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Military Lessons from Operation Sindoor

The India-Pakistan conflict that played out between May 6 and May 10, 2025, offers several military lessons. This article presents key takeaways from Operation Sindoor and breaks down how India’s preparations shaped the outcome and what more is needed to strengthen future readiness.

Published on October 6, 2025

“There is increased propensity amongst nations and governments to use force because political objectives today can be achieved by short duration conflicts,” India’s Chief of Defense Staff  General Anil Chauhan said on August 26, 2025, while speaking about the evolving nature of warfare. “Precision strikes create very little collateral damage, hence the cost of war for nations is less,” he added.

This encapsulates India approach for its military actions under Operation Sindoor against terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan as a response to the April 2025 terrorist attack in Pahalgam in Kashmir that killed twenty-six civilians. The operation represents perhaps the most significant and daring military strikes by India on Pakistani targets since the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971.

The five-day conflict that played out between May 6 and May 10, 2025, offers several military lessons. These include aspects that worked exceedingly well, but within them, those that need attention for preparedness in future conflicts. This article presents key takeaways from Operation Sindoor and breaks down how India’s preparations shaped the outcome and what more is needed to strengthen future readiness.

Key Takeaways

  • Clearly defined objectives provide space for punitive strikes within the escalation ladder.
  • Air power, once considered escalatory, has been normalized. Paired with long range precision weapons, air power presents compelling options to expand the threshold under the nuclear overhang.
  • For the first time since 1971, military asymmetry between India and Pakistan has been firmly established. China is becoming increasingly more involved, though indirectly, through its aid to Pakistan.
  • The short but intense conflict underscores the need for persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). A more critical requirement is the networking of various platforms, like the integrated air defense system that proved itself impactful during Operation Sindoor.
  • Key capabilities that stood out during the conflict went through a long development curve, like the supersonic cruise missile BrahMos and its integration with Su-30 fighter jets.
  • On the modernization front, some delays proved to be a blessing in disguise, like the legacy air defense guns that emerged as a cost-effective solution to counter small drones.
  • Recent conflicts have ensured better resilience in preparing for the most recent one. Emergency procurements have become the preferred route as the regular procurement process remains cumbersome. Therein lies probably the biggest lesson.
  • Lastly, the Indian armed forces have achieved a greater level of jointness, an incremental process accelerated by the appointment of the Chief of Defense Staff, combining centralized planning and de-centralized execution.

Controlling the Escalation

India’s strikes under Operation Sindoor are a statement of India’s political will, termed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a “new normal,” and no distinction will be made between terrorists and their state sponsors. This is a manifestation of two virtues—intent and ability—either one or both of which were deficient in the past.

According to General Anil Chauhan in July 2025, Operation Sindoor allowed significant space for conventional operations. He listed three aspects for this—India’s no-first-use policy for nuclear weapons; that Pakistan was the first to hit military targets, so the onus on further escalation was on them and that India’s strikes were targeted at terrorist infrastructure; and there was no attempt to capture territory. Further expansion of space in conventional operations is possible, he added.

Long-range precision-guided weapons, along with the technological means to gainfully employ them, have aided and expanded India’s options. India was found wanting for these in 2001 after the terror attack on the Parliament, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and as recently as 2019, when Indian and Pakistani fighter jets dueled in close quarter dog fights over the Line of Control after the 2019 Balakot airstrike.

In the six years since, the region has transitioned to beyond-visual-range combat with precision targeting backed by force multipliers. This flows from the lessons drawn from the 2019 conflict, the standoff with China underway since 2020, and the war in Ukraine which has fundamentally transformed the modern-day battlefield. Drones and loitering munitions, among others, backed by technological advancements, have changed battlefield dynamics and long-range firepower has emerged as a critical feature. These lessons were internalized and remedial measures taken quickly.

