For Arab Youth, Mass Mobilization Won’t Fight Climate Change

Throughout the Arab world, climate change has led to brief episodes of mass mobilization by impacted communities and put forward popular demands for more effective mitigation and adaptation efforts. At the core of the Hirak Rif Movement in Morocco in 2016–2017, the grassroots mobilization in Libyan Derna following the 2023 devastating floods, and local mobilization in Yemen demanding accountability for polluted water and other environment issues has been citizens’ realization that their governments fail to address the impacts of climate change as well as continue to exclude them from governance.

However, these climate mobilizations build upon more than a decade of Arab experiences with mass mobilization. When the first wave of Arab Spring uprisings broke out in 2010, citizens memorably seized upon public spaces demanding bread, freedom, justice, and dignity.¹ Young people in particular organized powerful movements and coalitions capable of credibly demanding political change. Fueled by existing grievances and long-standing deficits, the region’s youth bulge came at a historic juncture, resulting in unexpected turnout and, later, unanticipated consequences.

But the unexpected activism of Arab youth in 2011 triggered a paradigm shift toward consideration of the agency of activists and the possibility of mass mobilizations as drivers of change in the region. Since then, mass mobilizations in the Arab world have articulated a range of grievances against citizens’ lack of representation and the failure of authorities to consider their interests. Increasingly, the grievances of Arab youth have focused on the climate space. Weak climate mitigation and adaptation efforts, the fallout of major climate disasters, and increased hardship induced by civil wars have led youth groups to organize and mobilize for the climate using issue-based strategies. Through this lens, this article explores the emergence of the Arab uprisings in the early and late 2010s and examines how these protests laid the groundwork for climate activism in the Arab world today.

Youth Bulge and Cyber Activism

The 2011 surge in activism brought to the fore the sociopolitical significance of certain Arab demographics,² especially those under the age of twenty-five. Reports from the prior decades revealed that since 2002, Arab governments had failed to attend and respond to the legitimate needs and demands of their young populations aspiring for better education, work opportunities, social mobility, true political representation, social justice, and freedom of expression.³

Central to the Arab Spring were the ways that young Arabs organized protest networks and coalitions, and how they mass mobilized for change. Young Arabs’ activism employed social media—especially Facebook and Twitter (now X)—to raise awareness of their political demands and mobilize, first online then on the ground.⁴ Thus, cyber activism resulted in protest activism and mass mobilization among the Arab youth,⁵ spearheading the 2011 uprisings and, in turn, motivating a wider range of Arab populations to protest. This trend persisted in the outbreak of the second wave of uprisings in 2018–2019, with cyber activism again forming a central pillar for mobilization and coalition building for democratic change and social justice.

For instance, Algeria’s peaceful (or silmiya) Hirak movement used a social media campaign as a core strategy to mobilize.⁶ Learning from the some of the shortcomings of the first wave of uprisings, in which online organization did not result in sustained, on-the-ground mobilization, Algerian activists used online organizing for peaceful protests and, with this form of innovative collective action, forced security forces to exercise restraint and motivated others to participate in the public sphere. Iraqi youth, for example, employed cyber activism to combat censorship and control,⁷ engage in resistance and political action, and promote citizen-led journalism. Thus, the effects of cyber activism endured beyond the first wave and carried over to second wave movements.

Religious Radicalism and Resistance for Change: Disenchantment and Retreat

However, the first wave of Arab uprisings brought about winds of change that did not always align with the aspirations of young citizens. The removal of sitting presidents in Tunisia and Egypt resulted in neither sustained political openings nor orderly paths to democratic transition.⁸ Confronted with the continued dominance of old elites and the hijacking of the uprisings by religious radicals,⁹ youth movements and coalitions lost hope in achieving sustained change. Furthermore, as members of the enduring old political guard joined the new ruling structures, the youth were again marginalized by the very power structures they protested against.¹⁰ The collective view of young citizens in Tunisia and Egypt shifted drastically starting in 2013–2014 from feeling empowered and believing in their ability to democratize politics and modernize society,¹¹ to resignation and disenchantment resulting from the rise of religious radicals, to a preference for stability.¹²

