As Israel’s war in Gaza continues to spill over into regional conflict, there is a growing risk of nuclear attacks and weapon proliferation. Earlier this month, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency warned that the escalation of hostilities could have “nuclear dimensions”. To make sense of this alarming situation, Sada offers two perspectives from experts in the field.
Recent threats by an Israeli minister to use nuclear weapons in Gaza, as Sajid Aziz argues, may have inadvertently confirmed Israel’s nuclear capabilities. Israel has long adhered to a policy of deliberate obscurity surrounding its possession of nuclear weapons, and Aziz shows how multiple U.S. governments have supported Israel in this effort. As the U.S. continues to support Israel’s campaign in Gaza and only meekly condemns Israel’s nuclear posturing, Aziz suggests that it may be undermining global non-proliferation efforts.
Mahmoud Javadi examines the global non-proliferation regime more closely, and contends that both Israeli and Iranian provocations are likely to perpetuate the idea of nuclear deterrence among Arab states. However, despite these rising tensions, Javadi shows that two ongoing diplomatic initiatives—the recent Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the push for Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone—can be mutually reinforcing endeavors, and may be the best way to stem the spread of nuclear weapons in the region.
A Nuclear Revelation
The Israeli war in Gaza has revealed one of the Middle East’s worst-kept secrets.
Sajid Aziz
Grave crises bring to light profound revelations. In early November, less than a month into Israel’s war in Gaza, Israeli Heritage Minister Amihai Eliyahu suggested that dropping a nuclear weapon on Gaza was an option. While Eliyahu was publicly reprimanded by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and suspended from cabinet meetings, he has remained in government and even reaffirmed his pro-nuclear position in late January.
Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons is a fact long-known but rarely confirmed by Israeli officials. As part of a policy known as Amimut—Hebrew for obscurity or ambiguity— Israeli leaders neither deny nor acknowledge possession of nuclear weapons, purportedly to preserve non-proliferation in the Middle East. Israel’s nuclear program dates back to the 1950s, when the Negev Nuclear Research Center was established near Dimona. In its initial years, the program was supported by France, who provided nuclear reactors and plutonium separation technology and, according to some reports, even shared nuclear test data with Israel. While Israel reportedly developed its first nuclear weapon in mid 1960s, it now possesses a stockpile of ninety, and recent literature has revealed more details about its capabilities.
Eliayhu’s comments sparked widespread criticism both regionally and internationally and renewed calls for urgent non-proliferation efforts. At the United Nations headquarters in New York, representatives from China, Iran, and Arab nations condemned Eliyahu’s remarks, as they gathered for a conference to work towards a nuclear-free Middle East. Iran charged that Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons was a direct threat to regional stability, while China called on Israel to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Meanwhile, a U.S. State Department spokesperson deemed the call to use nuclear weapons in Gaza “unacceptable.” However, in an attempt to create a forced equilibrium, he urged “all sides to refrain from hateful actions.” More generally, the U.S. response to Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons has been tepid and complacent, which—with the exception of policy under the Eisenhower administration—reflects past patterns. For instance, in 1968, when CIA Director Richard Helms informed U.S. President Lyndon Johnson of concrete intelligence about Israel’s nuclear weapons, the president directed him to conceal the information to avoid taking any policy action.
Since the Clinton administration, Israel has secured assurances that Washington’s arms control efforts in the Middle East would not affect Israel’s nuclear program. Until 2020, the United States prohibited companies from publishing high-resolution satellite imagery of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories under the Kyl-Bingaman Amendment. Moreover, Israel has actively undermined nuclear non-proliferation efforts by working against the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCoPA), a deal that aimed to halt Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, even contrary to its own intelligence community's advice.
The U.S. approach to Israeli nuclear weapons sharply contrasts with its treatment of Iran, guided by geopolitics over a commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. Even when Iran complied with the terms of the JCoPA, the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the nuclear deal, and the Biden Administration has refused to restore it.
