BRICS Expansion and the Future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants

Introduction

Stewart Patrick and Erica Hogan

At their October 2024 summit in Kazan, Russia, the original five members of the BRICS coalition—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—welcomed into their fold four new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In January 2025, Indonesia became the bloc’s tenth member. Nine other nations have been officially designated as “partner countries,” and some two dozen have either been invited to join (for example, Saudi Arabia) or expressed interest in doing so (for example, Türkiye). BRICS states including Russia have touted the group’s expansion as a defining moment, heralding the dawn of a post-Western world order in which the “global majority” is finally empowered.

Among analysts, the significance of the BRICS expansion remains a matter of debate. On paper, “BRICS+” has the potential to become a major geopolitical and geoeconomic force. The bloc already boasts about 45 percent of the world’s population, generates more than 35 percent of its GDP (as measured in purchasing power parity, or PPP), and produces 30 percent of its oil. BRICS countries have also established an extensive and thickening latticework of intergovernmental cooperation. In addition to founding dedicated institutions such as the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), created in 2014 with an initial funding of $100 billion, and the New Development Bank (NDB) established in 2015 with an initial subscribed capitalization of $50 billion, the coalition has (like the G7 and G20 forums) embraced networked minilateralism, launching transnational partnerships and working groups on topics of shared interest from energy security to health, climate change, sustainable development, and technology transfer. BRICS avowedly seeks to challenge Western-dominated institutions of global economic governance, as well as to displace the U.S. dollar from its entrenched role in the world economy. Many analysts therefore depict BRICS expansion as a watershed moment in the shift to a more egalitarian international system.

However, the ultimate implications of these developments for world order remain unclear. No doubt, the expanding coalition will shape prospects for—and the nature of—international cooperation in a turbulent world. The main uncertainty is whether BRICS+ signals a turn against rather than simply away from the West. Some analysts anticipate that BRICS could evolve into a coherent, anti-Western bloc and complicate prospects for multilateralism, including by deepening divisions within the G20 and the United Nations. Heightened tensions between the United States and China (which dominates the bloc), as well as U.S. President Donald Trump’s confrontational approach toward BRICS, make this a possibility. Other observers are more sanguine, pointing to the group’s heterogeneity—which will only increase as the coalition expands—and to the fact that most BRICS members and aspirants have no desire to create a world of rigid blocs. They may view the coalition as a useful platform and vehicle to pursue reformist aims, but they remain open to cooperation with Western countries (and other middle powers) on matters of common concern.

These uncertainties—about the motivations of individual BRICS countries and aspirants, the bloc’s likely significance in concrete domains and its potential impact on world order, and the possibilities for cooperation between BRICS and the West—are obstacles to informed policymaking, as well as to nuanced consideration of how the coalition’s trajectory could be steered in the direction of global bridge-building.

To fill these gaps in understanding, Carnegie’s Global Order and Institutions (GOI) Program has launched a new initiative on BRICS Expansion: Understanding Its Motivations, Significance, and Implications for World Order. The ultimate objectives are fourfold:

• To better understand the goals and perceived benefits of BRICS for individual members and aspirant countries, including where these align and diverge.
• To identify those global domains where an expanding BRICS coalition has the potential to make its biggest impacts.
• To explore alternative scenarios for the evolution of BRICS and their implications for global order and multilateral problem-solving.
• To consider possibilities for bridge-building and practical cooperation between Western and BRICS countries on matters of shared interest, including in the G20 and other forums.

As an initial, scene-setting exercise, the GOI program solicited short commentaries from prominent experts on seventeen countries, including the five original BRICS members, the five new members, and seven nations—Colombia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Türkiye, Venezuela, and Vietnam—from different regions of the world that are either partner countries or aspire to or are considering joining the bloc. In each case, the GOI program invited authors to respond to three questions. First, what is “your” country’s primary interest in BRICS? Second, in what spheres do the country’s leaders expect BRICS to have the biggest impact? Third, how are recent geopolitical and international trends—such as Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency or U.S.-China tensions—shaping the country’s preferences regarding, and the likely trajectory of, BRICS?

Despite their brevity, the commentaries provide some important, if preliminary, insights. To begin with, country interests and motivations regarding BRICS vary markedly. Some nations perceive opportunities for expanded trade and investment with other BRICS members as a key benefit of membership or association. Others are more politically motivated, seeking higher-profile leadership roles on the global stage, especially within the Global South, or greater decisionmaking power in multilateral forums. 

A common thread across these disparate interests and motivations is the need to respond to and manage the consequences of American dominance. Some countries are seeking in BRICS a safe harbor from U.S. diplomatic coercion and economic statecraft, an escape from pressure to democratize, and a means to mitigate the impact of sanctions and tariffs. Even countries that enjoy relatively positive relationships with the United States value BRICS as a vehicle for greater international economic integration in an otherwise fragmenting Western-centric global economy, as well as an opportunity to garner greater power than they hold within traditional, Western-dominated multilateral forums. For developing countries, BRICS also offers a compelling prospect for obtaining development financing without political conditions and in local currencies rather than in dollars or euros. Countries engaged with BRICS are united in their desire to shift the global balance of power away from American unipolarity and in their belief that BRICS can help facilitate this transition.

At the same time, BRICS member states, partner countries, and aspirants remain divided on their engagement with the United States, and in particular on the extent to which BRICS is or should be an explicitly anti-American bloc, designed to counter U.S. interests. Some countries desire to maintain positive relations with the United States, even as they welcome the advent of a more egalitarian world system. Others, not least Russia, seek to position BRICS as a rival bloc to the U.S.-dominated West.  

The potential of BRICS members and partner countries to fulfill their individual aspirations via BRICS—whether to create a more egalitarian mode of global governance, to hedge against Western instability while maintaining a geopolitical neutrality, or to participate in an alternate international economic system outside of the reaches of American sanctions—hinges on which vision of the future of world order ultimately wins out. It will also depend on the degree of common purpose demonstrated by countries of the West themselves—whose like-mindedness and solidarity the second Trump administration has suddenly called into question—as well as on the Trump administration’s willingness to countenance a more egalitarian global order rather than force middle powers to choose between BRICS membership and friendly relations with the United States.

The Original Five

Brazil

Oliver Stuenkel

Brazil derives tangible benefits from BRICS membership—above all, prestige, geopolitical influence, greater proximity to China, and an “insurance” against diplomatic isolation.

These four main benefits explain why Brazil has enthusiastically embraced the group since its inception in 2006. 

First, in the view of Brazilian policymakers, membership came with considerable prestige. Joining the bloc implicitly equated Brazil with the large powers China, India, and Russia, which was an especially important gain for a country that often worries that its decisions to limit defense spending and to be a “good international citizen” (for example, by signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) might diminish its leverage on the global stage. Brazil’s association with BRICS might also have helped consolidate the country’s image as an “emerging power,” even though its growth has been below the global average for over a decade.

Second, Brazil believes that as a member, it can influence the adaption of global institutions in response to the shift from U.S.-led unipolarity to multipolarity—for example, by advocating the reform of existing institutions but also supporting the creation of new ones, such as the BRICS-led NDB. Brazil has been deeply skeptical of U.S.-led unipolarity and sees strengthening ties with other emerging powers (or great powers, such as China) as a means to increase its leverage when negotiating with Washington. This explains why even very pro-American politicians such as former president Jair Bolsonaro have not abandoned the BRICS group.

