In the Middle East, climate activism is often intertwined with public grievances over perceived governance failures and ongoing regional and national conflicts. Not only are Iraq and Yemen among the countries most vulnerable to climate change,1 compounded by apparent endemic state corruption, but they have also become key arenas for the ongoing regional confrontation between Israel and Iran’s axis that began in October 2023. In Iraq, for example, clashes between Iran-backed militias and U.S. and Israeli forces—a symptom of wider instability and governance failures—have enabled Türkiye and Iran to exploit the country’s water resources.2 In Yemen, Ansar Allah (commonly known as the Houthi movement) has disrupted international shipping in the Red Sea and attacked Israel, deepening the country’s isolation and insecurity. Both countries also grapple with fragmented political authority: Iraq’s federal structure includes a semiautonomous region, while Yemen remains divided among competing factions.
This ongoing armed conflict and political fragmentation shape the countries’ experiences of climate change and how citizens respond to it. Iraq and Yemen face acute environmental crises, including soaring heat, vanishing water sources, and agricultural decline. But in the current context, climate change is not an isolated challenge—it collides with long-standing governance failures and unfavorable geopolitical shifts. Successive governments have failed to manage natural resources, invest in sustainable infrastructure, and protect vulnerable communities. In both countries, the effects of climate change have become intertwined with public discontent over perceived corruption, marginalization, and the erosion of state legitimacy.
In response, climate activism has emerged in Iraq and Yemen as a vehicle not just for ecological advocacy but also for political expression in the shadow of conflict and hegemony and as civic space shrinks. Environmental mobilization in the countries often doubles as a demand for accountability and reform, even when framed in technical or local terms. Activists and citizens navigate hostile terrain (facing repression, surveillance, or institutional collapse) and yet still organize. In Iraq, youth and civil society groups have linked environmental issues to broader protest movements challenging state corruption and militia impunity. In Yemen, where formal governance has largely broken down, environmental initiatives are sustained through informal networks, community education, and local relief efforts. These movements reflect a deepening connection between ecological survival and political voice.
Rather than being marginal or apolitical, climate activism here represents broader struggles for dignity, livelihoods, and democratic participation.
Examining climate activism in these two fragile states provides insight into how environmental politics unfold under conditions of conflict and fractured governance. Rather than being marginal or apolitical, climate activism here represents broader struggles for dignity, livelihoods, and democratic participation—struggles that are increasingly central to the future of the Global South. When speaking about climate change, activists highlight a salient element of continuity with ongoing struggles against incompetent governance.
Iraq: Struggles, Strategies, and State Repression
From the drying of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers to intensifying heat waves and saltwater intrusion in the south, Iraq faces an escalating environmental crisis that intersects with existing corruption, misgovernance, displacement, and violent repression. In the southern province of Basra, for example, increased salinity has devastated once productive palm groves and citrus orchards. In nearby Dhi Qar, the slow disappearance of the marshlands has destroyed traditional livelihoods, such as fishing and buffalo herding.3 Almost 170,000 people in the country have been displaced because of climate-related causes as of October 2024, and desertification is costing the country roughly 250 square kilometers of arable land each year.4
In response, various types of environmental activists have begun organizing across Iraq, including some who may not necessarily identify as such. These actors include veterans of the 2019 Tishreen Uprising (which challenged entrenched corruption, sectarian politics, and foreign influence5), youth-led nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), scientists, heritage preservationists, and community organizers. Despite operating in a deeply repressive environment, they have become the most persistent voices advocating for environmental justice and climate adaptation in Iraq. A central theme of protests led by such actors is the demand to reestablish governance as a national priority, particularly in areas such as public services and climate response, rather than continuing to prioritize sectarian competition and abstract anti-imperialist rhetoric, which has largely been shaped by Iranian influence in Iraq.
One well-known organization is Nature Iraq, established in 2003 to protect Iraq’s unique ecosystems, especially the Mesopotamian Marshes. Another is Humat Dijlah (Tigris Defenders), a youth-led group focused on safeguarding Iraq’s vital rivers from pollution, overuse, and infrastructural threats.6 Grassroots initiatives in southern Iraq have also mobilized to draw attention to poor water management, flaring from oil production sites, and the absence of serious pollution controls. Collectively, these groups have demanded better environmental legislation, the end of gas flaring, and more equitable and transparent water governance policies.
