two men with their backs to the camera, shot through a doorway

Trump and MBS at the White House on November 18, 2025 in Washington. (Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images)

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MBS Wanted Status. Trump Wanted Deals.

Many of the agreements that came out of the crown prince’s Washington visit are less than meets the eye. But his reputational gains for making it back to the White House are significant.

Published on November 21, 2025

“That’s another point you won today,” President Donald Trump said to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), announcing Saudi Arabia’s new status as a major non-NATO ally (MNNA) at a state dinner on Tuesday in honor of the kingdom’s de facto ruler.

The prince and the president touted several new U.S.-Saudi agreements during MBS’s two-day Washington visit this week. In addition to MNNA status, the deals included new AI partnerships with U.S. tech giants and the release of advanced Nvidia chips to Saudi AI firms, the potential sale of F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, a nominal commitment from MBS to invest almost $1 trillion in the U.S. economy, and a nominal commitment from Trump to look into resolving the civil war in Sudan.

Many of these deals are less than meets the eye—either huge numbers announced solely to grab headlines or initial agreements that will take further negotiations to lock in. Still, the reputational gains for MBS in making it back to the White House are significant—not simply rehabilitating the crown prince as an essential part of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, but reinforcing his claims to domestic and regional leadership.

MBS’s clearest gain from the visit—and main priority heading into it—is his personal rehabilitation as a valued U.S. security partner. After more than seven years of being out in the cold, following the assassination of Saudi columnist Jamal Khashoggi, MBS enjoyed a warm welcome from the Trump administration, complete with a rare F-35 flyover, a black-tie dinner, and an investment conference featuring titans of Silicon Valley and private equity.

At Tuesday’s press conference, MBS couldn’t have asked for a better introduction from Trump—not only as a “very good friend,” but as somebody who’s done “incredible [things] in terms of human rights and everything else.” The president went on to run interference for the crown prince amid inevitable press questions about the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the Khashoggi assassination—chastising a reporter for “embarrass[ing] our guest,” dismissing Khashoggi as “controversial,” and even threatening to take away ABC’s broadcast license.

The crown prince still faces reputational challenges beyond the president’s inner circle, reflected in the reluctance of many congressional leaders (Democratic and Republican) to be photographed with MBS. Practically any U.S. news story on the visit mentioned the Khashoggi murder, as well as more recent rights abuses such as a surge in executions.

MBS is probably fine with being accommodated rather than loved, however. Republicans and Democrats on the Hill still met with the prince, and U.S. business leaders were happy to court Saudi business. New York Times and Washington Post editorials on the visit focused more Trump’s behavior, while caveating criticism of MBS by speaking of “imperfect partners” and the “unpleasant reality of geopolitics.”

Still, the symbolic value of the visit went beyond burnishing the crown prince’s reputation by signaling the kingdom’s international status: what political scientists define as “collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking [in the world, based] on valued attributes.” Leaders—including in Saudi Arabia—seek out international prestige and recognition not only to boost their own egos, but to cultivate domestic support as well.

Saudi media coverage framed the visit as a sign of Saudi Arabia’s status as a global power and championed MBS as securing the kingdom’s prestige and putting its priorities on the U.S. agenda. “We have nothing to hide or be ashamed about,” said news anchor Rafi‘a al-‘Amri in a video. “The time for [trying to] blackmail, humiliate, or intimidate Saudi Arabia has come to an end.” Some Saudi journalists even embellished a bit, with Zayd ibn Kumi claiming Saudi Arabia was the first MNNA to the United States (it’s the twenty-first, including Taiwan, and the ninth in the Middle East and North Africa).

Commentators also positioned MBS as asserting Saudi Arabia’s substantive independence from the United States, even amid close cooperation. “Have you ever heard a leader say in the White House”—per a paraphrase by Okaz columnist Hamood Abu Taleb—“‘I am not here to please America or its president, but to meet our shared needs and interests’?” (The crown prince’s original remarks were a deflection from a question about the kingdom’s finances.) Coverage also emphasized MBS’s continued support for a pathway to Palestinian statehood, carefully avoiding the crown prince’s stated desire to “be part of the Abraham Accords.”

But status is relative, and although several of the visit’s deals hold the potential to improve the kingdom’s status relative to other Middle Eastern powers, others saw Saudi Arabia fall short of its expectations.

Most prominently, Saudi Arabia secured nominal approval from the president to purchase the advanced F-35 fighter—potentially upsetting Israel’s status as the only country in the Middle East currently fielding the U.S. plane. “[Saudi Arabia’s] been a great ally, Israel’s been a great ally . . . they are both at a level where they should get the top of the line,” Trump said in justifying the sale.

Asharq al-Awsat cartoonist Ajmad Rasmi sketched a “Saudi-American relations index” as a stock indicator trending upward, tipped by a green F-35. Saudi confidence was met with concerns among some Israeli commentators that the kingdom’s gains would be at Israel’s expense. Eran Wolkowski captured these concerns for Ha’aretz in a cartoon of Trump and MBS walking atop Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to reach a “path to a Palestinian state.”

The visit produced mixed results in terms of Saudi Arabia’s standing compared with neighboring Gulf states, however. MNNA status falls a bit short of the security guarantees Trump afforded Qatar in a September executive order. Saudi Arabia also failed to secure—at least so far—a nuclear energy cooperation agreement like the one made with the UAE in 2009. And while Saudi AI firm HUMAIN gained access to the most advanced Nvidia chips, it did so at the exact same time—and by the exact same number of chips—as Emirati firm G42.

Additionally, status gains don’t guarantee that material benefits will follow. Israeli officials remain confident of maintaining the country’s “qualitative military edge” (possibly by lobbying to block the F-35 sale or modify the planes’ features), while the UAE saw a past deal on F-35s fall through over concerns about technology leaking to China.

To the extent that MBS feels rewarded for seeking status through economic development or diplomatic efforts, that’s better for the region than seeking it through open conflict. Investment summits and UN General Assembly resolutions are certainly preferable to MBS championing an ill-fated military intervention in Yemen or headline-grabbing acts such as kidnapping the prime minister of Lebanon. Even Saudi Arabia’s growing economic competition with the UAE remains a rivalry among “frenemies.”

For Saudi leaders, a key question is how long they can sustain the financial costs of the kingdom’s quest for ever-greater status. Trump has been willing to court Saudi Arabia in part because he sees it as a major source of investment and purchasing power. Silicon Valley, Wall Street, and other business moguls are willing to fête the crown prince so long as they think he represents a near-endless source of capital. Yet MBS has a growing number of prestige projects to fund, and citizens to employ, placing mounting constraints on the kingdom’s finances.

For the United States, the risk lies in squandering the status-based leverage it has over its security partners. Trump’s policy concessions seem driven more by a perennial Washington desire to keep security partners on-side—and a love of announcing big numbers—than by any tangible policy goals. The crown prince’s concern with appearing “statesmanlike,” along with the sudden return of a travel-barred U.S. citizen from Saudi Arabia, shows that Saudi officials are still sensitive to targeted U.S. criticism. But per the rules Trump sets, flattery and deals score far more points than respect for civil liberties in status-seeking with Washington.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.