Third, BRICS membership helps the Brazilian government manage its economic relationship with China, its most important trading partner, and adapt to that nation’s rise. Whereas the United States, Europe, and Latin America were Brazil’s dominant economic partners until the early 2000s, Brazil now exports more to China than to the United States and the European Union combined. This shift has required a profound redistribution of diplomatic resources and the development of new regional expertise within Brazil’s bureaucracy, its businesses, and civil society. And it has made initiatives such as the BRICS Business Council and Brazil’s cooperation with think tanks and universities from other BRICS countries highly relevant. For numerous Brazilian participants, engaging in these activities offers the first opportunity to travel to other BRICS member states, which are of growing economic importance to Brazil.

Finally, Brazil values BRICS as a “mutual diplomatic support group,” providing reliable backing during periods of global isolation from the West. The group has served as a vital life raft for member states facing temporary challenges on the world stage. In 2014, fellow BRICS nations shielded Russian President Vladimir Putin from diplomatic exclusion after the annexation of Crimea. In 2021, they supported Bolsonaro when he became internationally isolated following Trump’s failed reelection. This support notably occurred despite Bolsonaro’s tense relationship with China. While Brazil may not agree with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its own experience with U.S. sanctions in the 1980s (over its nuclear program) and recent bouts of being isolated from the West make the safe haven function of BRICS a key attraction—one which Western policymakers often overlook.

During its 2025 BRICS presidency, Brazil will likely use the group to craft its multi-aligned strategy in the face of Trump’s return to the White House and intensifying U.S.-China competition. While Brazil was unable to stop the BRICS expansion—which it long opposed, fearing a loss of prestige, more limited access to Chinese President Xi Jinping, and China’s and Russia’s growing clout—it will still seek to prevent the group from moving in a more anti-Western direction, which would complicate Brazil’s ongoing important ties with the United States. Because finding meaningful consensus is bound to become more difficult with increased membership, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva will also seek to emphasize less controversial topics where Brazil has the potential to be a leader on the global stage, such as food security and the green transition.

Brazil is quietly rooting for Trump to ease tensions between the West and Russia, which would remove a source of friction between Lula and Western leaders in recent years. While European governments, along with the former administration of U.S. president Joe Biden, criticized Brazil for not joining their efforts to isolate Putin, a ceasefire in Ukraine would make it easier for Lula to welcome Putin to the BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro this July.

Russia

Alexander Gabuev

“The Kazan BRICS summit declaration has reaffirmed our states’ shared commitment to build a more democratic, inclusive, multipolar world. We have also affirmed a shared determination to combat practices of using illegitimate sanctions or undermining traditional moral values,” Russian President Vladimir Putin pontificated when closing the annual BRICS summit on October 24, 2024, in Kazan, Russia. The message was clear: the Kremlin sees BRICS as a foundation for Pax Post-Americana.

But it hasn’t always been that way: Moscow’s primary interests in BRICS have evolved over time. Russia was the first of the major developing economies to start turning an ambiguous marketing tool of bankers into a political club. (It was Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill who coined the term “BRIC.”) The original format was very relevant amid the global Great Recession of 2008. Russia hosted the first summit of BRIC leaders in 2009 (South Africa did not join until 2010), and back then, the key idea was to supplement the Bretton Woods institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank and redistribute voting rights within those bodies from developed to developing countries. However, over time, as Russia’s relations with the West soured due to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin saw new potential in BRICS as a tool to make the world less U.S.-centric.

BRICS currently serves three primary Russian interests. First, Moscow wants to be seen as part of a dynamic group of non-Western great and middle powers that are shaping the future of the post-American world order. The Kremlin insists that BRICS represents the “global majority” of non-Western countries and that the bloc has already surpassed the U.S.-led G7 in terms of both GDP and population and is therefore more inclusive and influential. 

Second, Russia wants BRICS to become a sandbox for developing tools of trade, finance, and investment outside of U.S. mechanisms, particularly U.S. dollar–dominated ones. This interest, formulated even before Crimea’s annexation as a push to boost trade in national currencies to make the global financial system less dependent on the U.S. dollar and thus more resilient, is now directly connected to the Kremlin’s survival tactics amid the tsunami of Western sanctions unleashed since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin believes that launching alternative tools on the BRICS platform, such as new payment systems different than the international messaging network SWIFT, will make it easier for Russia to escape Western sanctions while maintaining international economic relationships, particularly as BRICS includes many crucial U.S. and Western partners including Brazil, India, and Indonesia.

Finally, BRICS provides a vehicle for high-level bilateral contact at a time when Putin and some of his officials are restricted in their global movements by International Criminal Court arrest warrants and broader sanctions and when some of Russia’s non-Western partners are wary of hosting senior Russians.

Going forward, Russia believes that BRICS can help develop and expand institutional frameworks to make the global financial system and markets less dependent on the United States. One priority is fortifying tools such as the NDB and the pool of BRICS national currencies to make these instruments invincible to U.S. sanctions. Russia’s own negative experience with the NDB over the last three years has exposed the current limitations of these tools in a world where any multilateral financial institution still needs to raise capital in global markets by issuing U.S. dollar–denominated bonds. Russia wants to supplement these mechanisms with additional tools such as a BRICS investment platform, insurance mechanism, payment system, logistics infrastructure, and e-commerce network. If these elements are integrated into a BRICS ecosystem for trade and trade settlement in national currencies, a sanctions-proof framework could emerge that may be immune to Western pressure. The same motivation inspires other Russian proposals to create new BRICS hubs for trading in hydrocarbons, metals, agricultural goods, fertilizers, and diamonds. Last but not least, Russia hopes that BRICS can be a powerful voice to frame the global conversation about artificial intelligence and that the Kremlin’s own views, amplified by the voices of powerful players including China and India, will be taken into account.

The summit in Kazan was a big success for Russia, since it demonstrated the futility of Western efforts to isolate the country and Putin personally. And while it exposed the clear limits of other BRICS members’ appetites for embracing mechanisms that the United States could view as tools for sanctions evasion, the Trump administration’s recent moves—including the imposition of tariffs, the mass reduction in the U.S. federal workforce (supposedly aimed at reducing the country’s budget deficit), and the potential infringement on the U.S. Federal Reserve’s independence—are only fueling global interest in alternatives to U.S. dollar–denominated financial instruments. The Kremlin hopes that BRICS mechanisms will, over time, satisfy this growing demand.

India

Ashley J. Tellis

Unlike most other multilateral groups, the BRICS’ genesis was not driven by common goals. In fact, its internal cleavages are as pronounced as its commonalities, a fact critical to understanding India’s role therein.

Among the initial five members, India has the closest ties with Russia and South Africa because of past bipolar competition and the anti-apartheid struggle, respectively. India’s ties with Brazil are cordial but limited, originally expressed through the G77 group of developing countries now frequently referred to as the “Global South.” India’s ties with China, in contrast, are persistently rivalrous despite the deepening amity between Moscow and Beijing. Both India and Brazil seek to prevent BRICS from sliding into inveterate anti-Westernism as Moscow and Beijing would prefer. Conversely, despite India’s close relationship with South Africa, the latter has strong sympathies for Russia, increasingly close ties with China, and a striking suspicion of the West.

