Politburo member Wang Yi’s postmortem on President Xi Jinping’s April 14-18 visit to Southeast Asia captured a core message – “at this moment of crisis, the world yearns for stability and direction, with neighboring countries expecting China to demonstrate leadership and provide certainty.” Just days before his departure, China convened a rare Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries. Subsequent authoritative commentary in People’s Daily suggested peripheral relations in seventeen countries of the “Indochina peninsula” and Central Asia will now become the highest priority in China’s foreign relations. “For many years,” writes commentator Li Kaisheng, “the United States has been trying to suppress and contain China through its Asian ‘allies,’ pushing a very small number of Asian countries to the forefront of containing China. However, the vast majority of neighboring countries have a clear understanding of this and insist on not taking sides.”
In this analysis, four scholars offer initial assessments of Xi Jinping’s visit and perspectives from Vietnam, Malaysia, Cambodia, and China on whether Beijing’s vision resonates with local realities. Inlaid in these assessments are two broad themes. The Trump administration’s effort to reshape the global trading system and reset overseas security commitments is creating an historic inflection point. Less clear is how far China will be able to capitalize on these dynamics, given these countries’ desire to preserve optionality, if not via ties with Washington, than through a diversification of ties aimed at preserving strategic autonomy.
Xi Jinping’s Southeast Asia Tour: Diplomacy, Influence, and the Limits of Engagement
Li Mingjiang
Nonresident Scholar, Carnegie China
During his April 14–18 tour of Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia, Xi Jinping oversaw the signing of numerous agreements across sectors including trade, infrastructure, technology, health, and education. These visits deepened strategic partnerships, expanded socio-economic cooperation, and bolstered China’s regional influence amid growing U.S. trade pressures. Xi sought to portray China as a stable, long-term partner committed to economic integration and regional peace. Nonetheless, persistent economic and security challenges may continue to deter some Southeast Asian countries from drawing too close—or moving too quickly—toward Beijing.
Notably, Xi’s trip took place less than a week after the Central Conference on Work Relating to Neighboring Countries in Beijing, where he emphasized the strategic importance of strengthening ties with neighboring states to enhance development, security, and regional influence. At the conference, Xi reaffirmed China’s commitment to mutual benefit and regional stability, highlighting the Belt and Road Initiative and a proactive diplomatic approach amid growing global uncertainties.
Southeast Asia has long been central to China’s foreign policy. Over the past few decades, Beijing has invested substantial diplomatic, financial, educational, and socio-cultural resources to cultivate stronger ties with ASEAN countries. This sustained engagement has contributed to the widely held perception that China is now the most influential power in the region across multiple domains. Since the first Trump administration and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, China’s focus on Southeast Asia has only intensified. For instance, Chinese institutions have championed unilateral openness to the region and promoted proposals such as the establishment of a China–ASEAN common market.
Xi’s April trip marked a major diplomatic effort to consolidate China’s influence in Southeast Asia amid intensifying strategic competition with the United States. The visits yielded concrete achievements across economic, socio-cultural, and diplomatic spheres, while also revealing the constraints of China’s regional strategy.
A major outcome was the strengthening of bilateral ties. In Vietnam, Xi and Vietnamese leaders signed 45 cooperation agreements as part of their Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership. These covered sectors such as infrastructure, science and technology, supply chains, and border trade. Xi’s emphasis on party-to-party exchanges underscored the ideological closeness between the Chinese and Vietnamese Communist Parties, reinforcing long-term strategic alignment despite unresolved maritime disputes.
In Malaysia, Xi oversaw the signing of 31 agreements focused on the digital economy, artificial intelligence, agriculture, and green development. The expansion of the “Two Countries, Twin Parks” industrial initiative signaled deepening industrial collaboration and highlighted China’s intent to further integrate with Southeast Asia’s manufacturing and technology sectors. These efforts aim to strengthen China’s role as an indispensable economic partner, especially as the United States imposes higher tariffs on Chinese exports.
In Cambodia, Xi reaffirmed China’s close relationship with a longstanding ally. The two sides signed 37 agreements spanning trade, education, public health, and defense. Xi expressed strong support for Cambodia’s development agenda, including symbolic backing for the controversial Funan Techo Canal project. He also addressed growing concerns over transnational crime, pledging closer cooperation in law enforcement.
