Ukraine’s New Theory of Victory Should be Strategic Neutralization

Introduction

Russia’s war against Ukraine has entered a new phase, defined not by momentum or negotiation but by strategic deadlock and ideological persistence. Despite the failure of its early campaigns, Russia shows no intention of ending the war. On the contrary, the Kremlin is preparing for a prolonged confrontation and additional offensives, relying on internal repression; growing external partnerships, particularly with China; and Western fatigue, along with the West’s apparent lack of will or ability to coerce it into peace.

Recent expectations—particularly in Washington—that a ceasefire could soon be negotiated have proven premature, if not an outright miscalculation. Many Western policymakers have constructed a long-term strategy for Ukraine based on an assumption that, once hostilities end, it can be fortified through a combination of indigenous production and targeted external support to deter renewed aggression.

But what if hostilities do not end? In that case, a strategy based purely on deterrence is not sufficient. Rather than assuming the war can be ended through a comprehensive battlefield victory or a negotiated compromise, Ukraine and its allies must plan to build a viable, sovereign, and secure state under constant military pressure. This reality demands a redefinition of what a successful outcome looks like. In this context, the objective should not be to defeat Russia outright or expect its regime to end the war because of economic or diplomatic pressure but to systematically deny it the ability to achieve its military goals.

This strategy is already materializing in multiple domains, where Ukraine has delivered what one senior U.K. official called “functional defeats” to Russia by paralyzing key capabilities without fully destroying them. Building on these successes, this article proposes a new term, “strategic neutralization,” as Ukraine’s long-term military approach. This approach aims to render Russian aggression futile, even if prolonged, by achieving cross-domain operational paralysis and persistently disrupting Russia’s offensive capacity. By expanding this model, Ukraine can shift the war from a contest of exhaustion to a contest of operational irrelevance in which Russia may still fight but cannot win. This, in turn, forms the basis of a viable theory of victory under conditions where an acceptable armistice may never formally arrive.

The Steel Porcupine Strategy

Kyiv and many of its partners in Europe have viewed a negotiated ceasefire as unlikely so long as Russia has shown no willingness to compromise on its core demands—namely, to render Ukraine defenseless and unable to seek external support from the West. U.S. President Donald Trump’s reelection and prioritization of ceasefire negotiations raised hopes that the war might wind down in 2025, spurring a new round of planning for a post-ceasefire security architecture.

Central to this planning has been the idea of turning Ukraine into a “steel porcupine”: a country so defensively fortified that any future Russian offensive would fail by design. Often referred to (somewhat inaccurately) as “security guarantees,” the emerging framework emphasizes Ukraine’s own domestic defense industry and population as the keys to long-term deterrence. The goal is to build a system of deterrence by denial, in which Ukraine’s strength and readiness—not formal alliances—are the first line of defense.

Europe has emerged as the chief enabler of this strategy. The European Union and its member states, as well as the United Kingdom and Norway, have committed billions of euros to Ukrainian defense manufacturing, including for the production of artillery systems, ammunition, and drones. In parallel, European nations have provided training, equipment, and logistical support, building Ukraine’s capacity to defend itself independently.

As the United States retreats from its leading role in managing international support for Ukraine, Europe has helped organize a more flexible “coalition of the willing,” less constrained than the consensus requirements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The European Commission’s first comprehensive defense strategy, published in March 2025, explicitly prioritizes enabling Ukraine’s defense by means of a “porcupine strategy.” This marked the first time that a long-term vision of Ukraine’s future security was part of a European strategic document.

Reality Check: No End in Sight

Russia is not preparing to end the war—on the contrary, it is positioning itself for a prolonged confrontation. Despite Western hopes for a negotiated ceasefire, Moscow’s posture and rhetoric, including recent declarations to “fight forever,” reflect a regime that sees time as an advantage, not a constraint.

This misalignment stems largely from a persistent Western rationality bias—the belief that Russia, too, must act according to a cost-benefit logic that follows the West’s own analysis. But Russian leader Vladimir Putin operates under a very different rationale, shaped by his belief that the war is existential both for Russia and for his regime and by his ideological conviction that Ukraine must be subjugated once and for all. The war is no longer just a campaign; it is the structural foundation of Putin’s system, absorbing a vast share of state resources and driving elite patronage networks. His control over the media and suppression of dissent have isolated the Russian public from the war’s true costs.

