After nearly five decades, Turkey’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), secured a decisive victory in March’s local elections, capturing nearly 38 percent of the national vote. Following its successes in 2019, when it secured the Istanbul and Ankara municipalities, this year the CHP expanded into municipalities across the inner Aegean, Black Sea, and Central Anatolia regions. The significance of these results is further underscored by the noticeable loss of support for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), including in its traditional strongholds across Turkey. Add to this the decline in votes for the Good Party (IyiP) and the ability of the People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM)—despite systematic government efforts to curtail Kurdish political representation—to rank first in most of the cities in Southeast and Eastern Anatolia, the March 31 elections might have altered the nation’s political landscape.
Scholars and experts have rightly noted that these rather unexpected results, especially following the defeat of the opposition in last year’s presidential and parliamentary elections, demonstrate President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s vulnerabilities and the weakening of his AKP. Some have gone further, arguing that the outcome provides a “first glimpse of a political future beyond the reigning strongman [Erdoğan]” and that “there is no fertile ground in Turkey for authoritarian regimes to flourish upon.” Others have been more cautious about writing off Erdoğan too early because of his reputation as “a survivor and pragmatist.” Moreover, much depends on how local governments, which were won by the CHP, will perform. Yet, there seems to be an overarching consensus that the aspiration for a “secular, democratic, pluralistic, inclusive and modern Turkey” is very much intact.
A comprehensive examination of the election outcomes presents a more nuanced perspective. Two key observations emerge: First, despite the splintering of opposition factions, their electorate remained cohesive in their collective opposition against the AKP and its People’s Alliance. While most opposition voters’ primary impetus for supporting the CHP lies in this anti-regime stance, it is essential to note the diverse composition of these voters that defies simple categorization. Second, the decline in support for the AKP stems from two interrelated factors: the party’s diminished capacity to mediate between the state and its citizens and its dwindling pool of resources to sustain clientelist practices aimed at securing continued support.
Opposition Voters Unite Against the AKP and the People’s Alliance
Although the opposition’s alliance dissolved after last year’s dual elections, leading opposition parties to nominate their own candidates, a heterogeneous coalition of voters maintained their collective resistance against the ruling alliance. A cursory comparison of total votes received by the parties in city council elections and mayoral elections provides a preliminary insight. Typically, voters’ selections in city council elections align closely with their party affiliations, whereas the mayoral elections often involve tactical voting practices beyond partisan preferences. The CHP accrued approximately 1.6 million more votes for mayoral positions than for city council representatives, underscoring the tactical vote shifts to the CHP from other parties.
City-by-city analysis further confirms this initial observation. In Istanbul, for instance, DEM voters overwhelmingly rallied behind the CHP candidate, Ekrem İmamoğlu. İmamoğlu also garnered significant support from backers of other opposition parties, such as IyiP and the Felicity Party (SP). In regions such as the inner Aegean and the Black Sea, CHP candidates received endorsements from IyiP voters and, in some instances, from supporters of the relatively new Victory Party (ZP).
Beyond the prevailing discontent with economic and political governance, which is a primary driver for voters backing the CHP, the electorate exhibits diversity. Their concerns range from apprehensions about “stealth Islamization” and state intervention in personal lifestyles to issues related to migration and the Kurdish issue, perceived by some voters primarily as a matter of rights and by others as a security question. For instance, in Afyon, where the CHP secured its first victory after seventy-four years, controversy within the party arose when its candidate, Burcu Köksal, expressed during the campaign period her intention to engage with all political parties except DEM if elected. Köksal was among the fifteen CHP politicians who joined IyiP in 2018, enabling the latter to establish a parliamentary group.
Resentment toward migrants and refugees emerged as another concern voiced by CHP candidates. In Uşak, the party’s recently elected candidate unequivocally noted his intention to withhold business permits from Afghan and Syrian nationals. He also expressed a desire to limit the presence of refugees in the region, despite Uşak’s relatively low concentration of refugees compared to other Turkish cities.