Despite these accomplishments, the visits revealed important limitations. One was China’s increasingly cautious financial stance. In Cambodia, for instance, Xi offered political support for the canal project but stopped short of pledging full funding. This reflects rising Chinese concerns over the financial risks of large-scale Belt and Road investments, especially given domestic economic challenges and mounting debt burdens in partner countries.
Another challenge is managing regional skepticism. For instance, in Vietnam, while the visit advanced bilateral cooperation, it did not resolve long-standing tensions in the South China Sea. Strategic trust remains fragile. Moreover, while China may be eager to cultivate collective positions among Southeast Asian countries against the growing impact of Trump’s reciprocal tariffs, many governments in the region have expressed interest in negotiating separately with Washington in the coming months. This could prove disappointing for Beijing, which had hoped for a more unified stance among its neighbors on trade issues.
China’s approach to the South China Sea may also continue to raise concerns. While Beijing emphasizes peace and cooperation in public diplomacy, it has not fundamentally altered its posture on the maritime disputes. For example, the joint statement issued during Xi’s visit to Malaysia indicated that the finalization of the long-delayed Code of Conduct in the South China Sea may be expected only in 2026, not earlier as previously hoped by many other parties. This suggests that China is not yet prepared to fully accommodate regional countries’ security concerns. At the same time, Beijing is likely to maintain an assertive stance in managing fisheries, energy resources, and law enforcement activities in contested waters. Such behavior, partly because of lack of coordination among various agencies in China, risks undermining the political goodwill generated through China’s expanding diplomatic and socio-economic engagement with Southeast Asia.
Although China continues to promote multilateralism and "win-win" cooperation, many Southeast Asian countries remain wary of overreliance on Beijing. Instead, they strive to maintain a strategic balance by strengthening ties with other powers such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan. Countries like Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia actively seek to avoid becoming entangled in U.S.–China rivalry. They are promoting regional initiatives like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and deepening intra-ASEAN collaboration. Many are also positioning themselves as alternative destinations for global supply chains shifting out of China, aiming to benefit from the ongoing reconfiguration of global production networks.
In sum, Xi’s Southeast Asia tour reinforced China’s regional footprint and highlighted its long-term ambitions. Yet it also underscored the delicate balancing act Beijing faces: fostering economic cooperation, providing political reassurance, and navigating enduring geopolitical frictions. China’s intensified regional diplomacy may yield strategic dividends, but it will continue to be tempered by both external resistance and internal constraints.
Xi Jinping’s Visit to Vietnam: A Diplomatic Show Amid Hidden Tensions
Le Hong Hiep
Senior Fellow and Coordinator, Vietnam Studies Programme
ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore
On April 14-15, 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping embarked on a high-profile visit to Vietnam, marking his second trip to the country in less than 18 months. The visit, part of a broader Southeast Asian tour that included Malaysia and Cambodia, saw Xi meet with Vietnam’s top leaders, including CPV General Secretary To Lam, President Luong Cuong and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, to sign dozens of cooperation agreements aimed at bolstering economic ties. Amid a backdrop of escalating U.S. tariffs on both countries, the visit appeared to signal a peak in Vietnam-China relations, with both sides emphasizing unity and mutual economic benefits. However, beneath the surface of this diplomatic spectacle lie persistent tensions—most notably over South China Sea disputes and the transshipment of Chinese goods through Vietnam—that suggest this visit is far from a turning point in bilateral ties.
Xi’s visit underscored the strengthening economic and political relationship between China and Vietnam, reflecting Hanoi’s strategic outreach to its northern giant. Vietnam rolled out the highest protocols for Xi, with President Luong Cuong personally receiving him at Noi Bai International Airport and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh seeing him off at the visit’s conclusion—a gesture of significant diplomatic respect. The two countries signed numerous agreements, including deals to enhance supply chains, develop railway infrastructure, and expand cooperation in emerging fields like artificial intelligence and green development. Xi also called for deeper industrial ties and urged Vietnam to work with Beijing to resist “unilateral bullying,” a thinly veiled reference to U.S. trade policies, while emphasizing the importance of maintaining global free trade systems. These developments highlight a mutual interest in deepening economic collaboration, especially as Vietnam has become China’s largest trade partner in Southeast Asia, with bilateral trade nearly doubling between 2017 and 2024.
