On May 6, Lebanese voters will elect an incoming parliament for the first time since 2009, and five years after the outgoing parliament’s original mandate expired. Not only will the elections show whether Hezbollah and its allies can increase their representation in parliament at a crucial time for the party domestically and regionally, but indicate whether the new electoral law will enable smaller parties and independents to reap tangible benefits. Will it be politics as usual, or will Lebanon’s changing political and security landscape affect the outcome?
Three experts examine these issues and offer their insights on the electoral process.
Please join the conversation by adding your thoughts in the comments section.
The Resistance Goes to the Polls
Alexander Corbeil
Alexander Corbeil, a fellow with The SecDev Foundation and a digital fellow with the Montreal Institute for Genocide Studies at Concordia University. Follow him on Twitter @alex_corbeil.
On May 6, Lebanese citizens will go to the polls to vote for in the country’s first parliamentary election since 2009, in large part due to the civil war in neighboring Syria. A conflict in which Hezbollah, Lebanon’s main Shia political party and most powerful military force, has come to the aid of the Bashar al-Assad, helping to ensure his dictatorship’s survival.
For Hezbollah, Sunday’s election is about maintaining control over its strongholds and taking advantage of a new electoral system based on proportional representation. In the south, Hezbollah will certainly maintain control over its traditional constituency. Hezbollah faces tougher competition in the east of the country in both the Rashaya-West Bekaa (Bekaa II) and the Baalbek-Hermel (Bekaa III) districts. In Bekaa II, its coalition with the Amal Movement will face off against another a coalition combining the Sunni-dominated Future Movement and the Druze-led Progressive Socialist Party. Bekaa III sees the Hezbollah-Amal alliance face the Future Movement and Christian Lebanese Forces Party. In each, the opposition looks to limit Hezbollah’s electoral victories.
On May 1, Hezbollah’s Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, delivered a speech to supporters in the city of Baalbek in which he stated, “the victories [in Syria and against Israel] and achievements for which a very high cost was paid should be protected with your votes,” telling supporters that the Future Movement must be held responsible for the impoverishment of marginalized Lebanese regions, particularly Baalbek-Hermel. Nasrallah further claimed that the Sunni political party conspired with terrorist groups, a reference to Syrian rebels and fighters from al-Qaeda and the self-proclaimed Islamic State—which had previously threatened the area from their bases along the Lebanese-Syrian border but were defeated by Hezbollah. The fact that one of the candidates Hezbollah is backing in Bekaa III, Jamil al-Sayyed, is the former head of Lebanon’s General Security Directorate adds a personal dimension to this electoral struggle. Al-Sayyed was previously accused of assassinating Future Movement leader Saad Hariri’s father and former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and thus the Future Movement and Lebanese Forces will try their hardest to defeat him.
The parliamentary election will do little to change the status quo for Hezbollah. Even if Jamil al-Sayyed loses in the Bekaa III district, the party will likely benefit from the introduction of new pro-Syrian independents into the parliament, their election made possible by the new electoral law and at the expense of Hezbollah’s rivals. Elsewhere, Hezbollah has ensured its control through the intimidation of Shia political hopefuls who are running as independents, in one case assaulting a candidate as he put up campaign posters. Hezbollah may emerge stronger, but while this may enable it to ask for more important ministerial portfolios, it will not gain political dominance, leaving it the option to join a unity government. Overall, save for an unforeseen and unprecedented upset for Hezbollah, it will probably be politics as usual. The lasting effect will instead be supporters’ deepening perception, propagated by Nasrallah and other Hezbollah leaders, that its political opponents are not only stifling economic development but if given the chance, would completely destroy their movement.
Falling Back on Clientelism and Intimidation
Haley Bobseine
Haley Bobseine, an independent writer, researcher, and analyst on the Middle East. Follow her on Twitter @haleybobseine.
Despite promises for reform, the erosion of March 8 and 14 political blocs, and shifting political alliances, traditional political elites remain determined to preserve the system that allows them to reap its spoils. They avoid tangible concessions, such as extensive anti-corruption reforms, which would only undermine their power. Indeed, local studies found parliament’s proposed legislation and passed laws do not address citizens’ concerns.
But greater relative security in recent years has allowed Lebanese voters to shift their focus to elites’ failure to deliver essential services or provide reforms. Non-establishment lists and candidates are responding with proposals for economic and other reforms such as secularization of the state, rule of law, and equal provision of basic services. Even if some do not win seats this year, Lebanese analysts argue that this sets the groundwork for potential future success at the polls.
Absent coherent, national, political platforms, elites are mobilizing their supporters on the basis of clientelism and sectarianism to counter both traditional and independent candidates. Fearful of losing seats under the new electoral law, they want to quash any opposing narratives that may subvert their hold on power. Media and rights organizations report that elites are engaging in vote buying, using control of ministerial posts to promote their own electoral lists, violating campaign finance regulations, and taking bribes. Some voters have reportedly been threatened to be fired or been promised better jobs by elites if they comply. In recent weeks, elites and their affiliates are also increasingly resorting to physical intimidation and harassment of non-establishment candidates who do not have the means to fight back against larger parties.
