Many Egyptians who are interested in the future of U.S.–Egyptian relations view the transition from the Bush to the Obama presidency as an opportunity to reinvigorate the relationship between the two countries.
U.S.–Egyptian relations encompass a comprehensive array of issues, including bilateral economic and political ones, as well as regional concerns. Regionally, Egypt has a vested interest in pushing forward the Middle East peace process, not only because doing so would sow the seeds for a peaceful region, but also because a successful peace process would validate Egypt’s decision to seek a diplomatic rather than a military solution to its conflict with Israel.
On the bilateral level, three issues are of particular concern: (1) political reform, (2) economic reform, and (3) security, military, and intelligence cooperation.
Bilateral Issues
On the bilateral level, three issues are of particular concern: (1) political reform, (2) economic reform, and (3) security, military, and intelligence cooperation.
Political Reform
Political reform issues include democracy promotion, the empowerment of women, enlarging the scope of political participation, enhancing civil and political rights, supporting nongovernmental organizations, decreasing the hegemony of the state, supporting social and media pluralism, and reinvigorating party life.
The issue of political reform has caused considerable tension between the two countries. The main points of contention are the content of proposed political reform measures, their mode of implementation, and the extent to which the Egyptian government has delivered on its promises. In 1986 Egypt has embarked on a process of political reform―almost two decades prior to the Bush administration’s new emphasis on democracy following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Despite these efforts, however, the last four years have seen increased U.S. pressure on the Egyptian government to induce more meaningful political and legal reforms. This pressure has been met with significant resistance, as the Egyptian government maintains that the political reform process is a domestic rather than international affair, one that must be approached gradually and tailored to the Egyptian context.
The issue of political reform has caused considerable tension between the two countries. The main points of contention are the content of proposed political reform measures, their mode of implementation, and the extent to which the Egyptian government has delivered on its promises.
Although the Bush administration acknowledged Egypt’s steps toward political reform, most notably with regard to freedom of the press and women’s rights, it made clear that these steps have fallen short of stated U.S. expectations. In particular, the Bush administration was openly critical of the Egyptian government’s imprisonment of al-Ghad party founder Ayman Nour and of human rights activist and American University in Cairo professor Saad al-Din Ibrahim. Both of these incidents gave way to increased public tension between the United States and Egypt.
Another issue of concern is the effects political reforms can have on the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s main opposition group. Although the Egyptian government considers the Brotherhood an illegal organization, it still tolerates the presence of 88 of its members―who ran as independents―in parliament. The question in this case is whether the Egyptian government will risk a potential increase in the Brotherhood’s power by implementing political reforms. Egypt believes that the United States shares its concerns. Nevertheless, the issue became an unusual source of tensions between the two countries after reports were made public of meetings conducted between U.S. officials and congressmen with representatives from the Brotherhood. In these meetings, the U.S. officials sought to find out more about the Brotherhood’s position on issues of direct concern to U.S. policy.
Finally, there is tension between the United States and Egypt concerning the link between a real resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict and political reform in Egypt. The Egyptian government maintains that the stalled peace process contributes to the spread of radical ideas and empowers groups that are opposed to itself and to U.S. policy. Thus increasing the pace of political reform, as the U.S. government demands, would be dangerous as long as there is no progress toward peace―it could, in fact, have deleterious consequences for Egypt’s internal stability. Instability would, in turn, affect Egypt’s foreign policy, including its relationship with Israel—a consideration that is often ignored or not taken seriously by Washington.
Economic Reform
Economic reform issues include restructuring the Egyptian economy, increasing the scope of privatization, supporting the private sector, floating the Egyptian pound, opening Egyptian markets to foreign investment, further integrating Egypt’s economy into the world economy, and building a competitive economy. U.S. economic aid is meant to speed Egypt’s adoption of neo-liberal economic policies, as well as ease structural pressures on the Egyptian economy.
U.S. economic aid is meant to speed Egypt’s adoption of neo-liberal economic policies, as well as ease structural pressures on the Egyptian economy.
According to 2007/2008 statistics, bilateral trade exchange between Egypt and the United States constitutes 35 percent of Egypt’s overall foreign trade, and amounts to $8.4 billion (with a trade surplus of $3.6 billion in favor of the United States). In addition, 2008 statistics estimate that American investments constitute 36 percent ($8.8 billion) of the total value of foreign direct investment in Egypt. Most American investments are concentrated in the petroleum and communication sectors. Because of the importance of trade with the United States, the failure to reach a free trade agreement with the United States after four years of negotiations is of great concern to Egypt. A free trade agreement would help bring more American investments to Egypt.
Military, Security, and Intelligence Cooperation
U.S.–Egyptian cooperation on military and security issues is central to the maintenance of regional stability and the geostrategic status quo, as well as to countering threats to shared U.S. and Egyptian interests in the Middle East. The centrality of this cooperation to U.S. and Egyptian strategic interests explains the amount of military aid to Egypt― an annual average of about $1.3 billion―in place since Egypt’s signing of a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Cooperation on this level involves enhancing Egypt’s defense capabilities, and sharing intelligence on extremist groups as part of the global effort to fight terrorism.