Military Asymmetry Established

Over five days, India established complete military dominance, now definitively established by post-damage assessment in the form of high resolution images, videos from the ground and footage from unmanned aerial vehicles that has since been released. During the initial strikes that targeted infrastructure and nine terror camps on the intervening night of May 6 and 7, 2025, at least 125 fighter jets from both sides were present at standoff ranges, according to some accounts and also stated by two military officials in conversations weeks after the conflict. That makes it the largest aerial engagement in recent times with fourth generation fighter jets. India suffered “initial losses” that were acknowledged much later, though the exact numbers are yet to be revealed.

As Pakistan hit back at Indian military and civil targets, the Indian response amplified over subsequent days—air defenses, command and control centers, and key airfields were taken out and at least five Pakistani jets and one early warning aircraft were shot down. Experts have noted that India’s military victory was shrouded by undue focus on specific platforms and one-sided narratives, partly fueled by undue silence from the Indian side on its losses and delays in sharing information.

Visibility was an important aspect, also a lesson from 2019. According to Vice Chief of IAF Air Marshal Narmdeshwar Tiwari, the military was given instructions that punitive action needed to be visual and visible. He added that the key to terminating a war once it starts is having very “clearly defined objectives.” Fewer than fifty weapons were fired to achieve this.

China’s role must be factored into any future India-Pakistan crisis. According to Deputy of Army Staff Lt. Gen. Rahul Singh, Pakistan might have been the immediate adversary, but it was backed by China and Türkiye. India-China relations are presently seeing an upward trend, but border tension are likely to remain a major challenge.

Separately, as also noted, both sides managed the escalation well and nuclear signaling was lower than in past conflicts.

Recent Conflicts Filled Capability Voids

Long-term capability development plans and their intended modernization efforts remain stymied by the cumbersome defense acquisition process. Against this backdrop, the conflicts India faced in 2016, 2019, and 2020, and the war in Ukraine were shocks that jolted the system. They prompted massive stocking of spares, supplies, and ammunition and accelerated the process of induction of asymmetric technologies like drones, counter drone systems, loitering munitions, man portable air defense systems (MANPAD), and anti-tank guided missiles, among others. Each episode over the years gave a buffer to withstand the shocks from the next one.

For instance, after the surgical strikes by the Indian Army in 2016, the armed forces stocked up on ammunition that had long been in short supply. A similar effort followed the 2019 Balakot airstrike, which gave a major fillip as the standoff with China unfolded in the icy heights of the Himalayas in Eastern Ladakh. The standoff was an infliction point in India-China ties, prompting a fundamental reorientation of the Indian armed forces to the northern front. Over the next two years, the Indian army expanded its armament, fire power, and support elements.

As the war in Ukraine commenced in February 2022, India was constrained from both sides, given that it operates military hardware from both Russia and Ukraine. The buildup and stocking of the preceding few years cushioned the blow to operational preparedness, which was still felt, but gave breathing space. The armed forces also reached out to the domestic industry for smaller spares and components that eventually yielded results.

Emergency Procurement to the Rescue

Emergency procurement (EP) emerged as a silver lining in this entire endeavor, along with enhanced financial powers at various levels in the military. The Indian Ministry of Defense (MoD) sanctioned the EP procedure in 2016 just after the Uri terror attack, while the established procurement process languished. EP powers were delegated to the service headquarters to address the “emergent operational needs for effectively responding to the operational situation in Eastern Ladakh/Northern Borders.”

As per EP provisions, the Indian armed forces can procure weapons systems, including entire systems, worth up to Rs 300 crore (approximately $36 million) on an urgent basis, meant to be delivered within one year of contract signing. Since 2016, six tranches of EPs have been sanctioned by the MoD to the armed forces—EP-2 was sanctioned after the 2019 Balakot airstrike, EP-3 during the standoff with China in 2020, and EP-4, approved in 2022, focused on China in what was termed to fill “critical capability voids.” EP-5 was sanctioned towards the end of 2024 and focused primarily on counter terrorism equipment and EP-6, sanctioned just days after all military action under Operation Sindoor ceased, focused on replenishing stocks up to Rs 40,000 crore (approximately $4.8 billion).

