Three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine shocked Europe into the realization that war had returned to the continent, Europeans are now reeling from a second tremor: the United States may no longer be there to protect it. The reelection of Donald Trump as U.S. president shows that his first term was not an aberration. Trump’s extortionate, retribution-focused style of foreign policy, disdain for the transatlantic alliance, and apparent inclination to normalize relations with Russia could permanently damage the credibility of NATO in its current form.
Europeans are now faced with the challenge of replacing the U.S. role as security guarantor for Europe and main military backer of Ukraine. They are ill prepared. The significant investments and force posture adjustments of the past few years assumed that Washington would continue to provide strategic leadership and military backup. Even those who advocated for more European autonomy did not prepare for an abrupt rupture. Europeans must not only spend drastically more money; they must also agree on how to spend it strategically and cooperatively. Will the EU step into the breach to lead this effort?
Judging from a much-anticipated “White Paper for European Defense” and “ReArm Europe” proposal, it does not look like it. With these proposals, the European Commission (EC) signaled its willingness to essentially get out of the way of member state defense efforts, pledging to reduce bureaucracy around European defense market integration and make it easier for capitals to spend more money. It reiterated a commitment to strengthening Ukraine through increased military assistance and further integrating the Ukrainian defense industry into European initiatives. But the EC is careful not to overreach. In this moment of crisis, it keeps member states “in the driver’s seat.” Now they must deliver.
How We Got Here
The white paper and ReArm Europe proposal build upon several recent measures to solidify and expand the EU’s role in the continent’s security and defense. In 2022, the EU and its member states adopted the “Strategic Compass,” a framework for EU security and defense policy over the next decade. Just over a year ago, the EC unveiled its inaugural European defense industrial strategy to improve long-term defense industrial readiness and capacity. In the time since, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen named Andrius Kubilius as the first-ever European commissioner for defense and space. Kubilius, a two-time Lithuanian prime minister and strong voice warning against the Russian threat, was tasked with authoring the EU’s first ever defense white paper, along with EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas.
Then Trump took office for his second term, and Europeans began to see their once-welcomed dependence on the United States for security as a vulnerability. Following the February 2025 German elections, Chancellor-in-waiting Friedrich Merz said Europe must “achieve independence from the United States, step by step.” Merz and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk have both emphasized the need to discuss options for a European nuclear deterrent. Following Washington’s pause of intelligence-sharing to Ukraine earlier this month, Europe has moved to explore new military satellite intelligence and communication capabilities to reduce its reliance on Starlink and other U.S. operators. Portugal’s defense minister has signaled that his country is less likely to purchase U.S.-made F-35 aircraft in the future. Former Italian prime minister Mario Draghi has called for a regional command structure in response to Trump’s foreign policy agenda.
Several European countries have also announced significant defense spending hikes. The United Kingdom declared its intention to increase defense spending to 2.5 percent of GDP from April 2027, with the goal of reaching 3 percent in the next parliament. The outgoing German parliament voted this month to exempt most defense spending from its historically strict “debt brake.” Both Poland and Estonia have announced plans to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense in 2025, which is the most recent number that Trump asked NATO allies to spend. Indeed, despite the growing call from some European leaders to reduce their dependencies on Washington, others have doubled down on strengthening ties with U.S. policymakers and defense firms.
Crucially, spending more money is only the beginning of the solution. With a (once again) completely changed threat assessment, Europeans must now invest in capabilities, troops, and planning capacity. Last week’s ReArm Europe proposal is an attempt to get member states to spend more. The newly published white paper is guidance on how to spend better, together, and European. But both documents at times read like the U.S. election did not happen.
ReArm Europe
ReArm Europe is a proposal from von der Leyen to boost European defense investment by more than 800 billion euros, with 650 billion euros mobilized through expected national spending increases. Among its most important measures are a relaxation of EU deficit rules for defense expenditures and a new Security Action for Europe (SAFE) loan scheme. Under SAFE, the EC can borrow money to issue loans with low interest rates to member states with high borrowing costs. This makes the instrument potentially useful for approximately twenty EU governments that have lower credit ratings than the EC. (Denmark, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden have higher ratings.) But even among the twenty, many will likely refuse to let the EU in on their national defense spending decisions in exchange for only marginally better rates, especially if their defense spending is already high. As a result, the SAFE loans will likely only benefit a small number of countries.
Nevertheless, the access criteria for third countries were contentious. Only EU member states can receive SAFE loans, and 65 percent of the cost of products purchased with SAFE funding must be spent in the EU. Companies based in the EU, the European Economic Area, the European Free Trade Association, or Ukraine can benefit from joint procurement. Non-EU countries, including Norway and Ukraine, EU accession countries, candidate countries, potential candidates, and countries with defense agreements with the EU can participate in joint procurements but are not eligible to receive SAFE loans. The EU has signed security and defense pacts with six countries and plans to conclude additional agreements with Canada and the UK. For all the alarmed responses from the UK over being excluded for now, the EU is offering a clear path for cooperation to London, whose defense firms are deeply integrated in various EU country defense industries.