Despite these incongruities, India has been a stalwart BRICS member for multiple reasons. First, when the West dominates the high tables globally, BRICS affords India an alternative stage where New Delhi can associate with other emerging powers and display international leadership that satisfies its desires for status and recognition. Second, India views BRICS as a useful instrument for engendering multipolarity wherein India becomes one of several great powers in the global system. Third, BRICS provides another forum for India to claim leadership of the Global South—an old objective given new impetus by the recent membership additions of five new developing countries, with others waiting in the wings. Fourth, BRICS supplies New Delhi with opportunities to demonstrate its strategic autonomy and preference for flexible, issue-based partnerships even as it preserves its valuable relationship with the West. Fifth, India values BRICS for direct materialist reasons, expecting that the group’s emerging financial institutions—the NDB and CRA—will provide new sources of lending to developing countries and “democratize” the global financial architecture.

New Delhi expects BRICS to demonstrate its greatest impact in two arenas. Politically, India hopes the group will help erode the primacy of the United States and its allies in international politics. Although this erosion would likely accelerate if BRICS were demonstrating greater coherence, if not actual unity, India believes the existing group still provides an important “voice” to geographically distributed and influential developing countries while fostering more equitable international rule-making bodies that encourage the consolidation of multipolarity globally. 

Economically, India hopes that the NDB will provide more resources to developing countries and the CRA will offer financial support during economic crises without the conditionality associated with Western lending. Obviously, both institutions are still far from being adequate substitutes for international financial institutions (IFIs) or Western or Chinese assistance, but India’s support for the UAE’s membership was colored greatly by its strong bilateral ties and its desire to expand the BRICS’ financial base to compete with Western and Chinese lending. The quest for a revamped international financial architecture, however, does not imply supporting the entire BRICS agenda: given its rivalry with China and its desire to avoid becoming trapped in Russia’s confrontation with the West, New Delhi has shunned outlandish ideas such as creating a BRICS currency or championing de-dollarization, even as India seeks to immunize itself from U.S. sanctions directed at third countries.

The most important international trend that affects India’s participation in BRICS is the dramatic rise of Chinese power. Although BRICS initially coalesced through a Russian initiative, Moscow—a friend of New Delhi—was soon replaced as its driving force by Beijing, which is at odds with New Delhi. China demonstrated its dominance most clearly in the recent BRICS expansion: India was ambivalent because it portended a loss of influence within the grouping, but Chinese-Russian collusion quickly overwhelmed Indian (and Brazilian) diffidence. India’s objective, consequently, remains preventing BRICS from becoming a virulently anti-Western clique (Moscow and Beijing’s preference), while averting complete Chinese domination of the grouping (Beijing’s objective). This task is challenging because China’s trade with all the BRICS countries is typically larger in volume and broader in scope than India’s trade and is often linked to strategic investments and state-backed initiatives that provide Beijing with even greater political influence.  

The imperative of India to stay engaged with BRICS has only increased with Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency. Although India’s priority is protecting its ties with the United States, the uncertainties surrounding the current U.S. strategic trajectory and U.S.-China relations require India to hedge all the more by deepening its engagement with other partners and groups. New Delhi has long viewed multi-alignment as the best bedrock for safeguarding its interests in an increasingly disordered international system. Its continuing involvement with BRICS, despite the complexities, will be an integral part of that effort.

China

Tong Zhao

As China observes the West’s decline and the Global South’s rise, BRICS has become Beijing’s strategic bridge to harness and potentially shape non-Western countries’ transformative power to reform the international order.

While Beijing faces challenges in managing the diverse and sometimes competing interests within the broad Global South network, it expects BRICS to provide a crucial platform. Through selective membership invitations, the establishment of BRICS partnerships, and the engagement of nonmember states via informal dialogues, China hopes to more effectively coordinate non-Western positions, unify voices, institutionalize cooperation, and maintain a leadership role within the Global South community. For Beijing, BRICS initiatives can be a force multiplier for Chinese efforts to expand influence in the global order.

As BRICS expands, China seeks to distinguish BRICS as a superior international cooperation alternative to Western-dominated institutions by highlighting BRICS’ principles of equality and consensus-based decisionmaking. Yet Chinese strategists are questioning the practicality of consensus as the increasing number of members complicates Beijing’s ability to steer the group’s direction without appearing overly assertive. Some Chinese experts are even suggesting that BRICS establish an exit mechanism for members that don’t fully align with China’s geostrategic vision. This reflects Beijing’s growing concern over maintaining unity and its leadership role within the group as China’s influence, though significant, faces challenges from diverse member interests.

To date, China has successfully steered BRICS’ evolution from a platform focused primarily on economic and trade cooperation to one also encompassing political and security issues. BRICS currently embraces a comprehensive framework built on three pillars: economy and finance, politics and security, and cultural and people-to-people exchanges. These pillars align with China’s broader strategic priorities: economic development, security, and narrative and normative power—key areas that reflect its long-term competition with the United States and other Western countries and that complement Beijing’s three global security, development, and civilization initiatives (known as GSI, GDI, and GCI).

In China’s strategic vision, BRICS engagement supplements the Belt and Road Initiative’s geoeconomic focus and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s geopolitical-security role in expanding China’s global influence. 

Economically, BRICS serves as China’s hedge against Western decoupling. Beijing leverages BRICS members’ collective economic power—now exceeding the G7’s GDP when measured in terms of purchasing power parity—to strengthen its energy, food, critical minerals, and supply chain security. The group also promises to help mitigate potential Western sanctions in a future East-West crisis. In addition, BRICS expands Beijing’s economic influence by promoting de-dollarization, advancing the internationalization of China’s renminbi currency, and shaping rules and standards in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. 

Regarding security, China pursues multiple objectives through BRICS, from seeking cooperation to ensure domestic stability and regime security to addressing shared, nontraditional threats such as terrorism. While countering Western military influence remains a central goal, China treads carefully in promoting direct military and defense cooperation under BRICS, as it’s mindful of member state political sensitivities and internal group dynamics.

China’s strategy for enhancing its narrative and normative power through BRICS remains less defined. Beijing’s expectation that managed cultural and people-to-people exchanges can forge a common identity and shared values to drive deeper strategic cooperation within the BRICS-led Global South may prove difficult to realize. While Beijing appears to genuinely believe that BRICS can advance an alternative model of global governance rooted in so-called true multilateralism and the democratization of international relations, translating this abstract vision into effective and widely embraced solutions will likely prove to be a challenging learning experience for the rising power. 

As U.S.-China competition intensifies under the second Trump administration, Beijing will likely further prioritize its engagement with Global South countries through BRICS. However, implementing China’s grand agenda will continue to involve numerous variables beyond Beijing’s control or even its anticipation. As China advances its global ambitions through BRICS, both Global South and Western countries will still have opportunities to pragmatically manage and navigate their relations with China to minimize international instability and confrontation.

South Africa

Gustavo de Carvalho and Steven Gruzd

South Africa, the smallest economy of the original five BRICS countries, sees the coalition as an important platform to amplify its global influence. The group’s objectives align with Pretoria’s broader goal of promoting a multipolar world where developing countries play a greater role in shaping international governance. BRICS allows South Africa to push for reforms in institutions such as the UN Security Council, the IMF, and the World Bank, while advocating fairer representation of African and Global South nations.