Putin’s bet on achieving a comprehensive victory in Ukraine is likely further reinforced by growing strategic partnerships, most importantly with China. Economic and technological collaboration with Beijing has reduced the perceived impact of Western sanctions and emboldened Putin to take an uncompromising approach. At the same time, signals from the U.S. administration—notably its reluctance to strengthen sanctions or provide significant additional military support to Ukraine—likely strengthen Putin’s belief that Western pressure will not intensify meaningfully as time goes on. For him, this is not a pause; it is an opening.

Moreover, Putin may believe better opportunities lie ahead. A tired Ukraine, a divided West, and a restrained United States suggest that time is on his side. He is gambling that prolonging the war will deliver more than settling it now—and that gamble is not irrational from his point of view.

Any strategy going forward must begin with this reality: Russia is not seeking an exit, and Putin does not feel compelled to negotiate. Without significant external pressure or internal disruption, he will likely continue the war indefinitely by adapting, maneuvering, and absorbing losses in pursuit of objectives that remain unchanged. Ukraine and its allies now face a unique challenge: an autocrat willing to sustain conflict for years, supported by a war-adapted economy, internal repression, and a growing partnership with China.

Traditional deterrence—meant to prevent aggression by threatening unacceptable consequences—no longer functions in this context. Putin is already fully committed to the war, views it as existential, and is prepared to absorb costs that would dissuade actors with limited aims. His commitment is not pragmatic; it is ideological and tied to regime survival.

If it is impossible to dissuade Putin, then the question is how to systematically obstruct his efforts. Ukraine’s strategy must now shift from trying to deter future attacks to actively preventing Russian operational success, no matter how long the war continues.

The Attritional Strategy Dilemma

In the early phases of the full-scale war, Ukraine and its partners envisioned a path to victory grounded in decisive maneuver: large-scale counteroffensives that would break Russian lines, retake occupied territory swiftly, and shift the war’s trajectory in Kyiv’s favor. These expectations culminated in the 2023 offensive, supported by extensive Western training and equipment. But the reality proved far more difficult. Personnel exhaustion, ammunition shortages, challenges for Ukrainian forces to conduct complex synchronized operations, slow and fragmented Western decisionmaking, and, most critically, the transformation of the battlefield through drones, mines, and layered fortifications exposed the limits of this approach. It became clear that a quick breakthrough was not achievable under these conditions.

In response, Ukraine transitioned to a strategy of defensive attrition: one that leveraged drones, artillery, remote mining, and distributed operations to inflict steady losses on Russian forces. This shift played to Ukraine’s comparative advantages: tactical innovation, technological adaptability, and an ability to conserve manpower. Throughout 2024 and the first half of 2025, the strategy has helped stall Russian advances, deny Russia operational momentum, and stabilize the front lines across much of the theater. In other words, Russia has not been able to achieve a strategic breakthrough despite its numerical and resource superiority.

But it is wrong to label the war a stalemate. Even though Russia has been unable, so far, to achieve any decisive breakthroughs, the battlefield remains highly dynamic, with Ukrainian troops fending off dozens of Russian assaults each day.

Attrition, by itself, is not a long-term strategy; it is a holding pattern. It has prevented Ukraine’s collapse and frustrated Russian objectives, but over the long term, this type of warfare holds significant risks for Ukraine: It will erode troop morale, sap Ukraine’s economic and industrial resources, and exhaust Western patience. Moreover, Russia is already adapting, mobilizing new personnel, regenerating equipment stocks, and refining its drone and strike capabilities. Therefore, Ukraine requires a strategic shift—not a wholesale rejection of attrition, but an integration into a broader, more proactive plan.

Ukraine and its allies must confront the reality that traditional definitions of endgame may also no longer apply. The idea of a clear military outcome now appears increasingly remote. For example, the JPMorganChase Center for Geopolitics in May 2025 put the odds of a South Korea–style armistice scenario at just 15 percent, reflecting how unlikely a formal cessation of hostilities is under current conditions. Given the Kremlin’s maximalist goals, domestic control, and ideological framing of the war, it is possible the conflict may not technically end at all, at least not while the current Russian regime remains in power.