The exclusion of U.S. defense companies from receiving funding through ReArm Europe was expected. During the first Trump administration, U.S. officials strongly opposed so-called poison pills in the European Defence Fund that precluded third-country participation by non-EU companies. The Biden administration, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, was more lenient in showing openness to a greater EU role in defense industrial policy. Nevertheless, the administration still negotiated various agreements to ensure U.S. firms’ access to EU defense industrial projects.
In remarks in February, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said the United States will “prioritize empowering Europe to own responsibility for its own security.” Hegseth also encouraged his European counterparts to “[expand] your defense industrial base.” The question is whether these objectives will trump long-standing U.S. defense industrial interests, which have historically been a pillar of transatlantic relations. Arguably, with such massive investments coming from Europe, U.S. defense companies are almost guaranteed to benefit from the overall growing defense industrial pie. And even if concerns over the reliability of U.S. defense equipment are growing, the transatlantic defense industrial base is deeply integrated, and it will likely take Europe many years to extricate its systems.
The White Paper
In the coming months, member states will need to decide what they want to buy with their defense spending increases. In the new white paper, the EC identified seven capability gaps that should be priorities for joint European spending:
- Air and missile defense
- Artillery systems
- Ammunition and missiles
- Drones and counter-drone systems
- Military mobility
- AI, quantum, cyber, and electronic warfare
- Strategic enablers—capabilities like intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that are not directly engaged in combat but still vital for battlefield efforts—and critical infrastructure protection
According to the EC, SAFE loans should support common procurement of defense products that focus on these priority areas. However, the EC leaves the planning up to capitals. Kubilius noted that he hoped the first member state proposals for concrete joint armament projects would be available in June. The EC suggests it could serve as a “central purchasing body” on behalf of member states, though this requires voluntary buy-in from national governments.
Also by June, the EC will present a proposal aimed at regulatory simplification in Europe’s defense sector in order to reduce industrial fragmentation. The EC is considering increasing mutual recognition of defense product certification throughout Europe, streamlining construction and environmental permits for defense industrial projects, and removing obstacles related to accessing relevant funds and financing. This could include restructuring or clarifying rules related to environmental, social, and governance standards, a long-standing and contentious issue. Between now and June, the EC will also launch a strategic dialogue with the European defense industry to identify and address challenges in the final proposal.
These measures are useful. Notably, however, the EC does not appear to want to tackle the national security exemption provided by the EU’s treaties, which protects the tendency of European governments to shield their domestic industries from competition, even within Europe.
Finally, the white paper included a two-pronged approach on increased military support for Ukraine, labeled by the EC as a “porcupine strategy.” First, the EC outlines specific defense capabilities—including air defense, drones, and space assets—for EU member states to continue supplying to Ukraine. Second, the EC calls for further integrating the Ukrainian defense industry into EU defense capability initiatives. Both parts of this strategy are a clear rejection by European leaders of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demands to halt military aid to Ukraine as a condition for a ceasefire.
Passing the Buck
The flurry of EU defense industrial proposals and initiatives in recent years can at times distract from the fact that the EC is still a relatively new player in this field, attempting to prove to EU member states its value in solving their defense industrial challenges. It has faced difficult conditions, essentially trying to build the plane while flying it, with limited financial and personnel resources and no defense planning experience. The EU’s pitch, on paper, is a good one—the EU could use its financial and regulatory levers to incentivize the integration of Europe’s defense procurement apparatus.
In recent years, however, Brussels has been unsuccessful in convincing member states of the EC’s value, both in cost and efficacy, in channeling defense policy decisions through the EU. Member states remain reluctant to share sensitive information—both with one another and the EC. Countries without highly advanced defense industries feel like they are not benefiting from the EU’s initiatives. Countries with traditionally high defense spending rates accuse the EU of using its funds as charity to those who have neglected national defense investments, instead of targeting shared capability gaps. No national defense planner wants to cede authority to Brussels, and no national defense industry wants more competitors. In short: Europeans don’t buy that working with the EU will make their defense procurements, research, and development cheaper and faster, they don’t trust the EC, and they don’t trust each other. This has led most EU initiatives so far to be under-resourced and disconnected from national defense planning.
Rather than raise its ambitions in response to the threat of U.S. withdrawal, the EU in this current moment of crisis is reverting to a light touch approach. With the white paper and the ReArm Europe proposal, the EC has presented solid tools that capitalize on the EU’s strengths as a market integrator and regulatory power but leave the bulk of the defense spending, planning, and implementation up to member states.
This begs the question where and how European capability and target setting, joint procurement, and defense planning will be organized in the future. The obvious alternative is NATO, and the alliance’s so-called European pillar. But this will require NATO to fundamentally adjust its defense planning process to take into account the possible withdrawal not just of U.S. capabilities, but also of U.S. leadership.
The EU’s new tools can contribute to such an effort. But the proposals and discussions of the past few days create the impression that Europe has time to manage this transition, when, in reality, the needs of Ukraine are urgent and immediate. Brussels has passed the buck to member states. Recent history shows that left to their own devices, countries tend to eschew defense industrial cooperation and integration. They can no longer afford to do so.