Many of today’s climate activists were active participants in the 2019 protests against systemic corruption, unemployment, and lack of basic services. These young Iraqis, disillusioned by the failure of political reforms, turned their attention to climate issues, seeing environmental collapse as a symptom of Iraq’s deeper governance failures. For them, clean air, potable water, and protection from extreme heat are not just ecological goals; they are rights and prerequisites for human dignity.
For them, clean air, potable water, and protection from extreme heat are not just ecological goals; they are rights and prerequisites for human dignity.
One key moment that illustrates this convergence of environmental and political demands came in 2018, when youth-led protests erupted in Basra following the collapse of the water system. Rising salinity and pollution in the Shatt al-Arab river had rendered the water undrinkable, leading to widespread illness. The protests quickly expanded into broader calls for political accountability, and their intensity foreshadowed the nationwide Tishreen Uprising the following year. This moment marked the crystallization of climate-driven mobilization as a form of political resistance.7
Popular mobilization around climate-related grievances has not ceased since then. In May 2025, for instance, residents of Al-Madina, a district in northern Basra, escalated protests over the lack of clean water and deteriorating environmental conditions by shutting down the local district council building. Demonstrators cited pollution from nearby oil operations; delayed public works, such as a promised desalination plant; and the failure of local and federal authorities to respond to health risks. Security officers forcibly reopened the building, but protest leaders warned that unrest would continue unless their demands were met. As one resident put it, in reporting by Shafaq News, “Al-Madina fuels Iraq’s wealth but receives nothing but neglect.”8 The protest reflected ongoing discontent over environmental injustice and mirrored earlier mobilizations in Basra and the southern marshes, illustrating how climate-related grievances continue to catalyze civic action.
Over the years, however, many Iraqi activists have pivoted toward quieter forms of advocacy. They conduct reforestation campaigns, monitor pollution, or tell personal stories from affected communities (in the hope of at least documenting the situation). Media platforms have become important tools, especially for amplifying voices from Iraq’s marginalized south. Stories from displaced farmers, fishers, and marshland residents are documented and shared widely, raising awareness both inside and outside Iraq. In Basra, individual activists have focused on sharing knowledge, raising awareness through social media, and fostering networks of civil society actors, academics, and local activists.9 These networks provide protective coalitions in a context where activism risks political scrutiny and personal danger. Visual artists lead cultural initiatives that document ecological degradation through storytelling and exhibitions,10 subtly shaping public consciousness around Iraq’s environmental crisis. In this way, activists have created a powerful narrative that links ecological degradation with economic collapse, displacement, and rights violations.11The rise of quieter advocacy is due, at least partially, to the fact that climate activism in Iraq comes at a steep price for many. The post-Tishreen crackdown dramatically shrunk civic space, and climate activists (especially those who were also politically active in 2019) are often viewed with suspicion by authorities.12 This is compounded by the perception among Iraq’s entrenched political and militia elites that environmentalists represent a threat to their interests, especially when their demands challenge oil-driven development or implicate the state in mismanagement. As a result, many climate activists face escalating repression, threats, and violence.
In one example, Salman Khairallah, co-founder of Humat Dijlah, was arrested and forcibly disappeared during the Tishreen protests in December 2019. He was eventually released, but continued threats forced him to flee the country.13 Similarly, Jassim al-Asadi, an environmental expert known for his work protecting Iraq’s southern marshes, was abducted near Baghdad in February 2023 by unidentified armed men. He was held for two weeks and reported being subjected to severe torture, including beatings and electric shocks, likely in an effort to silence his advocacy.14
Legal harassment is also common. Activists are routinely accused of having foreign affiliations or being backed by so-called outside agendas, charges that carry serious consequences in Iraq.15 Raad Habib al-Assadi, the head of the Chibayish Organization for the Protection of the Marshes, has faced repeated legal and bureaucratic obstacles while attempting to organize environmental campaigns.16 Activist groups often see their events shut down, funding blocked, or members surveilled and harassed by state-linked entities.17 Without institutional protection or sustainable sources of funding, even well-established organizations struggle to carry on long-term projects.