Under such circumstances, a revised theory of victory must be grounded in realism rather than closure. Victory for Ukraine may not come through peace negotiations or battlefield capitulation but through the construction of a resilient, secure, and thriving state under permanent threat. This means normalizing national life, rebuilding the economy, maintaining a viable defense posture, and ensuring that Russia’s attempts to disrupt Ukrainian sovereignty are strategically ineffective. It also means persuading allies to support Ukraine not just until peace but through a sustained period of resistance during which the war continues but Russia repeatedly fails to achieve its goals. In this light, Ukraine’s strategic objective would not be to end the war on ideal terms but to functionally nullify Russia’s war aims while building a successful nation under pressure.

Strategic Neutralization

If Ukraine’s theory of victory rests not on the war ending but on functionally defeating Russia’s objectives while building a resilient, secure, and sovereign state, then a new strategic framework is required: one I will refer to as “strategic neutralization.” The approach is designed to make Russian aggression across all domains operationally incapable of disrupting key aspects of Ukrainian strategic, political, economic, and social life. It is not premised on compelling Russia to negotiate or exhausting its resources through attrition alone. Instead, it aims to paralyze Russia’s ability to achieve any military success, not by defeating it in full but by making the pursuit of its goals unworkable and futile in practice. The strategy recognizes that functional defeat—where a military capability is not completely destroyed but rendered irrelevant—is both a repeatable and scalable outcome that Ukraine has already achieved in multiple cases.

Unlike traditional attrition, which aims to wear down enemy forces through sustained losses, strategic neutralization focuses on denying function rather than depleting volume. This distinction is critical to the long-term sustainability of Ukraine’s war effort.

Unlike traditional attrition, which aims to wear down enemy forces through sustained losses, strategic neutralization focuses on denying function rather than depleting volume. This distinction is critical to the long-term sustainability of Ukraine’s war effort. Attrition demands constant material and human sacrifice to maintain pressure; by contrast, neutralization aims to disable or render ineffective key operational systems, often with far lower costs. Operationalizing this approach will entail a mix of intelligence, precision strike capabilities, dispersed drone networks, electronic warfare, and real-time sensor integration. The goal is to render unusable specific high-value functions—logistics, coordination, mobility, and fire support, for example—rather than to eliminate every soldier or vehicle. This framework would allow Ukraine to conserve manpower and sustain resistance over time.

This strategy consists of the following key components.

1. Functional Defeat as an Operational Objective

Functional defeat is the building block of strategic neutralization. In domain after domain—in the Black Sea, in the air, in cyberspace, in the informational domain, and increasingly on land—Russia has been forced into a position where it cannot use its superior assets to deliver results. These defeats are not symbolic; they are operational. Each instance of a domain-specific functional defeat degrades Russia’s campaign and weakens its strategic leverage. The goal is to expand and replicate these effects, ensuring that Russia’s presence, though intact, yields no strategic gain.

2. Cross-Domain Operational Paralysis

Strategic neutralization requires sustained efforts to paralyze Russia’s capabilities across all domains—land, sea, air, cyber, and information—simultaneously. This is not attrition in the classical sense but a denial of function: Russia must be made incapable of conducting large-scale offensives, denying Ukrainian airspace, contesting the seas, or achieving cyber or information dominance. The strategy relies on disruption and denial, not complete destruction. Each domain must be contested persistently enough that Russian assets lose their strategic relevance, even if they remain intact.

3. Asymmetric Pressure and Strategic Patience

Because strategic neutralization does not require full liberation or formal resolution, it enables Ukraine and its partners to act asymmetrically and sustainably. It is a strategy of smart pressure and long-game resilience, not frontal sacrifice. While Russia pursues large, slow, and resource-intensive offensives with diminishing returns, Ukraine uses cheaper, higher-impact tools to destroy, disrupt, delay, and deny. Over time, the asymmetry favors the defender—as long as endurance is matched with innovation and support.

4. Erosion of Strategic Legitimacy and Perceived Effectiveness

Even in autocracies, perception matters. Strategic neutralization works not only on the battlefield but also in the minds of Russian elites and security institutions. Repeated failure to achieve military effects, despite massive investments, fuels doubt and disillusionment. Strategic neutralization should be paired with information operations to highlight these failures, erode confidence in Russian command, and challenge the internal narrative of progress and strength. While this may not produce rapid unrest, it could build internal friction over time.