Hezbollah critic and parliamentary candidate Ali al-Amin was violently attacked on April 22, allegedly by Hezbollah supporters, while hanging campaign posters in the south. Hezbollah denied any involvement. On April 16, supporters of the Sunni Future Movement allegedly stormed MP hopeful Nabil Badr’s office in Beirut while policemen stood idly by. Future Movement affiliates also allegedly attacked MP hopeful Mohammed Al-Qadi and fired shots at the building where he had taken refuge with fellow candidate MP Raja al-Zuhairi.
Supporters of independent candidates in Mount Lebanon District 4, who asked not to be identified, said they were forced to cancel campaign events after affiliates of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) allegedly threatened physical harm if they did not. PSP affiliates also allegedly pressured a local business owner to fire an independent political activist’s parent in retaliation for the activist’s involvement in the campaign.1 Even some business owners who merely rent spaces to independent candidates have come under pressure to cut ties with them or face consequences. Mount Lebanon’s District 4 has the lowest electoral threshold proportionally, at 7.7 percent, making it a prime target for independents and a cause of concern for elites.
Fully democratic elections cannot happen without respect for the exercise of fundamental human rights. This includes individuals’ and political parties’ freedom to associate without unreasonable or arbitrary restrictions and discrimination. And the electoral environment should allow for political parties and candidate to campaign freely in all parts of the country.
Veteran pollsters say most seats are already decided, but some battles remain. Whoever wins on May 6, any push for genuine structural reforms will test the limits of Lebanon’s confessional democracy.
1. Interviews with author, April 25, 2018.
Preserving Elites’ Collective Position
Anthony Elghossain
Anthony Elghossain, a program officer for the United States Institute of Peace and a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @aelghossain.
After suffering through a decade of intermittent institutional vacuums, recurring bouts of political paralysis, and constitutional crises, many Lebanese are eager—relieved, even—to participate in political life again. Lebanese leaders have provided the people a chance to reset their representation in parliament and, mostly, to vent their frustration by voting. However, these leaders have only entrenched their positions in power. Reformists who harbor hope for the 2018 elections are in for a rude awakening, as will be demonstrated by the election results—but especially the post-election period of coalition crafting, cabinet formation, and policy formulation, to say nothing of the ensuing years of post-election politics.
Lebanese leaders will rely on three tactics to preserve their position: confusion, competition, and consolidation.
Lebanese voters are confused by the 2018 electoral framework, which is a hodgepodge of constitutional provisions, laws, regulations, and accepted semi-licit or illicit practices. In addition to communal and geographic allocations, the Lebanese must now contend with freshly gerrymandered districts, proportional representation, preferential voting, and formula-based seat distribution. Many Lebanese do not fully understand the framework, and those who do disagree as to what its effects might be. And those who share interests disagree on the best strategy or on how to best execute it in the ballot booth. To slice through the complexity, many will walk to their preferred party’s local office and check on “what it is [they] want me to do.”1
In addition to crafting the convoluted electoral framework that keeps many Lebanese dependent on the established elites’ political machines, Lebanese leaders are reengaging in political competition. After the Cedar Revolution of 2005, Lebanese leaders coalesced in two coalitions, March 14 and March 8. While the coalitions did have internal conflicts, their leaders, who were unwilling and unable to reposition themselves in a polarized political environment, managed to extract benefits that outweighed the coalitions’ costs. But these coalitions have completely collapsed over the past two years. Entering into “sometimes surreal” alliances in some areas while going it alone in others, Lebanese leaders are now trying to maximize their share of the pie—so that they can more effectively compete for influence in the state. By competing and escalating their electoral rhetoric, Lebanese leaders will mobilize masses otherwise marred by apathy. And, more importantly, they will divert the popular pressures of the past few years: having begun to agitate against the elite as a collective class, most Lebanese will once again allow a faction within the elite to direct their frustrations against another faction of that self-same elite.
After the vote, Lebanese elites will then consolidate and preserve their collective position. To be sure, some parties will remain more powerful than others, just as some leaders will remain more capable than others. And these elites may gain or lose parliamentary seats in the election—thereby also altering the agreed-upon allocations of cabinet seats. But none of the half-dozen leaders, their parties, or their supporters are going to suffer a death blow at the hands of reformists and civil society actors—not in 2018, at least. Even as they compete to shape the cabinet’s policy statement, hire certain civil servants, control certain ministries, and extract benefits from the state, they will once again unite to preserve their position atop the system (as they did, for instance, in resisting recent foreign meddling in Lebanon). The more things—laws, parties, and figureheads—change, the more they stay the same.
1. Interview with the author, Beirut.
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