However, such work continues at both the individual and organizational levels, with environmental advocacy offering a rare opportunity to carve out civic space in an otherwise authoritarian system.18 Because officials sometimes perceive climate change as a technical rather than political issue, it sometimes allows for limited cooperation between activists and the government. Activists have used this ambiguity to push for reforms (however small) and engage with international bodies in ways that might pressure the Iraqi state without provoking outright confrontation. This cooperation provides activists with a shield of legitimacy that Oscar Berglund conceptualizes in his article in this series. Tactics include lobbying for stricter emissions standards, pressing for the inclusion of environmental protection in development plans, or seeking international protection (for instance, because of UNESCO heritage status) for ecologically important areas. For example, the campaign to secure global protection for the marshlands in southern Iraq exists not only as a conservation effort but also as a lever to hold the Iraqi government accountable for environmental degradation.19 In addition, the launch in 2014 of Iraq’s National Youth Climate Team under the Higher Youth Council speaks of a nascent, officially backed, but still limited platform seeking to engage young people in climate solutions.20
Nonetheless, entrenched systemic challenges continue to constrain the impact of these incremental forms of activism. Iraq’s muhasasa political system,21 which allocates power along sectarian and elite lines outside formal institutions, often sidelines youth-led and civil society initiatives, making direct political engagement fraught. Political neglect, limited resources, and occasional intimidation further hamper efforts, highlighting the difficult context in which these quieter campaigns operate. Political backing from reform-minded individuals would increase the prevalence of institutional success. Sustaining spaces where young activists and reformists within government can build trust and jointly address systemic barriers is essential, as is the independence and accountability of youth and civil society platforms.
The situation in Iraq today illustrates how climate activism can operate simultaneously as a flashpoint and a conduit for broader civic engagement. On one hand, it can be a deeply risky endeavor. On the other, it serves as a rare opening for young Iraqis to articulate visions of dignity, rights, and a livable future. Whether through institutional engagement, quiet advocacy, or public protest, Iraq’s climate activists have found ways to adapt, endure, and continue their work in the face of profound adversity.
Yemen: Activism Navigating Collapse and Conflict
Yemen faces one of the most acute climate emergencies in the world. Climate change in the country manifests in increasingly severe droughts, violent storms, desertification, and chronic water scarcity, all compounded by a decade of war and state collapse. The average Yemeni today has access to just 74 cubic meters of water per year (well below the threshold of absolute scarcity), making Yemen the most water-insecure country in the world.22 Temperatures are rising at twice the global average,23 while erratic seasonal rainfall has intensified. In July–August 2024, severe floods damaged or destroyed tens of thousands of shelters, affecting over 60,000 people. In Al-Hudaydah Governorate alone, there were thirty-one deaths, and Al-Mahwit faced home losses, crop and livestock damage, and the destruction of roads and bridges.24
This environmental degradation is closely intertwined with political dysfunction. The country’s already fragile, war-battered water infrastructure can no longer provide for the population. Over half of Yemen’s land is classified as desert; decades of groundwater overextraction (including for qat fields), deforestation, and weak regulation have intensified desertification and water scarcity.25 With agriculture and herding providing the backbone of rural livelihoods, ecological degradation is deepening food insecurity and economic precarity.26
Local climate activism has responded to these overlapping crises of climate stress, infrastructure collapse, and institutional breakdown. Youth volunteers, civil society organizations, environmental researchers, journalists, and educators have stepped into the void left by the state, developing grassroots solutions and sounding the alarm on Yemen’s climate vulnerability. One clear example came in response to the 2020 floods in Aden. After successive rounds of flooding devastated the Crater neighborhood, youth-led groups organized their own relief operations, as the government failed to offer extensive support. (Aden’s Civil Defense Authority operates with just a few firefighting vehicles and has no capacity to carry out evacuations.) Lacking access to public resources, the youth-led groups solicited donations from local philanthropists to rent vacuum trucks to clear floodwaters.27 During that same period, angry residents confronted officials over repeated flood damage and the failure to restore water or electricity. These reactions captured a broader truth: As climate shocks grow more severe, they intensify public frustration with states that are unable (or unwilling) to respond.
