A discussion meeting with Leonid Gozman, Union of Right Forces, on the current situation of the Union of Right Forces in the context of Russian politics.
On September 2, 2004, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a meeting on the current situation of the Union of Right Forces in the context of current Russian politics. The speaker was Leonid Gozman, a long-standing activist in the Union of Rights Forces and an advisor to UES CEO Anatoly Chubais. Michael McFaul, a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment, moderated the session.
Mr. Gozman began by noting that in recent years, abroad has become the only place to speak about the Russian political situation, since few remain in Russia who are willing to listen. He defined the focus of his presentation as the Russian political situation, its development, and its dangers as perceived by the Gaidar-Chubais team, to which he belongs to from 1992.
A few years ago Yegor Gaidar, Director of the Institute for the Economy in Transition, characterized Russia’s economic and political phase as “post-revolutionary stabilization. Gaidar stated that the goals of the revolution of the late 1980s and early 1990s have been accomplished, goals that included privatization, personal freedoms, and democratic institutions. Moreover, they have been widely accepted by the population. There is no danger of a communist restoration, and the government is generally perceived as conducting necessary reforms.
However, public opinion exhibits several conflicting tendencies. These tendencies include a complete opposition to liberalism and democracy, the abjection to actions that are carried out by the administration of President Putin, and, nevertheless, the continual support of President Putin.
The disappointment in the democratic process and economic reforms of the 1990s carries an absolutely fatal character in Russia. The reforms of the 1990s, according to opinion of the majority were ineffective and even criminal. This view is taken as a factor of national consolidation, to which all members of society and government have agreed on, except the Union of Right Forces (URF). The achievements of the reforms are left unrecognized by the public, and the details are forgotten. A recent survey, conducted at the anniversary of the August 1991 putsch, asked people if it were an August 2004 putsch whom would they support today, GKChP or Yeltsin. It turned out that 12% and 13% would have supported GKChP and Yeltsin, respectively, and 39% were against both. The rest had no definitive opinion on the subject. “As sad as this is,” said Gozman, “this is our current ideological failure. We were triumphant in economics, we were triumphant in politics, and actually in majority of other aspects, we achieved all the goals that we had set out on thirteen years ago, and nevertheless, we have failed miserably on the ideological frontier.”
Mr. Gozman also noted that the public opinion of Putin has always been independent of his actions. “Sometime ago, Reagan was known as the Teflon President,” said Mr. Gozman, “but the thick layer of Teflon that President Putin is surrounded by, Reagan had never even dreamt of.”
This layer of Teflon continued to protect the President even in his policies toward Chechnya. Mr. Gozman noted that the stern policies toward Chechnya were uplifting to the Russian public morale, which was tired and defeated. “Although, the public opinion toward the war changed, with more than half of the population in support of negotiations and against the war, the approval ratings of Putin, nevertheless, continued to go through the roof.”
Since March, 2004, for the first time, we are witnessing a stable decline of President Putin’s approval ratings, from 56 points to 48. Although there is no other candidate that rivals Putin’s popularity, the decline is the first of its kind. It is hard to say whether downward trend in ratings is permanent or if it is just a temporary tendency soon to reverse.
The key political issues in Russia today are the terrorist activities that are going on. Russia’s reaction most closely parallels the type of reaction that usually occurs in Israel, where blown up buses and cafes do little to discourage commuters and city dwellers to dine out or ride the buses. Unlike other countries, there has been no increase of racist sentiments in Russia since the outbreak of the war and the terrorist acts.
Furthermore, the government denies that there is a link between terrorist activities and the Chechen war. The words “international terrorism” serve as a magical phrase that explain the current situation. It should not be forgotten that every day we form new Shahids in Chechnya because our forces are still too cruel. These ‘black widows’ who blow themselves up, really are widows, and there really is chaos and insanity there, and there really is hell.
Another possible consequence of the terrorist activities in Russia is the danger of greater restrictions placed on civil liberties, which is evermore present in a country with a lack of such traditions. The registration system in Moscow can be used to illustrate this point. In a state of heightened security such measured do not necessarily lead to greater protection, but rather furthers the corruption among security and state personnel by exhorting monetary sums of those who fail the registration checks. Furthermore, a recent study shows that there is a wide gap that separates the mindset of an average citizen from the mindset of the police force. According to the study, Russian teenagers are more afraid of police officers than of criminals.
The small degree of change in political composition that occurred the last Duma elections is very illustrative of what is in store for the URF. Although the names of the party representatives have changed, the whole picture has barely altered. There has been no increase of the right forces, while the left opposition has remained the same. As a result, there has been a creation of not merely political opposition, but opposition to the to the government on the whole and the country, which is far more dangerous scenario. The increased power of the nationalists also contributes to more hazardous political situation in Russia. The number of eloquent speakers who have joined their ranks have contributed to their rising popularity among the public. Just like Vladimir Mayakovsky had given a voice to a new class, these people have gained new orators.
Furthermore, the political struggles that await Russia are similar to a case that occurred in Japan, where the next leader was chosen via a closed competition among the elite. In Russia, however, the preservation of political monopoly over a long period is impossible due to the dissatisfaction of the regional elite and government functionaries, as well as the lack of ideological unity among the ruling elite. The end of Vladimir Putin’s presidential term in 2008 and the absence of a definitive charismatic leader among the current elite will lead to a political struggle. The outcomes of this struggle are yet unclear, which can be illustrated by the unexpected political opponents in the Ryazan governor elections. What is known, is that the ideological and moral structure of such a struggle will be composed of illusionism, xenophobia, and clerical government, displaying elements of anti-Western, especially anti-American, sentiments which are present in the far regions of Russia.
