With the Egyptian People's Assembly's June 16, 2003 approval of legislation to create a National Council for Human Rights (NCHR), Egypt has become the latest Arab government to establish a state council to advance human rights. Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria formed such councils in the early 1990s, Yemen in 1997, Jordan in 2000, and Qatar in May 2003. Even Saudi Arabia is now talking of setting up a human rights council. Western governments tend to praise the formation of such bodies, but, so far, none has spurred a significant improvement in human rights conditions in their home country. There is a distinct possibility that Egypt's new organization will follow this pattern.

The ruling National Democratic Party's (NDP) policy secretariat, headed by President Hosni Mubarak's son Gamal, proposed the NCHR as part of a package of reforms designed to invigorate the NDP's domestic image and to respond to international, especially U.S., criticism of Egypt's human rights record. The NCHR's mandate includes developing a national plan for advancing human rights, reviewing citizens' human rights complaints, conducting human rights awareness programs, and monitoring Egypt's implementation of relevant international human rights treaties. The NCHR will be affiliated to the Shura Council, the partially elected advisory upper house of parliament and will be led by its chairman. It will have an independent budget and by-laws. The Shura Council will appoint the NCHR's 27 members to three-year terms.

On paper, the NCHR has three main positive attributes. In reviewing human rights complaints, it has some power to request cooperation from government agencies and to recommend cases for prosecution. The requirement that its membership be non-governmental makes it somewhat more likely that qualified members will be appointed. And it can establish offices outside of Cairo. More broadly, the very creation of the NCHR is an admission by the Egyptian government that it has human rights problems and that it is bound to comply with international human rights treaties.

Other signs, however, raise questions about the NCHR. The Shura Council, which serves as a rubber stamp for the executive, may try to manipulate it and limit its ability to fulfill its mandate. It is not clear whether the NCHR's reports will be made public. Many in Egypt's independent human rights community have greeted the news of the NCHR with suspicion because they were not consulted about its formation and fear its real purpose is to marginalize them; some have even threatened to create a competing organization. Their concern is heightened because the creation of the NCHR comes against a backdrop of continuing repression of peaceful, independent political activity. The draconian Emergency Law was extended for another three years in February. In June, two leading human rights organizations were denied legal registration on "security grounds," and a well-known human rights activist, Muhammad Zarea, was detained upon his return from a conference in Beirut. Arrests of Muslim Brotherhood members continue.

Observers in Cairo anticipate that in this context, the NCHR will likely concentrate on less controversial issues such as human rights education or individual cases of police misconduct. They expect it will sidestep systemic problems, such as the investigation and prosecution of senior security officials suspected of human rights violations, excessive constraints on civil society, persecution of citizens for "political" crimes under the Emergency Law, and the detention of thousands without charge for years at a time.

Existing Arab human rights councils do not offer a positive model for the NCHR. Inadequate investigatory powers, members without sufficient credentials, a lack of transparency, and excessive government control have prevented them from pushing the envelope on human rights issues. In Yemen and Jordan, human rights councils have undertaken mainly innocuous education programs, and have avoided any issues that might require criticism of their governments. The councils of Tunisia and Algeria have played a more menacing role, attempting to discredit independent human rights NGOs and to whitewash their governments' poor human rights records. Following a 2001 reconstitution, however, the Algerian body, although it has no independent power, is now acting somewhat more helpfully as an informational liaison between the government and the relatives of tens of thousands of citizens who "disappeared" during the 1990s civil war.

The exception so far is Morocco's human rights council. It has played a relatively constructive role, despite the Palace's control of its agenda and budget. It has not confronted the government directly, but it has worked hard to obtain compensation for former political prisoners, and the Palace has implemented several of its recommendations. The recent appointment to the council of two highly respected human rights activists as president and vice president suggest it could become more assertive. Even if similarly credible figures join the NCHR, it remains to be seen whether the Egyptian council will display any of the same nascent promise of becoming an important advocate for human rights.

Amy Hawthorne is an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.