The battle over representation and regional power has been delayed—not resolved—and will shape the future of India’s federal balance.
Louise Tillin, Milan Vaishnav, Andy Robaina
Source: Getty
A partnership between India, a country of subcontinental size, and Africa, a continent of fifty-four countries, may seem asymmetric until one notes that both are home to nearly the same number of people—1.4 billion. This essay spells out the existing challenges to the partnership, its optimal potential, and the possible pathways to realize it over the next quarter-century.
This publication is part of Carnegie India's Practitioner Paper Series, which highlights the experiences of professionals from the world of politics, public administration, and business.
A partnership between India, a country of subcontinental size, and Africa, a continent of fifty-four countries, may seem asymmetric until one notes that each region is home to nearly the same number of people—1.4 billion. Together, they represent about a third of humankind today. In 2050, they will count for about 40 percent of the world’s population. Hence, cooperation between them will contribute to worldwide peace, stability, and development in the mid-twenty-first century.
A futuristic perspective, however, should be anchored in a blend of past romanticism and present realism. The “peoples of Africa and India have known each other and traded across the Indian Ocean for millennia.” Their shared experience of a long, arduous, but successful struggle against colonialism and racial discrimination transformed the world, bringing a measure of political equality that was unimaginable until the mid-20th century. They have been engaged in a common endeavor to secure sustainable development and a respectable seat at the table of global governance. Besides, as the Delhi Declaration 2015 of the third India–Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) reminded us, “Africa and India represent rapidly growing economies with demographic advantages and are building on their long-standing development partnership, including through the active participation of the Indian Diaspora across the African continent.”
This essay proposes to spell out the existing challenges to the partnership, its optimal potential, and the possible pathways to realize it over the next quarter-century.
The fact that the IAFS process, which was initiated in 2008 and reached its climax in 2015, fell into disuse for the next decade, reveals both the potential and the limitations of this partnership. The three summits, held in 2008, 2011, and 2015, generated hopes that both sides were fully committed to taking their relationship to an altogether new level of vitality and diversification. Yet the partners failed to hold the fourth summit in 2020, contrary to their commitment. It took another five years to decide that the next summit may be convened in New Delhi in May 2026.
Whether this inordinate delay was avoidable and whether both sides are responsible for it are controversial questions that need not be discussed here. The lesson is that both sides must recognize that building deeper ties is a priority. They must find the necessary will, time, and resources to do so, amid their other pressing priorities.
India and Africa face varied challenges to upgrading and deepening their strategic partnership.
First, India faces serious competition on a continent that is wooed not only by the great powers but also by middle powers such as Brazil, Türkiye, the UAE, South Korea, and Australia. The severest challenge, of course, stems from China, which has become one of the most important partners for many African countries. Second, despite a rich history of India–Africa cooperation, a relative lack of interest in Africa in some Indian circles—diplomatic, business, and media—has been a serious constraint. This needs to be addressed appropriately, perhaps by establishing a new think tank in India dedicated exclusively to studying Africa in all its dimensions.
Third, frequent instability and conflict in Africa discourages Indian trade and industry, which is largely risk-averse. Fourth, geographic distance matters, not so much in the case of Southern and Eastern Africa, which is viewed as part of the Indian Ocean neighborhood, but in West and Central Africa, which are seen as part of a distant world.
Fifth, some experts claim that New Delhi has not been able to allocate adequate financial resources to development cooperation with Africa. The delay in holding the fourth summit further contributed to it. Finally, the polycrisis-ridden third decade of the twenty-first century sapped the energy and enthusiasm generated by the IAFS in 2015. A long list of crises comes to mind: COVID-19, the India–China border clash, the war in Ukraine, the Israel–Hamas hostilities in Gaza and Israel’s other strikes in the region, America’s tariff wars, the U.S.-Israel strikes against Iran, and eventually the broader Gulf war involving the United States, Israel, Iran, and the Gulf states, and the resultant energy and economic challenges. These may have reduced the bandwidth for new initiatives aimed at turning the India–Africa equation into a defining relationship of the present time.
As the governments in India and Africa, and the African Union (AU) plan their next steps leading to the fourth summit, they must adopt a holistic view, consider that incremental progress on all four pillars of the strategic partnership—political-diplomatic; security-defense; trade, technology, and economy; and people-to-people connections—is achievable. To this end, they must balance each other’s priorities and craft a new declaration that is both visionary and practical.
Africa considers India a role model for its governance, grounded in democracy and development, and for its determination to pursue the widely accepted goals of the Global South. Africa, with its large market, demographic dividend, and immense natural resources, especially energy and critical minerals, can be a vital partner for India.
The case for recalibration rests on three premises.
Firstly, deep complementarity exists between the needs and capabilities of both sides. Africa considers India a role model for its governance, grounded in democracy and development, and for its determination to pursue the widely accepted goals of the Global South. India must provide additional development assistance, create technological linkages, and help African states strengthen their manufacturing bases and employment opportunities. Africa, with its large market, demographic dividend, and immense natural resources, especially energy and critical minerals, can be a vital partner for India. Besides, in the political domain, “India believes that Africa must have an adequate presence and role in global decision-making, including in the reformed UN Security Council,” as External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar put it, while adding, “And in turn, we count on Africa to stand up for a partner with whom it has a past, a present, and a future.”
Second, the Gen Z population in both geographies is increasingly aspirational and highly globalized, but largely ignorant of the rich heritage of the India–Africa relationship. Efforts to bridge this divide should be encouraged, particularly through cultural and educational exchanges and field visits.
And third, while the lead will have to be necessarily provided by the governments, all relevant segments of Indian and African societies must be involved in the relationship-enrichment to produce maximum results.
