Source: Carnegie
Andrew Kuchins, Director of the Russian-Eurasian Program, answers questions
by Vek, a popular Russian weekly newspaper.
(Issue #14, April 06-13, 2001. Russian
version)
"Vek": The CEIP has just published a new analytic report
on US-Russian relations. This is the first serious publication by an influential
American
institution on prospects for US-Russia interaction under the Republican administration.
Russian readers would be especially interested with how your experts see future
developments with two major issues of Russo-American agenda, namely a second
stage of the NATO enlargement and American attitude vis-a-vis Russia's reaction
to missile defenses. Do you think the both nations would come to a serious conflicts
over the two matters?
Kuchins: First let me say that the Carnegie Endowment published An Agenda for Renewal: U.S.-Russian Relations initially in English in early December of last year when it was still unclear who would be the next U.S. president; our recommendations were prepared for either a Democratic or a Republican administration. On the missile defense issue, the report argued that as the missile proliferation threat today does not justify the United States unilaterally withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. The United States should consider a number of measures to address this problem, including research and development of appropriate technical systems, but also fully utilizing all diplomatic and political tools. The United States should take very seriously the Russian proposal to cooperate in addressing this threat. If the missile threat were to become more urgent and the United States and the Russian Federation were not able to reach agreement on modification of the ABM Treaty, then the United States would have ample cause to withdraw.
On NATO expansion, the report recommends that the expansion process continue, but that the alliance avoid expanding to the Baltic States before the year 2005 in order to provide NATO and the Russian Federation a period of time to have the possibility to build a firmer foundation of cooperation and understanding. This does not imply, however, that any state not a member of the alliance should have an implicit or explicit veto on alliance decisions about expansion of membership. In my personal view, with adequate wisdom and adroit diplomacy, the United States and the Russian Federation should be able to manage these issues.
"Vek": The USA omitted the word "national" from the what was earlier called NMD. Is it an American signal or invitation to negotiate a compromise? What kind of message it maybe if any?
Kuchins: I think that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's referring now to "missile defense" rather than "national missile defense" is designed primarily to reassure US allies that they will not be left out either of decision-making or coverage of whatever defenses are ultimately deployed. It is not clear to me whether this terminology is also designed to signal to the Russian Federation greater interest in cooperating on this issue. I hope that is the case since I can imagine that cooperation on missile proliferation and eventually missile defense systems can afford the United States and Russia a real opportunity to achieve deep security cooperation. I think the new terminology also indicates that the new administration is thinking about a multi-layered set of defenses, and this I could imagine Russian cooperation in development of aspects of boost-phase systems and theater systems.
"Vek": Russian experts are divided on the issue of the NATO enlargement. Some of them do not believe Russia possesses a tool to dissuade Americans change their plans for admitting new East European countries into NATO. Other insist Russia' reaction may be hard. How do you see chances for a compromise?
Kuchins: One can agree or disagree about the advisability of the policy of NATO expansion of membership, but I think that a Russian policy of strict opposition is not constructive. The louder Russia screams about the dangers of NATO expansion for Russia, this only confirms the views of supporters of NATO expansion. The Cold War is over, and the West is simply not a threat to Russia. It is inconceivable that NATO would ever attack Russia; such fears expressed during the war in Kosovo are paranoid fantasy. I do not think the issue is "compromise," rather I think that it is time for us once and for to abandon Cold War hangovers and identify issues of mutual interest for cooperation.
"Vek": Do you see any connections between the clash on the missile defenses and NATO enlargement ? Could it be a "package deal": Russia reconciles to missile defenses and NATO freezes its enlargement or ... any deal of this sort ?
Kuchins: I do not envision the possibility of any kind of "package deal," certainly not an explicit one. In fact, I do not think it is a good idea to link the issues. Each should be resolved according to its own logic. From the standpoint of the US political system and its key allied relationships, I am a little skeptical that the US and NATO will be able to push forward very aggressively on both issues simultaneously. It seems clear that missile defense is a higher priority than NATO expansion for the new administration, so I suspect that the US national security establishment will focus more effort on this in the near term. The NATO expansion process will continue since the NATO summit scheduled for next year will force some decisions, but my best guess at this point, and it remains a guess, is that the Bush administration will be more cautious on NATO expansion.
"Vek": Mister Ivanov, Secretary of National Security Council, met his American colleague earlier this month. In an interview after negotiations he said that Russian and America should work together to make their relations based on a formula of a "friendly opposition". This seems to imply Russia behaves as a sort of a parliamentary oppositions which tends to remain friendly to the ruling government but preserves its right to disagree and criticize. Could such a formula work without destroying bilateral relations?
Kuchins: The notion of "friendly opposition" is an interesting formulation. It implies that the United States broadly agree about the "rules of the game" or the parameters of their relationship, but they are both free to disagree on specific issues. Still, in disagreeing on any one issue, each side understands that their interests are well served by a broader framework of cooperation and understanding. In our report, we support the view that the United States and Russia are neither allies nor enemies, but that there is a deep reservoir of potential cooperation in the mutual interests of each side. While the US may disagree with Russian decisions to sell certain weapons systems and technologies to Iran and the Russians may disagree with a US, decision to deploy a missile defense system; these disagreements should not be allowed to spoil the overall relationship. It is clearly in the interests for each country that Moscow and Washington maintain a reasonably positive relationship at a minimum. Consequently, each government should be able to tolerate areas of disagreement in the relationship without immediately resorting to more of a Cold War framework. Given the vastly different geographical locations and domestic economic and political challenges of each country, it would be completely unrealistic to expect full and complete agreement on every issue of consequence. The US does not expect this even of its key allies in Europe and Asia, let alone important powers like China, India, and others.