To understand how this framework might work in practice, we can draw lessons from the various domains of this war: sea, air, land, and cyber (or information).

A Model from the Sea: Russia’s Functional Defeat in the Maritime Domain

Ukraine achieved a remarkable and unexpected success in the maritime domain. From the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion—and even earlier, with the occupation of Crimea and parts of the Black Sea in 2014—Moscow has treated control of Ukraine’s maritime access as a central strategic objective. By cutting off Ukraine from the sea, Russia sought to suffocate the Ukrainian economy and build the foundations for a wider territorial conquest along the Black Sea coast. The occupation of Snake Island on the first day of the war in 2022, attacks on Mykolaiv, and the planned assault on Odesa all reflect the importance Russia placed on this objective.

Although Ukraine’s ground forces could match Russian troops in terms of resistance and tactical acumen, its naval capabilities were vastly inferior to those of Russia. From a conventional military standpoint, Ukraine had little prospect of reversing Russian maritime dominance. Initially, a temporary international agreement negotiated by Türkiye and the United Nations in 2022 allowed limited Ukrainian grain exports from Black Sea ports, but Russia withdrew from the deal in 2023, aiming to reimpose a naval blockade. This move triggered renewed fears of a global food security crisis, as Ukraine’s grain exports were revealed to be a critical link in international supply chains.

Instead of relying on naval parity, Ukraine adopted a creative, asymmetric approach. It launched a campaign using surface drones, precision missiles, and air-launched strikes to degrade the Russian Black Sea Fleet and put at risk Russia’s commercial shipping. The outcome was not total naval destruction but something strategically more profound. By 2024, Russia had been forced to withdraw most of its naval assets to the eastern Black Sea, effectively ceding control of western waters. Ukraine successfully reopened maritime trade routes, and commercial traffic returned to prewar levels—without Russian approval, negotiation, or concession.

This outcome was described as a “functional defeat” by the United Kingdom’s then minister of state for the Armed Forces, James Heappey, at the Warsaw Security Forum in 2023. Though the Russian fleet still exists, its inability to perform its central mission—denying Ukraine the freedom of navigation—renders its operational role meaningless. Functional defeat, though not a formal military doctrine, accurately captures this dynamic: an adversary’s capability, while not completely destroyed, is gravely damaged to the point of being contained and critically ineffective. In this case, Ukraine did not need a treaty, ceasefire, or naval supremacy to regain the initiative at sea. It simply made Russia’s strategy unworkable.

Contesting the Skies: Russia’s Constraints in the Air Domain

Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb in June 2025 took the world by surprise and created another template from which to draw lessons. Using more than one hundred relatively simple drones, Ukraine was able to strike multiple air bases deep within Russian territory, damaging a significant percentage of Russia’s strategic airpower capabilities. Another bright example of asymmetric warfare, Spiderweb-type operations could also prove decisive in the Black Sea, where Russia’s large platforms have become liabilities. If Ukraine could replicate this success against Russian strategic aviation, it would be an enormous achievement.

It is challenging to demonstrate a functional defeat in the air domain when Ukraine continues to endure record-breaking waves of missile and drone attacks and its front lines face daily strikes from Russian glide bombs. Among all domains, air remains the most dangerous, and Ukraine’s air defense network—though resilient—is under constant strain because of limited capacity and escalating demand. Yet the present situation, as damaging as it is, is fundamentally different from what might have occurred had Russia succeeded in establishing air dominance in the first days of the war.

If the Russian Air Force had secured control of Ukrainian airspace and conducted persistent close air support (CAS) for its ground offensives, the battlefield—and the war itself—could have looked very different. Ukrainian defenses would have been suppressed, maneuver corridors closed off, and key leadership targets exposed to precision strikes. In that scenario, Ukraine’s military and political continuity would have been in jeopardy. Preventing this outcome remains one of Ukraine’s most critical early achievements.

From the opening moments of the invasion, Russia intended to assert aerospace dominance as a foundation for its strategic offensive. Within the first hour, it claimed that Ukraine’s air defenses had been suppressed. In reality, the airspace became highly contested, particularly over Kyiv, where early dogfights and surface-to-air engagements pushed Russian airpower out. The success of those units, known collectively as the Ghost of Kyiv, saved the country in those first critical days.