U.S.–Egyptian cooperation on military and security issues is central to the maintenance of regional stability and the geostrategic status quo, as well as to countering threats to shared U.S. and Egyptian interests in the Middle East.
This overview of issues of bilateral concern shows that U.S.–Egypt relations are marked by both agreement and disagreement. First, there is disagreement concerning Egypt’s domestic politics. And second, military and strategic relations have remained intact despite political differences. This suggests that U.S. policy toward Egypt can operate on different levels, depending on what is most important to U.S. interests. Such a policy can continue under the new administration.
Regional Issues
At this historic juncture, there are five main regional issues of shared concern for the United States and Egypt. Each will play a role in determining the future of U.S. policy toward Egypt, and offers great potential for strengthening the bilateral relationship.
First, the resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict, especially the achievement of a two-state solution, is undoubtedly the most important regional issue affecting U.S.–Egypt relations. It constitutes a central area of agreement between Cairo and Washington, and is expected to provide fertile ground for cooperation between the two sides during Obama’s presidency. The Obama administration has made it clear that the two-state solution is vital to U.S. interests.
Second, containing Iran’s growing regional influence is also a common concern, and it is closely tied to the resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict. According to Cairo, Iran’s regional ascendance constitutes a direct threat to Egypt’s national security, especially given close ties between Iran and Hamas, and the Lebanese Hizbollah. Iran’s ascendance also constitutes a national security threat to several Gulf countries, which employ millions of Egyptian workers. Nevertheless, the Iran dossier has been a cause of disagreement between Cairo and Washington over the past four years. Egypt and the Gulf countries are opposed to participating in any military action against Iran, preferring a diplomatic solution. It is likely that U.S. policy toward Iran will remain a source of contention between Egypt and the United States during Obama’s presidency, although for a different reason. Egypt is concerned about the possibility that the U.S. policy of dialogue with Iran (which involves providing Iran with economic, political, and security incentives) will bolster Iran’s bid to increase its regional influence, making it the top power in the Gulf. This is a red-line for Egypt as it threatens its interests and its regional role.
The gravity of the disagreement between the United States and Egypt on the Iranian issue depends on the fate of the U.S.–Iranian dialogue. If the dialogue achieves its stated objectives, as articulated by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Egypt’s fears would be assuaged. These objectives include a radical change in Iran’s policy toward the Palestinian issue, and its support of armed group such as Hamas and Hizbollah. Iran would also be expected to stop meddling with Iraq’s security, accept international supervision of its nuclear program, and put an end to its efforts to destabilize the Gulf. Given the practical challenges involved in achieving these ambitious objectives, the Iran dossier will remain a major source of anxiety for the Egyptian government. Egypt will not accept Iran as an alternative policeman to the West in the Gulf.
A third regional issue that affects U.S.–Egypt relations is Iraq, which is closely tied to Iran’s containment. Egypt has already taken steps to prepare for the situation in Iraq after the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The return of the Egyptian ambassador to Iraq has become imminent. Egypt’s contribution to U.S. efforts to train Iraqi security forces demonstrates both countries’ agreement on the necessity of such training for the future stability of Iraq. Despite some improvement in the security situation in Iraq, more Iraqi and Arab efforts are required.
Fourth, the Sudan dossier promises to be an area of positive cooperation between the U.S. and Egyptian governments. The United States has announced its willingness to begin a new chapter with Khartoum’s government, which includes turning a blind eye to the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) indictment of President Omar al-Bashir, reducing pressure on Sudan about Darfur, and offering to help convince rebel groups in Darfur to return to the negotiating table. Sharing similar strategic interests in the region, the Egyptian government is working toward suspending the ICC ruling, communicating with rebel groups, and inviting them to a conference in Cairo in an effort to reach a united position in their negotiations with the Sudanese government.
A better course of action for U.S. policy toward Egypt would involve dialogue and providing the Egyptian government with political incentives to make more significant steps with regard to civil and political rights and transparency in governance.
Finally, the situation in the horn of Africa and Somalia presents further opportunities for U.S.–Egyptian cooperation. The United States has endorsed a government of moderate Islamists in Somalia, headed by President Sheikh Sherif Ahmed, and is providing political and economic support as part of a comprehensive plan to rebuild the Somali state and end pirating. These objectives are in line with Egyptian and Arab goals in Somalia, and they provide Egypt the chance to offer diplomatic assistance to the Somali government, thus reinforcing cooperation between Cairo and Washington.
In conclusion, there is an opportunity to reinvigorate bilateral relations with regard to economic and political reform. This must, however, be done without resorting to pressure. A better course of action for U.S. policy toward Egypt would involve dialogue and providing the Egyptian government with political incentives to make more significant steps with regard to civil and political rights and transparency in governance. These steps would create the conditions necessary for a peaceful transfer of power in Egypt to any person, as long as the new leadership does not renege on Egypt’s peace agreement with Israel. Lastly, the sharing of intelligence and military cooperation will likely increase between the two countries, given their importance and direct impact on U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East.
Hassan Abou Taleb is vice president of the al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
