In the third week of June 2023, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be in Washington D.C. for a state visit hosted by President Joe Biden. Predictably, officials on both sides are fixated on “deliverables.” Presumably, negotiators are engaged in debating every word in the joint statement to be issued by the leaders during the visit. This includes developments in the U.S.-India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET). The iCET is perhaps best defined as “an interlinked framework for cooperation on critical and emerging technologies.” It is, in many ways, a charter for action that is designed to do more in existing areas of technology cooperation, generate new opportunities, and make the most of the present moment in geopolitical change.
Essentially, it is designed to deepen partnerships in specific domains of critical and emerging technologies. By doing so, this unique and agile structure, led by the National Security Council (NSC) in the United States and the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) in India, seeks to intensify and multiply economic, technological, and strategic ties between these outsized democracies.
The iCET was formally launched by the national security advisers of the two countries, Jake Sullivan and Ajit Doval, on January 31, 2023, in Washington, DC. It was first mentioned in a joint statement following a meeting between Modi and Biden in May 2022 on the sidelines of the Quad Summit in Tokyo. In a little more than a year, the political, administrative, corporate, and strategic energy on and around the iCET has deepened and broadened the discourse between Indian and U.S. officials. A common refrain among officials in both India and the United States goes like this: “India and the United States discuss strategic ties and common challenges in a way that would have been impossible only a couple of years ago.”1
To be sure, for the eight months since the iCET was first mentioned in Tokyo, the NSC and the NSCS spent a considerable amount of time in setting the agenda. This included reaching out to a wide group of corporations invested in the future of technology; academic institutions focused on critical and emerging technologies; start-ups and micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs); think tank analysts; and just about every ministry, department, and agency in the United States and in India that broadly deals with technology. This is as inclusive as a process gets. The end result was a clear statement of action published soon after the two NSAs formally launched the iCET in January 2023. Since then, the two sides have been engaged to deliver the action statement and more.
The iCET is, without a doubt, the best structured bet between India and the United States, designed to deliver a range of deals. These include setting up task forces to examine the potential of creating a “complimentary semiconductor ecosystem” facilitating an exchange of technologies and capital (for instance to build resilient innovation bridges in defense), developing standards in AI, loosening the grip of export controls to fuel innovation and manufacturing (which to start with includes a near-complete deal to coproduce GE jet engines for indigenously produced aircrafts in India), creating quantum hubs and operational working groups between experts in both countries, crafting strategies to connect innovators and patient capital with the view to build a common future in bioeconomy, and more generally multiplying the effects of transactions between corporations and research institutions invested in critical and emerging technologies in both countries.
With these intents in mind, this article takes stock of what the iCET framework has done to deepen ties and hasten cooperation since the initiative was first announced. While the attention among officials and commentators alike will be on iCET deliverables in the upcoming joint statement, the extent of activities and exchanges enabled by the iCET is worth considering. The article also highlights suggestions to further operationalize the iCET and allow a truly interlinked critical and emerging technologies ecosystem to grow and flourish between India and the United States.
Mobilization of the iCET
Almost every month, U.S. and Indian officials meet to discuss some aspect of the iCET. The level of activity is mind-boggling. Whether it is a space and AI dialogue, export controllers from the United States taking part in workshops in tech capitals like Bengaluru, defense officials planning new initiatives such as creating bilateral defense accelerators and negotiations around the coproduction of long-range artillery, corporations working out mutually satisfactory deals, think tanks and industry chambers hosting a range of Track 1.5 interactions, scientists and technicians logging on and off a constant barrage of “iCET calls,” or newborn communities pooling together to craft various defense-related opportunities, the sheer momentum generated by the iCET is noteworthy. Importantly, these interactions and touch points have a multiplying effect that is almost impossible to measure, making the iCET network effect remarkably electric.
As for official-level meetings, the energy is equally palpable. Consider, for instance, a snapshot of just the last three months. In May, P. K. Mishra, the principal secretary to the Indian prime minister, and Giridhar Aramane, the Indian defense secretary, visited the United States. A discussion on the technology partnership between the two countries was on the agenda. There was a specific conversation on how the iCET could lead to “unprecedented opportunities” especially in the defense sectors of both countries. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin was in India soon after, in the beginning of June.