The timing of Xi’s visit, occurring just two weeks after U.S. President Donald Trump imposed steep tariffs—145% on China and 46% on Vietnam—added a layer of strategic significance. While the visit was likely planned well in advance, it provided a timely platform for both countries to address the economic pressures stemming from U.S. trade policies. China, facing severe trade disruptions, sought to pull Vietnam closer into its orbit, positioning itself as a stable partner in contrast to the unpredictable America. Vietnam, heavily reliant on exports to the U.S. (which account for 30% of its GDP), saw an opportunity to buffer potential economic shocks by deepening ties with China. Key outcomes included agreements to build new rail links connecting norther Vietnam and southern China, and China’s pledge to open its market to more Vietnamese agricultural products. These measures aim to diversify Vietnam’s economic dependencies, reducing its vulnerability to U.S. tariff threats.
Despite the fanfare, Xi’s visit is unlikely to fundamentally alter Vietnam’s China policy or its strategic positioning between China and the U.S. Vietnam remains steadfast in its non-alignment foreign policy, which prioritizes maintaining a delicate balance between the two superpowers. This approach is critical for Vietnam, as it seeks to preserve economic stability and avoid being drawn into a superpower rivalry that could jeopardize its development goals. By fostering ties with both China and the U.S., Vietnam ensures it retains strategic maneuverability, avoiding over-reliance on either power while maximizing economic opportunities—a necessity for a smaller nation navigating great power competition.
Two persistent issues underscore why this visit will not mark a turning point in Vietnam-China relations. First, the South China Sea remains a latent source of tension. While the past three years have seen relatively calm waters between the two nations, Vietnam does not view this as a permanent state. China may reignite maritime tensions anytime to pressure Vietnam into aligning with its broader strategic goals, especially when Beijing is less preoccupied with other regional rivals like the Philippines. For now, Vietnam’s strategy of building good ties with China helps delay such tensions, allowing Hanoi to focus on domestic priorities and accelerate its land reclamation efforts in the Spratly Islands to strengthen its foothold there. Notably, China has not taken significant actions to obstruct these efforts, likely due to its current focus on other regional challenges and its wish to win Vietnam to its side amid its intensifying rivalry with Washington.
Second, the issue of Chinese goods being transshipped through Vietnam to evade U.S. tariffs poses a significant challenge. This practice has drawn scrutiny from the U.S., with White House trade advisor Peter Navarro highlighting it as a serious concern for Washington and a key issue in bilateral tariff talks. Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh has urged relevant authorities to crack down on this practice. While there is no public information on whether this issue was discussed during Xi’s visit, Hanoi has little choice but to act to preserve its ties with Washington and to avoid the worst of President Trump’s tariff policies. However, such measures risk upsetting China, potentially straining bilateral ties.
Xi Jinping’s visit to Vietnam showcases Hanoi’s deft diplomacy and its skillful balancing act between the U.S. and China. The carefully choreographed event reflects Vietnam’s need to demonstrate a keen interest in promoting ties with China. Yet, it is also a theatrical show—one where Vietnam must work quietly behind the scenes to address ongoing issues like South China Sea disputes and the transshipment problem. Unfortunately, Vietnam’s ability to manage these challenges is not entirely in its own hands. As a smaller power in an era of great power competition, Vietnam must adapt itself and learn to dance to the tunes of both the U.S. and China, navigating their competing demands while striving to maintain its independent foreign policy. Xi’s visit, while a diplomatic success on the surface, reveals the increasing fragility of Vietnam’s strategic position.
Xi Jinping’s Visit to Cambodia: Strengthening Ties Amid Strategic Recalibration
Chandarith Neak
Director, Institute for International Studies and Public Policy
Royal University of Phnom Penh
President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Cambodia on April 17-18 emphasized the two countries’ “ironclad friendship” and Phnom Penh’s pivotal role in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while also showcasing Prime Minister Hun Manet’s effort to balance stronger ties with China with efforts to preserve autonomy via other ties.
Deepening Bilateral Cooperation
Since 1958, Cambodia and China have built a robust partnership. Economically, China is Cambodia’s top trade partner, with 2024 bilateral trade at $15.19 billion, up 23.8% due to the China-Cambodia Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA) of 2022. At the China-funded National Road 71C inauguration, Hun Manet praised China’s $3 billion infrastructure financing and pledged to advance their friendship. The visit furthers projects like the Funan Techo Canal and “Fish and Rice Corridor,” boosting exports for 65% of Cambodian products, aligning with the Pentagonal Strategy (2023-2028).