By denying Russia control of the skies, Ukraine preserved the functionality of its ground forces, which would have been severely compromised under sustained aerial bombardment. Russia has since been unable to conduct the kinds of standard offensive air operations that would support its ground campaign, such as CAS or deep interdiction. Its tactical aviation has largely been forced to operate at standoff ranges, launching glide bombs from safe distances beyond Ukrainian air defense coverage.

Russia’s long-range strikes continue to cause extreme damage to critical infrastructure, civilian targets, and defense industrial facilities. Still, they do not amount to operational air supremacy. The air domain remains highly contested, and Ukraine’s ability to maintain this denial depends on continued external support, especially advanced Western systems. As in other domains, functional defeat in the air will never be permanent—it must be actively sustained through continued adaptation, innovation, scaling, and supply.

Ukraine and its allies must find ways to contest Russia’s air capabilities more effectively. Today, Ukraine intercepts many Shahed drones with anti-drone uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). These innovative solutions must be further developed and mass-produced to fully address this threat. Strikes on Russian airfields must be prioritized, rendering them redundant and incapable of launching jets and bombers. Ukraine desperately needs more Spiderweb-type operations, as Russia lacks the production capacity to replace its aging strategic aviation fleet, in which airframes are on average more than thirty years old. Like the Black Sea fleet, Russia’s aircraft numbers are finite. If Ukraine can degrade them significantly, they will stop being a strategic threat. Functional defeat in the air domain is very difficult, but possible, as proven by the Ghost of Kyiv, years of resilient air defense, and Operation Spiderweb. Making it a reality must remain a top priority.

Precision Kill Zones: Russia’s Functional Paralysis in the Land Domain

A very peculiar though still extremely dangerous situation has taken place on the ground. Although Russia has committed enormous manpower—estimated at nearly half a million troops deployed in Ukraine on a regular basis—and dedicated roughly 40 percent of national public spending to the war effort and related security costs, Russian forces have made no strategically meaningful territorial gains over the past year. Even with the concentration of offensive efforts in a narrow corridor of the Donetsk region, Russia has been unable to achieve the kind of operational breakthroughs envisioned in its campaign planning.

One of the key reasons for this paralysis has been Ukraine’s innovative use of small drones and precision-guided munitions to create a persistent, adaptive kill zone extending at least 20 kilometers in depth along the front. In this zone, Russian forces face constant surveillance and rapid targeting, making it nearly impossible for them to move equipment, resupply forward units, or even reposition small infantry elements without being struck. The result is not the total defeat of Russian ground forces but the functional disablement of traditional land warfare doctrines. Classic operational ground forces warfighting methods, including massed firepower or Russian-style human wave attacks, no longer produce results in such an environment.

What emerges instead is a new battlefield reality in which mobility equals vulnerability and mass becomes a liability rather than an advantage. While Russia continues to adapt and experiment, the current configuration of its land campaign—built on doctrines of armored assault and concentrated fire—is to a large extent proving operationally inert under constant disruption from dispersed, lower cost, and more agile Ukrainian systems. In effect, Russia’s ground war is not yet defeated, but, to a great extent, it is functionally damaged.

Still, Russia’s ground forces are launching dozens of small-unit assaults daily, backed by airstrikes, drone innovations, and persistent efforts to find breaches in Ukraine’s defense architecture. The Kremlin continues to prepare for a new strategic offensive, seeking to overwhelm or outmaneuver the evolving Ukrainian system. Thus, the functional disruption achieved on the ground is far from complete—it must be constantly improved and actively sustained, as even limited degradation or stagnation in Ukraine’s defensive innovation could open space for Russian breakthroughs. Ground denial, like other forms of strategic containment, is a moving target, not a fixed line. At the moment, Ukraine has achieved a partial success in the ground domain, showing that disruption is possible, even if functional defeat is still a distant prospect.

Unbreakable Ukraine: Russia’s Functional Defeat in the Cyber and Information Domains

Just days before the full-scale invasion in February 2022, Russia launched a large-scale cyber attack targeting Ukrainian infrastructure. While it achieved some disruptive effects, the broader campaign fell short of strategic objectives. Over the course of the war, Russia has continued its offensive cyber operations, occasionally scoring temporary tactical successes, but Ukraine’s cyber defenses have remained resilient. Despite continuous Russian attempts to undermine command and control systems, critical infrastructure, and economic operations, Ukraine has maintained operational continuity across its military, governance, and civilian sectors. In effect, Russia’s cyber war has failed to deliver lasting or decisive outcomes—another case where a key domain-specific tool has proven functionally ineffective.