U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo visited India in March 2023. She talked about the United States seeing India “as a trusted technology partner” and “working more closely with India in the private sector” around the technologies included in the iCET framework. Raimondo and Piyush Goyal, the Indian minister of commerce and industry, signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to “establish a collaborative mechanism on semiconductor supply chain resiliency and diversification.” Importantly, both sides agreed to coordinate on the structure of their respective incentive schemes on semiconductors.
The top-level representation was backed with a team of officials working on the details of the structure. Ramin Toloui, the assistant secretary in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs at the U.S. State Department, visited Delhi to discuss both countries’ incentive schemes. He made clear that U.S.-India technology cooperation was, without a doubt, a “very important area of work” for his bureau. In another visit, the assistant secretary of commerce for export administration at the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Thea Kendler, visited Bengaluru and Delhi in April to work through the questions around the export controls of dual-use items. She underlined that the United States “treat[s] India as though we’re a NATO partner under our export controls.” The NASA chief economist visited India to interact with the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and Indian space start-ups with the view to boost cooperation. At least a dozen other such official-level exchanges took place only in the last three months.
It is to be noted that this level of mobilization is not all talk. A new Strategic Trade Dialogue between both sides took place on June 6. This is a crucial dialogue process that is designed to unclog export control regulations and “take forward the strategic technology and trade collaborations” created under iCET.
On export controls, more is being done to connect controllers to applicants, including start-ups and MSMEs in India invested in strategic technologies like space. The U.S International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) continues to be a bugbear for deeper cooperation, and yet, it is no longer “an unknown commodity,” as one start-up CEO put it. Simple approaches like running export control workshops do wonders, connecting the private sector to those considering export control applications. Undoubtedly, there is much to be done to untie export controls.
On semiconductors, both sides signed an MOU—under the U.S.-India Commercial Dialogue— that would establish a semiconductor subcommittee to vet and review recommendations from a task force that was created following the iCET launch. Furthermore, the Indian Semiconductor Mission (ISM), which sits inside the Indian Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, entered into an agreement with Purdue University in May 2023 to conduct joint research and development programs aimed at “designing, manufacturing, and commercializing semiconductor chips.”
On defense innovation cooperation, both sides announced that an INDUS-X event would take place in the United States during Modi’s visit. INDUS-X provides a forward-looking agenda to give meaning to the defense innovation bridge announced under the iCET. It is led by the U.S. Department of Defense and Innovation for Defence Excellence (iDEX), which is the Indian Ministry of Defense’s innovative institution designed to “create an ecosystem which fosters innovation and encourages technology development in Defense.”
To be sure, there is every opportunity for announcements for joint challenges and joint funding and for INDUS-X to serve as a link between innovation, capital, and regulators in India and the United States. A platform like this, which holds the promise of cracking deals between defense primes, start-ups, and innovators, did not exist until now. To be clear, much like many iCET initiatives, INDUS-X was created as a result of long and systematic discussions between academics, innovators, think tankers, defense officials, and other experts. The sheer traction generated by these interactions is in itself noteworthy and can be understood as an iCET philosophy of driving the multiplication of effects without losing sight of core deliverables. While, predictably, all eyes will be on the latter during the state visit, the unmeasurable yet persuasive effects of the iCET will be felt well beyond the tick marks on a fact sheet.
Local Changes for Global Cooperation
Alongside the extent of mobilization highlighted above, India and the United States will benefit from current and local changes to domestic laws, the creation of domestic incentive schemes, private sector investments in cutting-edge technologies, and a more general push for deregulation. While these changes are not directly linked to the iCET, they are, in many ways, an expression of both countries’ desire to arrest the changing geopolitical tide to invest in like-minded jurisdictions. It is almost impossible to measure the iCET’s ability to force change on domestic laws and regulations, but, as insiders make clear, the two are not disconnected.
Quantum Computing
In the area of quantum technology, including quantum computing, India announced its National Quantum Mission at a cost of approximately $727 million to nurture and seed an innovation ecosystem in quantum technologies. As per a new partnership announced during the May 2023 G7 summit in Japan, Google and IBM will contribute $50 million and $100 million, respectively, to develop advanced quantum computing at the University of Chicago and the University of Tokyo. The contribution from Google will focus on accelerating the development of a “fault-tolerant” quantum computer and help train a quantum workforce, while that from IBM will aim to create blueprints for developing a 100,000-qubit quantum supercomputer. There is a sustained discussion underway in India on how Indian start-ups and research organizations can connect into these investments.