Security ties grow through the Ream Naval Base and “Golden Dragon 2025” exercises. Culturally, China funds scholarships and Angkor Wat restoration, co-producing Khmer films to address cultural concerns. Cambodia’s outreach to Japan and the U.S., including Japan’s April 2025 naval visit, reflects a balanced approach.
Strategic Context and China’s Engagement
President Xi’s visit aligns with U.S.-China trade talks, as President Trump confirms negotiations to ease tariffs. Cambodia, facing a 49% US tariff rate threatening its $2.3 billion garment sector, uses Xi’s visit to signal strength in tariff talks. Cambodia’s $3.96 billion debt to China, with $200 million annual servicing costs, prompted no new loans since January 2024. China emphasizes regional trust, as noted at the Central Conference on Neighborhood Diplomacy.
China acknowledges Cambodia’s diversification, including U.S. engagements and plans to revive the Angkor Sentinel exercise. Since 2023, Hun Manet has recalibrated Vietnam policy, exiting the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area (CLV-DTA) to assert autonomy amid nationalist sentiments, signaling Cambodia’s intent to reduce reliance on regional powers. Xi’s visit, timed with the Ream Naval Base inauguration, reinforces alignment through projects like the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), which hosts 200 enterprises and drives industrial growth.
However, Cambodia’s hedging strategy reveals its agency in managing China’s influence. By diversifying partnerships through RCEP agreements with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, Cambodia secures $8.1 billion in FDI from 2023-2024, reducing economic dependence on China’s 49.82% FDI share. Diplomatically, Cambodia’s offer to lower U.S. import taxes on 19 product categories demonstrates its ability to negotiate independently, projecting strength without fully aligning with China. The SSEZ, while a BRI flagship, also attracts non-Chinese firms, with Cambodia enforcing strict regulatory oversight to ensure local benefits, such as job creation for 30,000 workers. Cambodia’s refusal of new Chinese loans since 2024, driven by debt sustainability concerns, further underscores its fiscal prudence, maintaining a 34% debt-to-GDP ratio compared to ASEAN’s 2.5% average. Culturally, Cambodia insists on co-producing BRI-related media projects, ensuring Khmer narratives dominate, as seen in the 2025 Cambodia-China “Year of Tourism” initiatives. These actions demonstrate Cambodia’s strategic autonomy, allowing it to leverage China’s support while hedging against over-reliance, aware that China recognizes this calculated balance yet continues to invest due to Cambodia’s geopolitical value in ASEAN.
Geopolitical and Regional Dynamics
Malaysia’s 2025 ASEAN chairmanship promotes “Inclusivity and Sustainability,” enhancing Cambodia’s role in the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework and Mekong sustainability. Cambodia’s $8.1 billion diversified FDI strengthens its standing, but U.S. tariffs risk market imbalances, prompting intra-regional trade advocacy. Cambodia’s tariff concessions to the U.S. support ASEAN’s unified negotiation strategy. Domestically, optimism for Chinese investment meets calls for balanced partnerships.
Key Outcomes
The visit yielded 37 cooperative agreements, covering trade, infrastructure, and security. The Funan Techo Canal project, with five contracts signed on April 17, enhances irrigation and navigation across four provinces. Economic deals expand renewable energy and a Sihanoukville smart-city pilot, aligning with Cambodia’s 2050 vision and the UN 2030 Agenda. Digital trade protocols bolster Cambodia’s ASEAN export role. Security agreements include cyber-defense training. Diplomatic initiatives support Myanmar’s stabilization and Mekong sustainability.
Culturally, the 2025 Cambodia-China “Year of Tourism” fosters exchanges. Cambodia’s 34% debt-to-GDP ratio and diversified FDI reflect resilience, embodying the Khmer adage, “Do not put all your eggs in one basket”. The Ream Base’s openness to global partners highlights this balance.
Conclusion
Xi Jinping’s visit to Cambodia solidifies a historic partnership while advancing Cambodia’s recalibrated foreign policy. The 37 agreements, including the Funan Techo Canal and renewable energy projects, drive economic growth by mitigating U.S. tariff impacts and enhancing Cambodia’s role as an ASEAN export hub, promising sustained prosperity. Diplomatically, Cambodia’s strengthened ASEAN influence and diversified partnerships with Japan and the US ensure strategic autonomy, allowing it to leverage China’s support without over-reliance. By balancing economic gains, regional leadership, and independent diplomacy, the visit secures Cambodia’s stability and positions it as a resilient player in a multipolar world.