As climate shocks grow more severe, they intensify public frustration with states that are unable (or unwilling) to respond.
Climate inaction is a symptom of not only war but also structural dysfunction. Yemen is divided among the Houthis in Sanaa, the internationally recognized government based in Aden, the Southern Transitional Council, and other Gulf-backed forces, including Salafist militias. Neither the internationally recognized government nor the Houthi authorities have the capacity or political will to enact or enforce green policies. Groundwater depletion, overfishing, and land degradation continue unchecked. Environmental law is outdated and unenforced, and no agency has the power to coordinate a national response. As a result, citizens and activists have had to step in, offering both practical solutions and political critique.28
In Al-Mahra Governorate, the devastation wrought by Tropical Cyclone Tej in 2023 laid bare this institutional vacuum. Neighboring Oman mobilized shelters and evacuations in advance,29 while in Al-Mahra the response relied heavily on humanitarian partners and local authorities amid limited national capacity.30 Roughly 22,000 people were displaced, and the flooding destroyed infrastructure, livestock, and crops. With no disaster preparedness plans in place, communities were left to fend for themselves.31 For activists and local observers, this episode was not simply a weather event but also a demonstration of the deadly consequences of Yemen’s fragmented and under-resourced governance.
Despite these challenges, some civil society organizations and researchers are working to reframe the national conversation on climate and environmental governance. One prominent organization, Holm Akhdar for Environmental Consultancy, highlighted that more than half of Yemen’s internally displaced people have been forced to adopt harmful coping mechanisms (such as selling livestock or reducing food intake) because of worsening extreme weather.32 The group called for the establishment of a national disaster response plan and greater international engagement. Environmental researcher Maha Al-Salehi has issued similarly ambitious proposals, advocating for the revival of Yemen’s suspended Water Law, modernization of irrigation techniques, and the declaration of a national climate emergency.33 She points to the collapse of groundwater systems as a case study in institutional failure, emphasizing the lack of regulatory oversight and the disappearance of state authority.
Other experts, such as an agricultural engineer based in Aden, have explored how environmental degradation is contributing directly to violence and conflict. They link the rise in land disputes to the erosion of customary conflict resolution systems and the near-total collapse of judicial institutions.34 Droughts and floods have blurred property boundaries, destroyed farmland, and triggered disputes over access to water. In some cases, individuals have taken up arms to defend their land against encroachment from militias or neighboring communities, illustrating how climate impacts can fuel insecurity in the absence of state protection.
In Lahij Governorate, as a 2023 ARK Group survey found, 50 percent of rural respondents saw desertification as one of the greatest threats to their communities.35 Yet these fears have not translated into regional or national policy.36 Filling this gap, a young generation of activists has led autonomous initiatives to educate, organize, and respond to environmental breakdown. In Taiz, a short film featured at the Women Deliver 2023 festival documented grassroots pollution control campaigns led by local women, including engineer Irtifa Amin al-Qubati.37 The film captured how communities were improvising small-scale solutions to manage waste and mitigate health risks in the absence of public services. In Sanaa, youth activist Ishraq al-Suwaidi launched an educational campaign to integrate climate literacy into local schools, using monthly student competitions and interactive activities to raise awareness.38 In Aden, activist Ithar Fare’ah spearheaded a UN project to transform organic waste into compost, promoting both food security and sustainable agriculture.39
Filling this gap, a young generation of activists has led autonomous initiatives to educate, organize, and respond to environmental breakdown.
Other responses have taken shape in the media sector. In 2023, the Climate and Energy Transition Journalism Network was launched by the Studies & Economic Media Center,40 headquartered in Taiz, to strengthen local reporting on environmental issues.41 The network connects journalists, researchers, and experts to raise public awareness and document environmental harms. Its founder, Mustafa Nasr, describes the effort as a way to “build local capacity for climate adaptation.” Members of the network, including journalist Ihab Zidan, have highlighted the lack of training in environmental reporting as a major obstacle to public engagement. Though limited in scale, initiatives such as these reflect how local actors collaborate in crafting solutions tailored to their contexts.
