The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next 25 Year

Source: Carnegie

April 21, 2004

Click here for PDF

Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to you about U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. I respectfully request that my statement be entered into the record.

The peace, stability, and prosperity of East Asia and the overall advancement of America's security interests depend on the maintenance of stable, workable state-to-state relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. This is still true today even though the original strategic motivation for the normalization of U.S-China relations---the need to balance against the Soviet Union---no longer exists.

At present, and in my view for the foreseeable future, any workable U.S.-P.R.C. relationship depends on the maintenance of an understanding that was reached between Beijing and Washington at the time of normalization. This understanding exchanged a U.S. acknowledgement of the so-called One China position for a P.R.C. commitment to the search for a peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan issue as a first priority.

The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) codifies, in U.S. domestic law, two of the three central pillars of policy towards both the P.R.C. and Taiwan that derives from this understanding. First, it requires that the Taiwan situation be handled peacefully, and indicates that the U.S. Government will regard "with grave concern" any use of non-peaceful means to resolve Taiwan's status. Second, it requires the U.S. government to maintain (both directly and indirectly via assistance to Taiwan) a credible military capability to counter a Chinese attack, in order to deter Beijing from being tempted to employ force against a diplomatically weakened Taiwan.

These two elements form an essential part of the reason why America's policy toward Taiwan and the P.R.C. has been successful, to date, in preventing conflict, in sustaining a beneficial---if often troubled---Sino-American relationship; and in permitting Taiwan's society and polity to thrive.

However, the TRA is only part of the reason for this policy success. A U.S. commitment to a peaceful solution of the Taiwan problem---and to military deterrence in support of that goal---could not have succeeded in advancing U.S. interests without an equally strong assurance to the P.R.C. that the U.S. will not use its superior military power and its defensive-oriented assistance to Taiwan to encourage Taiwanese independence, or to shield movement by the island toward independence.

Without such a U.S. assurance, the P.R.C. leadership could not have tolerated what it views as the challenge to China's claim to sovereign authority over Taiwan that the TRA represents. They almost certainly would not have emphasized their desire to pursue a peaceful solution to the Taiwan situation as a top priority.

Therefore, the other important elements of U.S. policy---the agreement not to challenge the P.R.C.'s One China position as well as the expression of the P.R.C.'s priority emphasis on a peaceful resolution to the issue---are essential to the maintenance of stability in the Taiwan Strait. These elements were provided by the three Sino-American communiqués, not the TRA.

Some critics of U.S. policy argue that democratization in Taiwan, the subsequent rejection by the current Taiwan government of the original "One China" notion, and the P.R.C.'s military buildup along the Taiwan Strait require a fundamental change in U.S. policy. They argue that the One China approach should be jettisoned in favor of a policy that recognizes the "reality" of Taiwan's independence and that relies almost exclusively on military deterrence to prevent a rising P.R.C. from reacting forcibly to such a policy shift.

In support of this position, these critics would turn the TRA into a security guarantee to Taiwan (which it is not"), and would provide even greater levels of military assistance to Taipei. They would also negate, by word or deed, much of the three communiqués.

In my view, any effort by the United States to confront the P.R.C. with the so-called "reality" of an independent Taiwan would destroy the foundations of a stable Sino-U.S. relationship, throw Asia into turmoil (especially because no Asian state would support such a policy move), and very possibly result in a war with the Chinese. To those who disagree with this assessment, I would ask, can one be confident enough that the Chinese will not respond with force to make it worth the risk of provoking a confrontation with Beijing by unilaterally rejecting the One China policy---given the likely damage that will ensue if a conflict erupts? On the other hand, to those who accept the likelihood of a Chinese use of force in response to such a U.S. policy shift, I would ask, can one be sure enough that the resulting conflict would be quickly terminated, resolved, or contained in ways that preserve essential U.S. and Taiwanese interests? The danger of escalation in such a confrontation would be very real, once conflict begins.

