This article, which examines Nigeria’s approach to Ukraine and China, is part of an ongoing series on U.S. statecraft and the Global South developed by the Carnegie Endowment’s American Statecraft Program. For other articles in the series, click here.

Often referred to as the “Giant of Africa” because of its large population and economy, Nigeria is clearly one of Africa’s key emerging powers. It has a tradition of investing in helping other African countries decolonize and building African institutions, such as the Organization of African Unity and the Economic Community of West African States. Its economy is undergirded by generous oil reserves, a thriving entrepreneurial culture, and the soft power of its entertainment and creative industries. Unfortunately, Nigeria is also beset with corruption, human rights violations, a violent insurgency waged by Boko Haram in the northeast, and an armed rebellion in the oil rich Niger Delta. Under these conditions, Nigeria has sought neutrality on Ukraine and aims to deepen relations with both China and the United States to the greatest extent possible to serve its own interests.

Nigeria’s Approach to the War in Ukraine

Nigeria’s economy took a tremendous hit from Russia’s invasion and the resulting Western sanctions. Nigeria is Africa’s top oil producer, but it suffered from the wartime oil price hike because it relies on imports of refined oil to meet domestic demand.¹ The subsequent economic hit led Nigeria to advocate for a political resolution as soon as possible, even while opposing Russia’s invasion.

Nigeria is also compelled to preserve its friendly relations with Russia due to its OPEC membership. Therefore, although it has condemned the invasion and called for Russia to withdraw its forces from Ukrainian territory,² it has refused to join the West’s coalition against Moscow. It has also abstained on more punitive UN resolutions, including the April 2022 resolution to suspend Russia’s membership on the UN Human Rights Council and the October 2022 resolution to make Russia liable for war reparations.³

Yet as Russia’s war drains its financial and military resources, it may have less to offer African states, and thus its influence on the continent could wane.⁴ Putin’s exit from the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which permitted the export of Ukrainian grain onto the global market, is also bad for Nigerian food security. Diplomatic engagement with Moscow seems to have dropped off, even though Nigeria’s leaders insist that relations with Russia remain “absolutely intact.”⁵ For example, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu did not attend Russia’s Africa Summit this summer, opting instead to send his vice president.⁶ Compared to the last Russia-Africa summit in 2019, where former president Muhammadu Buhari and President Vladimir Putin signed agreements on oil and gas cooperation and arms sales,⁷ the recent summit resulted in few deliverables.

In addition, before the war, Nigeria had expressed interest in deepening its ties with Russia and in 2021 signed an agreement to start receiving Russian military equipment and training for its fight against Boko Haram.⁸ Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has complicated such arrangements, however, and Nigeria imported no arms from Russia in 2022.⁹ Meanwhile, the U.S. State Department recently approved a sale of attack helicopters that was previously on hold—the largest U.S. weapons sale ever offered to Nigeria.¹⁰

Nigerian leaders likely assess that Russia currently has little to offer. Ties could recover in the future, but probably not while Russia is overstretched with its war effort and weakened by sanctions. Nigeria’s drift away from Moscow is reflective of the broader continental trend— Russia is at risk of losing favor with African countries.¹¹

Nigeria’s Approach to China

As Tinubu strives to mend Nigeria’s domestic problems, he also aims to advance the country’s economic and international standing, with help from China and the United States. Though Nigeria has long valued the United States as its top foreign investor and a provider of security cooperation and training, it also values its relationship with China, its top arms provider and a key source of infrastructure investment.

In June 2023, for example, a Chinese People’s Liberation Army naval fleet carrying about 700 soldiers arrived at the port of Lagos in an unusual visit to Africa’s Atlantic coast. The five-day visit officially aimed to strengthen relations between the two countries’ navies, but many observers speculated that China was also prospecting for a possible military base on the Gulf of Guinea.¹² China’s presence on Nigeria’s coast is growing in any case; in January 2023, Nigeria opened the Beijing-funded Lekki Deep Sea Port, a project hailed by the Chinese ambassador as “a new engine of economic development” that will make Lagos a transshipment hub and generate over $360 billion for Nigeria.¹³