Xi’s visit further advances ties with Malaysia
Ngeow Chow Bing
Nonresident Scholar, Carnegie China
Malaysia was the second leg of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s three-country tour to Southeast Asia in mid-April 2025, which was also Xi’s first foreign visit in the year. Xi’s visit to Malaysia was highly anticipated on the Malaysian side, which had planned to invite Xi last year, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the diplomatic ties between Malaysia and China, but the scheduling just could not work out. Instead, Chinese Premier Li Qiang visited Malaysia in June 2024, and issued an upbeat Joint Statement with Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. The King of Malaysia, Sultan Ibrahim Iskandar, also paid a state visit in September 2024. It was under the King’s invitation that Xi paid a reciprocal visit.
Xi’s visit would have been quite a normal reciprocal visit if not because of the “Liberation Day” tariffs imposed by the United States in early April. Trump’s decision shocked the world and rocked the global multilateral trading order, an order which Malaysia heavily depends on. Malaysia was dismayed to be slapped a tariff rate of 24 percent, threatening the survival of its large numbers of manufacturers and exporters. Xi’s Southeast Asia visit was not planned in relations to the tariffs, but now it became a highly strategic trip aimed to forge a common ground against the U.S. assault on the trading order and to send signals of China’s resolve and determination.
Anwar was receptive of China’s messaging. In the speech delivered during the state dinner in honor of Xi’s visit, Anwar criticized “some nations” (an obvious reference to today’s U.S.) for abandoning “the principle of shared responsibility” while “China’s global initiatives offer a new lease on hope.” American actions, Anwar continued, is “a retreat into economic tribalism” while “market access is being weaponized… under the weight of arbitrary disruption and unilateral whip.” China, in contrast, has been a “rational, strong and reliable partner” and Malaysia “values this consistency.”
The visit delivered few concrete deliverables. No major economic agreements or business deals were announced. No new Belt and Road projects were showcased. Up to 31 Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) were signed, but most of them carried little substance. Nonetheless, the visit itself was the most important deliverable, with Xi and Anwar issuing an even more upbeat Joint Statement in the wake of the visit, with a joint commitment to build a “High-Level Strategic Malaysia-China Community with a Shared Future.” The most notable article of the Joint Statement was Article Nine, which stipulated “both sides agreed to establish the Joint Foreign and Defense Dialogue Mechanism to further expand channels for high-level strategic communication and platforms for political security cooperation.” The establishment of this Joint Foreign and Defense Dialogue Mechanism is also one of the MOUs, signed between the Foreign and Defense Ministries from both sides.
In effect, this is a “two plus two” mechanism, an almost unprecedented development. In December 2024 Malaysia held the first “Strategic Dialogue” with Japan that also involved foreign and defense ministries from both sides, at the director-general or deputy secretary general levels. It remains to be seen at what level is this “two plus two” between Malaysia and China to be implemented, but certainly this marks a significant page in the bilateral relations. It sends a clear signal that both countries are now more aligned than before.
On the South China Sea issue, the Joint Statement mentioned “the progress made in the official launch of the Bilateral Dialogue on the Management of Maritime Issues in the South China Sea.” This bilateral mechanism was launched in October 2024, an important step for both sides to manage the dispute, enhance communication, and explore opportunities for maritime cooperation. With this mechanism, signs are both countries have managed to further stabilize the issue. Although it remains an unsettled issue that could still erupt with negative consequences, as of now it is more an occasional irritant rather than a serious obstacle to the bilateral ties.
With Xi’s visit, Malaysia-China relations now stand at perhaps at the highest level in their history, and Trump’s tariffs had a significant role in it. Nonethless, Malaysia is not looking only towards China. ASEAN and other long-standing partners such as Japan, Korea, Australia, the United Kingdom, among others, remain Malaysia’s ideal options. Anwar has also tried to rally its fellow ASEAN members for a collective response, although this collective response is also somewhat undercut but his own decision to send his trade minister, Tengku Zaifrul Aziz, will travel to the U.S. on April 24 to discuss the tariffs.
Between the United States and China, is Malaysia now leaning towards the latter? Such a tendency is certainly more apparent, but not straightforward. At this moment, China certainly appears to be a vastly more dependable partner, but Malaysia is aware that there is no easy answer, and beyond the rhetoric, China itself is also the source of tremendous stress for Malaysia’s manufacturers and producers. Fundamentally Malaysia, like many other regional countries, seeks a dignified agency, not a simple matter of “choosing side” or bandwagoning towards one patron or another.