Economically, BRICS offers alternatives to Western-dominated financial systems. The NDB has become an important funding source for infrastructure and development projects, with a growing share of loans being provided in local currencies. Although its loan book is still far smaller than that of the World Bank’s, the NDB has helped reduce dependency on the U.S. dollar and Western financial institutions. South Africa also sees BRICS as a way to strengthen trade and investment ties with other member countries, thereby balancing its economic relations, which have been historically skewed toward developed economies.

Beyond the economic arena, BRICS allows South Africa to shape global debates and challenge Western development, governance, and security narratives. Cultural and knowledge-sharing initiatives, including academic and policy exchanges, have become increasingly important for Pretoria’s efforts to promote a more inclusive international order. 

South Africa expects BRICS to make the biggest impact in the areas of finance, trade, and knowledge production. The group’s financial cooperation has grown, particularly through increased trade in local currencies and the development of cross-border payment systems. While BRICS is not actively pushing for a common currency, it is creating financial alternatives that reduce members’ exposure to the current volatile global financial system. South Africa supports these efforts, alongside African financial integration initiatives such as the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System.

Trade and investment are central to BRICS activities as well. As BRICS expands, South Africa wants to position itself as a gateway to Africa, particularly within the African Continental Free Trade Area. The addition of Ethiopia and Egypt as BRICS members strengthens Africa’s presence in the group, opening opportunities for deeper regional economic cooperation. South Africa hopes to attract more investment from BRICS partners, particularly in manufacturing, digital technology, and green energy.

In the area of knowledge production, BRICS has been advancing research, technology, and education collaboration across its network of members. South Africa sees these linkages as an opportunity to contribute to global discussions on digital governance, climate policy, and alternative economic models. Initiatives such as the BRICS Network University and research partnerships help position the group as a counterweight to Western-led institutions that dominate global policymaking.

South Africa’s growing role in BRICS is partly shaped by shifting global politics. Relations with the United States have become increasingly strained, particularly after Washington’s negative reaction to the legal case that Pretoria brought against Israel at the International Court of Justice, as well as South Africa’s diplomatic engagements with China, Russia, and Iran. The Trump administration’s recent executive order halting aid to South Africa and accusing its government of discriminatory policies reflects the widening diplomatic gap. Against this backdrop, BRICS provides Pretoria an alternative space to navigate these tensions and reinforce its foreign policy autonomy.

U.S.-China competition also plays a role. While South Africa maintains strong economic ties with Western nations, its trade relationship with China has grown significantly. As BRICS explores alternatives to U.S. dollar–based trade, South Africa sees opportunities to diversify its financial systems and reduce external vulnerabilities. Pretoria’s long-standing commitment to nonalignment means it avoids taking sides in great power rivalries. Still, its participation in BRICS signals a preference for balancing Western influence with deeper engagement in emerging power blocs.

With BRICS expanding and institutionalizing new mechanisms—such as cross-border payment systems and a “partner countries” category—South Africa is positioning itself to benefit from the bloc’s more structured, long-term approach to cooperation. Pretoria’s focus within BRICS will likely remain on economic diversification, financial autonomy, and the strengthening of African agency in international decisionmaking as global tensions grow.

New Members

Egypt

 Amr Hamzawy

Egypt has three primary motivations behind its participation in BRICS. First, Egypt seeks to secure financial and development aid and major investments for its economy, in addition to what it receives from the United States, the European Union, and international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank.

Second, the Egyptian government hopes to expand trade exchanges in national currencies with other members, especially China, which is Egypt’s largest trading partner. Over the past years, Egypt has suffered from successive crises linked to the availability of the U.S. dollar for its trade exchanges, resulting in massive devaluation waves of the Egyptian pound. Therefore, the opportunity to use national currencies for trade among BRICS members represents an important priority for Egypt.

Third, Cairo sees joining an international group with Beijing, Moscow, and New Delhi, as well as other major capitals in the Global South, as a move away from continued unilateral reliance on strategic partnerships with the United States and Western European countries and a move toward more diverse economic, political, diplomatic, and military cooperation.

In the short term, the Egyptian government expects that its BRICS membership will help secure additional financing opportunities and foreign direct investments to revive the economy. Egypt has no choice but to continue to introduce economic structural reforms that gradually push the most populous country in the Middle East and North Africa down the path of infrastructure modernization, renewable energy projects, and the green economy.

In the medium term, Egypt wants BRICS to become a bloc for global trade in currencies other than the U.S. dollar, as well as for promoting mutual development efforts across the Global South. The Egyptian government has frequently expressed interest in learning from developmental successes in China and India and using them as guiding models for its own efforts.

In the long term, Egypt sees BRICS as a bloc that can assume roles similar to the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1950s and 1960s. Cairo perceives BRICS as an organization that can help pave the way for a genuinely multipolar world order—where the United States is no longer the sole hegemon and China doesn’t just become the competing pole in place of the Soviet Union.

But while Cairo desires a more multipolar global order, its strategic partnership with the United States remains a fundamental component of its foreign policy and is viewed as a precondition for achieving Egypt’s economic development goals. The United States has a major role in helping Egypt not only bilaterally but also multilaterally, including when it comes to the support Egypt receives from institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. 

Egypt also considers partnership with the United States a necessity for achieving security and peace in the Middle East and for overcoming other national security challenges, such as the impacts of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on Egypt’s water security.

However, perceived biased American policies toward Israel since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023 have had Egyptian policymakers worried. And these concerns have been compounded by those surrounding Trump’s current policy proposals and pronouncements on the Middle East. For instance, the Egyptian government recently rejected Trump’s endorsement of plans to annex the occupied West Bank and to displace the Palestinian population of Gaza, and there is now serious questioning in Cairo about the future of U.S.-Egyptian relations.

America’s perceived bias is bound to push Egypt to work hard to turn its bilateral relations with countries such as China, India, and Russia into comprehensive strategic partnerships and to invest more in multilateral arrangements such as BRICS. Egypt wants to avoid being at the mercy of the United States’ whims.

Ethiopia

Etsehiwot Kebret

Ethiopia was one of the four new members that formally joined BRICS in early 2024. In his keynote speech at the October 2024 summit in Kazan, Russia, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed underscored Ethiopia’s primordial interest in BRICS as an attractive multilateral vehicle to advance multiple national objectives, including infrastructure investment, manufacturing, and climate resilience. As with many other countries in the Global South, Ethiopia views BRICS as a platform that promotes economic cooperation and multipolarity, offering an alternative economic and political bloc that is not dominated by a single superpower as well as a forum where its interests and priorities may be respected and upheld. Indeed, the BRICS alliance offers Ethiopia a wealth of opportunities.

First, membership in BRICS facilitates new avenues for developmental and financial assistance, which is critical to Ethiopia’s long-term sustainable growth and development. The current international financial system is structured to meet the needs and interests of creditors, not heavily indebted countries such as Ethiopia. Potential access to NDB financing will allow Ethiopia to secure additional resources for key infrastructure projects across the nation.

Second, by strengthening its relationship with BRICS states, Ethiopia can use its newly gained diplomatic and political capital to promote its national interests within high-level global forums such as the UN Security Council and the G20, where other BRICS members are well-represented. Participation in BRICS will also elevate Ethiopia’s voice and representation in key international governance and economic decisionmaking bodies such as the G20, World Bank, and IMF. More directly, BRICS includes some of Ethiopia’s key partners, including China, its biggest economic partner, and Russia, a key security and diplomatic partner.