The federal government has been found to be far more liberal than the regional governments, where the only things that have changed since the fall of the USSR is the color of the flag. These nationalist and xenophobic sentiments continue to obliterate the accomplishments of the best people of the last 10-14 years.
There are two scenarios that can be identified today as the future of the economic and political stability in Russia. In the long run scenario, everything will be all right since the democratic institutions are already in place, and although the change will not occur over night like a transformation of Cinderella’s pumpkin, in a few election cycles the system will begin to function. The short run scenario, however, can be characterized as “anything can happen”, although there is one positive trend, the development of a new social class. This class can be characterized as a group of well-paid professionals, comprised of mostly young professionals in the private sector. “These are the only people in Russia who need a social order based on a just law system” said Mr. Gozman, “for the people at the high end of the social spectrum, these laws matter little since they have the power to tweak the law in their best self-interest. The people at the low end of the social spectrum need the law as a basic guarantee of rights. But the people in between these two extremes are the people who want to live according to the laws of a normal democratic nation.”
In the question and answer session, Mr. Gozman noted that the notion that there is a concrete list of oligarchs that are to be yet arrested does not seem probable. Mr. Gozman also noted that if such allusions were made by the President, than it was only to rally further public support for his policies. In reference to a second question, Mr. Gozman noted there is a law in Russia, according to which the actual salaries of officials should only be known to the Board of Directors, and this is the reason why they have not been published anywhere. He disclosed that the base salary of an official of his level (one level below Mr. Chubais) is approximately $5,000, which can be raised two to three times via bonuses and different premiums. He further stated that salary of an official one level below his own (two levels below of Mr. Chubais) is about two to three times less. Mr. Gozman also stressed the presence of perfectly transparent financial mechanisms in Mr. Chubais’ dealings.
When Mr.Gozman was questioned about the culmination of the Yukos affair and the spread of such actions, he noted that such actions have transformed the business environment of Russia. The arrest has sent a very harsh and disturbing signal to the public, indicating that if something is done incorrectly, the authorities reserve the right to do anything to you, not necessarily what is applicable by the letter of the law. Mr. Gozman stated that the arrest of Khadorkovsky has nothing to do with the illegal transactions within Yukos, although there were illegal actions, but that is not the motive of the administration. This type of signal would inadvertently lead to a lighter form of corruption, decrease of the political power of business and possibly the disappearance altogether of business structures as political force in Russia. As to the further spread of such actions by the government, Mr. Gozman noted that the arrest was used as an instrument of a particular policy, and if needed again, the administration will utilize the instrument to achieve a particular effect, much as it has been used previously to curtail the actions of Berezovsky and Gusinsky. Mr. Gozman also noted that it is probable that Mikhail Khadorkovsky will be imprisoned and Yukos will be privatized by individuals close to the administration.
Mr. Gozman further noted that there are three possible strategies for the Union of Right Forces. The first is a coalition with Yabloko and other democratic forces. The second strategy is a creation of some sort of union with the right fraction of the United Russia. The third strategy is to remain independent. The first strategy is currently unattainable and will probably remain so. The union with the United Russia depends solely on the President, who has so far expressed no interest in such a move. Thus, only the third strategy remains. Mr. Gozman noted that in order to survive on their own they must do one of two things, either strengthen the current URF or to create a completely new party. Aalthough the second version is much more preferred, the URF initially must be strengthened.
Mr. Gozman also noted that there is a restructure of the government from the center, but there is no indication that the country on the whole is unified under the same ideology as the center. He further noted that it is difficult to clearly identify the future groups that will create cleavages in power since it is still subject to change. The only trend that we are witnessing today is the rise of a national-theocratic ideology among many of the elite, which can lead to a very dangerous situation for Russia.
As for the criticism on Putin’s lack of stern politics toward recent events in Russia, Mr. Gozman noted that there are two problems for President Putin in reacting to these claims. The first problem is that the fibers of Putin’s politics are interwoven with pro-Western, pro-democratic regime. If he were to change his position and move toward a more stringent and harsher form of policies, he will lose face and respect. The second problem is that it is very easy to criticize politics from the sidelines and very hard to act once you are in the game. This relationship feeds the fires of criticism and contributes to the perception of ineffectiveness of the administration. The simple truth, unfortunately, is that there is just so little one can do right away.
When asked who are the most dangerous officials in recent Russian politics and if they are dependent on the Kremlin, Mr. Gozman identified D. O. Rabotin, leader of the Motherland block, as well as some figures of the church. Mr. Gozman stated that there is no political party that is fully independent of the Kremlin.
To a question on particular arrangement of political key players in 2007 and 2008, Mr. Gozman identified United Russia, CPRF, Motherland block, URF, and Yabloko. In 2008, Mr.Gozman stated, the arrangement depends on many factors such as economic and political stability. The successor of Putin will be chosen via very rigorous internal struggle of the ruling elite, and will be most likely well supported by Putin. Thus, the 2008 elections will have more of a presentational rather than elective character. The exact key players of this struggle are still to be determined.
Summary prepared by Alina Tourkova, Junior Fellow with the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
