Source: Carnegie

Originally published in the December 2001 edition of Prospect


In the elaborate dance being conducted over European participation in the US war in Afghanistan the steps are as follows: the Europeans pretend that they want to send troops to Afghanistan; the Americans pretend that they want them there; and all participants have to pretend that the dance is taking place to the music of Nato.

Why? The Europeans have to show willingness to send troops to help America because they know that otherwise US domestic pressure to withdraw US troops from the Balkans will become overwhelming. The Europeans also know that their own populations will never accept either serious casualties among their own troops or the kind of Afghan civilian casualties which are only too likely, and which the US public regards with some equanimity.

The Americans have to pretend that they want these troops both because they need to preserve the fiction of a coalition against terrorism, and more importantly because they still regard Nato as an essential vehicle for US interests in Europe. If Nato were revealed to be completely irrelevant to the greatest security crisis of the era, some wicked dissidents might really begin to wonder why it is still around. But of course the Americans don't want European troops in Afghanistan. With few exceptions they regard the European armies as providers of adventure holidays for subsidised backpackers. The Americans want "allies" like the British, who do what they are told. They know that other Europeans would not behave in this way, and they do not want any interference in the conduct of the war.

As to Nato, it is almost completely worthless as far as the "war against terrorism" is concerned. This campaign and all future such campaigns will be "coalitions of the willing," completely dominated by the US, and with contributions made on a bilateral basis. Efforts in joint policing are being made, but this is not Nato's business. Intelligence sharing, meanwhile, has always been Nato's weakest point, because the Americans trust no one but the British with their intelligence.

Even before 11th September the Alliance was looking decidedly seedy. One of the explicit justifications for breaking international law and launching the Kosovo campaign was the need to defend the security of the western Balkans and in particular Macedonia. Very strong commitments were made to defend it. Yet when the crisis there finally erupted, the Europeans hesitated shamefully before deploying a very limited and temporary force, while the US refused to participate on the ground at all. After this, it was clear that grand ideas for Nato interventions "out of area" were a fantasy.

Nevertheless, in a half-dead state, Nato will probably be around for many years to come. One reason is the number of uniformed and civilian bureaucrats whose jobs depend on it. But more fundamental interests are also at work. The Europeans need the US in Europe so that they can go on spending a scandalously low proportion of their budgets on defence, and so that US firepower can act as the ultimate deterrent against potential troublemakers in the Balkans. The problem here is that US firepower may simply not be useful when it comes to deterring Albanian guerrilla forces; and secondly, if the US is pinned down in wars in Afghanistan or elsewhere, a threat of US military action in the Balkans may well be utterly unconvincing.

The US desire to preserve Nato is rooted in one rather foolish, and now fading calculation, and one more serious one which has not yet been fully recognised by either the US or Europe. The foolish reason was the one which in recent years led some Americans (including at first the Bush administration) to oppose the creation of an EU security identity-on the grounds that it would challenge US hegemony.

The much more serious motive is that the US needs airfields and supply dumps in Europe as staging posts for the support of Israel and for the conduct of actual and future campaigns in the Muslim world. In future, advances in aircraft and aerial refuelling technology may make such bases unnecessary-but this will not be the case for a good many years to come.

Without Nato as a frame, the US would have to seek agreements with individual European countries, which would then become vulnerable to domestic protest against US policies; or increase reliance on Turkey or Israel, risking greater deference to these countries' dangerous agendas; or face an expensive permanent deployment at Diego Garcia or elsewhere.

European discontent at being cast as "Airstrip One" does not really matter as long as it is confined to fringe radical groups, and as long as it is set in the context of an alliance in which the Europeans see an interest in US strategies they broadly share. But these conditions are not necessarily stable. It is likely that at some point in the future, thanks to developments in the Balkans or elsewhere, Nato will become visibly moribund; and it is possible that US-Israeli policies in the middle east may diverge so radically from European ones that they turn into an obvious clash of vital interests. (This possibility would be especially great in the context of a new oil shock or a terrorist campaign against Europe).

Even without such radical scenarios, it is inevitable that one effect of 11th September will be a long-term reduction of US interest in security issues around the fringes of Europe. This means that however unprepared and divided it may be, the EU will have no choice but to assume greater responsibility for aspects of continental security.

This new responsibility brings with it three urgent priorities. The first is the creation of usable European armed forces on the pattern of the British. Secondly, the EU needs to treat enlargement to the central European and Baltic states-and hence the stabilisation of these regions-as a vital European security interest.

Equally important, the EU needs to improve, stabilise and as far as possible institutionalise security relationships with Europe's two main non-EU military powers, Turkey and Russia. For if the US does pull back from the Balkans, then every nationalist radical in the region is going to be emboldened, and a great many of them will look to Russians or Turks for support. The ultimate European nightmare would be if these two countries lined up on opposite sides in wars in the Balkans or the Caucasus.

In the case of Turkey, it is impossible to accede to that country's desire for early admission to the EU. Economic realities rule this out. However, we can and should discard immediately the absurd Greek-inspired provocation of inviting southern Cyprus to join. With Russia, things are easier, given its greater degree of isolation and greater desire for reconciliation with the EU as a counterweight to Turkey.

When it comes to creating new security relationships with non-members or part-members of the west, the EU is in a stronger position than Nato. The latter was created as a defensive military alliance against the Soviet Union. Not only does that give it an enduring anti-Russian bias and ensure Russian suspicion of it but it means that Nato is a clear-cut alliance. You're in, or you're out. In security terms and, increasingly, in economic and social ones, this is not so with Europe-and the position of Britain is a good example of this. When it comes to economics, Europe is as a series of concentric circles. At the heart are members of the eurozone; then those EU countries like Britain which are not euro members, and a couple (Norway and Switzerland) which are not even in the EU. Then there comes the next ring, of central European and Baltic applicants. Hopefully, these will soon be EU members. Finally come a host of countries which are without question part of Europe-and even vital for European security-but which are not going to be EU members for the foreseeable future.

Britain is not part of the euro core, but has to be at the heart of any security identity. Meanwhile, some rich but small countries which are part of the eurozone must be left outside where serious European security issues are concerned. Such already existing asymmetries should allow in principle the creation of a European Security Council including Russia, Turkey and America and the development of structures which will stand a chance of replacing Nato as the latter rots away.

It may be true that 11th September has ushered in a struggle of civilisation against barbarism, but if so, in its Afghan manifestation and probably others too, this is not a struggle in which the Europeans can play a military role. Europe can play its part by finally taking responsibility for its own space. Il faut defendre notre jardin.