Third, the wide-ranging focus of the BRICS agenda, encompassing areas such as investment, trade, and infrastructure, aligns with Ethiopia’s developmental blueprint—the Homegrown Economic Reform Agenda. This alignment enables Ethiopia to prioritize and fund development projects consistent with its domestically determined developmental framework, which focuses on growth-producing assets, and without the conditionalities imposed by Bretton Woods institutions for financial support. 

Given the unprecedented shifts in the world order, including rising tensions between the United States and China and Trump’s “America First” policy, Ethiopia must navigate an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment. Trump has made it clear that he views BRICS as a rival bloc, as seen by his threatening to impose 100-percent tariffs to dissuade BRICS nations from creating a BRICS currency or moving to replace the U.S. dollar. However, despite the rapidly changing global dynamic, two key factors need to be considered.

First, due to Ethiopia’s strategic position in the Horn of Africa and in the hinterland of the Red Sea region, countries in both the West and East have a vested interest in Ethiopia’s stability and growth as an anchor state with great regional geopolitical and geoeconomic influence. This location provides Ethiopia with political and strategic leverage that reduces the potentially destabilizing geopolitical impact of global power shifts.

Second, consistent with Ethiopia’s long-standing position of nonalignment, strategically participating in and joining coalitions such as BRICS allows the country to strengthen its diplomatic and economic interests internationally. This can be seen in Ethiopia’s growing relationship with China, which was upgraded to what Beijing calls an “all-weather strategic cooperation partnership” during the Ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in September 2024. In a volatile and uncertain global political and economic landscape, BRICS offers Ethiopia and other Global South countries a welcome alliance to advance their national and shared interests.

Indonesia

Elina Noor

In January 2025, Indonesia officially became the first Southeast Asian member of BRICS, ahead of neighbors Malaysia and Thailand, both BRICS’ partner countries.

Indonesia’s quick ascension to membership came as a surprise to some, especially since former president Joko Widodo had demurred in 2023, cautioning against “rush[ing]” into joining the BRICS group. Just a year later, Jakarta’s about-turn was set in motion when Indonesia’s foreign minister, Sugiono, travelled to Kazan, Russia, representing the newly inaugurated President Prabowo Subianto at the BRICS summit. Indonesia’s membership application was reportedly fast-tracked given the country’s demographic, political, and economic significance.

Some Indonesian observers argue that Jakarta’s redirection has been driven more by status, visibility, and an internationally activist president than by economic imperatives. But there have been domestic concerns about the optics and value of joining a strategically disparate group of states that seem overshadowed by the sheer economic and political weight of China. This could, skeptics say, potentially undermine Indonesia’s long-standing “free/independent and active” (bebas aktif) foreign policy, complicate Western perceptions of the country’s alignment, and strain already stretched government resources, particularly given Jakarta’s simultaneous pursuit of membership in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

In response to this skepticism, Prabowo asserted that Indonesia’s decision to join BRICS in fact underscores the nation’s trademark independent and active policy: “Indonesia can’t be tied to specific blocs but aims to be everywhere.” It is worth recalling that Indonesia held back-to-back leadership of the G20 and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2022 and 2023, respectively, so the country is not short of desire or capability “to be everywhere.”

For Indonesia, BRICS membership is an additional platform for the country’s strategic diversification rather than a diminution or dilution of its foreign policy approach. In terms of numbers, joining BRICS makes sense for Southeast Asia’s largest country, as measured in population, GDP, and land area. The group offers Indonesia an opportunity to trade with fast developing markets it does not usually do business with and expands the country’s options for sources of technology transfer and infrastructural development through mechanisms such as the NDB. Additionally, as major suppliers of key commodities such as oil and gas as well as rare earth minerals, BRICS’ strategic potential remains under-leveraged—a point surely not lost on Indonesia, home to the world’s largest nickel reserves and palm oil production.

Amid increasing chaos marked by great power tensions as well as an erosion of international law and accepted norms, Indonesia’s policy elites view BRICS as an avenue to bridge interests between developed and developing states, to advance economic reform, and to mitigate geopolitical competition.

Indonesia’s participation in BRICS may be read as a throwback to the spirit of the Bandung Conference of 1955—that is, the solidarity among nonaligned countries, particularly in Asia and Africa during a period of ideological bifurcation. But it is also Jakarta’s effort at contributing toward reshaping and stabilizing the international order even if, as critics claim, the engagement may be underpinned by the personal ambitions of Prabowo.

Iran

Karim Sadjadpour

Over the last four decades, few governments in the world have had a more clear and consistent grand strategy than the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since the country’s 1979 Islamist revolution, Iran has sought to drive America out of the Middle East, replace Israel with Palestine, and partner with like-minded countries (and nonstate actors) to help dismantle the U.S.-led world order. It is in this context that Tehran proudly joined BRICS in 2024, which it ambitiously views as a growing group of nonaligned nations who share its opposition to U.S. hegemony.

As one of the world’s most politically isolated and sanctioned nations, Iran views BRICS as both a geopolitical and economic counterweight to Western dominance. “One of our problems today is being dependent on the dollar,” Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said in a January 2025 speech touting the BRICS financial system. “Those countries [members of BRICS] have also understood this . . . [we] must strive to eliminate the dollar in trade as much as possible.”

“The Islamic Republic of Iran,” said Iran’s late president Ebrahim Raisi in 2023, “has unique capacities and is ready to participate in all three main areas of BRICS activities, i.e., political-security, economic-financial and social fields… we announce our readiness for any cooperation, joint economic action, and investment with the countries.”

Iran hopes to see the NDB and CRA emerge as alternatives to U.S.-headquartered financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, which operate in U.S. dollars, adhere to U.S. sanctions, and commonly attach political conditions to their development aid.

As a major oil and gas producer, Iran also sees BRICS membership as an opportunity to diversify its economic and geopolitical partnerships beyond China, which currently imports 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports. Despite Tehran’s hope that BRICS membership may help it expand its commercial and diplomatic relationships with key markets in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, those nations that enjoy strong ties with the United States will likely continue to be deterred by the Trump administration’s forthcoming “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign against Iran.

In the aftermath of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Tehran’s export of drones to Russia, Iran has sought to strengthen its role as a producer and exporter of military hardware. BRICS offers Tehran a valuable opportunity to both import advanced technologies and expand its export of military equipment.

Despite Iran’s recent geopolitical setbacks—including the decimation of its regional proxies Hamas and Hezbollah and the collapse of its longtime ally, Syrian ruler Bashar al-Assad—Tehran remains committed to its resistance against the United States and continues to believe that America is vulnerable both internally and externally.

Although Iran has reportedly sought to assassinate Trump—to avenge the killing of Revolutionary Guard commander Qassem Soleimani in 2020—it also sees in Trump’s presidency an opportunity to further polarize America internally and blunt its external power. Tehran has applauded Trump’s policies to shutter U.S. foreign aid and democracy assistance and has encouraged Trump’s instincts to withdraw U.S. forces from the Middle East.  

Despite his public bravado, Trump has signaled to China, Iran, and Russia his willingness to negotiate with them. Meanwhile, Tehran hopes that Trump’s erratic behavior, coupled with his alienation of traditional U.S. allies, will bolster China’s standing as the more reliable global superpower.

While Israel has prevailed in Gaza militarily, its killing of tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians has come with enormous reputational costs. With South Africa leading international legal action against Israel, Iran views BRICS as a useful forum to delegitimize Israel and advance its own regional posture.