Voters Shift to Supporting the CHP
The CHP is Turkey’s second-biggest party, with nearly 1.5 million registered members. (The AKP is the largest party by far with more than 11 million members.) As the pioneering party of the republic, the CHP is also the oldest political entity in Turkey and therefore holds a significant historical stake.
The following factors, among others, contributed to the party's success in winning over voters in March’s elections.
Changing the party leadership
Following the opposition’s setback in the 2023 dual elections, the CHP and the DEM emerged as the only parties to enact substantial changes in their organizational structures. The election of Özgür Özel as the party's new leader at the 38th Ordinary Assembly might have partially compensated the voters’ disappointment with the party leadership after last year’s presidential elections.
Appeal of Ekrem İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş
During the CHP’s election rally in Kilis, a city bordering Syria with Turkey’s highest density of Syrian refugees, Özgür Özel characterized Kilis as “the guarantee of this country’s [Turkey] unity and solidarity”. Adopting an inclusive tone, he rallied the crowd by suggesting that voting for the CHP candidate would ensure uninterrupted service provision, because “Ankara’s mayor, Mansur Yavaş, will always have his hand on the candidate’s right shoulder, while Ekrem İmamoğlu would do the same on the left.” The CHP candidate secured victory at 31.4 percent, garnering support not only from the voters of IyiP, but also from the supporters of the AKP and its coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).
Beyond the profound symbolism inherent in Özel’s statements, the significant contributions of İmamoğlu and Yavaş to the CHP’s electoral success are evident. Several factors underscore their impact. First is the political charisma exhibited by İmamoğlu, which resonated widely across the political spectrum and appealed to a diverse array of voters.
Secondly, Yavaş’s political history with the MHP helped fostering a strong connection with nationalist circles. This likely contributed to voters’ shifts from nationalist opposition parties to the CHP. Finally, also influential in the CHP’s success was the perception that the tenures of İmamoğlu and Yavaş in Turkey’s two largest cities since 2019 were marked by effective governance that largely transcended partisan divides.
Nominate Former AKP or MHP Candidates
Moreover, the CHP decided to nominate former members of the AKP and MHP in select regions. This likely contributed to its success in winning over voters from the ruling alliance.
In various districts of Ankara, the CHP fielded candidates who had previously been affiliated with the AKP, MHP, or IyiP. Notably, in the Senkaya district of the Eastern Anatolian city Erzurum—renowned as an AKP stronghold—the party’s candidate was formerly with the AKP and served as mayor for fifteen years. This strategic maneuvering was reflected in the electoral outcomes, as evidenced by the CHP's doubling of its vote share in the city of Erzurum itself, rising from around 3.7 percent in 2019 to 6.2 percent in the recent elections.
What Explains the AKP’s Decline?
While the offerings of the CHP to voters, or the perceptions thereof, may provide some insight into the election results, they only offer a partial explanation. Another significant factor contributing to the decline in the AKP’s vote shares was escalating discontent among the party’s supporters, as demonstrated by declining turnout. Participation in Turkish elections dropped by 6.4 points between the 2019 and 2024 elections, from 81.3 percent to 74.9 percent (measured as the share of valid votes in the total number of votes cast). Even though it is difficult to know with certainty how the decline in turnout rate is distributed across parties, a rough overview of voting patterns across various cities suggests that, on average, a greater number of AKP supporters appeared to have abstained from voting compared to opposition voters.
Yet, the lower participation rate alone does not fully account for the AKP’s losses. The shifts from the incumbent party to the CHP have already been noted, a trend evident even in the AKP’s stronghold cities such as Konya and Kayseri, where the AKP maintained its position as the leading party but experienced substantial declines in vote shares. According to a recent analysis of the vote shifts, around 1.5 million citizens that supported the AKP and the MHP in last year’s parliamentary elections voted for the CHP in this year’s local elections.