The armed forces procured systems that were stuck in the regular process for years, albeit in small volumes. For instance, a deal for Igla-S MANPADs selected in a larger deal from Russia was stuck for over a decade. The Army finally procured the Igla-S launchers and missiles first under EP-2 and then more Igla-S missiles under EP-4.

Capability Development is Iterative and Takes Time

Key domestic capabilities were battle-proven during Operation Sindoor, including the BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, a joint development with Russia; the Akash air defense system; and medium-range surface to air missile systems, among others.

The air-launched BrahMos emerged as a game changer. Integration with the Su-30 jet began in 2013. Russia offered to undertake the project for $200 million (approximately Rs 1,300 crore). Due to the high cost, it was instead executed domestically at just around $90 million (Rs 80 crore). It took four years to carry out the first test in November 2017. Subsequently, forty Su-30 MKIs were modified to carry the BrahMos, weighing 2.5 tons each.

The layered air defense (AD) network is another case where capabilities developed over time. It proved resilient when the Indian Army and IAF networks worked in sync to take down volleys of drones from Pakistan—at one point, over 600 were fired in one go across India’s western front.

The Indian Army’s AD systems are connected by the Akashteer system which is plugged into the IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS). It integrates all its systems—Akash, Israeli Spyder, medium-range surface-to-air missile (MRSAM), and the Russian S-400 Triumf long-range AD system—backed by radars and command control systems to generate a round-the-clock picture of India’s airspace.

A bulk of the projectiles fired by Pakistan were small drones, primarily intended to saturate the air defense network and map Indian defenses. These were accompanied by a few kamikaze drones, missiles, and munitions from fighter jets. For smaller drones and quadcopters, the Indian Army’s AD deployed hard- and soft-kill guns and other counter-drone system, taking down most of them. These include battle-proven AD systems like the L-70 and Zu-23 guns, Pechora, and OSA-AK that have been awaiting replacement for some time.

The Army’s legacy AD guns that have remained in service due to procurement delays got a new lease of life to tackle the new threat of drones. Upgraded suitably with new optical sights, motors, and air burst ammunition rounds, these guns were cost-efficient and proved effective against smaller drones. The threat of drones was among the top lessons drawn by the Army AD from the war in Ukraine.

The Way Forward

While a conflict establishes thresholds, it also lays bare existing capabilities. Pakistan got a good glimpse of India’s existing strengths and weaknesses. It will now race to even the scales by sourcing more advanced weapons from China, which already accounts for a bulk of its military imports. There have been reports that Pakistan is looking to procure forty J-35 stealth fighter jets, HQ-19 air defense systems, and KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft. Pakistan is likely to share their assessments of Indian capabilities to China as well, a bigger threat for India. For India, the challenge is twofold. First, to maintain an edge where there is one; and second, to make up for deficiencies that came to the fore.

India must streamline the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) to ensure that capability development is realized in a definitive time frame. The DAP 2020 is currently undergoing a comprehensive review with a stated aim to meet “operational requirements and modernisation” in a “timely manner.” From an operational perspective, networking and sensor fusion must be top priorities. The IAF operates a diverse fleet of aircraft and systems from various countries that need to communicate in real time for seamless operations. For instance, India was keen to integrate the Meteor BVR missile manufactured by MBDA with Tejas, India’s indigenous light combat aircraft. MBDA, however, stipulated that it could be done only if an Indian or European radar was used on the jet as integration would mean exchanging sensitive details. The project fell through after an Israeli radar was chosen instead for the aircraft in 2018.

Future conflicts will differ from those in the past as adversaries respond in their own way, warns Air Marshal Tiwari. Operation Sindoor has drawn a clear differential at the conventional level between India and Pakistan, but, as Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi has noted, it would be unwise to assume it will put an end to cross border terrorism. The operation has established a much higher deterrence level, though it comes with uncertainty for how the next conflict will pan out.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.