United Arab Emirates

Ebtesam al-Ketbi

The UAE, which joined BRICS in 2024, views its membership from both economic and strategic perspectives. Economically, BRICS offers an opportunity to expand trade, attract more investment, and access new markets—all benefits that closely align with the Emirates’ strategy for economic diversification and growth. The UAE’s membership in BRICS will allow the country to expand its reach in re-exports, energy, and innovation while strengthening existing exchanges with the group’s countries. Today, the UAE is among BRICS’ most significant trade partners, with annual non-oil trade between the Emirates and BRICS member countries totaling approximately $93.2 billion and accounting for over 20 percent of the UAE’s total non-oil trade. The UAE leverages its geographic location at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and Europe to maximize these opportunities. BRICS will offer the Emirates deeper trade and economic ties with the Global South, especially as the bloc plays an increasingly significant role in global growth.

The Gulf countries’ diversification and hedging strategies over the past two decades have been, in part, a response to evolving global economic dynamics, changes in international trade, and the broader transformations in globalization. With the United States achieving energy self-sufficiency and China’s economic rise reshaping trade patterns, the UAE’s largest trading partners are no longer the United States and Europe, but rather China and India. These shifts also include an increasing trend toward regionalization driven by protectionism and national priorities. 

Through BRICS, the UAE can participate in economic projects focused on innovation and connectivity, thus strengthening its regional influence and advancing its ambitions in key sectors such as clean energy, food security, services, trade, infrastructure, technology, logistics, and investment. The UAE is involved in major BRICS-led initiatives and mechanisms, including the NDB. This bank focuses on infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging and underdeveloped economies, offering the UAE a platform to support its economic diversification goals.

Strategically, the UAE emphasizes that joining BRICS is not intended as a counterweight to the United States or Western countries, with which it continues to deepen cooperation. Instead, membership in BRICS and participation in other international platforms—such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (where it is a “dialogue partner”) and the G20 (where it has been a “guest”)—reinforces the UAE’s commitment to the principle of multilateralism in international relations, while also allowing it to expand its policy options by having a foot in diverse organizations. The UAE’s participation in various international platforms reflects a pragmatic approach in light of the fragmented international landscape, an unsettled global economic order, and fierce partisan divisions within the United States, especially under the Trump administration. The UAE expects BRICS to promote a rules-based international order founded on genuine multilateralism and mutual respect among nations.

From an Emirati perspective, BRICS serves as a platform to address imbalances in globalization and the international system. It will allow the UAE to expand its strategic autonomy and diversify its economic partnerships, better advance its national interests, and more effectively navigate the intensifying competition between global powers. The UAE believes addressing the imbalances will support global cooperation, reduce tensions, and move away from zero-sum dynamics.

Given the erosion of the international multilateral system, it is imperative to reform the United Nations and the Security Council to ensure fairer representation of countries, regions, and continents; to reassess the use of the veto; and to strengthen international institutions to prevent conflicts, promote global peace, and enhance solidarity in addressing poverty, inequality, and crises. BRICS countries should advocate a multilateral order that upholds state sovereignty, reevaluates economic sanctions, and expands options for countries to conduct trade through their own currencies in bilateral or multilateral transactions.

It is crucial for major powers to recognize the importance of dialogue, as it serves the collective interest of all nations. Middle powers such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye actively utilize their roles in mediation, positive neutrality, and strategic hedging to advance these principles in global forums such as the G20 and BRICS. At the same time, BRICS itself requires deep institutional reforms to enhance its effectiveness, inclusivity, and balance, ensuring that it is not dominated by one or two nations.

Partners and Potential Aspirants 

Colombia and Venezuela (Aspirants)

Victor Mijares

Venezuela views BRICS as a crucial platform to counterbalance U.S. influence and mitigate its vulnerability to international sanctions, which have restricted its access to financing and global markets. Caracas’s pursuit of formal membership aligns with its broader strategy of deepening ties with emerging powers such as China and Russia, with which it has already established political, financial, military, and energy partnerships. For President Nicolás Maduro’s government, BRICS represents a mechanism to secure funding from the NDB, diversify its economic relations, and conduct transactions in currencies other than the U.S. dollar. Geopolitically, Venezuela sees BRICS as an opportunity to weaken the U.S.-led unipolar order and enhance its autonomy vis-à-vis the West.

Colombia, by contrast, approaches BRICS with greater caution. While President Gustavo Petro’s administration has expressed interest in diversifying international partnerships and attracting new sources of investment and infrastructure development, it remains careful not to jeopardize Colombia’s long-standing and structural ties with the United States, which remains its top security ally and economic partner in the hemisphere. For Bogotá, potential collaboration with BRICS serves as a way to expand its strategic options without committing to a full realignment. Consequently, Colombia’s primary interest lies in leveraging economic and commercial opportunities with emerging powers while preserving the financial and political support it receives from Western-aligned institutions.

Both Venezuela and Colombia recognize BRICS’ economic and financial dimensions as being the most impactful. For Venezuela, given it faces economic difficulties and international sanctions, its primary interest lies in securing access to NDB financing and conducting trade in currencies other than the U.S. dollar. Financing and trade mechanisms are critical for Venezuela to sustain oil production, acquire technology, and strengthen alliances with key BRICS members, particularly China and Russia.

For Colombia, BRICS could provide new investment flows in infrastructure, energy, and trade with major economies such as China, India, and Brazil. However, this interest is tempered by concerns over potential political and financial repercussions from institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, which play a crucial role in Colombia’s economic stability. Thus, while both countries see the economic and financial domains of BRICS as the most promising, their expectations differ based on their domestic circumstances and existing international relationships.

Recent international dynamics have reinforced Venezuela’s motivation to join BRICS. Economic sanctions and the growing U.S.-China rivalry have pushed Caracas to further consolidate its reliance on Beijing and Moscow—two central players within BRICS. Additionally, the war in Ukraine and the global reconfiguration of energy flows have heightened the strategic importance of oil-producing nations within the bloc. Venezuela perceives this as an opportunity to expand its influence in Asian markets and secure financial and political backing from BRICS members.

For Colombia, uncertainty surrounding Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency has led some domestic voices to advocate greater diversification of international alliances, reducing the country’s dependence on Washington. However, this approach faces resistance from business and political actors concerned about potential negative repercussions for U.S.-Colombia cooperation. Nonetheless, Petro’s government has cautiously explored the prospect of expanding its network of partners, recognizing that global polarization and intensifying U.S.-China competition could reshape the international order in ways that reward countries with diversified diplomatic and economic ties.

Nigeria (Partner)

Ovigwe Eguegu

Along with eight other countries, Nigeria formally joined BRICS as a partner country following the 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. There are three primary motivations behind Nigeria’s participation in BRICS.

First, Nigeria sees BRICS as a grouping it naturally belongs to, since the group comprises the world’s leading emerging economies and provides a crucial space to strengthen economic ties with them. In recent years, Nigeria has lost its position as the biggest economy in Africa. It now sits in fourth place, trailing full BRICS members South Africa and Egypt, which occupy first and second place, as well as Algeria in third place. Nigeria sees BRICS as a unique platform where economic cooperation can be advanced through strategic partnerships with other major emerging countries. In 2022, trade between Nigeria and the five core BRICS countries totaled about $41.4 billion, which represents 32 percent of Nigeria’s overall trade with the world.¹ BRICS includes some of Nigeria’s most important economic partners, not least China, its biggest trade partner. And the UAE, a BRICS member, recently became the top source of foreign direct investment in Africa. Thus, BRICS provides a vehicle for closer and more frequent high-level contact to expand economic ties. In a press release, the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the country seeks to leverage BRICS to achieve shared development goals in domains such as trade and investment, energy security, infrastructure, and technology transfer.

