Throughout the latter part of the twentieth century, Egyptian TV dramas held an unrivaled position among Arab audiences. Over the past decade, however, there has been an undeniable decline in their quality and reputation, even if the reasons behind this decline are subject to debate. Since the 1950s, the Egyptian state has wielded considerable influence over Egypt's media landscape. But a new kind of centralized control may have paved the way for this deterioration: in the current moment, the only TV dramas are the ones that have gained the regime’s approval.
During the reign of Hosni Mubarak, particularly throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Egyptian drama became a potent tool of soft power that the state used domestically and regionally to disseminate propaganda. The series "Raafat Al-Hagan", for instance, was produced in 1987 and depicted an Egyptian spy trained by Egyptian intelligence and dispatched to infiltrate Israeli society.Through the series, which suggested continued Egyptian hostility towards Israel, the Egyptian state succeeded in diverting public attention away from its ongoing normalization activity.
The same strategy was repeated, albeit in different forms, in subsequent productions such as "Al-Shahd wel Domoua"(Honey and Tears), "Layali Al-Helmiya" (Al-Helmiya Nights), "Al-Mal wa Al-Banun" (Wealth and Offspring), and "Lan A3eesh Fe Gelbab Aby" (I Won’t Live in My Father's Robes). Each of these series established political, social, and historical narratives that skillfully blurred the lines between reality and fiction to shape public opinion.
Under Mubarak’s rule, Egyptian drama remained dominant despite several constraints, including low production budgets, government censorship, and restrictions on political and social freedoms. It succeeded because of its degree of professional and artistic creativity, which allowed it to deliver its messages effectively without resorting to unnecessary rhetoric, direct political messaging, or authoritarian interference.
Following the January 2011 revolution and the ouster of Mubarak, a swift reversal occurred on July 3, 2013, as his loyalists regained power. The new regime believed that the small democratic margin that Mubarak allowed was the main catalyst for the revolution, and saw democracy as a destabilizing force that could lead to the destruction of the state. Accordingly, they tightened their control over the public sphere, including artistic production, and acquired a majority stake in most private production companies, merging them into the United Media Services Company. This marked a significant shift in the role of the state: from setting broad public policies to actively intervening in the details of drama production. The authorities started dictating scripts, handpicking actors and directors, and manipulating viewers’ understanding of the series through carefully constructed narratives.
The series "Al-Ikhtiyar” (The Choice), for instance, was inspired by a speech by President Abd El-Fattah Al-Sisi. According to the pro-regime journalist Mohamed El-Baz, the series was intended to serve as a "guardian of national memory," a sentiment that Sisi himself approved of and echoed in the Eid al-Fitr celebration in 2022, when he described the events of the series as "the truth."
In its first and second parts, the series depicts the heroism of the army and the police in the face of terrorism, which is conflated with political opposition. The third part recounts Sisi's rise to power, after removing his elected predecessor, Mohamed Morsi. Moreover, Sisi's character was played by a tall actor, sparking a wave of ridicule on social media. In fact, some viewers saw the physical discrepancy between Sisi and his on-screen counterpart as a measure of the pro-regime narrative’s dishonesty.
This year, a new series entitled “The Assassins” sought to correct the perceived shortcomings of “The Choice”. The writer of the series took inspiration from the history and mythology of the eleventh-century Order of Assassins, a topic more susceptible to political manipulation. However, despite its avant-garde approach, the series fell short of expectations and prioritized artistic originality over historical accuracy. Notwithstanding a substantial budget, stunning visuals, and pervasive propaganda, “The Assassins” was still received by Egyptian and Arab audiences as further evidence of the decline of Egyptian drama and its politicization.
Historically, Egyptian drama succeeded by blending art and entertainment with subtle social and political messaging. It declined, however, when its creativity was limited by presidential mandates: forced to push propaganda over artistry, incite controversy rather than provide entertainment, and preach about national agendas and military orders.
Muhammad Tolba Radwan is an Egyptian poet, writer, and journalist interested in public affairs. In his articles, he focuses on arts, literature, and the complex relationship between religion, democracy, citizenship, and human rights in Egypt and the Arab world. Follow him on X @Tolba_Radwan.