Concerning the content of this strategic partnership, it is based on “the needs and priorities of the African countries,” stated the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in answer to a question in the Lok Sabha. It clarified that the alignment with the AfCFTA (African Continental Free Trade Agreement) and Agenda 2063 is “essential for our bilateral engagements with African countries.” It listed the following as key areas for long-term collaboration: energy, agriculture, healthcare, infrastructure, capacity-building, and digital public infrastructure.
In this context, one should underline the potential for progress in two specific areas: skilling and human resource development; and maritime security and the blue economy.
Africa is rich in human capital, but needs nurturing through education, training, skilling, and preparation to become employment-ready, thereby producing a valuable dividend that spurs widespread economic growth. By 2030, 40 percent of the world’s “young people will be African, and 75% of Africa’s population will be under 35.” All ten of the world’s youngest countries are in Africa. By 2050, 1.3 billion people on the continent will be under thirty.
India is in the same boat. Even as it strives to upgrade its own human capital, it must apply its enhanced development cooperation tools to expand the scope of human resource development in Africa, especially in select partner countries. This requires more financial resources to create educational, training, and capacity-building institutions; deploying new digital technologies, including AI, and modern distance education methods; and involving business and industry to ensure that an educated workforce finds jobs that fuel Africa’s economic growth. Slots for education and training, offered under the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC), and other programs, will require substantial expansion to achieve the desired impact. In addition to the network of Indian institutions established in Africa over the past two decades, Indian universities, including Indian Institutes of Technology, should be encouraged to open campuses or branches in suitable locations across the continent.
Nivedita Ray, from the Indian Council of World Affairs, has suggested “a tri-tiered governance model” consisting of a high-level oversight body for the IAFS, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) liaison offices, and bilateral joint working groups to execute an innovative strategy, stressing that “India-Africa collaboration in education and capacity building holds transformative potential for shared prosperity.”
The second focal area should be maritime security, leveraged through a judicious application of instruments to deepen blue economy–related cooperation between India and select African countries.
Among the emerging spheres of security and defense cooperation, maritime security ranks as a priority. Littorals on the east and west coasts of Africa and Indian Ocean island states face non-traditional threats such as piracy, terrorism, maritime crime, illegal fishing, environmental degradation, and disaster relief assistance management. India’s awareness of this aspect and calibrated activism in this domain is reflected in the recent elevation of its vision from SAGAR (Security and Growth for All) to MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions). A recent manifestation of India’s commitment to provide maritime security was the inaugural Africa-India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME) exercise. A six-day multilateral event, held in April 2025 in Dar es Salaam, it was jointly hosted by the Indian Navy and the Tanzania People’s Defence Force. It focused on combating regional security challenges and strove to boost interoperability and offer opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation. More such initiatives with other partner countries should be expanded and explored.
Cooperation in the blue economy is the other side of the same coin. Much of the intellectual and policy research has already been completed, as evidenced by readily available sources. The immediate need is for New Delhi to announce its official policy on the blue economy and co-develop, with willing African states, an operational plan to forge linkages in sectors like water resource management and food security risks, fisheries and aquaculture, marine tourism, offshore renewable energy, marine biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals.
At the launch of the theme, logo, and website for the fourth IAFS, Jaishankar outlined future areas of cooperation, highlighting “new frontiers in digital, fintech, and innovation reshaping economies across the African continent.” He termed the forthcoming summit “a unique opportunity to further deepen our engagement” and a platform for a more ambitious, inclusive, and future-directed phase of the partnership.
This year’s theme—IA Spirit – India-Africa Strategic Partnership for Innovation, Resilience, and Inclusive Transformation—captures, he said, “the essence of a relationship that goes beyond transactions, and is marked by shared values, mutual respect, solidarity and collaboration.”
While Africa is portrayed as a region of immense importance to India, the Ministry of External Affair’s (MEA) development aid budget remains tilted in favor of India’s immediate neighbors. For example, in the FY 2024–2025 budget aid for Bhutan, Nepal, and the Maldives amounted to approximately 2,068 crores ($248 million), 700 crores ($84 million), and 400 crores ($48 million) respectively, but only 200 crores ($24 million) were set aside for “African countries.” However, this should be viewed in the larger context. At the joint review of India–Africa cooperation undertaken in September 2019, the MEA announced that out of $10 billion allocated for the lines of credit in 2015, $6.4 billion had been committed; and that, as against the promised grant assistance of $600 million, a higher sum of $700 million was committed for Africa. Besides, of the 50,000 training slots promised, 40,000 had been completed by 2019.
Yet, given the magnitude of Africa’s needs and the fact that over a decade has elapsed since the last summit, there is a compelling case for additional assistance in ample measure for Africa.
There is no dearth of ideas for imparting fresh momentum to strengthening this strategic partnership. Keeping in mind the next five years, and utilizing the opportunity offered by the fourth summit, this author offers a five-point formula, as follows:
Finally, a parting thought: India must push for holding the IAFS once every three years instead of five, to project the seriousness of purpose and sustain institutional momentum.
Rajiv Bhatia
Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Programme, Gateway House
Rajiv Bhatia is distinguished fellow at the Foreign Policy Studies Programme at Gateway House. He is a member of the Confederation of Indian Industry's International Advisory Council, Trade Policy Council and Africa Committee. During a 37-year innings in the Indian Foreign Service, he served as ambassador to Myanmar and Mexico and as high commissioner to Kenya, South Africa, and Lesotho. He dealt with a part of South Asia, while posted as joint secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs. He is the author of India in Global Affairs: Perspectives from Sapru House (KW Publishers, 2015), India-Myanmar Relations: Changing contours (Routledge, 2016), and India-Africa Relations: Changing Horizons (Routledge, 2022).
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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