Ambitious youth expectations clashed with power dynamics and societal realities that severely hindered opportunities for modernization and democratization. Youths’ sense of elevated agency was confronted by the political entrenchment of old elites and religious right-wing movements,¹³ both willing and ready to hijack the youth uprisings and push young Arabs back to their previous state of marginalization and ineffectiveness. Therefore, while some activists continued the fight, many saw the survival of old political elites and religious radicals as a definitive loss for their movement, accepting that it had been hijacked by the very people they sought to overthrow.¹⁴ Public opinion polls indicated that this resignation also translated into an overall decline in political interest and participation.¹⁵ Youth participation in elections and referendums plummeted.¹⁶

Since then, Arab youths have been generally disengaged from formal and informal politics. In the years after 2011, youth civic engagement decreased in all forms: political party membership, electoral turnout, attendance of campaign rallies, participation in protests, attendance of meetings, and signing petitions. Key findings on youth opinions, reported by Arab Barometer,¹⁷ indicate that youth in the Middle East and North Africa have little trust in government, look negatively at politics, and favor stability and gradual reform over sudden change.¹⁸ Young activists refrained from transforming their movements and coalitions into political parties, labeling political parties corrupt instruments geared to domesticate the youth.¹⁹

Meanwhile, in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, by 2012 peaceful uprisings had already begun to degenerate into violent clashes between incumbent regimes that refused to surrender to popular pressure and emergent militarized opposition movements with radical political and ideological backgrounds.²⁰ Violent clashes in these countries led to civil wars that exerted great pressures on states and societies.²¹ The results have been a combination of state fragmentation; collapse of coexistence across multiethnic, multireligious, and multitribal settings; and the end of peaceful mass mobilization as a means of change.²² In these horrific conditions, youth activism for democracy and social justice in the three countries receded and was replaced with mere survival activism in the homeland and in the exiles to which many Libyans, Syrians, and Yemenis started seeking safety.

State Repression and the Loss of Faith in Political Change

The second wave of uprisings in 2018–2019 were also led by young activists and students seeking to mobilize their respective populations.²³ Their primary grievances were related to unemployment, social injustice, political corruption, electoral fraud, and restrictions on personal freedoms. Unlike the first wave, the second wave understood how deeply entrenched ineffective governance was in all areas of society—political, social, and economic.²⁴ Thus, protesters’ goal became to establish a new political order: what scholars have labeled an orientation “against everyone.”²⁵ In contrast to the protesters of the first wave, those of the second wave had a widespread cognizance that both their governments and their opposition forces were incapable of delivering on promises of political and economic reform.²⁶ They did not trust their political leaderships would meet their demands,²⁷ whether it was the incumbent or opposition leaders. Furthermore, the protesters rejected sectarian divisions,²⁸ such as those present in Lebanon and Iraq, in favor of cohesion in order to achieve a new beginning. Hence, any reforms short of restructuring entire political systems were insufficient and could not satiate the grievances of the second wave’s protesters.²⁹ This was a tall order that was both unattainable and destabilizing.

In Algeria, the Hirak movement protests to oust the president started in February 2019. They were peaceful in nature; however, the young activists were met with extreme violence and intimidation in order to subdue their revolutionary initiatives.³⁰ The state also employed selective repression, legal reforms, and carefully stage-managed elections to slow protesters’ momentum.³¹ In Iraq, the Tishreen uprising—a series of demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, and civil disobedience spanning 2019–2021—was made up of young Iraqis seeking better services and opportunities in their country.³² The youth coalitions were violently subdued, allowing entrenched authoritarian powers and political parties to regain their foothold on society.³³ In both countries, the result was a stalemate, with both the government and opposition incapable of exacting definitive results. Youth were left with a sense of resignation: Public opinion polls found that majorities or near-majorities of the youth populations expressed a desire to emigrate and seek opportunities elsewhere.³⁴

Young Algerian and Iraqi activists, specifically those supporting opposition movements, have since retreated from the political sphere, their faith in political change and newfound sense of agency squandered.³⁵ Fear of violence and punishment has eliminated youth engagement in public space activism—which also has implications for climate activism in one of the world’s hottest and driest regions.

Climate Activism and Youth Representation

In the countries of the Arab uprisings, youth have largely withdrawn from politics and public affairs. However, some forms of youth activism continue today, particularly those more specifically focused on certain issue areas such as climate change rather than broader regime change. In other words, youth activists working in the climate space have come to favor working with existing governments either to avoid repression or to ensure more immediate and tangible outcomes that alleviate some of the hardships resulting from climate change.