Space
India announced a new space policy in April 2023. This will allow investors, including those from the United States, to gain clarity about the relevant regulatory bodies that oversee India’s space ecosystem—a level of clarity that did not exist earlier. Furthermore, India’s legislative agenda may soon see the passing of a long-pending space bill If this bill eventually gets passed, it would go a long way in providing a predictable regulatory environment to U.S.-based investors. Large U.S. technology companies have lately started to invest and incubate start-upsin India’s space sector. A new space law will provide much-needed, granular-level clarity about how such investments may be treated.
Meanwhile, the United States released its national preparedness strategy on planetary defense, the purpose of which is to look at various ways of tracking hazardous near-earth objects. In the strategy document, international cooperation is presented as one of the objectives, though the document is short on how such cooperation may be achieved. While the iCET lists planetary defense as one of the areas for further cooperation, it could devise more ways to bolster engagement with India to boost joint research in this area.
Semiconductors
In December 2021, India announced a semiconductor incentive scheme, under which it received, in the span of a few weeks, three applications for establishing different aspects of a semiconductor ecosystem. However, no application was cleared by the ISM, India’s nodal agency for vetting such applications. Recently, however, India reopened the application process with a considerably longer application window, which may augur well for India’s semiconductor ecosystem by allowing more applications to come through and giving the ISM additional time to review them. In fact, a few weeks before the incentive scheme was reopened, Micron Technology, a major U.S. semiconductor firm, spoke about evaluating opportunities in India regarding assembly operations. The reopening of the scheme comes at a time when India announced a massive upgrade to its domestic semiconductor laboratory in Mohali. This rejigging of internal policy measures is significant since it may have a signaling effect, demonstrating to prospective U.S. semiconductor firms that India is earnest about setting up a competitive semiconductor ecosystem.
At the same time in March 2023, the United States, through its Chips Program Office (CPO), came out with proposed guardrails, which clarify certain key terms regarding funding under the CHIPS and Science Act. One of the terms clarified was “any significant transaction involving the material expansion of semiconductor manufacturing capacity in the People’s Republic of China.” From the outset, the CHIPS and Science Act had restricted the funding available under its provisions so that it would not be available for such “significant transactions.” As per a major new clarification, the term “significant transactions” would include those related to mature nodes in China.
Specifically, it was stated that the recipients of CHIPS and Science Act funding expanding a “legacy facility” of mature nodes in China would have to utilize 85 percent of the output in China itself. China has steadily increased its market share in the mature nodes segment over the last few years. It has also sought to leverage and weaponize this ability globally. The proposed guardrails may partially blunt China’s ability to leverage its mature node chips output in global markets, given the CHIPS And Science Act mandate on utilizing almost all of such output in China itself. Interestingly, at the same time, India has also announced mature nodes as an area of focus Therefore, the proposed guardrails may help to create a larger global market for India when it comes to the mature node chips segment.
Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory Facility
Unrelated to the iCET, India has started to burnish its credentials as a destination for state-of-the-art scientific facilities. Recently, it announced the setting up of a Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO) facility—the fifth one set up globally after the twin LIGO facilities in the United States and one facility each in Japan and Italy. It will study phenomena such as black holes to “make new discoveries about the universe.” The Indian government has already committed to invest approximately $320 million in this singular facility. This will be further augmented by a supply of components worth $80 million from the United States. This project has been called a “game-changer” and signals that India is ready to commit substantial financial and intellectual capital to contribute to pathbreaking scientific initiatives. Sophisticated technologies such as these, housed in like-minded countries, provide several opportunities to further grow a strategic technologies ecosystem within and beyond the iCET.
The Next One Year of the iCET
The aforementioned deliverables and announcements for and around the iCET are possibly being negotiated at this time. Yet, there is much work to be done following the joint statement in June. The article will now offer suggestions to further deepen iCET-focused ties between the United States and India in the hope that they are discussed at the functional level in June, even if they are to be directly addressed following the state visit. Some of these suggestions reflect on the need to develop clearer domestic strategies, especially in India, to make the best of the good bet on and around the iCET.