Ties between China and Nigeria have roused concern among U.S. officials, especially because of possible security implications.¹⁴ The U.S.-Nigeria relationship once centered on Nigeria’s oil exports,¹⁵ but improvements in Canada’s oil sands production have reduced Nigerian oil to only two percent of U.S. imports, weakening the link.¹⁶ The U.S.-Nigeria relationship now rests more heavily on security cooperation. The United States provides the Nigerian security forces with training, joint exercises, enhanced intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance capabilities, air to ground integration, maritime security, and law enforcement support under the category of countering violent extremism.¹⁷

Even as Nigeria relies on the United States in these areas, it depends on China as its top source of arms. Nigeria gets some weapons from the United States, but its difficulties with Leahy vetting have led Abuja to turn to China as an alternative supplier.¹⁸ In 2021, China accounted for over one-third of Nigeria’s arms imports, while the United States accounted for only about two percent.¹⁹

Economically, Abuja is intertwined with both Washington and Beijing. Nigeria is the United States’ second-largest trading partner in Africa and eligible for U.S. trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act. But Abuja trades more with China than with the United States, importing the largest share—24 percent—of its commodities from China.²⁰

In the past, China was a go-to source of investment for the construction of railways, power plants, airports, and technology in Nigeria. China has more recently reduced these investments, however, in the face of Nigeria’s difficult security situation and as part of China’s global cutback on risky projects.²¹ The delivery of billions of dollars of Chinese funding is now in question, even for construction projects that are already underway.²² Abuja may now turn to European lenders to finance its infrastructure needs.²³ In any event, the United States remains Nigeria’s largest foreign investor, although most of the investments are concentrated in the oil and gas sector.²⁴

People-to-people ties also matter, and Nigeria sends thousands of its students to both the United States and China for higher education.²⁵ These ties stand to further cement (or loosen) Nigeria’s ties with Washington and Beijing over the next few years.

Shortly after taking office in May 2023, Tinubu told a Chinese delegation that Nigeria was open to business and looking forward to greater cooperation. “We can learn from each other, but we will remain non-aligned,” he told them.²⁶

Nigeria will not choose the United States’ side in strategic competition with China, despite the security relationship. Instead, Abuja will seek to reap the benefits of strong ties with both Beijing and Washington, all the while trying to take care of its domestic priorities and economic interests. With Nigeria’s large economy, population, and geographical size, and the influence it exerts on the African continent, the United States cannot afford to ignore Abuja.

Notes

¹ “How Russia-Ukraine War Affected Nigeria’s Economy,” Business Day, December 26, 2022, https://businessday.ng/business-economy/article/how-russia-ukraine-war-affected-nigerias-economy/#:~:text=The%20conflict%20caused%20disruptions%20to,the%20disruption%20in%20petrol%20supply.

² Geoffrey Onyeama, Tweet, February 27, 2022, https://twitter.com/GeoffreyOnyeama/status/1497887108568166400?s=20; Sodiq Oyeleke, “Withdraw Your Troops From Ukraine, Nigeria Tells Russia,” Punch, February 25, 2022, https://punchng.com/withdraw-your-troops-from-ukraine-nigeria-urges-russia/.

³ Chiamaka Okafor, “Nigeria Neutral in UN Vote Despite Russia’s Abstention Threat,” April 7, 2022, Premium Times, April 7, 2022, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/522513-nigeria-neutral-in-un-vote-despite-russias-abstention-threat.html; “UN Calls for Russia to Pay Reparations. How Did Countries Vote?” Al Jazeera, November 15, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/15/un-calls-for-russia-to-pay-reparations-how-did-countries-vote

⁴ “Why African leaders Shunned Vladimir Putin’s Summit,” Economist, July 26, 2023, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/07/26/why-african-leaders-shunned-vladimir-putins-summit

⁵ Johnbosco Agbakwuru, “Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Our Relations with Both Countries Intact, Says Nigerian Govt,” Vanguard Nigeria, April 28, 2022, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/04/russia-ukraine-conflict-our-relations-with-both-countries-intact-says-nigerian-govt/

⁶ Debora Patta, “Russia-Africa Summit Hosted by Putin Draws Small Crowd, Reflecting Africa’s Changing Mood on Moscow,” CBS News, July 28 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-africa-summit-vladimir-putin-ukraine-war-wagner-group/

