2025 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference

As geopolitics and the climate heat up, there is an emerging rush to significantly expand nuclear power. Shuttered nuclear plants are being rehabilitated, vendors are seeking to construct new advanced and modular designs, and private technology companies looking to power AI and data centers are emerging as key advocates and financiers. How might the anticipated renaissance in civilian nuclear programs affect nuclear weapon proliferation risks, including the potential spread of enrichment or reprocessing capabilities? What are the implications for international safeguards, safety, and security? How should the putative benefits be shared with developing countries? What technologies, including small modular reactors and fusion plants, or policies could mitigate--or exacerbate--the risks of deployment? What are the effects of leadership by private technology companies rather than traditional utilities? 

Since the end of Cold War, most commentators have believed that the United States’ missile defense policy went either too far or not far enough. Critics questioned the feasibility of defending against even North Korean attacks. Advocates believed the United States should try to defeat limited or possibly even large-scale Chinese and Russian attacks against the homeland. The new U.S. administration seems to have sided decisively with those advocates. Is comprehensive defense the way forward? What kind of programs should the United States prioritize? How might China and Russia respond? What role does missile defense play in assuring allies? Should the United States be willing to put missile defense on the table in any future arms control negotiations? 

Rapid changes in the size of China’s nuclear arsenal, its development of new nuclear capabilities, and the persistent opacity about its goals have fueled speculation about Beijing’s motives. Is China abandoning its traditional posture of minimal deterrence and seeking to develop a nuclear arsenal that it can wield for aggressive purposes? Is it primarily interested in bolstering its status as a great power Or, does it simply seek to ensure the survivability of its nuclear forces? Finally, how—if at all—should the answer to these questions influence policy and military planning for the United States and its allies? 

During the Cold War, a shared interest in stymying proliferation motivated extensive cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Since its end, however, the great powers have become increasingly interested in bolstering alliances at the expense of nonproliferation. China supports Pakistan’s nuclear program. Russia is formalizing its partnership with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and shielding Iran’s nuclear program from international censure. And, as the U.S.-India deal and the AUKUS submarine initiative exemplify, the United States’ wants exceptions to the rules it originally championed. What are the implications of this fraying great power commitment for nonproliferation? Are there circumstances that might revive cooperation? Can the nonproliferation regime be upheld in the absence of great-power consensus and what role might non-nuclear weapons states play? 

All nuclear-armed states appear to have military doctrines that include at least some role for limited nuclear strikes. At one end of the spectrum, France envisions a “final warning”—a single limited nuclear strike—before launching a massive attack; at the other, both Russia and the United States appear to plan for a protracted nuclear exchange. In all cases, nuclear-armed states assess that the ability to conduct less than all-out nuclear attacks enhances their capacity to deter nuclear and non-nuclear aggression. But what would happen if deterrence failed and nuclear weapons were used in a limited way? What pressures would leaders face to further escalate toward all-out nuclear war? To what extent would the fear of such an outcome help prevent escalation?  Is there a version of nuclear planning for limited strikes—French-style, U.S./Russian-style, or something else—that better achieves the goal of deterrence?

Russia recently revised its nuclear doctrine by broadening the range of circumstances in which it might use nuclear weapons. According to U.S. officials, Russian is developing a space-based nuclear-armed anti-satellite weapon, which also suggests an expanding role for Russian nuclear weapons. How well understood are the circumstances in which Russia might use nuclear weapons and the purposes that such use might serve? To what extent do changes in Russia’s nuclear strategy impact European and global security as well as the risks of escalation? And how should the United States, NATO, and other states respond to such changes?

See the agendas and watch videos from sessions in previous nuclear policy conferences.