Hyper Computers and AI
Insiders suggest that there is some traction with regard to U.S. corporations thinking of shipping hyper computers and AI clusters to India. It is unclear whether or not an announcement to this effect will make it to the June statement. Yet, for India, there is an urgent need to procure and access hyper computers. India’s first supercomputer was installed in 1990. In 2023, AIRAWAT was installed at the Centre for Development of Advanced Computing in Pune. It has a peak compute capacity of 13 petaflops. It ranks among the world’s top seventy-five supercomputers. Yet, if India is to make the most of AI compute, a clearer strategy is needed to develop further capabilities. AI clusters with capacities of over 30 or 40 petaflops is the need of the hour.
The clusters, no matter which company develops them, require land, maintenance, and governance models that allow start-ups and MSMEs to plug in and build the models needed to bring to life field-defining solutions. India has the skill, but it needs compute power—this is an aspect of the iCET that could be further developed. To be clear, there is a natural benefit of greater compute within India. A truly effective technology corridor between the Silicon Valley and Bengaluru, Pune, Hyderabad, and Gurgaon (India’s tech capitals) can be realized with greater compute in India. As experts like to point out, the talent will follow the compute. According to some experts, India has less than 300 GPUs of compute power. To put this in perspective, China, according to open sources, has more than 100,000 GPUs of compute power. To stay ahead in the AI race, India and the United States will need to work together—and compute together more effectively.
Funding for the iCET
India and the United States presently fund the Nehru-Fulbright Scholarship, the Partnership to Advance Clean Energy, and the Indo-U.S. Science and Technology Forum (IUSSTF). However, a mechanism to fund an iCET fellowship, as highlighted earlier by Carnegie India in a set of takeaways from prior Track 1.5 iCET discussions, still needs to take shape. Currently, the Indian government has a scheme under Global Initiative of Academic Networks, a program that allows engagement between Indian institutes of higher education and accomplished scientists, academicians, and entrepreneurs overseas. While this scheme is welcome, it is an overarching one focused on global connections being forged by Indian academia, not just those formed with the United States.
The iCET needs a dedicated fund for three main reasons. First, academic institutions should be able to access mobility grants allowing scholars and experts to travel between the United States and India. This could include funds for buyouts in a university, allowing scholars to engage in sustained research in both countries. Second, academics and policy institutions should be able to run workshops across a range of iCET focus areas. Some of this is happening in a Track 1.5 format through think tanks and industry bodies, but dedicated funds are also needed to allow expert-level workshops to mushroom more effectively between and within universities, laboratories, defense institutions, export control departments, and an array of national missions. Third, accelerators in defense, space, and quantum computing should be funded. These accelerators bring start-ups, MSMEs, and venture capitalists together under one roof and have every potential to fuse relations between ecosystems and lead to the joint funding of strategic capabilities. They could be designed as coproduced exhibitions, hackathons, and joint challenges.
An iCET fund could start with as little as $5 million a year. It could be split between Indian and U.S. funders. Large foundations, trusts, and philanthropists would be best placed to support this fund, and it could potentially be governed by a reformed IUSSTF, which has the promise to host and govern such a fund.
Regulatory Sandbox
There are a range of digital regulations being considered in India at this time, including the Digital Personal Data Protection Bill. For U.S. companies and government practitioners, there are still several questions around the future of data localization, the treatment of nonpersonal data, and the new Digital India Act that will likely replace the Information Technology Act, 2000. Equally, both the Indian and U.S. governments and stakeholders are in the midst of thinking through the regulation of generative AI. There is an opportunity for India and the United States to work together, at the very least, to agree on the right AI safety breaks and guardrails. Some of this can be done by regulation, and some might be developed in code—either way, this conversation needs to urgently happen between regulators, companies, experts, and governments more broadly.
There is a need for a regulatory sandbox to be built more effectively into the iCET framework. The NSC and the NSCS have done wonders in cocreating mini ecosystems across the range of technologies under examination. It is important to focus on mobilizing these ecosystems more clearly through sandboxes across a range of regulations.
Further, and outside of the iCET’s focus areas, there is an increasing acceptance in Washington, London, and Brussels of the strategic value of digital public infrastructure (DPI). India has been a leader in building a DPI framework, along with Brazil, Estonia, Rwanda, and others. There is an interest in understanding how DPIs could be built in countries in the Indo-Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. There is also a case for DPIs to be adopted in U.S. cities looking for solutions such as open mobility platforms and connectors. In the end, and although outside of the iCET’s expressed toolkit, a sandbox on building DPIs in the Indo-Pacific as a strategic technology could be created. Under this approach, private sector firms that wish to get involved with DPI could test and pilot their innovations under such a sandbox architecture. Based on the response of this pilot, they could keep tweaking their approach until they have arrived at the desired model.