At the core of the AKP’s defeat was its failure to meet citizens’ demands. Unlike previous elections, party leaders struggled to freely allocate resources and to sustain clientelist practices. Due to the dearth of resources, they also had a hard time maintaining stability in key economic indicators, including unemployment rates, foreign exchange rates, and inflation. The party’s inability to positively respond to the demands of “pensioners and citizens with low and fixed incomes” was a particularly heated topic ahead of the elections, even among pro-government journalists.
Further exacerbating the situation was the party’s weakened capacity to mediate between the state and its citizens. The AKP’s foundational claim has long centered on its portrayal as a “party of the people,” positioned in stark contrast to the CHP, which is often depicted as a party representing elite interests and detached from the broader populace. According to the AKP’s narrative, its ascendance to power as an Islamist party has purportedly empowered segments of Turkish society traditionally underrepresented in mainstream politics. Leveraging the networks established by its precursor, the Welfare Party, the AKP steadily rose to dominance after coming to power in 2002, positioning itself as the intermediary between citizens and the bureaucratic apparatus of the state. However, the centralization of power, coupled with a simultaneous fragmentation of authority heightened under the presidential system, have disrupted the AKP’s aspired role as an intermediary.
The erosion of meritocracy, competing interests vying for influence, and the marginalization of parliamentary (and ministerial) roles have tarnished the direct connection that the AKP has long prided itself on establishing with citizens since assuming power. The consequences of such disconnection are felt the most in everyday life at the local level, where mounting discontent has been fueled by the partisan distribution of services and a surge in corruption.
In fact, Erdoğan’s disproportionate focus on the Istanbul elections may have also inadvertently weakened support for the AKP. Constituting one-third of the Turkish economy and one-fifth of Turkey’s population, the city provides a crucial resource base. In different Anatolian cities, the president urged citizens to rally their relatives residing in Istanbul to vote for the AKP’s candidate, Murat Kurum. Additionally, the AKP mobilized government ministers to actively advocate for Kurum, further amplifying the perception of excessive centralization of power and resources, potentially alienating voters outside of Istanbul, and benefiting the CHP.
A Familiar Rival: The New Welfare Party
Amid increasing income inequality and partisan governance, the New Welfare Party (YRP) additionally strained the AKP’s situation by fielding its own candidates. In the lead-up to the 2023 elections, the YRP aligned itself with Erdoğan’s ruling bloc under certain stipulations, including commitments to “safeguarding moral values” and “upholding the integrity of the family.”
With its leadership, name, and claims, the YRP evokes a sense of nostalgia, especially for those who are familiar with the transformation of Turkish Islamists. Its leader, Fatih Erbakan, is the son of Necmettin Erbakan, who founded Turkey’s Islamist National Outlook Movement and led several prominent Islamist parties before the AKP, including the Welfare Party. Underlined by the claim that they represented economically marginalized communities, the Turkish Islamist parties owed their success starting from the 1990s to small business owners, low-income groups, and the urban poor.
Shortly after the 2023 elections, Fatih Erbakan delivered scathing criticism of the AKP’s tight monetary policy, accusing the party of “neglecting pensioners” and treating retirees as “an afterthought.” He emphasized the government’s duty to distribute economic burdens equitably, stressing that it should not disproportionately burden low-income groups. (In early March 2024, Turkey was listed in a report published by a UK-based real estate consultancy as the frontrunner among thirty countries surveyed in the increase of individuals with a fortune exceeding $30 million.) Months later, Erbakan reiterated his earlier criticisms and declared that his party would nominate its own candidates, though he remained open to discussing potential proposals with the AKP.
The war in Gaza exacerbated Erdoğan’s challenges. For the National Outlook Movement, Palestine is a passionate file in Turkish foreign policy. Throughout his election campaign, Erbakan expectedly intensified his criticism of the AKP’s policy on the war in Gaza, accusing the government of not adopting a firmer stance against Israel. He demanded the closure of the Kürecik Radar Station in Malatya and supported sending troops to Gaza.