A similar pattern has emerged in the information domain. At the onset of the invasion, Russia launched a widespread disinformation campaign aimed at domestic Ukrainian audiences, international media, and policymakers. The objective was to demoralize Ukraine, erode Western support, and legitimize the war through a narrative of inevitability and provocation. Yet these efforts largely failed to penetrate Ukrainian society or influence international opinion. Ukraine and its allies demonstrated robust information resilience, rapidly countering false narratives and reinforcing public resolve. Despite continuous information attacks since 2022, and partial tactical results, Russia has been unable to undermine the strategic communication ecosystem that sustains Ukrainian morale and broader Western solidarity.

However, Russia’s information warfare has seen success, particularly in parts of the Global South and among segments of Western societies drawn to anti-NATO narratives. Moscow’s nuclear threats have shaped Western risk perceptions, while daily disinformation campaigns have targeted Ukrainian social media—aiming to undermine confidence in the government, the military, and hopes for victory. Though Ukraine and allied governments actively resist these efforts, functional defeat in the information domain remains fragile, requiring continued vigilance both in Ukraine and abroad.

Winning the Military Technology Race

Perhaps the most decisive factor in neutralizing Russia’s warfighting potential will be Ukraine’s ability to win the military technology innovation race and to scale successful solutions faster than Russia can. Across multiple domains, traditional concepts of warfare are being redefined by emerging technologies—in particular, unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, and digital battle management. The scale and pace of change suggest there is a new military-technical revolution underway, one that could reshape the character of war more profoundly than previous shifts in military history. What sets this revolution apart is the speed of innovation, open access to knowledge, and rapid prototyping, all of which allow smaller, more agile actors to seize asymmetric advantage.

This creates a unique opportunity for Ukraine. If the war becomes locked in conventional dynamics, Ukraine’s path to victory will narrow. But by leading in military innovation, Ukraine can offset traditional disadvantages and impose disproportionate costs on Russia. But Russia also recognizes the stakes and is investing heavily to win this race. Ukraine’s advantage lies in its people—including an agile and creative tech sector that has already turned the country into a hub for battlefield innovation—as well as in the support and technical expertise of its international partners. Capitalizing on this opportunity will require the right policies, targeted investments, and an industrial strategy designed not only to survive, but also to win, a contest of innovation at scale.

Conclusion

At its core, strategic neutralization seeks to create cross-domain operational paralysis. Russia may continue to fight, but its forces will fail to achieve their objectives, and its strategic capabilities will be systematically disrupted. Ukraine would not need to “win” by conventional definitions but rather ensure that Russia can no longer impose outcomes through war.

Strategic neutralization will require a more adaptive, capable, and forward-looking force. This means Ukraine’s defense institutions must commit to rapid, wartime adaptation—even amid daily pressures and resource constraints. To sustain that transformation, Ukraine may need to create structures to manage change at the organizational level; for example, a dedicated entity in the Ukrainian armed forces, potentially named the Future Command, could be tasked with driving innovation and reform over time without pulling leaders away from immediate operational demands.

Strategic neutralization is not a peace plan but a strategy for sustained resistance and long-term success under conditions of permanent hostility. It offers a way to survive, adapt, and prevail without illusions—by ensuring that Russia’s war, no matter how prolonged, remains operationally pointless. If Russia cannot win, its leaders will eventually have to ask whether it is worth continuing to fight. That is where Ukraine’s theory of victory begins.

Strategic neutralization will not be a static condition but a dynamic contest. Even when Russia suffers a functional defeat in one domain, it will continue to innovate, adapt, and search for alternative ways to regain momentum. The Kremlin’s strategic persistence ensures that any paralysis is temporary unless actively maintained. For this reason, Ukraine—together with its allies—must not only defend against Russian moves but also continuously shape the operational environment, staying ahead through proactive disruption, not reactive containment. Maintaining the initiative is essential: Russia must be the one forced to adapt, absorb pressure, and defend—not Ukraine.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Diana Razumova for her contributions to this article.