Ultimately, the U.S. position toward Taiwan must balance two policy objectives:

" The need to preserve the credibility of America's word, in this case its commitment to a peaceful, non-coerced solution to a potentially volatile international problem, as well as America's support for a longstanding friend; and

" The need to maintain workable, if not amicable relations with a nuclear power whose long-term stance toward U.S. interests remains unclear, and whose cooperation is essential for the maintenance of many core U.S. interests, including the war on terrorism.

For the United States, both of the above objectives are critical, and, equally important, are not mutually exclusive, as long as the P.R.C. is not resolved to using force against Taiwan.

In fact, China remains committed to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan situation as a first priority. Chinese military deployments are intended primarily to deter the attainment by Taiwan of de jure independence, not to prepare for an inevitable war. But if deterrence fails, China's leaders will almost certainly fight, to ensure their respect among their colleagues and the Chinese populace, and to defend the legitimacy and stability of their government. Moreover, China's leaders would likely fight even they stood a good chance of losing in the initial rounds. For them, to not fight would mean a certain loss of power; to fight and lose would probably mean that they would survive politically to fight another day.

There is at present no realistic alternative to the One China policy, combined with the TRA, that can provide a more durable basis for stability, for conflict avoidance, and for gaining the time that is required for the two sides to moderate their stance and move toward dialogue and a stability-inducing modus vivendi

However, in order to maintain the credibility of the One China policy and overall stability in the Taiwan Strait, I believe that the United States must consider taking a more active role in influencing calculations in both Taipei and Beijing. Specifically, Washington should, in my view:

" Reaffirm unambiguously that a danger of conflict with the P.R.C. exists over the issue of Taiwan, i.e., the threat of a use of force and of inadvertent escalation is genuine; thus, provocations by either side are totally unacceptable.

" State clearly, either publicly or privately, that the United States does not agree with the position of Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's government that it is engaged in merely "consolidating" a long-term status quo of sovereign independence. This position is dangerously misleading to the Taiwan public. For the U.S. and virtually the entire international community, the sovereign status of Taiwan remains unresolved at best.

" Communicate clearly that U.S. support for Taiwan is not unconditional---it requires responsibility and restraint---and that efforts to alter the source of sovereignty of the government of Taiwan by unconstitutional means---something that Chen threatens to undertake via a referendum on a new constitution---are potentially dangerous and destabilizing.

" Pledge that, as long as Taiwan exercises restraint, Washington will undertake greater---albeit still limited---efforts to increase Taiwan's international profile.

With regard to the TRA, I believe that the United States government should consider redefining and delimiting more precisely the type of defense assistance that it will provide to Taiwan in the future. Washington should insist that Taiwan acquire greater capabilities to defend itself against specific military actions, especially the possibility of a rapid strike by Beijing designed to achieve success before the U.S. can lend assistance. Such a stance would convey to elites in both Taipei and Washington the fact that some types of military capabilities currently desired by Taipei (and by some in the Pentagon and Congress) are less critical for Taiwan, and that Taiwan must ultimately rely on the U.S. for its defense in key areas, especially its defense against a sustained amphibious and air attack.

Washington should also unambiguously reject the option of "offensive" strike capabilities for Taiwan. Such capabilities are currently under serious consideration by the Chen Shui-bian government. However, in my view, they would not increase Taiwan's security, and would undermine efforts at controlling escalation in a crisis.

Toward Beijing, The United States should assert that the best way for China to lower tensions with Taiwan would be for the People's Liberation Army to reduce its military deployments along the Taiwan Strait, as an indicator of good will, as a first step toward a cross-strait dialogue, and with the clear understanding that such actions would be reciprocated in some manner. To reach such an understanding, Washington should undertake direct discussions with Beijing on reducing the military buildup along the Taiwan Strait, in consultation with Taipei.

Finally, in my view, Washington should undertake more active efforts to advance political reform in China, in order to increase China's attractiveness to the Taiwan public and thereby encourage movement toward a cross-strait dialogue. Concrete initiatives to support the rule of law should be included in this undertaking.

Without a more active effort by the United States to balance deterrence with reassurance, and to counter unilateral efforts by either side to alter the status quo, the chances for an eventual conflict in the Taiwan Strait will in my view increase significantly over the next several years.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.