Second, for Nigeria, BRICS is a means to achieve the broader strategic objective of a less U.S.-centric international system. Nigeria, like many emerging countries, is in favor of a multipolar world and sees BRICS as a group of like-minded countries keen to engineer systemic changes. One of the coalition’s major goals is to transform the international monetary and financial system by challenging U.S. dollar dominance in global trade while promoting trade and settlement in local currencies. A key part of this plan is to further de-dollarize the global oil market or at least part of it. Because Nigeria is Africa’s top oil producer and fifteenth globally, joining BRICS further cements the overlap of BRICS members and partners and members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. By granting Nigeria partnership status, BRICS is working to consolidate its influence over global energy markets. Access to development finance is another factor. For too long, Nigeria and other developing countries have decried the shortcomings of the Washington Consensus, a set of neoliberal economic policies and principles promoted by international financial institutions and some Western governments. BRICS also creates the opportunity for an alternative source of financing through its NDB. 

Lastly, with economic and political challenges putting Nigeria’s long-standing position as a regional power into question, joining BRICS allows the country to position itself as an emerging power and to boost and reinforce its status. While Nigeria will not have the same decisionmaking powers and agenda-setting influence as a full BRICS member, as a partner country, it will participate in year-round meetings within the coalition framework, as well as attend the annual summit of BRICS leaders during which matters of global significance will be discussed. This gives Nigeria visibility and a louder voice on the global stage. Furthermore, Nigeria also aspires to join the G20, where South Africa, a founding BRICS member, is currently the rotating chair. This confluence may give Nigeria the chance to leverage its new BRICS partnership in pursuit of G20 membership.

Nigeria’s decision to become a BRICS partner country was based on a combination of political, strategic, and economic factors. But while the partnership provides opportunities in these domains, Nigeria must now perform a balancing act. It needs to maintain established relationships with countries such as the United States and France, despite these countries’ conflicts with BRICS members China and Russia. The success or failure of Nigeria’s engagement with BRICS will depend on whether it can craft policies that take advantage of the partnership while simultaneously managing the many challenges it faces at home and abroad.

Saudi Arabia (Invited)

Abdulaziz Sager 

Although Saudi Arabia has not yet formally decided to accede BRICS membership, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan did lead a delegation at the 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, and participated in its activities as an invited nation. Being part of the discussion aligns with the kingdom’s view that in a shifting world order, multifaceted relations with a variety of countries and organizations are both warranted and necessary. Through mechanisms such as BRICS, there are additional opportunities to advance global discussions on issues impacting the collective, shared priorities of developing and emerging economies. These priorities include economic cooperation, energy security, climate resilience, and greater representation in global governance. Moreover, such mechanisms and discussions are typically held in settings where the perspective of the Global South is better recognized.

Saudi Arabia’s readiness to consider BRICS membership and participate in its meetings should be viewed as a pragmatic approach to multipolarity, emphasizing collaboration with emerging economies without committing to any exclusive bloc. As it stands, Saudi Arabia already shares economic and development goals with many of the countries within the BRICS framework—through, for example, infrastructure projects via the Saudi Fund for Development, food security cooperation with Latin America, and renewable energy investments supporting climate resilience. The kingdom’s national interests are in essence converging with the broader agenda of multilateral alignment, but at the same time, the kingdom is seeking to maintain its foreign policy independence.

From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, participation in BRICS or any other multilateral framework should center on improving the global situation rather than pursuing narrow political or interest-based agendas. The goals of BRICS, as the kingdom sees them, should be fostering stability, enhancing economic cooperation, addressing global challenges such as energy security and climate change, and promoting dialogue among nations to create a more balanced and resilient international system.

In a time of global uncertainty and transition, Saudi Arabia’s priority is to maintain flexibility in its international partnerships, ensuring the protection of its national interests. Regardless of its own membership status, Saudi Arabia believes that all multilateral organizations should prioritize meaningful contributions that serve the greater good and drive positive global progress. In this context, Saudi Arabia used the Kazan summit as an opportunity to stress the value of international collaboration in addressing global issues. Prince Faisal bin Farhan reiterated the kingdom’s call for more robust international institutions that genuinely reflect the diverse needs and interests of all countries. In Riyadh’s view, many existing international institutions were designed in a different geopolitical era and have struggled to adapt to the realities of a more multipolar world. As a result, these institutions often fail to ensure fair representation in decisionmaking, respond effectively to evolving geopolitical and economic challenges, and equitably distribute economic power to support sustainable development.

In particular, the current global governance system is seen as overly Western-dominated and unresponsive to the needs of emerging economies. IFIs impose burdensome conditions on indebted nations, the UN Security Council remains paralyzed by great power vetoes, and institutions such as the World Trade Organization and G20 prioritize wealthier economies. Saudi Arabia’s calls for reform of international institutions reflect these concerns. The kingdom has expressed its commitment to fostering a more inclusive, just, and effective global governance system that better reflects today’s economic and geopolitical realities and upholds the principles of fairness and mutual respect.

Saudi Arabia’s active involvement in the recent BRICS summit thus reinforces important messages regarding fostering balanced international relations that reflect the interests of both the Global North and Global South. 

Saudi Arabia’s engagement with BRICS is shaped by a mix of geopolitical shifts and evolving international trends. The ongoing U.S.-China tensions and the broader shift toward a multipolar world have encouraged Riyadh to diversify its partnerships beyond traditional Western allies. While maintaining strong ties with the United States, Saudi Arabia sees BRICS as an avenue to strengthen economic and political collaboration with major non-Western powers, including China and India, which are also key energy partners. The uncertainty surrounding Trump’s policies has reinforced Saudi efforts to hedge its strategic bets by deepening ties with emerging economies. Because BRICS’ goals broadly align with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 goals, engagement with the group offers access to new investment opportunities, technology partnerships, and alternative financial mechanisms that will reduce dependency on Western institutions. However, Riyadh’s engagement remains pragmatic, prioritizing economic benefits and global stability rather than ideological alignment with any single bloc.

Overall, the kingdom sees the BRICS summit process as a strategic platform to expand their diplomatic and economic ties on a global scale. Through engagement with BRICS, Saudi Arabia aims to deepen economic cooperation and drive development within the Gulf region, using these partnerships to support sustainable growth. Additionally, the country recognizes BRICS as a means to contribute to broader global stability and to align their interests with other nations in fostering a resilient, multipolar world order that prioritizes balanced and collaborative economic policies.

Senegal (Aspirant)

Gilles Yabi

Although Senegal did not attend the 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, the country has expressed interest in joining the group. Senegal’s main interest in becoming a member, or at a minimum developing close relations with the bloc, is to diversify the country’s international partnerships. Membership, or even more close alignment, would offer new options for financing economic development and thus reduce dependence on Western partners, particularly France (which previously colonized Senegal), Europe as a regional bloc, and the United States.