By maintaining unconditional support for Israel during the Gaza conflict, even in the face of dangerous nuclear rhetoric, the United States has not only risked escalating tensions in the region but also perpetuated a nuclear double standard. This approach undermines U.S. credibility in ensuring security and stability, while weakening the global non-proliferation regime when it is needed more than ever before.
Sajid Aziz is an independent researcher with a focus on security and foreign policy issues. He previously worked as a consultant at the Strategic Policy Planning Cell (SPPC), an Islamabad-based think tank. Follow him on X @SajidAz11388239.
Two Paths Towards a Nuclear-Free Middle East
In the face of rising nuclear threats, the recent Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and ongoing efforts to establish a Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone are mutually beneficial pursuits.
Mahmoud Javadi
The Second Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) concluded in December 2023. The Treaty, which entered into force in 2021, emerged as a response to global disillusionment with the slow progress of nuclear disarmament as outlined in the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As of February 2024, ninety-three countries have signed the TPNW, with sixty-nine of them having ratified or acceded to it. Additionally, forty-three states, neither party to nor signatories of the Treaty, are considered TPNW’s “other supporters” since they voted in favor of its adoption in 2017. Thus, nearly 70 percent of the UN member states and permanent observers endorse the Treaty in various capacities.
Among the twenty-two member states of the Arab League, six states—Algeria, Libya, Sudan, Djibouti, Palestine, and Comoros—have signed the Treaty, with the latter two as states parties. The Arab world represents a significant portion of the Treaty’s other supporters, which includes fourteen states within the Arab League. Syria and Saudi Arabia are categorized as undecided, signifying neither support nor opposition to the Treaty. Thus almost the entire Arab world recognizes the TPNW as “a significant addition to the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.”
This response to the TPNW is only the latest example of longstanding Arab support for nuclear non-proliferation across the wider Middle East. Following the entry into force of the NPT, Egypt and pre-revolutionary Iran jointly sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution in August 1974 advocating for the creation of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (MENWFZ). Since then, the Arab world consistently advocated for this cause, albeit with limited success. In 2018, the UNGA decided to hold an annual conference on the MENWFZ, with the fourth session convened in November 2023, and the idea of a MENWFZ has found general recognition within the framework of the TPNW.
Yet despite this recognition, several factors have kept Arab states from fully endorsing the TPNW. Notably, Israel’s deliberate ambiguity about its nuclear programs, coupled with Iran’s nuclear ambitions and other military threats, have bolstered the idea among Arab countries that nuclear weapons are essential deterrents. While actually attaining such weapons would be challenging, if not impossible, for the Arab states, they might refrain from ratifying the TPNW in order to preserve this option.
The recent surge in tension in the Middle East has been marked by provocative Israeli nuclear rhetoric against Palestinians and Tehran’s increasing opacity surrouding its nuclear programs—despite the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement. This presents a bleak outlook for the widespread acceptance of the TPNW in the Arab world anytime soon: continuous nuclear provocations by both Israel and Iran are likely to perpetuate the concept of nuclear deterrence.
Nevertheless, MENWFZ and the TPNW can be mutually beneficial pursuits. By incorporating MENWFZ into the TPNW’s future core agenda, the Treaty can serve as an additional legal and political instrument for the Arab world. To bring Arab states on board, states parties to the TPNW should leverage the upcoming intersessional period, extending until 2025, to endorse the MENWFZ within the framework of the TPNW and form a working group to determine how the creation of a MENWFZ can be best facilitated.
In return, to make this approach credible, the Arab Group and the Arab states of the TPNW should explicitly acknowledge the treaty as a complementary pathway for the MENWFZ in their statements at the UN’s First Committee, the General Assembly and other forums. While the process of mutual reinforcement may not yield immediate results, it aligns with the aspirations of TPNW advocates and the Arab world alike, who refuse to stand idly by as nuclear risks increase.
Mahmoud Javadi is an AI Governance Researcher at Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), and was previously affiliated with Carnegie Europe, where he conducted research on EU external relations. He co-represents EUR at the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium. Follow him on X @mahmoudjavadi2.