Still, the work of these activists and journalists carries risk, with environmental advocacy seen as potentially political. One member of the journalism network explained: “You always have to calculate what you’re saying . . . if the Houthis or the [Yemeni] government think it’s political, you could be in trouble.”42 Surveillance, harassment, or even violence are not uncommon, especially when activists speak out about state negligence or environmental destruction in contested areas.
In one interesting example that came with the shield of legitimacy, local authorities in 2023 held a conference on climate-related challenges and solutions. Hosted in Mukalla, it brought together representatives from Yemen’s environmental protection authorities, agriculture and water resources offices, and local and international organizations from the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Al-Mahra, and Shabwa. They emphasized the lack of operational budgets, technical personnel, and coordination between agencies and developed a set of concrete recommendations.43 Although not led by grassroots activists, these incremental, technocratic efforts reflect a quieter form of advocacy rooted in local governance that seeks to strengthen institutional responses to Yemen’s escalating climate threats.
Years of war have drained state revenues, and international donors remain hesitant to engage meaningfully with Yemen’s environmental collapse, focusing instead on short-term humanitarian relief. In this context, Yemeni climate activism functions both as a form of resistance and of resilience. It addresses immediate environmental harms while also restoring a sense of community agency. Whether in the classroom, on farms, or through emergency flood response, activists are filling the void left by state neglect. Their work is grounded in the daily realities of conflict and climate crisis.
Conclusion
Iraq and Yemen show how climate-induced degradation interacts with deep governance failures and protracted instability, compounding public suffering and fueling wider discontent. Despite these challenges, citizens continue to mobilize. Their responses reveal how climate activism can become a vehicle for broader demands for justice, accountability, and reform.
In Iraq, environmental concerns have become increasingly central to protest politics, especially in the post-2018 period. Activists have linked salinized (and poisoned) water, deadly summer heat, and mismanaged resources to the failures of a political system shaped by sectarian clientelism and militia dominance. In Yemen, where formal activism appears almost impossible in much of the country, a quieter but equally political form of environmentalism has emerged through community-based efforts to preserve agriculture, manage water, and adapt to shifting weather patterns. What ties these two contexts together is the way that the climate crisis interacts with degraded forms of political authority. In both countries, those most affected by climate change are also those least able to influence how resources are managed or how decisions are made. Their vulnerability is not only ecological but political. And yet, this activism (whether in the form of public protests, grassroots organizing, or local resilience initiatives) suggests that meaningful mobilization can emerge even in the harshest of conditions.
Looking at Iraq and Yemen together challenges assumptions about where and how climate activism takes shape, even if this activism does not match the organizational level of established democracies. In other words, climate activism may not always be confined to strong states or liberal democracies, nor does it always take the form of visible mass movements. Instead, it can arise where governance is fragmented, where risk is highest, and where the stakes (access to water, health, and survival) are most immediate. In these contexts, activism becomes a way to contest not only ecological harm but also the structures of violence and neglect that allow it to persist.
In this series of articles, Carnegie scholars and contributors are analyzing varieties of climate activism from around the world, focusing on the intensification of activity both from the protesters themselves and from the authorities and forces who are the objects of their discontent.
Read more from the series here:
Notes
1“INFORM Climate Change,” European Commission Disaster Risk Management Knowledge Centre INFORM, October 2022, https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/INFORM-Climate-Change.
2“Iraq’s Water Crisis: Dammed by Neighbours, Failed by Leaders,” Chatham House, August 13, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/08/iraqs-water-crisis-dammed-neighbours-failed-leaders.
3Mohammed Aty, “Droughts in Iraq Endanger Buffalo, and Farmers’ Livelihoods,” Reuters, April 30, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/droughts-iraq-endanger-buffalo-farmers-livelihoods-2025-04-30.
4International Organization for Migration, “Understanding the Needs and Vulnerabilities of Climate-Induced Migrants in Iraq: Climate Vulnerability Assessment,” June 2025, https://iraqdtm.iom.int/files/Climate/2025619044711_IOM_DTM_CVA_June-2025.pdf; and “Iraq ‘Green Belt’ Neglected in Faltering Climate Fight,” Arab News via AFP, April 20, 2022, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2066801/amp.