Export Control Rapid Reaction Cell
Given the immense complexity of U.S. export control laws, whether under the ITAR or the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), compliance with them becomes a time-consuming and costly endeavor. In such a case, a fine balance has to be struck between protecting such technologies and not overburdening businesses with regulatory compliance. Accordingly, it is worth exploring whether a rapid reaction cell can be set up, which would ideally consist of export control officials entrusted with vetting high-technology exports to India. They could act as a sounding board for any queries of Indian businesses regarding the applicability of the relevant export control regime, be it the ITAR or the EAR.
The iCET Visa
The iCET has an understandable focus on cooperation in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields. However, the mobility of STEM talent between India and the United States remains an issue. For instance, the number of Indian STEM students studying in the United States dropped by 38 percent from 2016 to 2019. Also, there is an abundance of fast-track permanent residency programs for top STEM graduates launched by other countries. Accordingly, the United States has lost out on some of this talent. An increasingly bipartisan consensus is needed in favor of moving toward immigration reform, especially when it comes to high-tech talent. One model could be Australia’s treatment under U.S. immigration laws, which offer an E-3 visa program applicable to Australian citizens possessing “highly specialized knowledge.” Perhaps, a pilot iCET visa along similar lines could be extended by the United States and India to each other’s STEM talent as well. In the beginning, this could be limited to institutions enrolled in the joint initiatives envisioned by the iCET and could later be extended to institutions designated as “leading research institutions” by the American Association of Universities and their Indian counterparts.
Semiconductors
Under the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act, the International Technology Security and Innovation (ITSI) Fund was set up, the stated purpose of which is to “provide for international information and communications technology [ICT] security and semiconductor supply chain activities.” A maximum of $100 million can be transferred each year under the ITSI Fund. Accordingly, there are likely to be a number of countries seeking financial support under this fund. It is best that such funding should not be fragmented and instead be focused on a few regions where it could lead to quick results. The United States may consider assigning a portion of this funding separately, under the iCET, to India.
India would be an ideal recipient of an endowment from the ITSI Fund for two reasons. First, regarding the bucket of semiconductor supply chains, there is the possibility of bolstering policy coordination between the ISM and the CPO through capacity-building exercises. Second, the other area where funding could lead to results relates to the bucket of ICT security. As per a McKinsey & Company survey of senior global executives, cyber resilience and the ability to work in a trusted way with other countries will be key in the future to be a part of the semiconductor supply chain. This is because cybersecurity issues have become prominent in the global semiconductor supply chain. Therefore, any country trying to position itself as a viable location for semiconductor operations would need to address cybersecurity issues. This issue can potentially be both an accelerator and a differentiator for India as it tries to enter global supply chains at a time when they are recalibrating.
Space
The iCET factsheet mentioned that both ISRO and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) would work to convene Indian and U.S. companies that could partner on the Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) program. However, these companies are yet to be identified by ISRO and NASA—a situation that needs to be rectified. The CLPS program is significant as it may present an opportunity for Indian space companies to seamlessly enter the U.S. supply chains. Usually, most U.S.-India commercial space cooperation is seen to be hindered by stringent U.S. export control laws. However, the CLPS program, with its focus on “services,” may not be afflicted with the same issues. Since U.S. companies under this program are providing services, they are at liberty to determine how they manage their own supply chains. Furthermore, the CLPS is a very cost-aggressive program and will focus on cost reduction, which may work to the benefit of Indian enterprises.
Indian space start-ups should also think about utilizing technologies under the EAR more robustly. This is because these regulations are a lot more permissible in terms of what is considered transferrable from the United States. Currently, India enjoys a Strategic Trade Authorization (STA-1) exception under the EAR, which signifies that specified exports to certain destinations will not need a license under the EAR. However, the STA-1 exception given to India is severely underutilized. The reported value of transfers to India under this mechanism is only around $6.5 million. A lot of this has to do with a strongly held view in India that the STA-1 provisions are both onerous and time-consuming. Accordingly, under the iCET, there could be regular workshops conducted by the BIS, the administering authority for the EAR, to create awareness among Indian space start-ups regarding the STA-1 exception.