⁷ “Nigeria and Russia to ‘widen and Deepen’ Energy Cooperation: Novak,” S&P Global, October 24, 2019, https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/102419-nigeria-and-russia-to-widen-and-deepen-energy-cooperation-novak

⁸ “Nigeria Signs Military Cooperation Agreement with Russia,” Reuters, August 26, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/nigeria-signs-military-cooperation-agreement-with-russia-2021-08-25/

⁹ SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/ 

¹⁰ “U.S. Approves Arms Sales to Nigeria After Pause Over Human Rights Concerns,” Reuters, April 15, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-approves-arms-sale-nigeria-after-pause-over-human-rights-concerns-2022-04-15/

¹¹ Ronak Gopaldas, “ Will the Invasion of Ukraine Change Russia-Africa Relations,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 26, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/04/26/will-invasion-of-ukraine-change-russia-africa-relations-pub-89596.

¹² “Chinese Navy Makes Rare Foray into West Africa with Nigeria Visit,” Reuters, July 3, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/chinese-navy-makes-rare-foray-into-west-africa-with-nigeria-visit-2023-07-03/ ; Kate Bartlett, “Chinese Navy in Nigeria Amid Base Concerns,” Voice of America, June 6, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/chinese-navy-in-nigeria-amid-base-concerns-/7169855.html.

¹³ Nigeria’s State House, “Lekki Deep Sea Port Roars to Life as President Buhari Observes Historic Offloading From Container Ship,” January 23, 2023, https://statehouse.gov.ng/news/lekki-deep-sea-port-roars-to-life-as-president-buhari-observes-historic-offloading-from-container-ship/.

¹⁴ David Vergun, “General Says China is Seeking a Naval Base in West Africa,” Department of Defense News, March 17 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2969935/general-says-china-is-seeking-a-naval-base-in-west-africa/.

¹⁵ “Nigeria, the Largest Crude Oil Producer in Africa, is a Major Source of U.S. Imports,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, September 13, 2011, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=3050.

¹⁶ Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Nigeria,” https://oec.world/en/profile/country/nga#:~:text=Overview%20In%202021%2C%20Nigeria%20was,Economic%20Complexity%20Index%20(ECI)%20.

¹⁷ “Nigeria: Key Issues and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, March 25, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47052/2.

¹⁸ Gordon Lubold, “China’s Growing Influence in Africa Seen in Arms Trade and Infrastructure Investment,” Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-growing-influence-in-africa-seen-in-arms-trade-and-infrastructure-investment-11650554282.

¹⁹ SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/.

²⁰ World Bank World Integrated Trade Solution, https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/NGA.

²¹ William Clowes, “China’s Pullback on Lending Stalls Dreams of Rebuilding Nigeria,” Bloomberg, May 17, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-17/china-infrastructure-funding-stalls-for-nigeria?embedded-checkout=true.

²² Jevans Nyabiage, “Nigeria Says China Has Held Off Its Pledged Financing for 2 Railway Projects,” South China Morning Post, October 13, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3195760/nigeria-says-china-has-held-its-pledged-financing-two-railway.

²³ Briget Chiedu Onuchie, “Amaechi Announces Delay in Rail Projects as China Suspends Funding,” The Guardian Nigeria, February 1, 2022, https://guardian.ng/news/amaechi-announces-delay-in-rail-projects-as-china-suspends-funding/.

²⁴ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, “U.S. Relations with Nigeria: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet,” April 29, 2021, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-nigeria/#:~:text=Through%20U.S.%20foreign%20assistance%2C%20the,to%20those%20affected%20by%20terrorism ; “Nigeria: Key Issues and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, March 25, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47052/2.

²⁵ Adelani Adepegba, “6,800 Nigerian Students In China – Envoy,” Punch, November 4, 2020, https://punchng.com/6800-nigerian-students-in-china-envoy/.

²⁶ “Chinese Delegation Meets Tinubu, Pledges Increased Economic Cooperation with Nigeria,” Premium Times, May 31, 2023, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/601793-chinese-delegation-meets-tinubu-pledges-increased-economic-cooperation-with-nigeria.html.