2025 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference

Almost every commentator believes that the United States’ current missile defense policy goes either too far or not far enough. Critics argue that defending against even North Korean attacks is increasingly infeasible. Advocates believe the United States should try to defeat limited Chinese and Russian attacks against the homeland. What is the way forward? What kind of programs should the United States prioritize? How might China and Russia respond? What role does missile defense play in assuring allies? Should the United States be willing to put missile defense on the table in any future arms control negotiations?   

Rapid changes in the size of China’s nuclear arsenal, its development of new nuclear capabilities, and the persistent opacity about its goals have fueled speculation about Beijing’s motives. Is China abandoning its traditional posture of minimal deterrence and seeking to develop a nuclear arsenal that it can wield for aggressive purposes? Is it primarily interested in bolstering its status as a great power Or, does it simply seek to ensure the survivability of its nuclear forces? Finally, how—if at all—should the answer to these questions influence policy and military planning for the United States and its allies? 

During the Cold War, a shared interest in stymying proliferation motivated extensive cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Since its end, however, the great powers have become increasingly interested in bolstering alliances at the expense of nonproliferation. China supports Pakistan’s nuclear program. Russia is formalizing its partnership with the DPRK and shielding Iran’s nuclear program from international censure. And, as the U.S.-India deal and the AUKUS submarine initiative exemplify, the United States’ wants exceptions to the rules it originally championed. What are the implications of this fraying great power commitment for nonproliferation? Are there circumstances that might revive cooperation? Can the nonproliferation regime be upheld in the absence of great-power consensus and what role might non-nuclear weapons states play? 

All nuclear-armed states appear to have military doctrines that include at least some role for limited nuclear strikes. At one end of the spectrum, France envisions a “final warning”—a single limited nuclear strike—before launching a massive attack; at the other, both Russia and the United States appear to plan for a protracted nuclear exchange. In all cases, nuclear-armed states assess that the ability to conduct less than all-out nuclear attacks enhances their capacity to deter nuclear and non-nuclear aggression. But what would happen if deterrence failed and nuclear weapons were used in a limited way? What pressures would leaders face to further escalate toward all-out nuclear war? To what extent would the fear of such an outcome help prevent escalation?  Is there a version of nuclear planning for limited strikes—French-style, U.S./Russian-style, or something else—that better achieves the goal of deterrence?

Russia recently revised its nuclear doctrine by broadening the range of circumstances in which it might use nuclear weapons. According to U.S. officials, Russian is developing a space-based nuclear-armed anti-satellite weapon, which also suggests an expanding role for Russian nuclear weapons. How well understood are the circumstances in which Russia might use nuclear weapons and the purposes that such use might serve? To what extent do changes in Russia’s nuclear strategy impact European and global security as well as the risks of escalation? And how should the United States, NATO, and other states respond to such changes?

See the agendas and watch videos from sessions in previous nuclear policy conferences.