In the countries of both the first and second waves, youth groups, networks, and organizations have emerged that focus on sectoral and specialized issues such as women’s rights and freedoms, the conditions of marginalized populations, access to basic services, and the issue of climate change and its societal implications.³⁶ For example, groups such as Djerba, Authenticity, Heritage and Environment network in Tunisia; VeryNile in Egypt; EcologicalDZ in Algeria; and Humat Dijlah (Tigris River Protectors Association) in Iraq are active in the climate space.³⁷ As was the case in 2011 and 2018, these actors operate throughout civil society rather than as formal political parties or movements, seeking to influence policy by raising public awareness on the one hand and engaging in dialogue with governments through various civil society groups on the other.³⁸

However, these efforts have mixed success. A preliminary survey of citizens assessing state responses to climate issues in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and Iraq indicated a wide perception among citizens that the ongoing policy dialogue between civil society organizations and governments on environmental strategies has been limited. The survey also found a common preference—particularly among urban populations—for governments to focus on climate adaptation and resilience projects and efforts, such as financing green economy projects.³⁹

Alongside the need for greater government initiatives, the survey also indicated citizens were enthusiastic about raising awareness about climate issues and the current impacts of climate change on human security in its broadest sense among specific social groups, such as the urban, educated, or middle-class; women; university students; and youth entering the labor market.⁴⁰ These youth-led networks and organizations often form the core of their countries’ civil society representation at global climate summits.

While the countries of the first and second waves have some civil society activity working on climate issues today, they still lack a cohesive sector of nongovernmental actors working among marginalized populations disproportionately affected by climate change.⁴¹ For instance, few organizations work in rural areas or among farming communities or fishermen, despite these groups experiencing disproportionate impacts of climate change.⁴² Representing the concerns and interests of these groups is typically left either to governments and their local structures—which vary significantly in their governance and empowerment capacities—or to development agencies and a mix of local and foreign NGOs.⁴³

As Amir Gohar’s article from this series explains, government administrations—across all levels and titles, from provinces and districts to local councils and units—governing water, energy, and agricultural issues that especially affect the rural sector tend to suffer from limited effectiveness, transparency, and popular participation.⁴⁴ Simultaneously, the dysfunctionality and limited presence of environmental groups, networks, and organizations exacerbate the conditions experienced by low-income and resource-dependent populations. As a result, governments in the Middle East and North Africa continue to develop and implement policies in areas such as agriculture, water consumption, and energy without genuine community participation.⁴⁵ The voices of women, youth, farmers, and local government representatives are not seriously heard, nor is there a robust NGO infrastructure that can bring those voices into the public sphere.

Beyond the exclusion of rural communities from governance frameworks, another constraint lies in the fact that many climate activists tend to build bridges and maintain continuous coordination and communication with governments—whether in the context of global climate summits or regarding environmental policies applied in rural and urban areas.⁴⁶ This stems from a legitimate desire to influence public policy and aims to protect these groups, networks, and organizations from governmental restrictions on their activities and funding sources. However, the flip side of this pragmatic approach is that the independence of these actors is also subject to legitimate doubts, and their ability to democratically oppose adopted policies and propose practical alternatives remains a topic of public debate.

In many ways, these tensions can be considered a natural response to the lessons learned from the uprisings of the 2010s and especially the young activists’ retreat from politics that followed them. Climate activists are probably keen to avoid being associated with radical demands and sudden change. On the other hand, their younger cohorts have very little trust in politics. There is no doubt that the limited grassroots and institutional reach of climate change actors—in addition to the issue-specific nature of their advocacy—makes it difficult for them to influence public policies in the climate space. However, dialogue between activists and governments can promote a societal and political environment conducive to gradual reforms that aim at climate mitigation and adaptation.

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to express their gratitude to Carnegie research intern, Adam Kinder, for his excellent sourcing and editorial work on this article.

In this series of articles, Carnegie scholars and contributors are analyzing varieties of climate activism from around the world, focusing on the intensification of activity both from the protesters themselves and from the authorities and forces who are the objects of their discontent.

Read more from the series here:

• Why Climate Sabotage Remains an Unlikely Strategy
• The Growing Criminalization of Climate and Environmental Protests
• In Iraq and Yemen, Climate Activism Requires Both Defiance and Adaptation
• Women and Climate Activism in Morocco and Tunisia
• Backlash Against Carbon Pricing in Australia and Canada
• Confronting Backlash Against Europe’s Green Transition
• The Paradox in Southeast Asia’s Decarbonization Agenda
• Northeast India’s Environmental Movements Have Taken a Climate Edge