Source: Politico
With nuclear talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany scheduled to begin on October 1, Iran has come under increasing pressure to provide the IAEA with immediate and total access to its recently revealed covert uranium enrichment plant. Facing U.S.-led efforts for more stringent economic sanctions, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has denied Iran violated any IAEA rules by constructing the facility.
In a live online chat hosted by Politico.com, Karim Sadjadpour and Deepti Choubey discussed the impact of these latest revelations on the upcoming negotiations, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and domestic politics within the country.
Fred Barbash: Welcome POLITICO readers and welcome our guests from Carnegie...Deepti and Karim.
So first question for you Deepti and then we'll open it up to readers:
How does Friday’s disclosure about Iran’s covert uranium enrichment facility affect the strategy of the P5+1 countries going into Thursday’s nuclear talks with the regime?
Deepti Choubey: Hello to Fred and everyone who has joined us. Last week’s revelations properly put the spot light back on the Iranians to answer for their illegal nuclear activities. Despite claims by Iranian officials to the contrary, Iran has violated its February 2004 agreement with the IAEA. According to it, Iran is supposed to inform the IAEA of new facilities as soon as the decision is made to build them. The international debate is no longer about whether and how the US will engage Iran and should, instead, it should be about what the Iranians have been doing non-transparently. The United States and its partners have effectively re-opened the Iran nuclear file. For years, the Iranians have asserted that the “nuclear file” is closed and that there is no problem to be discussed.
The goal now is to get Iran to recognize that they have crossed some lines and that they have a major problem they need to negotiate their way out of. The second uranium enrichment facility and questions about whether there may be other secret facilities raises serious questions for states that until now have listened with an open mind to Iranian claims. The world is becoming increasingly unified in their concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities. This means that Iran’s strategy of dividing key powers against one another is on shaky ground. Iran should realize that seriously negotiating sooner rather than later is in its best interest. The goal is to get genuine negotiations to resolve the current problem and make appropriate accommodations on both sides. Iran has not engaged in genuine negotiations since 2004.
Question: In your perspective, to what extent are Iran's nuclear ambitions driven by its nuclear establishment, that is, by the bureaucratic self-interests of nuclear scientists, engineers, and managers associated with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran? In particular, what do you make of the recent replacement of the AEOI's director Gholam Reza Aghazadeh with Ali Akbar Salehi, and what role do you think Salehi will play in the upcoming nuclear talks?
Karim Sadjadpour: I think Iran's nuclear ship is being firmly steered by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, not Iran's scientists or bureacrats.
Question: How will Iran's actions impact the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan?
Deepti Choubey: The issues with Pakistan and India are different than those with Iran. First of all, it is important to remember that Iran has a legal obligation to not develop nuclear weapons as it is party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon state. India and Pakistan are not party to that treaty and do not have the same legal obligations.
You are right, though, to raise the impact of the proliferation threat posed by Iran. The amount of political energy and attention that has gone into addressing Iran, in some ways, detracts from the very serious dynamic between India and Pakistan.
Question: What do you see as the main strategic aims of the Iranian nuclear program? Should the U.S. embrace a policy of offensive realism, delivering a decapitating blow to the mullah regime, or a defensive one, returning back to the layer upon layer of missile defense theaters so that nothing can pass by? Can you talk about the strengths and weaknesses of each?
Karim Sadjadpour: Dear Igor, I think there are multiple explanations for Iran's nuclear ambitions, including a profound sense of insecurity. Ultimately I believe that this regime is odious but not suicidal, i.e. it is deterrable. Our underlying problem with Iran has more to do with the character of the regime than its nuclear ambitions. My concern is that if we attempt to "deliver a decapitating blow" to the regime we will further entrench it for years to come.
Question: When Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad denies that Iran broke the law regarding construction of the nuclear facility at Qom, what is the legal basis for his argument and does it hold water?
Deepti Choubey: Ahmadinejad is trying to argue that Iran is not bound by a modified Code 3.1 that Iran agreed to with the IAEA in February 2003. He is saying that Iran is bound to a previous Subsidiary Agreement where Iran would have to inform the IAEA of a new facility 180 days before fissile material is introduced to it. He is also asserting that the Majlis never ratified the modified Code 3.1. These arguments are false. The modified Code 3.1 does not require ratification. Instead, they are done through an exchange of letters. Iran tried to unilaterally break the agreement in 2007 and the IAEA said they could not do that.
The IAEA stated that both parties need to agree to terminate the agreement. A key issue for the upcoming inspection is whether the secret facility was constructed before Iran tried to terminate the modified 3.1 agreement. That would make it even more clear that Iran has violated its Subsidiary Agreement with the IAEA.
Question: What has been the political impact on both the regime's standing in Iran broadly, and Ahmadinejad's in particular, from last week's revelation about Iran's nuclear facility?
Karim Sadjadpour: Dear Greg, I think after the elections fiasco many people in Iran have lost all trust in their government, and in Ahmadinejad in particular. Many people I've spoken to in Tehran say that if they so brazenly rigged the election, they cannot be trusted in other realms either.
Question: What is your view on whether the international community can ultimately get Iran to stop its enrichment activities. Some experts argued (prior to the revelation of the Qom site) that Iran should be allowed to have a mutinational enrichment facility on its soil. Do you agree and what are the implications for preventing potential future spread of mutinational enrichment facilities in other countries (GCC states for example) or regions.
Deepti Choubey: This is a great question and raises how complicated the challenge with Iran is. The initial goal is to get Iran to temporarily suspend enrichment as a confidence building measure as negotiations take place. The international community is aware, through experience, of Iran's negotiating strategy of playing for time. There will likely be a zero tolerance approach to such tactics when this Thursday's talks begin.
With last week's revelations and greater awareness of Iran's divide and conquer approach to the international community, support that Iran has been relying on from countries such as those from the non-aligned movement is crumbling. As a result, Thursday may be the best chance the US and its partners have had in a long time to drive to the result of a temporary suspension. Multilateral facilities may be a good idea in theory, but we need to think hard about what they look like in practice. This all goes to show how high the stakes are for Thursday and how hard it will be to get even modest outcomes.
Fred Barbash: Last question...I'm so sorry we're out of time because this is really important and there are questions backed up. Possibly we can have you both back soon. Yes?
In any case…last question for both of you. Karim first, Deepti second. It's what everyone wants to know.
Question: Do you think world sanctions will make a difference in Iran's enrichment activities?
Karim Sadjadpour: Sayeh jaan: Sanctions will certainly inflict damage on the Iranian economy, the problem, however, is that this regime has never held the economic welfare of the Iranian people as an important priority, i.e. they've in the past been willing to endure severe economic hardship rather than compromise on their political and ideological aims. Indeed, they prolonged their 1980s war with Iraq for several years in order to consolidate power domestically. So in short, I think that sanctions will not compel Tehran to suspend enrichment, but they could have a role--if pursued smartly--in helping to facilitate political reform in Iran.
Deepti Choubey: No one thinks that sanctions are going to make the Iranians stop enriching. But sanctions might make them decide to negotiate over the conditions under which they would continue enriching. The point is the need for genuine negotiations, which Iran has not engaged in since 2004. Fred, thanks for covering such an important issue at this time. Happy to come back and thanks to everyone for the great questions.
Fred Barbash: Thanks to all our readers, with apologies to all the questions we did not get to. Like I said, I hope to have our guests return soon.