5Harith Hasan, “Iraq Protests: A New Social Movement Is Challenging Sectarian Power,” Middle East Eye, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 4, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2019/11/iraq-protests-a-new-social-movement-is-challenging-sectarian-power?lang=en.
6“Home,” Humat Dijlah Association, accessed August 10, 2025, https://humatdijlah.org/en/main.
7“Iraq: Water Crisis in Basra,” Human Rights Watch, July 22, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/22/iraq-water-crisis-basra.
8“Clean Water Demanded: Tensions Soar in Basra as Situation Escalates,” Shafaq News, May 2, 2025, https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Clean-water-now-Basra-residents-rally-against-pollution-government-failure.
9Hayder Al-Shakeri, “Iraq’s Young Agents of Change,” Chatham House, October 4, 2024, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/10/iraqs-young-agents-change.
10Ali Mahmoud Khader, “Iraqi Intellectuals: Climate Change Is an Existential Threat,” Al Majalla, August 6, 2023, https://www.majalla.com/node/296986/%D8%AB%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B9/%D9%85%D8%AB%D9%82%D9%81%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%BA%D9%8A%D9%91%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A.
11Maha Yassin, “Climate Activism in Iraq: A Dangerous Undertaking,” Clingendael Institute, December 2021, https://www.planetarysecurityinitiative.org/sites/default/files/2022-01/idee215%20VERZET%20%E2%80%94%20column%20Maha%20Yassin.pdf.
12Maha Yassin, “The Space for Iraqi Climate Activism Is Dangerously Small, and Shrinking,” The Century Foundation, August 30, 2023, https://tcf.org/content/commentary/the-space-for-iraqi-climate-activism-is-dangerously-small-and-shrinking.
13“Arbitrary Detention of Omar Al-Amri and Slaman Khairallah,” Front Line Defenders, accessed August 10, 2025, https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/arbitrary-detention-omar-al-amri-and-salman-khairallah.
14“Environmental Human Rights Defender Jassim Al-Asadi Released by His Kidnappers After 2 Weeks,” Front Line Defenders, February 15, 2023, https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/environmental-human-rights-defender-jassim-al-asadi-released-after-2-weeks.
15Taif Alkhudary, “Navigating the Challenges of Environmentalism in an Increasingly Authoritarian Iraq,” Arab Reform Initiative, February 6, 2025, https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/navigating-the-challenges-of-environmentalism-in-an-increasingly-authoritarian-iraq.
16“Iraq: Environmentalists Face Retaliation,” Human Rights Watch, February 23, 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/23/iraq-environmentalists-face-retaliation.
17 “Iraq: Environmentalists Face Retaliation,” Human Rights Watch.
18Hayder Al-Shakeri, “Postcard From Baghdad: How Climate Activists Are Turning the ‘Tishreen Dream’ Green,” Chatham House, December 9, 2024, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2024-12/postcard-baghdad-how-climate-activists-are-turning-tishreen.
19“Iraqi Marshlands Named a UNESCO World Heritage Site,” Wetlands International, July 25, 2016, https://www.wetlands.org/iraqi-marshlands-named-a-unesco-world-heritage-site.
20“Launch of the National Youth Climate Change Team Conference,” Iraqi News Agency, June 7, 2024, https://ina.iq/ar/local/212085--.html.
21Ali Al-Mawlawi, “Is Iraq’s Sectarian Quota System Holding the Country Back?,” Al Jazeera, March 21, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/21/is-iraqs-sectarian-quota-system-holding-the-country-back.
22Albert Martínez, Suaad al-Salahi, Laura Geres, Sinéad Barry, and Alina Viehoff, “Voices From Yemen – How Environmental Dialogues Can Contribute to Resilience and Peace,” Climate Diplomacy, February 7, 2025, https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/environment/voices-yemen-how-environmental-dialogues-can-contribute-resilience-and-peace.
23“Yemen Climate Country Profile,” Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre, June 29, 2024, https://www.climatecentre.org/wp-content/uploads/RCCC-ICRC-Country-profiles-Yemen_2024_final.pdf; and “Climate Resilience Is Key to Energy Transitions in the Middle East and North Africa,” International Energy Agency (IEA), July 3, 2023, https://www.iea.org/commentaries/climate-resilience-is-key-to-energy-transitions-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa.
