerns. On August 10th, the BJP announced that former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee would lead a delegation of Parliamentarians to President Abdul Kalam to seek his intervention to prevent the passage of a deal that they believed would compromise India’s ability to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. Sensing an opportunity to rally all the parties in opposition to the deal against the ruling Congress, the BJP also invited the Left, including CPI (M) to support this move.
However, the CPI (M), in its response on August 11th, unequivocally distanced itself from the BJP by pointing out that it opposed the nuclear tests in 1998 under the BJP rule and continues to oppose nuclear weaponization, in direct contradiction to the BJP. The Left believes that the BJP is simply maneuvering to cash in on opposition to the nuclear deal and divert attention from its own internal squabbles. Nevertheless, the Left has demanded a debate in the Parliament so that, in striking similarity to the US Congress’ actions, a “Sense of the House” could be publicly formulated in India as well. This debate is expected to be conducted in the Rajya Sabha, the upper House of India’s bicameral legislature, starting August 17th.
Opposition has also arisen from other quarters. Ahead of the Parliamentary debate, a group of influential nuclear scientists in India, in an open letter to Members of Parliament (MPs) that has received much publicity, appealed to the MPs “to ensure continuance of the nuclear option and not to accede to any restraint in perpetuity of scientific freedom.” In March this year, several members of the scientific community had welcomed the India-US nuclear deal for recognizing “India’s capabilities in the international stage while removing the decades of isolation in which atomic energy in India was developed”. However, in light of the additional caveats laid out in the Bill passed by the US House of Representatives, they have expressed concern that the deal, if passed in the current form, would impinge on India’s independent indigenous R&D efforts in nuclear science and technology in perpetuity, referring to the new clause introduced in the Bill that demands that the safeguards on India’s civil nuclear facilities be placed in perpetuity, in contrast to the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) that are allowed to remove certain facilities from safeguards when they so desire.
The letter remains vague on the specific clauses that the scientists oppose, or what they fear will be lost as a result of the deal.
Some analysts in India have suggested that the scientists’ objections are premised on “their long-standing suspicion of any non-DAE (Department of Atomic Energy) evaluation of their activities, and resistance to public accountability itself.” Others have also refuted the claim that the deal would in any limit India’s nuclear weapons program, citing the fact that 8 of India’s 22 nuclear reactors would still not be under IAEA safeguards, including some fast-breeder reactors. India, they argue, would definitely be able to retain its minimum credible deterrent, based on its ability to make at least 30-40 bombs a year in addition to its existing stockpile of over 100 weapons.
The Congress government does not seem to share all of the scientists’ concerns either. However, the Singh government is perturbed by the safeguards in perpetuity clause and the externally imposed moratorium on further testing (the explosion of another nuclear device by India would terminate the agreement), along with other concerns such as the “prohibition on transfer of enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water technologies”- the so-called ‘sensitive nuclear technologies.’ These concerns have been conveyed to the US, and will have to be addressed before the Senate version is approved in order for the deal to be acceptable to the Indian government.
The “safeguards in perpetuity” clause has been repeatedly emphasized in the Senate report of July 20 on the deal as well as Condoleezza Rice’s testimony in April. Since the revised version of the Bill passed by the House stipulated that India negotiate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA before the deal’s final ratification in the Congress, the form that the final safeguards agreement takes will depend largely on India’s ability to negotiate an agreement with the IAEA that does not imply any long-term permanent restrictions. In addition, it will have to be accompanied by heavy lobbying in Washington to step down from its position on the issue.
Despite these concerns and domestic criticisms, the likelihood of the deal being rejected remains extremely low. The Singh government remains committed to seeing the historic deal through. Domestic opposition is unlikely to spiral out of control since its allies, specifically the Left, are unlikely to withdraw support on this issue, and public support and approval for Bush in India is among the highest in the world. The scientific community as well as opposition parties can simply ignite some debate in the Parliament. In fact, they may simply end up giving the Indian government the ability to cite domestic pressure to further strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis IAEA and the U.S in the days before the Bill is presented to the Senate.
Anirudh Suri is a Junior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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