The desire to diversify its portfolio of partners is not new for Senegal, which has always made balancing cooperation with all regions of the world a hallmark of its foreign policy. In a context of changing global power relations, with the growing influence of China, India, and Brazil in particular, the BRICS bloc is not seen as a substitute for Senegal’s Western partners, but rather as a forum that allows the country greater latitude in enhancing its external alliances and international negotiations while pursuing its national interests.

China and India are important trade and economic partners for Senegal. According to data from 2023, India was the second-largest importer of products from Senegal and the fourth-largest supplier. China was the second-largest supplier after being the first in 2022, overtaking France. Russia, another driving force of the BRICS group, is also a rapidly growing trading partner, rising from seventeenth place as Senegal’s supplier in 2016 to fourth place in 2023.

From this point of view, the country’s interest in BRICS is justified by the desire to deepen already progressing bilateral relations with the most important BRICS members and to take advantage of the broader BRICS framework to forge new links with other group members whose economic and demographic weight are clear to everyone.

Senegal’s main policy concern is economic transformation and job creation for young people. The country is looking for investment from BRICS countries and for relatively powerful allies who can defend the interests of Senegal and African countries in international forums. Senegal needs to develop its capacity for local processing of its natural resources through agri-food and manufacturing industries, as well as to diversify the services sector and generally improve productivity through digitalization, technology transfer, and research partnerships. In these areas, enhanced cooperation with BRICS, either as a member or a privileged partner, seems a reasonable and realistic option, without implying a rejection of historical cooperation with Western nations.

At a broad strategic level, Senegal perceives BRICS as an important vehicle to shift the world order in a more equitable direction, so that it reflects the emergence of large and medium-sized non-Western powers and gives greater voice to non-Western populations. This view is reinforced by the outcome of the recent U.S. elections, the rise of extreme right-wing parties in Europe, the legacy of European colonization, the perception of a permanent and disproportionate Western influence on the world stage, and the serious security and economic difficulties faced by African countries.

The election of the nativist and nationalist Trump to another presidential term has reinforced the feeling that African countries should rely on themselves and reduce their dependence on the United States, as well as Europe. The rise of anti-migrant sentiment in both regions, particularly against African migrants in Europe, contributes to the perception that Americans and Europeans hold a negative view of African populations. Senegal is an open society and stable democracy with a large diaspora present on most continents. The country’s political elites are particularly well informed about internal political orientations and debates in Europe and the United States. They see the need to turn more to emerging and established powers such as China, which offers opportunities for cooperation based on explicit mutual economic interests.

Türkiye (Aspirant)

Sinan Ülgen

Türkiye’s interest in BRICS is first motivated by Ankara’s aspirations to enhance its strategic autonomy in international relations. Over the past decade, Turkish political elites have strived to reconceptualize the country’s place in the world. This reappraisal was necessitated by the fallout with the United States on regional security issues—primarily the overriding disagreement over the future of Syria—as well as the total loss of momentum in Türkiye-EU relations. This new outlook has led to a policy of rapprochement with key nations of the non-Western world, particularly China and Russia, as well as a balancing of Türkiye’s relations with its traditional partners in the West. 

The second reason for Türkiye’s interest in BRICS has to do with economic expectations. Ankara hopes to receive more foreign direct investment (FDI), technology, and long-term finance capital from BRICS nations. Despite Türkiye being firmly anchored in the Western economic ecosystem, the country’s prevailing political tensions with Western countries—for example, related to NATO, the Middle East, and the war in Ukraine—coupled with a gradual erosion of democratic standards at home have acted as barriers to further economic integration. In fact, FDI flows from the West have declined and technology sharing has diminished. As a result, Turkish authorities have decided to seek these critical resources for Türkiye’s development objectives from a China-centered ecosystem. Turkish officials hope that establishing closer relations with BRICS states will help with this objective. In many ways, therefore, Türkiye’s interest in BRICS stems from the current absence of a more optimal economic roadmap, which remains conditional on substantive improvement in the country’s democratic norms and rule of law.

It is uncertain, however, whether Türkiye’s aspirations to establish a closer partnership with BRICS will actually advance under the present geopolitical conditions. Despite its desire to become a member, Ankara has so far not received an invitation. The group’s recalcitrance may be due to an internal decision to slow down BRICS’ expansion. But it may also be due to some members’ resistance to admitting a NATO member state. Additionally, there is now the Trump factor. At a time when the new U.S. administration is singularly focused on the China challenge and is adopting a more hawkish stance toward Beijing, it may become more difficult for a NATO ally such as Türkiye to continue to court BRICS. As a result, the Trump factor could indirectly end up helping to revitalize Türkiye’s relationship with the EU and by so doing compel Turkish authorities to deprioritize their BRICS aspirations. This outcome, however, will be conditional on EU leaders deciding to engage more constructively with Ankara against the backdrop of the security challenge posed by Russia and the economic challenges posed by the United States and China. EU leaders will have to believe that Türkiye can help Europe address its structural security and economic shortcomings.

Vietnam (Invited)

Trinh Nguyen

Vietnam’s interest in BRICS is motivated in part by similarities between itself and the group’s member states. Vietnam is a developing country and is a member of ASEAN, which champions noninterference; and similarly, BRICS members are largely emerging economies that also claim to support noninterference. In BRICS, Vietnam could find both representation and additional resources, including more access to finance, infrastructure investment, and supply chains. The NDB in particular could be an important source of financing, especially with its focus on local currencies. 

Vietnam is trying to further develop its infrastructure and raise its GDP per capita, in part by attracting greater FDI and expanding its global trade links. It already has one of the more liberalized trade regimes in Southeast Asia, as well as trade agreements across the world. Many BRICS countries are already large trade, investment, and security partners of Vietnam. The country has negotiated comprehensive strategic partnerships with China (2008), Russia (2012), and India (2016). China is currently Vietnam’s largest trading partner, while Russia is an important partner in energy, oil, and gas.

Vietnam’s desire for more effective representation in international governance provides another motivating factor for joining BRICS. Government officials believe the country can gain more opportunities to influence international affairs via BRICS, as the group elevates developing country interests via forums and meetings that facilitate dialogue, cultural exchange, and cooperation, especially on matters of security and economics.

However, to date, Vietnam has taken a cautious approach to BRICS. It has expressed interest in the group but, unlike Indonesia, has yet to become a full member. Indeed, Vietnam has not yet accepted the invitation to join as a BRICS partner country, unlike its neighbors Malaysia and Thailand. It wants to lay low geopolitically for the moment and avoid becoming overly dependent on China, which seemingly dominates the bloc. It also wants to avoid jeopardizing its relationship with the United States, which remains an important export market for Vietnam. BRICS countries have angered Trump by discussing increasing trade in local currencies instead of the U.S. dollar, as well as by taking bolder steps to de-dollarize the global economy. Because Vietnam, of all the Asian countries, has the highest trade exposure to the United States as a share of GDP, the Vietnamese government hopes to stay neutral and move cautiously, especially as Trump continues to threaten tariffs.

Currently, Vietnam benefits more by positioning itself as a neutral country than it does by joining BRICS. This posture allows it to stay out of the crossfires of trade wars and extract benefits from investors looking for nonaligned host countries. While becoming a member is not likely in 2025, Vietnam will still curry favor with BRICS nations by attending conferences and forums and expressing an interest in someday joining. Vietnam already has free trade agreements (including the prized EU Free Trade Agreement) and bilateral trade agreements with major partners including with Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. While BRICS membership could carry benefits, it might bring more pitfalls in the short term, if not carefully managed.