24“Flash Update #1: Heavy Rains and Flash Floods in Yemen,” UNFPA, July 2024, https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/Flash%20Update%20-%20Yemen%20floods%20-%20Aug%202024.pdf.
25“Republic of Yemen: National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan II,” UNDP, 2017, https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/yem176431.pdf.
26Sahar Mohammed, “Yemen’s Environmental Crisis: The Forgotten Fallout of an Enduring Conflict,” Arab Reform Initiative, June 15, 2023, https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/yemens-environmental-crisis-the-forgotten-fallout-of-an-enduring-conflict/?tztc=1.
27Yasmeen al-Eryani, “Yemen Environment Bulletin: How Weak Urban Planning, Climate Change and War Are Magnifying Floods and Natural Disasters,” Sana’a Center, July 14, 2020, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/10346.
28Martínez et al., “Voices From Yemen.”
29“Oman on High Alert Over Cyclone Tej as Shelters Open and Schools Close,” The National, October 23, 2023, https://www.thenationalnews.com/gulf-news/2023/10/23/oman-on-high-alert-over-cyclone-tej-as-shelters-open-and-schools-close.
30“Yemen: Flash Update #1 – Cyclone Tej, 24 October 2023,” UN OCHA, October 24, 2023, https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/yemen/yemen-flash-update-1-cyclone-tej-24-october-2023-enar.
31“Yemen – Flash Alert | Cyclone Tej Update (23-25 October 2023) | Al Maharah and Hadramawt,” International Organization for Migration, October 26, 2023, https://dtm.iom.int/reports/yemen-flash-alert-cyclone-tej-update-23-25-october-2023-al-maharah-and-hadramawt.
32Mohammed Al-Hakimi, Amani Mohammed, and Maha Al-Salehi, “At the Mercy of the Climate: The Impact of Climate Change on IDPs in Yemen,” Holm Akhdar for Environmental Studies and Consultancy, February 15, 2025, https://holmakhdar.com/en/publications/the-impact-of-climate-change-on-idps-in-yemen.
33Maha Al-Salehi, “Yemen: Groundwater Depletion and Available Solutions,” Holm Akhdar for Environmental Studies and Consultancy, May 18, 2022, https://holmakhdar.org/reports/6008.
34Quoted in Hannah Porter, “Conflict and Weak Governance Fuel Yemen’s Environmental Crisis,” Arab Gulf States Institute, November 21, 2023, https://agsi.org/analysis/conflict-and-weak-governance-fuel-yemens-environmental-crisis.
35Porter, “Conflict and Weak Governance Fuel Yemen’s Environmental Crisis.”
36Afrah Nasser, “Climate Change: A New Battlefield in Yemen’s Ongoing Conflict,” Arab Center Washington DC, September 6, 2024, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/climate-change-a-new-battlefield-in-yemens-ongoing-conflict.
37Salah bin Ghalib, “A Yemeni Film Wins an International Climate Award,” Al-Mushahid, May 30, 2023, https://almushahid.net/114507.
38“Ishraq Al-Suwaidi and Ithar Fare’ah, two young women from Yemen, are tackling climate change through creative ideas that make a difference in their community,” UN News, October 23, 2022, https://news.un.org/ar/interview/2022/10/1113517.
39“Yemeni Youth Help Prevent Climate Change for a Sustainable World,” UN Development Program, September 20, 2022, https://www.undp.org/arab-states/stories/yemeni-youth-help-prevent-climate-change-sustainable-world.
40Studies & Economic Media Center is a civil society organization in Yemen specializing in research and media issues related to economic matters.
41“Economic Media Announces the Climate Journalism Network in Yemen,” Al-Mushahid, November 28, 2023, https://almushahid.net/118955.
42“Economic Media Announces the Climate Journalism Network in Yemen,” Al-Mushahid.
43Hasan Shujaa, “How Local Authorities in Yemen Respond to the Effects of the Climate Crisis,” Berghof Foundation, December 5, 2023, https://berghof-foundation.org/news/how-local-authorities-in-yemen-respond-to-the-effects-of-the-climate-crisis.