In response to accusations from pro-government circles suggesting that the YRP’s decision to nominate its own candidates could aid the victory of Turkish Islamists’ historical nemesis, the CHP, Erbakan stated a few days before the municipal elections that his party would retract its candidate in Istanbul under specific conditions. He outlined that the withdrawal would occur if Turkish trade with Israel ceased, the Kürecik station was shut down, and pensions were increased to 20,000 Turkish liras (around $620). No concrete steps were taken by the government ahead of the elections.
On March 31, the YRP’s candidates did quite well. Overall, the party secured 6.2 percent of votes and successfully captured Yozgat and Şanlıurfa from the AKP. In twenty-three other cities across Anatolia that were strongholds of the AKP since 2004, a significant voter shift occurred from the AKP to the YRP. The YRP’s decision to field its own candidates undoubtedly earned Erbakan significant bargaining power vis-à-vis Erdoğan. On April 9, Ankara announced restrictions on its exports to Israel, including cement and jet fuel, and on May 3, trade with Israel was completely halted.
A New Era of Detente in Domestic Politics?
If the AKP had secured the Istanbul and Ankara metropolitan municipalities while maintaining its nationwide vote shares, this would have significantly bolstered the party’s political legitimacy following last year’s elections. Instead, the AKP’s inability to win in major metropolitan cities has led to a loss of some resources that are key to rent distribution. It is crucial to note that in addition to winning mayoral positions, the CHP also secured majorities in the city councils of Ankara and Istanbul. This underscores the importance of these victories for the opposition party in terms of governance and policymaking at the local level.
According to a poll conducted in April, the CHP continues to be in first place. The AKP is preoccupied with efforts to reverse the loss of its “first-party” status to the CHP. The ruling alliance’s inability to unify nationalist votes, scattered across various parties, and the emergence of the YRP as the AKP’s Islamist rival pose significant obstacles to the leaders’ aspiration to consolidate nationalist and Islamist parties. In addition, the AKP’s weakened bargaining power within the alliance brings these cracks into sharp relief.
Notwithstanding, the presidential system confers considerable power to the executive, undermining local governance. The government’s efforts to convince the public of a new constitution suggest it will not back down easily. Still, economic woes, the ruling alliance’s internal tensions, and resistance from Islamist and nationalist actors to a possible thaw with the CHP will likely render the AKP leadership increasingly unstable.
The CHP’s Difficult Balance: Co-optation or Leading the Exit Out of Authoritarianism
For the CHP as well, the road ahead is not without challenges. The widespread support for the party across various cities and districts indicates a considerable shift in voter preferences, placing the CHP as the dominant opposition party at the center of the political landscape. Moving forward, one challenge for the CHP’s leaders will be to develop and enact a substantive agenda that transcends competitive clientelism and symbolic gestures of identity politics. It is through the implementation of such a programmatic agenda that the CHP can establish itself as a party truly committed to public good.
In his victory speech on March 31, Özel adopted a populist tone, embracing different segments of society, reminiscent of the AKP’s narrative in the early 2000s. Later, in response to criticisms from within and outside the party to his planned meeting with Erdoğan, Özel noted that the CHP will deploy a double strategy of “negotiation and strife” with the ruling alliance.
Effective implementation of such a strategy will be another challenge for the CHP leadership in the post–March 31 era. Given the increasingly blurred boundaries between the state and the ruling alliance, negotiation efforts can fall into the trap of co-optation. It will be difficult to pressure the ruling alliance without a systematic mobilization of growing societal discontent; the incumbent’s space for maneuvering against civil society actors could even widen.
The CHP’s ability to reroute Turkey off of its authoritarian path depends on whether it can bolster the leverage the party gained in the local elections with continued mass support and a firm attitude about its red lines in domestic politics and foreign policy.
Dr. Sinem Adar is an associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. The article reflects the author’s personal views.