Defense Innovation Bridge
INDUS-X, a defense accelerator initiative that will be launched in Washington, DC during the Indian prime minister’s visit, is designed to create a working defense innovation bridge (DIB) between the two countries. Dozens of start-ups from India, defense primes, export controllers, and experts will be under one roof for a day and a half. Senior U.S. and Indian officials will also be part of the event. Track 1.5 closed-door meetings are being organized to continue the discussion in private. INDUS-X is meant to boost business-to-business cooperation and connect start-ups and venture capitalists from both countries invested in the future of strategic technologies.
Yet, to be sustainable over time, INDUS-X should be used to announce joint challenges and joint funding for entities in India and the United States. There ought to be an announcement of another accelerator in India, later in the year, to maintain the momentum. This should be institutionalized as a niche, biannual venue for exchange. Further, for a DIB to be successful, a mentor-protégé program that seeks to enlist smaller businesses into the wider industrial base could be considered. This will fuse a logic of trust between those in India and the United States, allowing entities to get a better sense of each other’s capital markets and technological capabilities.
Of course, a pioneering project that gives momentum to the DIB would ideally be a big-ticket deal that can demonstrate that the United States is willing to spend massive political capital in transferring technology, burnishing India’s credentials as a destination for defense manufacturing. The GE engine deal has this potential and is every bit as significant as it is being made out to be.
Unlike previous bilateral defense initiatives, such as the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative, which were perhaps ahead of their time given the relatively cordial relations between the United States and China and accordingly didn’t materialize as was originally hoped, the DIB, under the iCET, should build upon vanguard projects like the impending GE engine deal in order to ensure that the momentum provided by this deal does not fizzle out. Any discussion down the line should also consider looking at procurement rules in both countries.
While India is not and will not be an “ally” of the United States, it might at some point wish to be considered a “domestic source” under the latter’s Defense Production Act. Given how the Ukraine war has rapidly depleted the U.S. Armed Forces’ munitions and put the U.S. defense industrial base under considerable strain, the United States may also benefit from such a coproduction arrangement since it would help the country shoulder the burden of its defense industrial base. Given the success the United States has had in the HIMARS deal with Poland, which eventually led to a “reciprocity agreement” for defense procurement between the two countries, this may not be a far-fetched scenario in a few years’ time.
Conclusion
Predictably, iCET sceptics and advocates alike will be focussed on “deliverables” during the Indian prime minister’s state visit to Washington, DC. As indicated above, there is plenty in the works. There are likely announcements on jet engine production in India to semiconductor assembly plants moving to India, and from developments in quantum working groups between the two countries to coproduction of long-range artillery. Whether setting standards in AI or creating a common ecosystem for compute, there is much that is currently in the iCET mix. Some of this will be realized in the next couple of weeks. Some will take longer. Yet, as has been highlighted across the suggestions above, it is imperative that iCET is seen and understood as a framework for cooperation over a long period of time. It will require sustained efforts from all stakeholders, private sector buy-in, university-led cooperation, academic engagement and mobility, and thriving innovation bridges.
Most importantly, the iCET will require the continuing mobilization on the part of both governments, coordinated and led by the NSC and the NSCS. This is key. Leaders in both countries will step into election mode by the end of 2023. iCET architects in both countries may well move on or move up, as the case might be. To make the most of this genuinely agile and far-reaching framework for deeper cooperation, it is imperative that stakeholders within and outside the government pay as much attention to crucial deliverables as they do to institutionalizing iCET imperatives. How exactly this can be done for a dexterous structure such as this is no doubt challenging. Yet, this is a challenge worth spending time on when the political capital invested into the iCET is at a high.
For those at the functional level, we have outlined a range of suggestions to be discussed as action points to be realized in the near term, beyond the June state visit. In the room, as Modi and Biden shake hands on what is without a doubt a good bet between the United States and India, it is worth considering the imperatives for institutionalizing iCET. Beyond the incredible efforts of the mavericks and architects in both systems that have enabled iCET’s extraordinary journey and outcomes thus far, it is crucial to widen that base and bake iCET into a system that can be resilient and adaptive to both change and continuity.
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1Author interviews with Indian and U.S. officials, New Delhi and Washington, DC, ongoing.
